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THE REBIRTH OF THE FINE ARTS AND FRANCISCAN THOUGHT

П

GIOTTO DI BONDONE

N a colorful historical scene, and within surroundings where Franciscanism played a significant rôle, at the turn of the thirteenth and during the first decades of the fourteenth century, we see Giotto at work.

He was a painter, a sculptor and an architect. He won praise and high respect in all these fields. Yet painting was the center of his artistic activities.

According to Vasari, Giotto was born in 1276. Pucci² informs us that he died in 1336, at the age of seventy, thus indicating his birth in 1266. The reference to his age might well be only approximate. In the face of these contradictory statements Giotto's date of birth remains an unsolved problem.

There is an amazing discrepancy between the darkness and cruelty of the epoch in which Giotto lived and the purity and peacefulness emanating from his pictures. During Giotto's lifetime, the last of the great medieval Popes, Boniface VIII, was impetuously steering St. Peter's ship through the turbulent seas; the Papal Court was transferred from Rome to Avignon; Philip Le Bel of France pursued his power politics ruthlessly; the Hapsburgs entered history, and the emperors Henry of Luxembourg and Louis of Bavaria took up anew the policy of intervention in Italian affairs as practiced by their Swabian predecessors. It was in the last year of Giotto's life that Edward III of England succeeded in winning the assistance of Louis of Bavaria and the Flanders cities against France and initiated the bloody and ruinous period of the Hundred Years' war. In Italy there were continuous conflicts. Venice fought Genoa, Boniface fought the Colonna, Florence struggled against

^{1.} Giorgio Vasari, Le vite de' più eccelenti architetti, pittori e scultori Italiani. Con nuove annotazioni e commenti di Gaetano Milanesi, Firenze, 1878-1880, vol. I., Giotto di Bondone.

2. Antonio Pucci, "Centiloquio," in Delizie degli eruditi Toscani, Firenze, 1772.

Arezzo, Prato, Pistoia, Pisa, and Siena. Great captains like Uggocione di Faggiuola, Castruccio Castracani and the first Visconti battled in the field. The city of Florence was torn by civil wars between democrats and nobility, Guelphs and Ghibellines, Black and White Guelphs, Black Guelphs of the party of Corso Donati and Black Guelphs of the party of Rosso della Tosa. The democrats, under the leadership of Giano della Bella, proclaimed the right to liberty based upon self-determination as demanded by the laws of nature and forbade the sale of bondsmen. Among the enemies of freedom and democracy, the sinister figure of Corso Donati, the "worst of the culprits," fascinates the imagination. Almost every page of Dino Compagni's contemporary chronicle is stained with violence, bloodshed and murder. It closes with this exclamation: "Thus our city is endangered! Thus, our citizens persevere in their misdeeds!... In this city, and by these citizens, nothing praiseworthy is done which would not be distorted and reviled. Men kill one another; crime is not punished according to law; he who has friends or can pay flaunts freely in spite of his crime.

"Oh you godless citizens who have bribed all the world and demoralized it by your wickedness and unjust profit! It is you who have introduced in the world all that evil. Yet, the world is about again to be down upon you: The emperor with his mighty hand will lay hold of you and will bereave you by sea and by land."

Over and over again, we meet the same bitterness in Dante's Divina Commedia:

> Florence From day to day of good is more depleted And into dismal ruin seems ordained⁴

or:

Rejoice, oh Florence! Since thou art so great, That over sea and land thou beatest thy wings, And throughout hell thy name is spread abroad !5

Spirits of less high morality than Dante veer from extreme to extreme, from exalted piety to godlessness, from wild joys to

Dante, Divina Commedia, Purg. 24, 82.
 Dante, Divina Commedia, Purg. 24, 79, translated by Longfellow.
 Dante, Divina Commedia, Inf. 26, 1, translated by Longfellow.

despair, cynicism and destructiveness. The well-known poem of Cecco Angolieri, the "poeta maledetto" of Siena: S'fosse foco, arderei 'l mondo,⁶ is at least tinged with a kind of humor. Such humor is lacking, however, in Cino Sighiboldi's poem: "Tutto ch'altrui aggrada a me disgrada." These verses show a depth of despair and hate seldom paralleled in the history of literature.

The Italian figurative art of the period gives no reflection of these troubled times. It is almost exclusively religious, though worldly allegories such as the presentations of good and bad government begin to appear as artistic themes, and in the late years of Giotto's life, other secular topics come up. In his fresco of 1328, Simone Martini even painted one of the mighty on earth, Guidoriccio Ricci dei Fogliani da Reggio, the adversary of

6. Translation by Dante Gabriel Rossetti:

If I were fire, I'd burn the world away;
If I were wind, I'd turn my storms thereon;
If I were water, I'd soon let it drown;
If I were God, I'd sink it from the day;
If I were Pope, I'd never feel quite gay
Until there was no peace beneath the sun;
If I were Emperor, what would I have done?
I'd lop men's heads all round in my own way.

If I were death, I'd look my father up;
If I were life, I'd run away from him
And treat my mother to like calls and runs.
If I were Cecco (and that's all my hope)
I'd pick the nicest girls to suit my whim,
And other folks should get the ugly ones.

7. Cino Sighiboldi or Cino da Pistoia, poet and friend of Dante, who later became a famous jurist. The quoted poem is included in Vita e Poesie di Messer Cino da Pistoia, Pisa, 1813, Parte Quarta, Ch. III, p. 11.

What others fills with joy, fills me with gloom; I loathe in what the world puts its delight. "And what do you like?" I'll answer this alright: If furious swords spread ruin around and doom;

If raging seas become the sailor's tomb, And if another Nero showed his might, If all turns dust what's beautiful and bright, And if for peace on earth there is no room.

What I can't stand is cheerfulness and glee. Melancholy alone rules heart and breath, As mate a maniac is just right to me.

To see tears shed is sweet for me like mead, And, dying once myself, I long to see All those I killed in thought in pangs of death. Castruccio Castracani, riding his battle horse over the field. Yet nowhere are the horrors of the epoch depicted and nowhere is the cry of desperation heard. A noble reserve is significant in all paintings by Giotto himself. Purity and nobility characterize the atmosphere of the rooms decorated by him. He never exaggerates, even when he depicts the antagonists and enemies of his heroes, the Savior, the Virgin, and the Saints to whom his paintings were devoted. It is not coldness or lack of temper which makes him do this; he knows very well how to show the utmost intensity of strong feelings like love, piety, or affectionate mournfulness. The immediate cultural atmosphere surrounding him, an atmosphere which had developed under the dominant influence of Franciscanism, saved him from the cruel and the ignoble.

Besides the heroes of wars and politics, the heroes of economics have secured their place in the history of Giotto's Florence, where a capitalistic age had arisen in the course of the thirteenth century, long before the rise of capitalism in the North. This premature Florentine capitalism showed very modern features. Great commercial firms, manufacturers and bankers controlled international commerce and international finance. As a rule these firms were organized as corporations, formed of family members and outsiders, up to thirty and more in number. Many of them enjoyed a world-wide reputation. The war conjuncture was exploited by the Bardi, Gherardini, Gianfiliazzi and others, who were selling arms to Italian and foreign powers. Among others, the Guidalotti and Neri were leaders in textiles. When the former were expelled after the battle of Montaperti, their factories were destroyed. We possess a list of them: they consisted of no less than twenty-eight separate buildings. Among them were two palaces, one serving as a store house; three buildings were devoted to the dying of cloth; three others, each with a separate garden, to the stretching and drying of it, and so on. The number of workers in such factories must have been quite considerable. Many of these manufacturing or commercial firms also carried a banking business while others specialized in banking alone. Among these bankers we find many famous names such as the Cherchi, Bardi, Peruzzi, Frescobaldi, Accajuoli, Cavalcanti, or Francesi. They played a special rôle of a highly political character as moneylenders, not only to private





The Meeting at the Golden Gate

people and firms, but also to governments, kings and the Popes. England, for instance, was highly indebted to the Bardi.

The legislation of the period was very much concerned with the control of economy and shows efforts to curb its exaggerations. Laws against dishonest dealing, usury, restraint of trade, monopolizing tendencies especially of the guilds, or measures aiming at price control by ceiling prices were numerous.

The early Florentine capitalists were no Puritans. They wanted culture, luxury and beauty around them. Besides that, they knew very well that their businesses included operations of a doubtful nature such as the taking of usurious interests and other unjust profits. They often tried to compensate for their sins by pious donations and bequests, or by the erection and decoration of churches and chapels. The Italian passion for fame and lasting glory made the latter way very attractive. Art and the artists profited from this state of things and among Giotto's employers we find the Bardi, Peruzzi, Tosinghi, Spinelli and Giugni of Florence and the Scrovegni of Padua. Nevertheless, we find many of these heroes of economics together with their colleagues in political and military fields appearing in Dante's Inferno: among them Reginaldo Scrovegni, the father of Enrico Scrovegni, who became the Maecenas of Giovanni Pisano and Giotto, and the builder of one of the most magnificent chapels in Christendom, Sta. Maria della Arena in Padua.

Within the ranks of the Franciscans there was also much confusion and discord. On one hand, they became a rich order and built magnificent monasteries and churches. They were heavily engaged in the flourishing manufacturing of cloth. Many ecclesiastical dignitaries from their own ranks and such as were in close relation to the Franciscan Order, as the earliest known employer of Giotto, Cardinal Jacopo Stephaneschi of San Giorgio Velabro in Rome, who became later Cardinal-Protector of the

^{8.} The bankers, merchants and manufacturers of wool, silk, furs, and their products, were organized together with the notaries, lawyers and physicians in the arti maggiori, the seven higher guilds, whereas the artisans and smaller merchants were originally included in the arti minori, the five lower guilds, the number of which rose in the course of the thirteenth century to fourteen. These lower guilds sometimes developed features strongly resembling certain traits of our labor unions. The Bolognese jurist Oldofredi, who lived in the second half of the thirteenth century, reports a resolution of the mason's guild setting forth that no mason should accept work with a builder who was in conflict with the guild.

Franciscans, were pompous prelates. On the other hand, the adherents of the strictest interpretation of the poverty rule did not forsake their old struggle. It flared up anew in Giotto's time with the utmost intensity. Whereas the Relaxati spent enormous sums for their churches and cloisters, Ubertino da Casale, in his *Arbor Vitae Crucifixae*, written in 1305, accused them of bereaving the poor by turning bread into the stones of their structures: "Pious lie says that this conduces to the honor of God, in truth it is a sneer for the poor Christ." In his *De Planctu Ecclesiae* of 1332, Alvise Pelagii declared that the majority of the monasteries was built from unjust mammon and therefore more consecrated to the devil than to God.

In his bull, Exiit qui seminat, Pope Nicholas III had, on the whole, accepted the opinion of the Conventuals, who formed the majority within the Order. Nevertheless, the strong opposition of the Spirituals did not cease. Angelo da Clareno founded a congregation of friars demanding the strict interpretation of the poverty rule; this congregation was headed first by Pietro or Liberatus da Macerata and, after 1307, by Angelo himself. In 1309, the differences between the Relaxati and the Spirituali again reached a critical point. At the final session of the Council of Vienne, in 1312, the constitution Exivi de Paradiso, containing an interpretation of the rule of St. Francis along stricter lines than those of the bull of Nicholas III was drawn up. Notwithstanding, peace was not restored. Towards the end of the year 1312 a number of Tuscan Spirituals deserted their own monasteries and took forcible possession of others in Tuscany. Only a few years later, similar uprisings occurred in Southern France. Angelo da Clareno was excommunicated at Avignon in 1317. In the next year, he fled to Italy and founded an independent order, the Fratres de paupere vita; the people called their members Fraticelli. The Tuscan spirituals who had uprisen in 1312 fled later to Sicily, where, under the leadership of Frate Enrico da Ceva, they openly defied the authority of Pope John XXII.

It is understandable that the heads of the Conventuals were very angry with their rebellious brothers. It is easily imaginable

^{9.} Lib. I, c. 11, f. 31. 10. Lib. II, c. 26, f. 207.

that many sharp words were hurled against them, against their interpretation of the poverty rule and against poverty itself as it was understood by them. In the light of these circumstances the well-known canzone against poverty, ascribed to Giotto, becomes understandable. Some scholars have tried to interpret it as an utterance against the Franciscans, in whose employ Giotto created so many works, and to depict Giotto as a child of the world and an enemy of the clerics. Yet, if Giotto had not been deeply involved in Franciscan matters, he would hardly have interfered in such a way with Franciscan problems. Even Dante does not go deeper into this matter.11 If it were Giotto who wrote this poem, it would only prove that he felt involved in Franciscan affairs and expressed in it feelings which must have been familiar to many of the Conventuals to whom his friends and employers belonged. The painter who, in a very conspicuous place of the Arena Chapel, depicted the Pact of Judas and, immediately preceding it, the Chasing from the Temple, with the same priests acting in both pictures, and who, in the Crucifixion, allowed the adversaries of the Lord to be dominated by the group of soldiers concerned with Christ's clothes (in contrast to all older iconography), was certainly not a devotee of mammon. Like Dante, he probably bewailed the "cursed flower" of Florence; but he preferred to be free of all domination by money-thought, not only in the form of being possessed with a "having" spirit, but in the form of being possessed of any peculiar spirit of "not-having" as well.

The fact that Giotto worked for Franciscan churches, that his first known protector, Cardinal Gaetani-Stephaneschi, held a close relation to the Franciscan order, and that Giotto painted Franciscan themes, shows at least that he was in strong contact with Franciscanism and, at least to some degree, familiar with Franciscan thought. Yet this connection with Franciscanism had deeper roots; for the humanization of the old biblical stories and the intenseness with which they were reexperienced again and again, the holy fervor of feeling in their reproduction in art, in poetry as well as in sculpture and painting, grew from the soil prepared by St. Francis and his followers. The Franciscan view of the world and the Franciscan attitude towards it, born out of love,

^{11.} Dante, Divina Commedia, Par. 12, 124.

were cultural factors of eminent power, and they were responsible for the cultured spirit emanating from Giotto's pictures. Their lovely and mellow colors, the extreme moderation and reserve with which scenes of violence are rather hinted at than really described, the sweetness and tenderness of the expressions in face and motion, all these features characteristic of the art of Giotto are emanations of the seraphic spirit of Assisi and the culture inaugurated by it.

It is much more difficult to try to derive Giotto's themes directly from the known Franciscan literature. Hettner¹² and Thode¹³ and their followers tried to show the influence of the Meditations especially on Giotto's iconography. They succeeded in demonstrating quite a number of parallels. Since, according to the research of P. Oliger,14 the Meditations must have been written in the last years of the twelfth or in the first years of the thirteenth century, Giotto may well have known them; if not, he might have known their content even before they were published, since he might well have known their author, Fra Johannes da Caulibus; San Gimignano is very near to Florence and Giotto was obviously familiar in Franciscan circles. Yet we know that motives which appeared in the known literature for the first time in the Meditations, can sometimes be traced in art to an earlier date. Hettner and Thode stress, for instance, the fact that the attitude of Giotto's Holy King who kisses the feet of the Child, are not described in literature before the Meditations. In art, we find it already in the Siena pulpit of Nicolo Pisano, which is certainly older than the Meditations. Mrs. Gy-Wilde¹⁵ demonstrates that the picture of the Stigmatization over the entrance to the Bardi Chapel of Sta. Croce stems from the "Considerazioni" which appeared as an appendix to the Italian version of the Fioretti. She points out that this Italian version originated in the second half of the fourteenth century, but that the Latin source, the Actus beati Francisci et

^{12.} Hermann Hettner, "Die Franziskaner in der Kunstgeschichte," Nord und Sued, vol. XIX, Breslau, 1881.
13. Henry Thode, Franz von Assisi und die Anfaenge der Kunst der Renaissance in Italien, Berlin, 1885.
14. P. Livorio Oliger, 'Le meditationes vitae Christi del Pseudo-Bonaventura," Studi Francescani, anno VII, 4 and VIII, 1, Arezzo, 1922.
15. Julie Gy-Wilde, "Giotto Studien," Wiener Jahrbuch fuer Kunstgeschichte, vol. VII, 1930.

sociorum ejus, had been written (according to the research of Sabatier and P. Benvenuto Bughetti) in the second half of the thirteenth century, yet not including the "Considerazioni." Mrs. Wilde assumes that, nevertheless, some source of the "Considerazioni" must have existed and been known to Giotto. This is doubtlessly possible. On the other hand, could it not be that in those times which did not yet know the art of printing, when reading was much less common than it is today (although not in Florence itself, where reportedly everyone was able to read and to write), when, however, people were much more picture-conscious, as the general interest of the common man in works of art shows, that ingenious artists were responsible for iconographic novelties and changes? Be this as it may, in certain complex cases of literary character the dependence of artists on literary sources can be taken for granted. When, on the arch leading into the choir of the Arena Chapel, Giotto describes the happenings before the Annunciation to the Virgin, showing the intercession of the angels on behalf of humanity suffering under the burden of sin, and the contest of the Virtues before the throne of God, Mrs. Wilde is most probably right in seeing here the direct influence of the Meditations

The first half of the fourteenth century witnessed the first decisive victory of the nominalistic trend in European thought. Stressing the logical character of the universal, William of Ockham, the contemporary of Giotto, points to the perception of the singular objects and experience as the primary sources of knowledge; thus, he opened the way for inductive science and became one of the forefathers of modern thought and philosophy. Like his predecessors also, Ockham and his followers met with the strong resistance of the realists; yet the fact that, in 1339, the Paris University felt itself compelled to forbid lectures based on Ockham's writings, and the solemn but futile rejection of Nominalism in 1340 demonstrate that nominalistic thinking must have been already widespread and deeply rooted. We learn that in the following period also many Dominican and Augustinian friars joined those Franciscans who taught nominalistic doctrines.

The same trend of thought which was, in philosophy, accepted and promoted first by Franciscan thinkers, led also to the objectivism

and the substantial qualities of Giotto's art; in this field, Giotto occupies a similar place to that of Ockham in philosophy. Also in this sense, Giotto became the forefather of modern art; when old writers praised his "naturalism," they referred to this modern kind of thought radiating from Giotto's compositions.

Ockham was a younger contemporary of Giotto, and Giotto created his first splendid works before Ockham published his philosophic views. A very interesting phenomenon which in later times can often be observed in the history of Western Europe appears here, perhaps, for the first time: that art is often ahead of philosophy in revealing the existence and the progress of the undercurrents of thought in an era.

II.

According to a note in Riccobaldo da Ferrara's Compilatio chronologica, most probably referring to the year 1305,18 Giotto had worked in Assisi, Rimini, and Padua. We can fairly assume that he had been working also in Rome.17 The "Ottimo" commentary¹⁸ on Dante, which was also published within Giotto's lifetime, mentions works of his in Rome, Florence, Naples, Padua, Vignone (or Vinegia) 19 and "other parts of the world." Later authors speak of works from his hand in different Italian cities, such as Rome, Naples, Florence, Ravenna, Rimini, and Bologna. It is reported that he was called also to Avignon and Milan.

Many of his works have perished, and opinions differ about the authenticity of most of the remaining works connected with his name except his paintings in the Arena Chapel in Padua, the Uffici Madonna, and the frescoes of Sta. Croce in Florence. An-

19. Different texts exist mentioning on the one hand Vinegia and on the other Vignone. The latter means Avignon, while Vinegia is Venice.

^{16.} Riccobaldi Ferrariensis Compilatio chronologica usque ad annum MDCCCXII

producta. In Muratori, Scriptores rerum Italicarum, Milano, 1726, p. 255.

The note concerning Giotto would fit into 1305; some scholars, however, think of a later interpolation. See Rintelen, Giotto und die Giotto Apokryphen, Basel, 1923, p. 152 ff.

^{17.} It is generally assumed that Giotto lived at the turn of the century in Rome where he executed at about this time the mosaic of the Navicella.

18. L'Ottimo Commento della Divina Commedia, ed. A. Torri, Pisa, 1827-9. This commentary originated about 1334.

other uncontroversial work by Giotto, the Navicella at St. Peter's in Rome, was so often and so thoroughly restored,20 that almost nothing of Giotto has survived. The fresco series in Assisi and some other less important works bearing his name are the subjects of the hottest disputes among scholars as to their supposed authors and the date of their creation. Rintelen²¹ and Beda Kleinschmidt²² may be named as representatives of the divergent opinions; while the former strictly confines the work of Giotto to the paintings named in this paragraph as being uncontested, the latter tries to save for Giotto most of the fresco series of Assisi

We may understand both and accept their opinions if we differentiate between Giotto, the individual, and Giotto, the head of a large workshop executing orders presumably under his own or one of his chief assistant's supervision. We know from Cennini that one of his helpmates, Taddeo Gaddi, had worked as a member of this workshop for twenty-four years. Sacchetti, in his Novelle, speaks of Giotto's "brigade." Reported dates from Giotto's life indicate that he had worked, in the same years, at such different places as Florence, Naples and Bologna.²³ Thus, it must be assumed that his workshop had simultaneously large orders at hand at different places, and that large portions of such paintings had to be executed by assistants and helpers. Even in the fresco cycles unanimously accepted as works of Giotto we find traces of other hands, not only in minor details but also in the somewhat weaker

^{20.} Reported restorations took place in 1514, 1610, between 1610 and 1617, 1628-1630, 1648, and 1673-1675.

Baglione (Vite, 1773, p. 235) and Mancini (Viaggio, ed. Ludwig Schudt, Roem. Forschungen der Bibl. Hertziana, IV, 1923, 53) report about the restorations of 1610, executed by Provinciale and Cento, whereby the mosaic was removed, divided in three parts, and transferred to the South wall of the Vatican palace for a short stay. It was removed to its present place in 1675, after its last thorough restoration and "barockisation" by Oratio Manenti.

See: Antonio Munoz, "I restauri della Navicella di Giotto," Bolletino d'arte II, ser. IV, 1924-5, p. 433 ff. and Werner Koerte, "Die Navicella des Giotto," Festschrift Wilhelm Pinder, Leipzig, 1938.

21. Rintelen Giotto und die Giotto Abobeythen Rosel 1023

^{21.} Rintelen, Giotto und die Giotto Apokryphen, Basel, 1923.

^{22.} Beda Kleinschmidt, O.F.M., Die Basilika San Francesco in Assisi, Berlin, 1915.

^{23.} Rintelen in Thieme-Becker, Allgemeines Lexikon der bildenden Kuenstler von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1921. The dates mentioned by Rintelen stem partly from mere reports and only partly from documents. Giotto may have easily visited the three cities named in one year and may have worked there. Nevertheless, Rintelen's assumption that the coincidence of the dates may prove that Giotto had a large bottega, is very probable in the light of all the other circumstances known about him and other artists of his period.

execution of entire compositions.24 It is difficult to reconcile some of the most famous among the controversial works, such as the St. Francis cycle in Assisi, with the authentic paintings. Yet, all reports from contemporary as well as reliable later sources establish for Giotto's activity in Assisi a fair preponderance of evidence. Unfortunately none of these sources name specific pictures; it is not even clear whether Giotto's paintings there were frescoes, and if so, whether they have survived. Some of the St. Francis frescoes, such as the scene of St. Francis breaking with his father, bear in their invention and composition strong evidence of Giotto's, at least, indirect authorship. Apparently, however, they are not painted by himself.

Apart from the hands of assistants, the hands of the frequent restorers are discernible. Hardly any of Giotto's paintings escaped damage and restoration. Where the plasticity and the terse modeling of Giotto is not noticeable, where the expression does not reach Giotto's intensity, assistants and restorers must be held responsible for the execution. Sharp colors such as the strong blue injuring the harmony of the Arena Chapel reveal the activities of restorers. Their hands are further visible in the frequent heavy and black contours.25 Giotto's technique of fresco painting was described by Cennini: the design was put on the prepared wall in such a manner that it shone through the wet second cover upon which the painting was laid on; therefore, no new contours were drawn. We discover restorations most easily where the composition is mutilated by overpainting of essential parts of the composition26 or where old paint is still shining through the cover of the new.27 Here we can

Chapel as partial restorations.

^{24.} As examples the two last frescoes in the Arena series, the Ascension of Christ and the Pentecost may be mentioned. Both frescoes reveal a somewhat softer style than Giotto's; their execution shows the hand of one of Giotto's assistants whom we find later working in the Magdalene Chapel of Assisi.

25. All the paintings in the St. Francis series in Sta. Croce, Florence, show these ungliottesque outlines. They are to be found also frequently in the Arena Chapel of Assisi.

^{26.} This is the case, for instance, in Joachim in the temple. Weigelt (Giotto, des Meisters Gemaelde, Berlin-Leipzig, 1925) asserts that, at the right, two overpainted figures are ascertainable in their outlines and modeling under the cover of the overpainting. Another conspicuous case of this kind is the Annunciation of the Birth of St. John the Baptist in the Peruzzi Chapel: here, some figures at the right are missing. Mrs. Gy-Wilde points to a free repetition by Starnina in the Castellani Chapel of Sta. Croce (Photo Brogi 19267), after which Giotto's composition can be reconstructed.

^{27.} Many examples can be found in the Arena Chapel as well as in the Florentine chapels. In the Mourning, for instance, a part of the sitting figure at the

also detect how much restorers misunderstood Giotto's style, and how much damage was done to the general impression when simplicity was turned into primitivity or deep sentiment into sentimentality.28

The dating of Giotto's work is another controversial issue. We have no indication of the time in which Giotto's works were created with the sole exception of the Arena frescoes which can be dated at least approximately. But even here chronological problems cannot be avoided. There is an obvious difference between the upper row of these frescoes relating the story of St. Joachim, St. Anne, and the Virgin, and the lower rows representing the life of the Savior. Although both series of frescoes are certainly Giotto's, their stylistic differences suggest that they were not executed simultaneously. Romdahl20 was the first to detect this. He concluded from the more monumental conception of the upper row and other advanced features visible in it that this row originated later than the other paintings of the chapel. Baumgart³⁰ arrives at the same conclusion adding some more plausible reasons for his assumption. He stresses the point that the dominating position of the heavenly scene over the arch leading into the choir is impaired by the particular situation of the upper frescoes reaching into the ceiling. He assumes that it was added to the decoration soon after the completion of the story of the Savior, whereas Romdahl thinks that it was painted much later, after an assumed trip of Giotto to France where he became acquainted with French cathedral sculpture and its monumental style. Against them, Jantzen³¹ tries to prove that the frescoes were painted in their historical sequence;

utmost left shines through the innermost band of the frame; in St. John on Patmos, the overpainted foot of the Saint is clearly visible through the covering restoration, and so on.

^{28.} Mrs. Gy-Wilde who examined thoroughly the frescoes at Sta. Croce describes how Bianchi, the restorer of the Bardi Chapel, aimed only at general primitivity; Marini, the restorer of the Peruzzi Chapel, had made his preliminary studies on Giotto before the rather doubtful paintings in Assisi; at his hands Giotto's energetic drawing and modeling becomes soft and his expression often sentimental. Compare the violinist in the Feast of King Herod with the similar figure in the less restored so-called Bridal Procession of the Arena Chapel.

^{29.} Axcl Romdahl, "Stil und Chronologie der Arenafresken Giottos," Jahrbuch der Preussischen Kunstsammlungen, Band 32, Berlin, 1911.
30. Fritz Baumgart, "Die Fresken Giottos in der Arenakapelle zu Padua," Zeitschrift fuer Kunstgeschichte, VI, 1 ff., 1937.
31. Hans Jantzen, "Die zeitliche Abfolge der Paduaner Fresken Giottos," Jahrbuch der Preussischen Kunstsammlungen, Bd. 60, Berlin, 1939.

he compares the "paratactical" order of the upper frescoes with the "hypotactical" order in the middle and the even more forcefully centered compositions in the lowest row. Further he believes that the compositional principles of the upper frescoes bear resemblance to the earlier works of the artist such as the Navicella, whereas the principles applied in the lower rows lead to Giotto's late works. Although his reasoning is logical and impressive, from other characteristics of Giotto's style we can deduce exactly the opposite conclusions. For instance, in the upper row the space values are greater and the disposition in space clear and definite; in the lower rows the figures are sometimes heaped together. Giotto's monumental style as known in his late works is more tangible in the upper than in the lower rows. Another point which speaks for the correctness of the latter point of view can be added. The artists of the late Middle Ages, as contemporaries of the great Scholastics, were not satisfied with giving a merely historical record in their cyclical compositions. Each single representation was conceived as part of an entity expressing a leading idea. The decoration of the Arena Chapel, which was devoted to the Madonna Annunciata, follows a similar principle. The leading idea expressed in it is Salvation. Thus, the logical beginning of the whole series of paintings, depicted on the wall which was first seen whe the church was entered, was the story of the intercession of the angels on behalf of suffering mankind and its result: God's message to the Virgin. From here, the cycle starts, following the of the Savior, to the Last Judgment. The story of the Virgin ! the Annunciation is a later added introduction separated 1. additional frame

Again there is discord among scholars in dating the much later paintings of Giotto in the Bardi and Peruzzi Chapels at Sta. Croce in Florence. While the Bardi frescoes seem more advanced, in the sense of the general trend of the contemporaneous art, towards elegance, gracefulness, and classical order, the paintings of the Peruzzi Chapel breathe the spirit of monumentality and power. Here, Giotto seems before his age and almost a companion of Masaccio and Michelangelo.

The greatest among the Giotto problems, however, are the

apparent absolute novelty of his art and the evaluation of his singular artistic personality.

To the artists who wrote about him, Giotto was the great innovator and the creator of modern art. Cennini states that Giotto changed art from the Greek to the Latin, thus laying the foundations of modern³² art. Ghiberti praises Giotto as the inaugurator of the resurrection of art after the long darkness of the preceding centuries; according to him, Giotto brought art back to new life and brought it into esteem again by his natural and graceful representations; he revived the ancient knowledge on art which had remained buried for about six hundred years. Lionardo³³ sees the greatness of Giotto in his refusal to copy old patterns; thus, he became greater than all his contemporaries and predecessors and found his heir only a hundred years later in Masaccio. For Vasari, Giotto is similarly the resuscitator of the art of painting which had been almost at the point of death; it was he who rediscovered the correct manner of painting which had been lost since Antiquity.

Poets and historians of his century extol Giotto's greatness as Dante did in his famous verses, 34 or Petrarca, who refers to Thim when he speaks of the "pictor nostri aevi princeps." 35 Boccaccio "and the older Villani stress Giotto's ability in rendering nature. Modern authors agree that Giotto's art shows an almost miraculous : advance if compared with previous art, and that its influence on rartistic development can hardly be exaggerated. Jacob Burckdt wrote that even the art of Jan Steen would have been different most probably, inferior, if Giotto had not been.

In the course of the thirteenth century, and under the influence of St. Francis' attitude towards the visible world and the rising - trend towards Nominalism, art had gradually acquired new life. In the last decades of this century, the world of objects — of light,

^{32.} First use of the term "modern" in art literature, on p. 5 of The book of the art of Cennino Cennini, translated by Christiana J. Herrington, London, 1899.

33. Il Codice Atlantico, Milano 1894-1904, p. 141.

34. Dante, Divina Commedia, Purg. 11, 95. Wickhoff, Schlosser, and others stress the fact that this passage has a moral meaning and points to the vanity of cearthly fame and glory. Yet Dante would hardly have chosen the examples of Cimabue and Giotto if he had not agreed with the general opinion placing Giotto over Cimabue as the greatest in painting. Characteristically, the Dante commentators since the Ottimo Commentary understood this passage unanimously as a praise of Giotto's greatest. Giotto's greatness.

35. Petrarca, Itinerarium Syriacum, quoted by Milanesi in his Vasari edition.

space, body, mental and emotional activities — gained definitely its place in sculpture and painting. The tree of art was in sap already before Giotto. It was covered with promising buds, and one or the other of them had already burst into blossom. With Giotto, however, it suddenly stood in full bloom. It is that miracle of spring which is the miracle of Giotto.

Duccio, Cimabue, Cavallini, the Isaac master, and others had already discovered the values of light, space, corporality and expression; but Giotto's light is clearer and more natural, Giotto's space more definite and wider, Giotto's bodies more substantial, his expressive power incommensurably greater. Giotto surpasses each of his great predecessors and contemporaries in the fields where they excelled most. Their works seem primitive in comparison with his, and poor against Giotto's abundance. This abundance, achieved without visible effort, gives to his art the aspect of absolute novelty.

In all his representations, Giotto concentrates on the essential. He narrates his stories with restraint, omitting irrelevant detail. Structural quality dominates the representation of his landscapes and buildings, of the human body and the bodies of animals, of the trees, grasses and flowers. Giotto follows the same principles in depicting sentiment. The expression of sentiment is the structural core of the life of his figures. Clinging to these abstractions Giotto achieves not only unsurpassed clarity but also irrefutable truth.

Giotto's figures are three-dimensional bodies, occupying space, creating space around themselves, and they are placed into a spatial scenery. Each is closely connected with the other, thus forming a definite and integral part of the representation. All of them take part in the related story by action, thought, or sentiment. The psychological expression reflects their character and their actual situation in the story. Figures dominate the pictures. Landscape, architecture, animals and plants, and the little things of life are only parts of their sphere, framing and underlining their thoughts, feelings, and actions; yet as such they are indispensable to the narration and deeply imbued with its spirit.³⁶

^{36.} The long horizontal line of the rock in Joachim's Retreat to the Shepherds parallels the thoughtful, stern and sad expression of the man slowly walking; the same rock, in Joachim's dream, shines in the night like a ray of hope. In the Flight to Egypt, the mountains form not only an impressive setting, but tie up and frame





Detail from left-centre of The Last Judgment

Since man dominates the scene, the rocks, architecture, animals and trees are generally reproduced in a smaller scale without endangering the truth of the representation, since the guiding principle is not imitation but evaluation of reality. Neither are colors copied from nature; they form an ideal coloristic harmony corresponding to the spirit of the painted stories.

Thus, the unity of the artistic intuition is forcefully materialized. The general character of the pictures has been changed from the epic to the dramatic. In former times, the illustrative tenor of the representations was predominant; now, the artistic structure comes to the fore. Mere illustration or the arrangement of the figures within old compositional schemes becomes a free composition, even where old iconographic schemes are used. They are filled with new life and new thought, and prosaic description changes to poetic vision. The most vigorous thought and the most intense feeling meet in perfect harmony. The fruit of the balance of such powerful forces is the great style of Giotto in its quiet majesty.

The dominating position of man in Giotto's art has its sources in both Hellenism and Christendom. In the Greek as well as in the Hellenistic and Byzantine art the interest was focused on the human figure. According to the Bible man is great in the world, overshadowed only by the infinite greatness of God; he is the master of the earth and of its creatures which God had given to him. The pantheistic attitude showing the grandeur of nature contrasted to the smallness of man is strange to the Christian art of Giotto.

When Cennini wrote that Giotto replaced the "Greek" art through the "Latin" manner, he had not the manner of the old Romans of the Republic in mind with its naturalistic leanings and its relative simple narrative or descriptive compositions, but the Italian version of the Hellenistic art which dominated the art of the Roman empire from the days of the Flavian emperors up to the time when the separation of the Western and the Eastern Empire took place. Then, in the east, Byzantine art arose and soon

the figured composition at the same time; the steeply-falling diagonal of the landscape is contrasted with the slowly-rising diagonal of the group; the backwardleaning rocks emphasize the hardships of the way. The infinite horizon in St. John on Patmos corresponds to the infiniteness of his vision, etc.

gained an exclusive position; it became important also in the West, but did not supersede totally the old manner. Western Hellenistic traditions survived the centuries up to the Roman school of Cavallini and the Isaac master who were older contemporaries of Giotto. This western Hellenistic art was characterized by its pondered composition, its rilievo, its spatial concentration, the statuary quality of the figures and their ideality and monumentality. All these features were taken over by Giotto. The influence of ancient art manifests itself in his pictures also in the abundant use he made of ancient drapery and ancient decoration. Sometimes his figures are obviously derived from ancient prototypes. In the fresco of Joachim's Retreat to the Shepherds the figure of Joachim resembles strongly a Hellenistic figure from a Greek relief in the Campo Santo at Pisa, which appears also in the Pisan pulpit of Nicolo Pisano.37 The complex movement of the Sultan in the Bardi Chapel recalls the similar movement of the Good Shepherd in the Galla Placidia mosaic. Also in the representation of animals Giotto follows Hellenistic tradition.38 The composition of the Navicella and its landscape are closely related to the composition and landscape of a Hellenistic fresco, Helen's Reception in Troy. 39 In the days of Giotto, probably numerous ancient and early Christian paintings were preserved which are lost today, as, for instance, the doubtlessly rich series of old paintings covering the walls of the old dome of St. Peter in Rome, where Giotto himself is reported to have painted five large frescoes.

From Byzantine art Giotto took over the artistic simplification of his compositions and the majestic appearance of many of his figures. Another Byzantine treat is the symbolization of buildings by characteristic parts or significant details of their interior. Many of Giotto's iconographic schemes originated in the art of Byzantium. Byzantine tradition in Giotto cannot be overlooked; it is strong enough that Diel could call him a Byzantine artist of genius, in certain respects.40

^{37.} Both figures are reproduced in Swarzenski, Nicolo Pisano, Frankfurt a / M, 1926.

^{38.} See note 34 in Rintelen, Giotto und die Giotto Apokryphen. Compare also the animals in the Viennese Genesis.

39. Wetner Koerte, Die Navicella des Giotto. The fresco in question is reproduced in Monumenti della pittura antica scoperti in Italia, III, 2, "Le pitture dell'aula isiaco di Caligula, descritte da G. E. Rizzo," Roma, 1936.

40. Charles Diel, Manuel d'art Byzantin, Paris, 1926, p. 718.

The great art of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in France was bound to make a deep impression on all the neighbouring peoples. Yet while Spain, Germany, and England accepted the spirit of this art, the case of Italy was different. Although the Italians accepted readily technical achievements such as the Gothic system of vaulting, or ornamental details or special techniques like the staining of glass, and although they did not hesitate to borrow some beautiful French types such as the Beau Dieu, only very few of the great Italian artists filled their work with Gothic spirit. Even the most outspoken Gothicist among the great Italians, Giovanni Pisano, embraced rather French elegance than Gothic spiritualism based upon the thought of Realism. Thus, also Giotto's relation to the contemporary Gothic art of the North seems rather superficial. We find Gothic architecture in some frescoes of the St. Francis series in Assisi. In the Arena Chapel the two illusory chapels at the sides of the apse are Gothic. Among Giotto's types, the Savior of the Arena Chapel recalls a Gothic figure, the French Beau Dieu, which occupies in Gothic art a rather singular place. Whereas Gothic art, generally, aimed at characteristic individual expression, the Beau Dieu represents a type. It shows the calm, free, wise and superior teacher, similar in its meaning to the old Greek type of the Lateranean Sophocles who also represents the ideal of superior personality as developed by a highly cultured and artistic people. It may be interesting to remember that one of the ancient types of the Lord, as preserved on some old sarcophagi,41 was conceived in direct dependence upon the old Greek himation figures of the Sophocles kind. In Hellenistic antiquity, the Lord was naturally conceived as an ideal type. When occidental art began to rise again, it did not dare to swerve from this path as far as highly venerated types were concerned. The figure of the Lord, particularly, remained an ideal one. It was idealized again in conformity with the feeling of the advancing civilization of the western world, and the aim was once more to create an ideal similar to that represented in the old Greek poet: the wise and superior man embodied in a beautiful form. So the Lord is shown in the blessing Savior of Amiens and the similar figure of Rheims. From there,

^{41.} Specimens of such sarcophagi are in the museum of Clermont Ferrand and in the Kaiser Friedrich Museum, Berlin.

Nicolo Pisano borrowed his blessing Savior. A descendant of this noble line is the Christ conceived by Giotto.

Certain affinities between Giotto's art and the art of Gothicism can be explained by the fact that the ruling trend of thought influenced the Gothic world as well as Italian art, and by the influence which Italian art began to exercise now on the art of the North. The Gothic art of the preceding fourteenth century became also more and more world-conscious. In contrast to Italian art, however, which, under the leadership of Giotto, accepted the world affirmatively and without qualification, and succeeded in raising nature to the heights of the spirit, Northern Gothic art tried the opposite way. Thus, it lost partly the dignity and nobility which distinguish many of the figures of the great cathedrals or the figures of Bamberg and Naumburg. As a consequence, the Gothic reaction towards nature became uneasy, and Gothic art preferred to cling to the old structureless and purely spiritual patterns, dominated, essentially, by the concepts of Realism.

Already in Giotto's lifetime traces of his influence on the Gothic art of the North are noticeable. In the Noli me tangere of Klosterneuburg⁴² the main group of the Lord and St. Mary Magdalene seems almost a copy of Giotto's composition. Nevertheless, it reveals utterly different features. It translates the strong structural forms of Giotto into Gothic spiritualism. The figures do not stand firmly on the ground. Giotto's simple sarcophagus is replaced by an elaborated construction which is not clear in its meaning. The landscape is reduced to the stony base upon which the Savior is placed and a single purely ornamental tree. While Giotto's bodies are corporeal, Christ as well as the tree at His side appear to be incorporeal, like flames arising from the ground.

Giotto was no Gothic artist; he is the first great representative of modern art; his art is utterly Italian, nourished by Franciscan Christendom and the powerful ancient tradition of his people.

^{42.} This painting with its companions, the Crucifixion, the Death of the Virgin, and the Coronation of the Virgin, was painted on the Rear of the famous Klosterneuburg altarpiece, ascribed to Nicholas of Verdun, under the abbot Stephen of Sierndorf, who headed the monastery from 1324 to 1329. It shows Giotto's influence on German art already in the lifetime of the great Italian. Reproduced in V. O. Ludwig, Der Verduner Altar, Vienna, 1929, Tafel LIII, and in Paecht, Oesterreichische Tafelmalerei der Gothik, Augsburg, 1929, Tafel 2.

III.

In the three fresco series of Giotto in Padua and Florence changes of style are discernible enabling us to form a view of his artistic development.

The first of these works is the decoration of the Arena Chapel in Padua. The handsome building consists of a simply vaulted hall with an adjoining Gothic choir. Doubtlessly, its architecture was planned with regard to its pictorial decoration. It has even been conjected that Giotto himself had been the architect.⁴³ The walls and the vault of the hall are adorned with his frescoes.

Within a painted ornamental framework of architectonic character including a base of imitation stone the story of the Virgin and the Savior is depicted, starting with the expulsion of Joachim from the temple and leading up to the Last Judgment. The skyblue vault, sprinkled with golden stars, is divided into two sections, each of them centered by a medallion containing the half-figures of Christ and the Virgin respectively, surrounded by four smaller medallions with the busts of prophets in the corners.

Entering the chapel we see above the apsidal arch Heaven depicted and God the Father seated on His throne, with the archangels at one side and the virtues at the other. Gabriel approaches Him and is ordered to deliver the message. On both sides of the arch, like towers flanking the entrance into the sanctuary, architectonic frames are holding the figures of the angel and the Virgin: at the left, Gabriel, kneeling, delivers the message; at the right, Mary, also kneeling, ⁴⁴ receives it. The connection between the heavenly scene and the Annunciation is accentuated by the representation of God the Father within the architecture of His throne, of the same shape and scale, and with a similarly colored background as the two pictures of the Annunciation.

^{43.} Crowe and Cavalcaselle. Weigelt (see note 26) and Mrs. Gy-Wilde (see note 15) doubt this; we may, however, dismiss Weigelt's argumentation if we assume that the upper row of the Arena frescoes was later added to the composition. Generally, Fra Giovanni degli Eremitani is supposed to have been the architect. Some authors see his portrait in the monk supporting the model of the church with his shoulders in the Last Judgment of the Arena Chapel.

^{44.} Kneeling symbolizes humility. The kneeling Madonna of the Annunciation here appears in art for the first time. In literature, this situation is first described in the Meditations.

On the lower part of the apsidal wall the Visitation and the Pact of Judas are depicted. Virtue and vice are contrasted here as in the monochrome allegorical figures of the single virtues and vices beneath the narrative scenes on the longitudinal walls. The virtues, on the side of the Visitation, lead to salvation, the vices, on the side of the Pact of Judas, to condemnation, as depicted in the Last Judgment, on the wall over the entrance.

In the Last Judgment, the Lord appears in superhuman proportions and in full glory. Surrounded by a mandorla in the colors of the rainbow, He centers the majestic composition. Angels encircle Him, four of them sounding the trumpets of doom. On either side of the Lord the apostles are seated over a balustrade separating the lower regions from heaven, on elaborate thrones. Heaven is filled with the angelic choirs in symmetrical groups, each choir headed by a leader in helmet or with stave or banner. Six of the heavenly choirs are fully visible, two others partly, while the ninth is replaced by the light streaming through the large tripartite window of the entrance wall, which is thus included in the composition.

Before Christ, the Cross is raised on earth by two angels; to the right of it, we see the Resurrection of the dead and, on the next higher level, the procession of the elect guided by angels. Over this group the Saints are moving upwards, led by the grandiose figure of the Madonna.

Only less than a quarter of the painting is devoted to the representation of hell. In its description Giotto follows old patterns. A mighty stream of fire issues from the mandorla surrounding the Lord and spreads wildly towards the right corner of the composition. Naked figures rush down from above, others are dragged along by the demons to the enormous Satan who devours them. Dark and gloomy tints replace Giotto's light and lovely colors; love, which fills heaven and triumphs on earth, has no place here. This absence of love imparts to Giotto's hell demoniacal power.

Between the resurrection and the group of the elect, Enrico Scrovegni, the donor of the chapel, offers its model, which is supported by the shoulders of an Augustinian monk, 45 to a group of three magnificent figures. Scrovegni and the monk show in-

^{45.} See note 43.



The Last Judgment



dividual features; they are fine examples of Giotto's art of portraiture for which he was famous.*

Between the representation of the message and the Last Judgment the story of salvation is spread. The story of the Conception of the Virgin and of Her youth before the Annunciation appear in the upper row of the frescoes. In the second row the story of Christ from His birth to the slaughter of the innocents and from His teaching in the temple to the chasing of the merchants from the temple is depicted. The third row shows the Passion from the Last Supper to the mocking of Christ, and from the bearing of the Cross to the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

The single pictures are surrounded by the ornamental frames. The stories of St. Joachim, St. Anne, and the Virgin before the Annunciation are separated, in their entity, by a second ornamental outline indicating their merely introductory character. The height of the north wall is accentuated by vertical bands embellished with small representations from the Old and New Testaments and half-figures of Saints. On the south wall, the same type of division separates the frescoes in the upper row, while, in the lower rows, the high Gothic windows fulfill the same purpose. Three of these ornamental bands overarch the ceiling thus framing the intersections of the vault. At the bottom of the vertical bands the figures of the Virtues and Vices are depicted in stone imitation.

The single stories, as particular in Franciscan art, are narrated in a simple manner, but with great expressive power. Deep humanity is matched with intense religious feeling. For the simple man, easily cognoscible personalities in clearly characterized attitudes display the well-known tales. Moving tenderness and the sweetness of natural human feelings as conjugal love, motherly affection, or the sorrow and grief of mourning appeal to the heart. The sobility of the holy figures lifts mind and soul.

Giotto's means in reaching such effects seem very simple. With one line he is able to express a whole character and its particular reaction in a given situation. The almost straight line of the back of St. Elizabeth in the Visitation expresses motherly love, the devotion of old age, nobility and humbleness. The outlines of the heavy body of the kneeling priest in the picture of the suitors of

^{*} Vide plate opposite page 19.

the Virgin awaiting the miraculous sign indicating Her future husband give the impression of a devotion whose prayer, as Thode remarked, almost forces down the blessing of heaven. Utmost love, devotion and longing is expressed in the simple outline of the figure of St. Mary Magdalene in the Noli me tangere, while the vertical line of the mantle of Christ is like a wall, as forbidding and imperative as His gesture. St. Magdalene's outline in the Resurrection of Lazarus, in a similar posture, is a picture of the humility of the mortal creature before the Master of life and death. In this painting, the distance between the figure of the Savior and that of Lazarus seems to be much greater than the actual space between them. This is achieved partly by Giotto's great art of composition, by the unevenness of the soil and the movements and gestures of the figures between Christ and Lazarus. It is achieved, however, in a much higher degree by the spiritual content which Giotto pressed into this picture. The distance between Christ and Lazarus is the distance between life and death, and between heaven and earth. In this particular picture, the painter used, in almost exact reproduction, an old iconographic scheme. Its narration is simple and clear and can be taken in at a glance. Yet, on closer examination, its mystical power and symbolic significance will carry us to breathtaking peaks of thought and feeling.46

^{46.} It is instructive to compare Giotto's compositions with those of his school. In the Resurrection of Lazarus in the St. Magdalene Chapel in Assisi, for instance the Lord is shown walking towards the grave in a hilly landscape over even ground, he seems to come nearer to Lazarus with every step. Lazarus appears already living and has the color of life. St. Magdalene and her companion are kneeling in dedevotion in the attitude of the kneeling figures before St. John in the Resurrection of Drusiana. The whole story is well related in a plain and narrative mann r, almost "gemuetlich." In Giotto's picture in the Arena Chapel dramatic contraits are stressed. Lazarus shows the color of death, he seems to be almost Death its "f confronted with the Lord of life. Christ and the apostles stand against the paybackground of the sky, Lazarus and the group surrounding him against the paybackground of the earth which seems to be the grave itself. All life is concentrated in Christ and emanating only from Him, and then not only to Lazarus but to the whole group between the Lord and him, animating all these phantomlike psople the nearer they are to Christ in corporeal distance and in thought. The women, showing in their kneeling attitude more than reverence and devotion, look awestruck in the face of the incredible miracle. Each detail of the picture is impregnated with the significance and the pathos of the whole story. The two hands of Christ and the man flanking the Lazarus group alone reveal its spirit. In each of his stories, Giotto's rich and profound mind accomplishes miracles of philosophic and poetic description. Each of them deserves to be expounded not only literally, but also spiritually, allegorically, and mystically, as the Scriptures were expounded by the old commentators.





With line, shade and color the painter shapes his forms, creates the illusion of light, space and body, and reproduces motion and emotion. He materializes his artistic intuition by integrating all this into a rhythmically ordered entity. The greater and more sublime his intuition is in respect to truth and clarity, to vigor and depth of feeling and thought, the greater his power of integration, the more will the artist fill us with admiration. There were very few artists who, in these respects, can be compared with Giotto.

The works of young artists are often predominantly emotional. Later on the problems of form gain in importance. The next great fresco series of Giotto, the St. Francis series in the Bardi Chapel of Sta. Croce in Florence, reveals the formal endeavors of the matured master.

It was many years after the completion of the work in the Arena Chapel that Giotto executed the decorations of the chapels in Sta. Croce. It is reported that he decorated four chapels of this church. Only two of them and the painting of the Madonna over the entrance to the third have survived. The frescoes, which had been whitewashed, have been uncovered in the nineteenth century, whereby they had undergone a thorough restoration so that "little more than the composition are now Giotto's" (Berenson).

On the outside of the entrance wall of the Bardi Chapel, Giotto depicted the Stigmatization of St. Francis. This painting has suffered relatively few changes from later hands, thus giving us the possibility of studying Giotto's style in this period of his life. The compositional principles deducted from the analysis of this painting, applied to the stories in the chapel, prove the genuineness of the latter.

The interior of the chapel is adorned with scenes from the legend of St. Francis. If we start with the paintings under the vaults of the Gothic construction the story begins with the scenes that connect the Saint with the Church: on one side, we see St. Francis parting with his earthly father after having returned to him his earthly belongings, and embraced by the Church naked as a newly born. On the other side, the Church accepts the brother-hood of St. Francis in the person of Pope Honorius III who confirms the rule of the Franciscan Order. The Saint's apostolic activity is

recalled in the scene in which he tries to convert the Sultan. In the next fresco his death and his assumption are depicted, while the two last representations deal with his miraculous appearance to the brothers of his Order in Arles and with the visions of Bishop Guido and Brother Augustine. All these paintings are richly and gracefully framed. Four large figures of Franciscan Saints and, on the ceiling, three small allegorical representations complete the decoration.

Compared with the frescoes of the Arena Chapel this work appears richer in ornamentation and more decorative in its composition. To serve the decorative principle, a uniform and symmetric disposition of the scenery has been adopted. The buildings framing the stories are more independent and more ornate than before. The ornaments themselves show more natural details, and the figures' accidental traits are taken rather from nature than from abstract ideals. The garments in their often rich appearance are painted for their own sake; the imitation of fur in the rich habit of St. Francis' father or the cascades of folds in the draperies of the Mohammedan priests are not subservient to sentimental expression in the same degree as the draperies were in the Arena Chapel. Yet the ornamental beauty of the Gothic line does not govern the bodies themselves which became even more definite in their spatial appearance, more tangible in themselves, although Giotto has never been nearer to Gothic elegance than here. The paintings of the Bardi Chapel in their harmony and balance of proportion forecast the classic art of the sixteenth century.

Giotto appears here on his artistic peak. Knowledge of imitation and decoration brings about a rich and costly surface. His wisdom of disposition is admirable, and it is no wonder that Ghirlandajo copied one hundred and fifty years later the scene of St. Francis' death almost literally.⁴⁷

It is not a very great step to the adjoining Peruzzi Chapel, but it is a step forward from the highest peak. This means, in some respect, a step down, as old age must mean a step down from the height of life. Yet, as often the case in the life of very great artists, old age, although reduced in vigor and color and

^{47.} In S. Trinità, Florence.





perhaps also in abundance, brings about wisdom which is beyond the realities of the day. In many respects, the decoration of the Peruzzi Chapel is the sublimest work left us by Giotto.

One wall of the chapel is devoted to St. John the Baptist. Three large frescoes, the annunciation of St. John's birth, his nativity and Zacharias writing his name, and, finally, the Feast of King Herod adorn it. St. John the Baptist himself in his popular figure does not appear in either of these compositions. The other wall, containing the stories of St. John the Evangelist, shows the Saint on the island of Patmos, the resuscitation of Drusiana, and St. John's ascension.

There is a final monumentality in the conception of the figures and objects. Great tension fills the compositions. The human personalities of the leading figures are overshadowed by the superhuman character of their forms. Space, which had been since the early experiment in the Navicella, always strictly confined and limited, becomes boundless in the picture of St. John on Patmos. Landscape becomes even more decorative than it was before. Realistic details are strictly omitted, only little color is used, and no trace of Gothic elegance is visible. The ornamentation is much less rich than in the neighbouring Bardi Chapel, and all the obviously pleasant as well as all popular features are neglected. Sheer greatness dominates the mighty compositions.

The figures in the St. John Chapel are stern and grave; they do not exhibit their feelings in the expression of their faces or in their motions. Nevertheless, the paintings are vibrant with emotion. They are ripe fruits of the spirit of love which led to the dolce stil nuovo in literature and art from the religious revelation of St. Francis.

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A SPECIAL ASPECT OF ATHANASIAN SOTERIOLOGY

PART I

ST. ATHANASIUS was on fire with the love of Christ. What he wrote of his friend could be written of him: "... I am confident that you consider knowledge of, and faith in, Him [Christ] more precious than all else." Likewise, he himself could be called what he called this friend, φιλόχριστος, a lover of Christ. His love of Christ is the key to his whole life and also to his writings. Christ, the Word Incarnate, occupies the central position in the doctrinal system of this celebrated Doctor of the Church, as all writers on Athanasius observe. It is true, he did not write a Summa of Christology or of theology; however, from his writings we can build up a rather complete system of religious thought in his day. In that system Christ, under one aspect or another, is always in the central place.

Whenever we consider the place of Christ in God's plan of the universe, we are, as a matter of fact, asking what the purposes of Christ's existence in this life and in the glorious life are, and also what relation there exists between these various purposes.

St. Athanasius treats ex professo the purposes of the Incarnation of the Eternal and Divine Word. True, the chief burden of all his writings is to prove that Christ, and consequently, the Word, is divine; but in proving this he also explains why the Word who is divine and eternal, took unto Himself our human nature. He mentions various purposes of the Incarnation without really philosophizing on the relation between them.

In his work *Contra Gentes*, St. Athanasius refutes hellenistic idolatry: he demonstrates the sinful origin, progress and extravagance of idolatry. To this he opposes the knowledge of the true God, which was given by the Eternal Word from the beginning of creation, and the knowledge of God which could be gotten by

^{1.} Contra Gentes, n. 1 (P. G., 25, 5 B).
2. Ibid., n. 47 (P. G., 25, 96 B); De Incarnatione Verbi, n. 1 (P. G., 25, 97 A); n. 56 (25, 196 A).

the contemplation of the creation even after man had sinned. In his second work, De Incarnatione Verbi, which is really only a continuation and completion of the first, he deals with the restoration, through the Word Incarnate, of the primitive work of God which had been destroyed by sin. In this work he treats ex professo two main reasons for the Incarnation. From this brief outline of these two works we can see that Athanasius is studying and describing the plan of God in the order of execution, in the historical order: at creation God gave man knowledge of Himself through the Eternal Word; man sinned and lost that knowledge, but God had made provision that man should still be able to know Him through the creation; then in the fullness of time the Word became incarnate in order to restore the power to know God through the Eternal Word.

CHRIST OUR SAVIOR

We will examine in detail the various purposes of the Incarnation that St. Athanasius proposes. The first one that he discusses is the need of redeeming sinful man. He introduces the subject thus:

But to explain these matters [sc., the Incarnation and the divinity of the Word], it will be of service to recall what was said above [i.e., in Contra Gentes] in order that you may be able to know why the Word of the Father, who [the Word] is so great and so eminent, appeared in a body; and that you will not think that the Savior bore a body as a consequence of his nature; but [that you will know] that He who is by nature incorporeal and the Word, has nevertheless appeared to us in a human body for our salvation because of His Father's goodness and love for man. Besides, in giving this exposition it is proper to speak first of the creation of all things, and of God their Artificer, so that by this method one may rightly perceive that the renewal of creation has been wrought by the Word who had created the same in the beginning. For [then] it will not seem a contradiction that the Father wrought the salvation of creation in Him by whom He had created the same.³

So it is for our salvation that the Word who had created us became incarnate. And this salvation includes liberation from sin. That is what St. Athanasius spoke of in Contra Gentes, and that is what he later says still more clearly.

^{3.} De Incarn. Verbi, n. 1 (P. G., 25, 97 B); cf. Contra Arianos, III, 29-31 (26, 385-389) et passim in nearly all his works.

You are wondering perhaps why in the world we are at present discussing the beginnings of mankind, whereas we proposed to speak of the Incarnation of the Word. But this is by no means foreign to the scope of our treatise. For when speaking of the appearance of the Savior among us, it is necessary to speak also of the origin of men, that you may plainly know that our cause was the occasion of His descent, and that our transgression called forth the Word's love of man, so that the Lord should come to us and appear among men. For we were the purpose of His incarnation, and for our salvation He acted most lovingly toward man in being born and appearing in a human body.4

God created man in grace; but man forsook God. However, it would have been very absurd for God to let His great work perish completely; so He owed it to His wisdom to redeem man in some way.6 But no one was so capable of restoring all things to man, as the Word Who excelled all things; and no one was so fit, and even necessary, to make man incorruptible, as the Word Who created all things out of nothing.7 For this reason, the Word Who had created man became man in order to re-create man.

For this purpose, then, the incorporeal and incorruptible and immaterial Word of God comes to our regions, although even before He was not far away... He took pity on our race and had mercy on our weakness. Condescending to our corruption and being unable to bear that death should have dominion - lest what He had made should perish and the Father's work in regard to men should come to nought — He takes unto Himself a body, and that no other kind than ours... For He, being powerful and the Creator of all things, prepares for Himself the body as a temple in the Virgin, and makes it His own (ἐδιοποιείται) as an instrument by which He is made known and in which He dwells; and having thus taken from our bodies one of like nature, and giving it up to death in the stead of all — because all were liable to the corruption of death — He offered it to the Father, doing this, moreover, because of His love toward man, for this purpose that, all having died in Him, the law concerning the corruption of men might be abrogated — since its power was exhausted (πληρωθείσης) in the Lord's body, and it no longer held any ground against men of similar nature — and that, whereas men had turned toward corruption, He might again turn them toward incorruption and bring them to life from death by making the body His own (ίδιοποιήσει) and by the grace of the resurrection, removing death from them as straw from fire.8

^{4.} De Incarn. Verbi, n. 4 (P. G., 25, 103 A).
5. Ibid., n. 5 (P. G., 25, 103 D - 105); De Decretis, n. 6 (26, 436 A).
6. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 6 (P. G., 25, 108 A); n. 8 (25, 109).
7. Ibid., n. 7 (P. G., 25, 108 C).
8. Ibid., n. 8 (P. G., 25, 109 A).

And again,

For, since the Word perceived that the corruption of men could not be undone in any other way than by unconditional death, and since the Word, immortal as He is and the Son of the Father, could not suffer death, on this account He takes unto Himself a body capable of death, in order that this [body], having partaken of the Word Who is above all, might become worthy to die in the stead of all, and because of the Word Who dwells in it, it might abide incorruptible, and that henceforth corruption might cease from all by the grace of the resurrection... And thus the incorruptible Son of God, being united with all by a like body, naturally clothed all with incorruption, by the promise of the resurrection. And so the corruption of death no longer has any power against men because of the Word Who dwells in them by means of the one body.9

In the following number our Doctor reminds us that he had been treating the first cause of the Savior's being made man; namely, the giving back of incorruption by dying on the cross.10 Then he continues to show the fitness of the Incarnation because of the second purpose; namely, for revealing God.11 He concludes the discussion by summing up the two purposes thus:

For by the Incarnation the Savior was to accomplish two works of love: first He put away death from us and renewed us again (averaiviter); secondly, being invisible and unseen, He appeared and made Himself known by His works as the Word of the Father and the Ruler and King of the universe.12

Later he again sums up the various purposes of the Incarnation, showing that the Word alone was qualified to accomplish them.

We have, therefore, stated, as far as possible, in part also as far as we were able to understand, the reason of His bodily appearance; [namely,] that it was in the power of none other to change corruption into incorruption, except the Savior Himself who at the beginning had also made all things out of nothing; and that it was in the power of none other to create anew (πάλιν ἀνακτίσαι) for men the likeness (τὸ κατ είκόνα) of the image, except the Image of the Father; and that it was in the power of none other to present the mortal as immortal, except He Who of Himself is Life (ἀυτοζωῆs), our Lord Jesus Christ; and that it was in the power of one other to teach [men] about the Father and to overthrow

^{9.} Ibid., n. 9 (P. G., 25, 112 A). 10. Ibid., n. 10 (P. G., 25, 113 C). 11. Ibid., nn. 11-16 (P. G., 25, 113-125). 12. Ibid., n. 16 (P. G., 25, 124 D - 125 A).

the worship of idols, except the Word Who arranges all things and is alone the true Only-begotten Son of the Father.13

If one were to ask why the Word did not assume some nobler nature to accomplish this work, St. Athanasius would answer that man alone had gone astray and needed to be healed.14 Let us note that this reason would suffice for the Word's assuming man. The fact that man was in need of redemption is sufficient reason for the Word's taking man's nature. But it is not necessarily the exclusive or final reason.

Again, if the Word Who created man, also saved Him, but not by a mere Fiat, as in creation, it was because for creating man there was nothing which could be used as an instrument; whereas for saving man, man was already in existence and was tending to corruption. Moreover, death was intrinsic to man, therefore life should be intrinsic to man; that is, the Word Who is Incorruption, should be united with the body and make it incorruptible.15

In the reasons we have given, St. Athanasius is certainly making the Incarnation dependent upon the work of restoration. Even the manifestation of the Father through the Incarnate Word belongs to the order of restoration: the Incarnate Word is to restore the knowledge of the Father which the Word had given at creation, but which was lost through sin. However, nowhere in these two works does Athanasius say that the work of restoration was the only reason of the Incarnation. He does make the remark: "But since the debt that all owed had to be paid, all likewise, as I have already stated, were obliged to die; on this account especially (μάλιστα) did He come to live among us." 16 But this μάλιστα (praecipua) need not be taken in the sense of primary or final. It simply means the most important in view of man's fallen state, from which he had to be freed. As we noted in the beginning, in these two works St. Athanasius is following the order of execution. He wants to give reasons for the Incarnation of the Word to show that, although the Word is eternal and divine, there still were good reasons why He should have taken a body in time. St. Athanasius did not have to state the reason that was primary in the

^{13.} *Ibid.*, n. 20 (*P. G.*, 25, 129 C). 14. *Ibid.*, n. 43 (*P. G.*, 25, 172 B). 15. *Ibid.*, n. 44 (*P. G.*, 25, 173 C and 176). 16. *Ibid.*, n. 20 (*P. G.*, 25, 129 D).

mind of God; any reason of the Incarnation would prove his point. In fact, the need of dying for man and of manifesting the Father to man, were more cogent reasons because more tangible.

As we saw, St. Athanasius insists that the Word alone was properly qualified to restore man, and that He became man for that reason. But we should not make the mistake of concluding from this that the Word became incarnate primarily and ultimately because of the work of restoration. The conclusion is simply not warranted. In fact, the opposite would seem to be true. If only the Incarnate Word could make man incorruptible and give man a knowledge of the Father, it would seem that the Word had in mind from the very beginning to become incarnate, since man was destined to that incorruptibility and knowledge from the beginning. This idea recurs later more than once. In the meantime, let us remember that Athanasius is following the historical order in his explanation, and that it is evident that incorruption is the ultimate goal of Christ's coming, even though He must pass through death.

Sometime after Athanasius had written those first two gems of Patristic literature, the heresy of Arius grew very strong and spread far and wide. He pushed a vigorous pen in refutation of it. The Arians maintained that the Word, Jesus Christ, was a mere creature. God, wishing to create us, first created the Word in order that through Him as an instrument He might create us.17 One of their main arguments for that stand was taken from Proverbs 8, 22, which according to the Septuagint (which they followed) reads: "The Lord created me a beginning of his ways for his works." St. Athanasius insists that they misinterpret this text which does not refer to the Word as such, but to the Incarnation of the Word. He devoted the entire first book and forty-three numbers of the second book of Contra Arianos to proving that the Word is divine. After having firmly established that truth from various texts of Sacred Scripture, he devotes the rest of book two to explaining the correct meaning of Proverbs 8, 22.

Not as if forgetting that It [Wisdom] is Creator and Maker, or ignorant of the difference between the Creator and creatures, does It number Itself among the creatures; but It intends a certain sense, not patent but latent, as in [the style of] proverbs, which It inspired the saints to

^{17.} Cf. Contra Arianos, I, 5 (P. G., 26, 21 B - 24); II, 25 (26, 200 B).

use in prophecy, and soon after It Itself gives the meaning of "He created" in another, parallel expression, saying, "Wisdom made herself a house." It is clear, then, that our body is Wisdom's house, which It took unto Itself on becoming man; hence with reason does John say, "The Word was made flesh," and through Solomon Wisdom, observing closely, says of Itself, not "I am a creature," but only, "The Lord created me a beginning of His works"; nor, "He created me that I might exist"; nor, "I have a creature's beginning and origin." 18

Time and again he tells us that this passage of Proverbs refers to the Incarnation of the Word and not to the existence of the Word as such. 19 And he never retracts that opinion. It is true that in numbers 77 to 82 of book two, he gives another interpretation, but this does not exclude the first, nor does he thereby retract the first. There he states that "created me" refers to the created image of Eternal Wisdom which the Word implanted in all created things at their creation. The image of which he speaks there does not seem to be a mere natural image; it includes the supernatural image impressed on man through grace at creation. St. Athanasius does not always make a clear-cut distinction between the natural and the supernatural gifts at creation because both were given at the same time.20 And even at creation the supernatural image was the more important, so he stresses that. It is an image by which man could know God as Father;21 it is a likeness to the Image, the Eternal Son of God.

Now this explanation does not contradict the one given first; it is merely a fuller explanation of the passage of Proverbs. The same Son, the Father's Wisdom, whose image was impressed on all things in creation, became incarnate to restore that image. The

^{18.} Ibid., II, 44 (P. G., 26, 241 B).

19. Cf. Ibid., I, 13 (P. G., 26, 40); 62 (26, 141); II, 45 (26, 241); 50 (26, 253 A); 61 (26, 277 A). St. Athanasius himself adds this note of precision, "to the Word as such"; ibid., II, 8 (26, 164 A); III, 41 (26, 409 B); 51 (26, 432 C). Very often he speaks of, "according to the essence of the Word"; cf., e.g., II, 13 (26, 173 C).

20. Contra Arianos, II, 77-82 (P. G., 26, 309-321): De Incarn. Verbi, n. 5 (25, 103 D - 105); De Decretis, n. 6 (25, 436 A). See J. A. Moehler, Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit, besonders in Kampfe mit dem Arianismus (Mainz, Kupferberg, 1884), pp. 137 and 142; L. Atzberger, Die Logoslehre des bl. Athanasius: Ibre Gegner und ibre unmittelbaren Vorlaeufer (Muenchen, 1880), pp. 152-160; H. Straetter, Die Erloesungslehre des bl. Athanasius (Freiburg in B., 1894), p. 22. The Protestant writer Voigt, in Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien (Bremen, 1861), p. 107, maintained that the image of which Athanasius writes is wholly natural.

21. Cf. Contra Arianos, II, 78 (P. G., 26, 311-312); n. 80 (26, 315-316). 21. Cf. Contra Arianos, II, 78 (P. G., 26, 311-312); n. 80 (26, 315-316).

same passage of Proverbs can refer to both phases of the divine economy. This he implies when in this very context he again refers to the Incarnate Word.

Since, however, he continues, saying, "When He prepared the heaven, I was present with Him," we must know that He says these things not as if the Father prepared the heaven or the clouds above without Wisdom - for it cannot be doubted that all things are created in Wisdom, and without It was made not even one thing. But this is what He says, "All things were made in Me and through Me, and when need arose that Wisdom should be created in the works, I, being indeed with the Father by My essence, fitted My own impress to the works by a condescension to things originate, so that the whole world, as in one body, might not be discordant, but in concord with itself... For no longer, as in former times, did God will to be known by an image and shadow of Wisdom, [that, namely,] which is in the creatures; but He has made the true Wisdom to take flesh and to become man and to endure the death of the cross, in order that by faith in It henceforth all that believe may be saved. However, it is the same Wisdom of God which formerly through Its own image in the creatures (whence also it is said to be "created"), manifested Itself, and through Itself, Its own Father; and afterwards, though It is the Word, "was made flesh," as John says; and after abolishing death and saving our race, It revealed Itself still more clearly, and through Itself, Its own Father, saying: "Grant to them that they may know thee, the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ." Cf. John 17, 3.22

According to this citation, then, Wisdom is "created" because of Its impress on creatures at creation and because of the Incarnation. Another reason for saying that Athanasius never rejected his first explanation is that immediately after giving the second interpretation, he begins book three by stating that Proverbs 8, 22 has a correct sense when referred to Christ;23 evidently he is referring to the explanations given in numbers 44 to 82, not merely to numbers 77 to 82. After having spent so much time on the first explanation, he can hardly be said to reject it by an appendix of a few numbers. Furthermore, the first interpretation occurs again in later writings. For instance, in the Second Epistle to Serapion he writes, "... thus when we hear this word "created," it would be proper to recall that He who is God, was created man." 24

Finally, St. Athanasius makes it a point in other places to give

^{22:} Ibid., II, 81 (P. G., 26, 321).
23. Ibid., III, 1 (P. G., 26, 321).
24. Ad Serapionem, II, 8 (P. G., 26, 621 B); cf. n. 7 (26, 620); also De Sententia Dionysii, nn. 10-11 (25, 493 C and 496).

as many legitimate explanations of a text as possible, thereby more completely to confound the adversaries. That he intends to do the same here is plain from the introduction he gives to the second interpretation. He had just finished some thirty numbers in explaining the passage of the Incarnate Word, then he adds:

These things, therefore, should suffice as a proof that the Word of God is not a creature, and that, moreover, the sense $(\delta\iota\acute{a}\nu\iota\iota a\nu)$ of the sentence is correct. Since, however, this sentence, when thoroughly examined, has a correct sense from every angle $(\pi a\nu\tau a\chi\acute{o}\theta\epsilon\nu)$ it may be of service to state this sense $(\nu o\hat{\nu}\nu)$ so that by many [senses] these senseless men might be put to shame. 25

At times, even while giving the first interpretation, St. Athanasius wrote as if he were referring Proverbs 8, 22 to the Word as Divine only; for example,

Therefore, if the Word would be a creature, He would not be first or beginning of the rest; if, however, He is before all, as indeed He is, and if He Himself alone is First and Son, He is therefore not the beginning of all things as to His essence; for the beginning of all things is also numbered among the *all*. If, then, He is not a beginning, neither is He a creature; but it is very plain that He differs in essence and nature from the creatures, and is other than they, and is Likeness and Image of the only and true God, since He is also an only one.²⁶

In regard to this passage we must note that, though the Word is not a creature, He is the beginning of creatures, however, not by His essence, that is, not as God Himself, but by an office He received, namely, by His relation to creatures as Mediator. The Word could not be the beginning of creatures if He were a mere creature, neither is He, on the other hand, the beginning of creatures as God without any relation to creatures. So the very fact that the Word became the beginning of all things created shows that He existed before them in some respect, even though He became like them in "being created," that is, in the Incarnation. Therefore the passage of Proverbs 8, 22 implies that Christ is divine, even though directly it refers to His human nature. St. Athanasius deduces the

^{25.} Contra Arianos, II, 77 (P. G., 26, 309 C and 312 A); cf. ibid., I, 44 (26, 101) in regard to Phil. 2, 9-10; ibid., II, 1-11 (26, 145 D-169) in regard to Hebr. 3, 2; ibid., II, 11-14 (26, 169-177) in regard to Acts 2, 3.
26. Ibid., II, 49 (P. G., 26, 252 A); cf. also nn. 48 and 50 (26, 248 C and 253).

same thing from the expression "for the works," namely, if he was created for the works, He Himself is not a work.²⁷

Our Doctor does not retract his oft-stated interpretation that the passage under consideration refers to the Incarnate Word. But if it refers to the Incarnate Word, what purpose is alleged for the Word's becoming incarnate? Athanasius answers in the words of the same Scripture text that the Word became incarnate "for the works." What does that mean? For our salvation, he explains. The phrase of the Nicene Creed, "propter nos et propter nostram salutem" is constantly on the lips of the Doctor of the Council of Nice. And it does express the work of the Incarnate Word rather succinctly. A number of elements enter into this concept of salvation. It is not merely synonymous with redemption or liberation from sin, as we shall see.

CHRIST OUR REDEEMER

St. Athanasius considers the redemption from sin as one of the works, as a part of the work of salvation. Christ, in other words, was "created" for our redemption. He was made a beginning and a foundation of our renewal, of our new creation.²⁸ This idea is so frequent in the works of St. Athanasius that we need spend no time in proving it. However, and this is the special point we are interested in, does that mean that Christ as man would never have existed if there had been no need of a re-creation? The simple statement that the Word became incarnate to redeem us, and others of a like nature, would cause us no difficulty. We could say, like

^{27.} Ibid., II, 71 (P. G., 26, 297).
28. Ibid., II, 7 (P. G., 26, 161); n. 14 (26, 176); n. 47 (26, 245 C and 248); n. 51 (26, 256 B); n. 55 (26, 261 C and 264); n. 65 (26, 285); n. 66 (26, 288 A); n. 73 (26, 301 B). J-B. a Parvo-Bornand, O.F.M.Cap., Proludium de Primatu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et Causa Motiva Incarnationis; translated from the French by Ambrosius a Saldes, O.F.M.Cap. (Barcinone, apud Subirana Fratres, 1902), pp. 289-290, errs when he says that St. Athanasius limits "the works" of Prov. 8, 22 to the restoration of fallen man, though he strenuously defends the Absolute Primacy of Christ even according to Athanasius. Aloysius Spindeler holds that Athanasius links these "works" of Prov. 8, 22 with the redemption "in all passages, and so clearly that we could not make it clearer." See his work Cur Verbum Caro Factum? Das Motiv der Menschwerdung und das Verhaeltniss der Erloesung zur Menschwerdung Gottes in den Christologischen Glaubens-kaempfen des vierten und fuenften Christlichen Jahrhunderts, in Forschungen zur Christlicher Literatur und Dogmengeschichte (Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1938), XVIII, n. 2, p. 74. Our study will show how false his position is.

many Scriptural passages, they are not to be taken in an exclusive sense. There are, however, some passages in which Athanasius, apparently at least, makes the redemption from sin the exclusive and, therefore, final purpose of the Incarnation.

The Lord Himself has spoken many things in proverbs; but when signifying something about Himself [as Word], He has spoken absolutely: "I in the Father and the Father in Me," and "I and the Father are one," [etc.]... not setting down for each case the cause or the reason why, lest He should seem second to those things for the sake of which He was made. For the cause without which even He would not have been made, would necessarily take precedence of Him... But the Lord, not having prior to Himself any cause wherefore He should be Word, except that He is the Father's Offspring and the Only-begotten Wisdom, when He is made man, then He states the cause for which He is about to bear flesh. For the need of man preceded His being made man, apart from which He had not put on flesh. What the need was for which He was made man, He Himself signifies, saying... [He quotes John 6, 38-40; 12, 46; 18, 37; I John 3, 83.29

This need of man as the motive of the Incarnation is brought forward in other passages:

For ere the works were made, the Son ever was, and there was as yet no need that He should be created. When, however, the works had been created and when later need of the economy for their restoration arose, then it was that the Word offered Himself to condescend and to become like the works.30

For though no works had been created, still the Word of God was, and the Word was God. And His becoming Man would not have taken place, if the need of men had not become a cause. The Son, then, is not a creature.31

The last sentence quoted emphasizes what we already know: St. Athanasius is proving the divinity of the Word by the fact that no reason is ever adduced for the existence of the Word; only when He became incarnate, namely, created in human nature, are reasons adduced. In general he calls these reasons the need of man. This need sufficiently proves his point. He evidently takes that reason from the historical order of things. And if he seems to make it exclusive, we can say that he does not identify this need with redemption. This need also includes deification, of which we shall

^{29.} Ibid., II, 54 (P. G., 26, 261). 30. Ibid., II, 51 (P. G., 26, 256 B); cf. also n. 52 (26, 257 A). 31. Ibid., II, 56 (P. G., 26, 268 A).

hear much. Deification was definitely a need of man, and that apart from sin.

Secondly, these statements cannot be taken in their apparent absolute sense, because they would exclude the truth that the Word came for the need of His own human nature, a truth which St. Athanasius himself stresses so much, as we shall see in the second part of this study.

Thirdly, more than once our Doctor makes absolute statements which must, however, be balanced by other statements. For instance, he asks at what time the Word took on the works. He answers that it is not proper to refer to the time prior to the Incarnation, lest His sojourn among us should seem useless; for He came precisely for the works. And His works began when He became man. 32 Now we know from theology that the Incarnate Word operated as Mediator long before He actually became man, and still His coming was not useless. Nor would Athanasius deny that. He simply wants to preclude any objection that the Word is not divine.

Fourthly, we could say that Athanasius is speaking of the coming in passible flesh, in a body that could die. Certainly He would not have assumed such a body if man did not have to be redeemed by death. For the need of a passible and mortal body to redeem man, Athanasius had explicit statements in Scripture and could easily refute the Arians.

These reasons are, of course, only negative; they show that it is possible to hold that Athanasius does not make the redemption the exclusive reason of the Incarnation. We must try to prove positively that St. Athanasius considered the Incarnate Word as part of the original plan of God; in other words, that our salvation through the Incarnate Word began already at creation. That is what we shall attempt to show by continuing the analysis of salvation according to Athanasius.

CHRIST MEDIATOR OF DEIFICATION

In the study on St. Irenaeus³³ we saw that he was constantly occupied with the notion of recapitulation. St. Athanasius, too, has

^{32.} Ibid., II, 67 (P. G., 26, 289 A). 33. See Franciscan Studies, XXVI (1945), 128-134.

his pet idea, deification (θεοποίησις). For this term and idea he evidently depends on St. Irenaeus.34 He is extremely fond of this idea. Students of Athanasian doctrine have called it a most important contribution to theology.35 To understand the reason for this we must remember that the Arian heresy was above all a theory of deification, but a false one. According to Arius the Word and Son was not divine, but merely a creature who was deified in a very special way, though still like us: Μετοή καὶ αὐτὸς ἐθεοποιήθη.36 St. Athanasius resists this error very vigorously and insists that we indeed are deified, and that through the Word; but that itself proves that the Word is divine. Time and again he expresses this fact of our deification;³⁷ it is the heart of his Christology; it is his mode of expressing the doctrine of the Mystical Union of all in Christ.³⁸ It, moreover, expresses concisely but completely the Savior's rôle in the universe.39

Athanasius tells us not merely the fact that man is at present deified through the Incarnate Word, he insists that our deification is the very purpose of the incarnation. (Αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνηνθρώπησεν ίνα ήμεις θ εοποιηθώμεν). 40 Having explained that the exaltation of Christ does not consist in His becoming Son and God, he wrote:

And if He descended to effect our promotion, therefore He did not receive the name of Son and God in reward, but rather He Himself has made us sons for the Father and deified men by becoming Himself man. Therefore, He was not man, and later became God; on the contrary, being God, later He became man in order rather to deify us.41

And again,

Likewise, if we hear in Proverbs the word "creature," we must not think that the whole Word is by nature a creature, but that He put on the

^{34.} See H. Straetter, op. cit., pp. 3-6 and 11-13; also Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte (1909), II, 310.
35. J. A. Moehler, op. cit., pp. 220 et seq.
36. In Thalia of Arius; apud S. Athana, Contra Arianos, I, 9 (P. G., 26, 29).
37. Cf. Contra Arianos, I, 9 (P. G., 26, 29 B-C); n. 16 (26, 46 A); nn. 38-39 (26, 89 B-95); n. 42 (26, 100 A); III, 19 (26, 361 B - 364); n. 23 (26, 372 B); nn. 33-34 (26, 393-397); n. 40 (26, 409 A); n. 53 (26, 444 C); Ad Maximum, n. 2 (26, 1088 C); Ad Serapionem, I, 24-25 (26, 588 A and 590); De Decretis, n. 14

^{(25, 448} D).
38. Cf. E. Mersch, S.J., Le Corps Mystique du Christ, 2 vol. (Paris, Desclée du Brouwer, 1936), I, 374-409.
39. J. B. Berchem, A.A., "Le Christ Sanctificateur d'après Saint Athanase," Angelicum, XV (1938), 516 et seq., and 558.
40. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 54 (P. G., 25, 192 B).
41. Contra Arianos, I, 38-39 (P. G., 26, 92 B-C).

created body and that God created Him for our sakes, perfecting for Him the body, as it is written, that in Him we might become capable of being renewed and deified (ἀνακαινισθῆναι καὶ θεοποιηθῆναι δυνηθῶμεν). 42

Once more,

For the flesh did not bring dishonor $(\delta \delta \delta \xi (a \nu))$ to the Word. Perish the thought! Rather it was glorified by Him $(\delta \epsilon \delta \delta \xi a \sigma \tau a \iota)$. Nor, because the Son, who is by nature God, took unto Himself the nature of a slave, was He diminished in regard to His divinity; rather He is become Liberator of all flesh and of all creation. And if God sent His Son, born of a woman, this is not a cause of shame for us, rather of glory and of great grace. For He has become Man in order that He might deify $(\theta \epsilon o \pi o \iota \dot{\eta} \sigma \eta)$ us in Himself, and He has been born of a woman and begotten of a Virgin in order to transfer unto Himself our erring generation and in order that we might henceforth become a holy race and partakers of the divine nature $(\kappa o \iota \nu \omega \nu o \iota)$, as Blessed Peter wrote:... (II Peter 1, 4).43

Now, while it would be quite true to say that the Word became man in order to deify us even though that had not been willed apart from sin and redemption from sin, still St. Athanasius' insistence on the deification as the purpose of the Incarnation seems to warrant the conclusion that deification through the Incarnation was in the original plan. He seems to hurry over the idea of redemption from sin in order to stress the most important and primary point, deification in and through Christ. That inference will be strengthened by what follows. He asks quite emphatically: "And how can there be deification apart from the Word and before Him?" 44 That the Word here is really the Word Incarnate, is brought out in the following passages. The Word had to become Man in order that man might possess the graces in a secure manner; a mere creature like Adam was not able to keep our gifts secure permanently.

... but rather being God, He assumed the flesh, and being in the flesh, He deifies the flesh... When the Savior quotes the passages, which also they allege, "Power is given to Me," and "Glorify thy Son," and when Peter says, "Power is given to Him," we understand all these in the same sense; humanly, namely, because of the body He spoke all these things. For though [as Word] He had no need, nevertheless, He is said to have received what He received, humanly, that, once more, inasmuch as the Lord

^{42.} Ibid., II, 47 (P. G., 26, 248 B). 43. Ad Adelphium, n. 4 (P. G., 26, 1077 A). 44. Contra Arianos, I, 39 (P. G., 26, 92 C).

received, and the gift rests with Him, the grace may remain secure ($\beta \in \beta ala$). For as long as mere man receives, he is liable to be despoiled — as was made clear in Adam's case; for though he had received, he lost. Now that the grace may never be taken away and may be kept secure for men, He Himself makes the gift His own (ໄδιοποιείται); and he says that He has received power, as man, which He ever had as God, and He Who glorifies others, says, "Glorify Me," to show that He has flesh which needs these things.45

Even the Arians held that the Word as a mere creature deified other men. Athanasius objects strenuously: the deifier must be divine Himself and he must be united to a creature.

And if we wish to know the object gained by this, we shall find it to be as follows: that "the Word was made flesh" in order to offer up this [body] for all, and that we, partaking of His Spirit, might be capable of being deified, something we could not otherwise have attained except by His clothing Himself with our created body, for thus henceforth we began to call ourselves "men of God" and "men in Christ." ... for He was not diminished by the envelopment of the body, rather He deified it and rendered it immortal.46

So the Incarnation of God was necessary for the deification because man was a mere creature, and a mere creature who could have divinity only by participation would never be capable of deifying others. That is why Adam was never intended as the principle of deification apart from Christ.

And again, if, as we have stated before, the Son is not such by participation, but, while all things created have by participation the grace from God, whereas He is the Father's Wisdom and Word, of whom all things partake, it is manifest that He, being the deifying and enlightening power of the Father, in whom all things are deified and vivified, is not alien in essence from the Father, but coessential. For by partaking of Him, we partake of the Father; since the Word is the Father's. Whence if He too were by participation, and if He were not of Himself the essential divinity and the Image of the Father, He would not deify, being Himself deified. For it is impossible that he who possesses by participation could impart of that partaking to others, since what he has is not his, but the giver's; and what he received is barely sufficient grace for himself.47

In some of the texts quoted the reader no doubt noticed that it is sinful man who needs to be deified. However, the need of

^{45.} Ibid., III, 38 (P. G., 26, 404 C - 405. 46. De Decretis, n. 14 (P. G., 25, 448 D). 47. De Synodis, n. 51 (P. G., 26, 784 A-B).

the Incarnate God for deifying man does not arise merely and primarily from the fact that man's nature is sin-infected, but from the fact that man is a mere creature. Adam was not a secure foundation of grace because he possessed it only from without, not from within; that is, he did not have grace united with his body as it actually was in Christ. But such a union of God with man was necessary for a stable foundation of sanctity.⁴⁸

Again, if the Son were a creature, man would nevertheless have remained mortal, since he was not joined to God; for a creature would not have joined creatures to God, since it too seeks someone who will join it [to God]; nor would a portion of the creation have been the salvation of creation, since it too needs salvation.⁴⁹

And that is true, even through a mere creature had been used by God, as such, as an instrument of deification; because that is precisely the Arian doctrine that Athanasius is combatting. Note again,

For He so assumed the created and human body, that having renewed it as its Maker, He might deify it in Himself and thus introduce us all according to His likeness into the kingdom of heaven. For man would not have been deified again, though joined to a creature, unless the Son was true God; nor would man have been brought into the very presence of the Father unless He who had put on the body, had been His natural and true Word. And just as we would not have been liberated from sin and the curse unless it had been by nature human flesh which the Word put on — for we had nothing in common with what was alien — so also the man had not been deified unless the Word who "was made flesh" had been by nature from the Father, His true and own [Son]. For on this account the union was of such kind that He might unite what is by nature man with Him who belongs to the nature of the divinity, and his salvation and deification might be secure. ⁵⁰

For salvation and deification, therefore, Athanasius demands the Incarnation of God. And even though he mixes the need of the redemption into his explanation, that need is not the ultimate reason according to him why the Incarnation was necessary; the ultimate reason is the fact that man was a mere creature, and it takes a God-Man to deify man. Consequently, if man was destined

^{48.} Contra Arianos, II, 68 (P. G., 26, 292). 49. Ibid., II, 69 (P. G., 26, 293 A). 50. Ibid., II, 70 (P. G., 26, 296).

to be deified from the beginning, the Word had in mind from the beginning to become man.

Union with God is as impossible without the Incarnation as deification.

For He says not, "Wherefore He anointed Thee" that you may be God or King or Son or Word; for this He was before and always is, as has been shown; but rather, "Since Thou art God and King, therefore Thou wast anointed because it was not in the power of any other to unite man with the Holy Spirit, except the Image of the Father, according to which we were made from the beginning; for even the Spirit is Thine." For this the nature of created things could give no guarantee, since even the angels transgressed and men disobeyed. Wherefore there was need of God - and the Word is God - that He might liberate those who had come under a curse.51

As a matter of fact, man and even angels sinned and, therefore, could not unite us with God. But that is not the precise reasoning of St. Athanasius. He argues not merely from the fact that man and angels had sinned, but from the fact that they are changeable, peccable. It takes the unchangeable and impeccable God, united with Man, to unite man firmly with God.

The first Adam sinned. Now, since it is in the nature of created things to alter, the second Adam should be unalterable, so that if the serpent would again attack man, he might not be defeated.⁵² Otherwise there would be an interminable need of pardons. Here Athanasius is looking at the matter from an historical viewpoint. Adam sinned: Christ should be unaltarable. But that does not mean that God willed Christ only after the sin of Adam. He really willed the unalterable foundation first. More about that later.

THE NATURAL SON NEEDED FOR OUR ADOPTED SONSHIP

Adopted sonship is another term of which St. Athanasius is very fond; it is part of our deification. When we are deified by the natural Son of God we become adopted sons.⁵³ Our sonship is in imitation of the natural Sonship of Christ.54 And by the very fact

^{51.} *Ibid.*, I, 49 (*P. G.*, 26, 113 B); cf. II, 68-69 (26, 292-293). 52. *Ibid.*, I, 51 (*P. G.*, 26, 117); II, 68 (26, 292). 53. *Ibid.*, II, 72 (*P. G.*, 26, 300 C); III, 19 (26, 364 B). 54. *Ibid.*, III, 19 (*P. G.*, 26, 364).

that the natural Son of God has assumed our flesh, we who are thereby related to Him, receive a title to sonship. "We, because of our relationship to His body have become God's temple, and henceforth we are made God's sons so that even in us the Lord is now worshipped." 55

The very fact that we do become sons of God through the Incarnate Son is proof that God willed the Incarnation for our adoption. St. Athanasius does not leave us in doubt about the matter. He states explicitly that that was the purpose of the Incarnation. The Eternal Son became man in order that men might become sons of God: "In order that this might take place, 'the Word was made flesh,' in order that He might make man capable of receiving the divinity." ⁵⁶ Even though some authors do not admit the genuineness of De Incarnatione et Contra Arianos, they must admit that it gives us the thought of Athanasius. It states the present truth very clearly.

And for this reason the Son of God was made the Son of Man in order that the sons of man, that is, of Adam, might be made the sons of God. For the Word who was born above from the Father in an ineffable, inexplicable, incomprehensible manner, and eternally, the same was born below in time from Mary, the Virgin Mother of God, in order that those who before were born below might again be born above, that is, from God. He therefore has only a Mother on earth; we have only a Father in heaven. And on this account He calls Himself the Son of Man that men might call God their Father in heaven... Therefore, just as we who are servants of God, have been made sons of God, so the Lord of servants was made a mortal son of his own servant; that is, of Adam, so that the sons of Adam, being mortal, may become sons of God... Wherefore the Son of God tasted death by virtue of his carnal father, so that the sons of men might partake of the life of God, their Father according to the Spirit. He therefore is Son of God according to His nature; we however, through grace...⁵⁷

The same idea is found in the fourth book against the Arians:

But He says sometimes that He is called our Father also, because He has Himself become partaker of our flesh (κεκοινωνηκέναι). For on this account the Word has been made flesh that, since the Word is Son,

^{55.} Ibid., I, 43 (P. G., 26, 100 C); cf. I, 38-39 (26, 89 B - 95); De Decretis, n. 31 (25, 473 C).

^{56.} Contra Arianos, II, 59 (P. G., 26, 275 A).
57. De Incarnatione et contra Arianos, n. 8 (P. G., 26, 995 A).

therefore, because of the Son dwelling in us, He might be called our Father also...⁶⁸

The Incarnation of the natural Son of God was necessary for making us adopted sons; and that not because we were sinners, but because we are by nature incapable of being sons. Sin, it is true, must now be removed before we can receive the adoption of sons, but the need of the Incarnate Son for this adoption comes from the fact that we are creatures. "Neither can adoption take place without the true Son since He Himself says: 'Nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and him to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matt. 11, 27).59 The idea here is that we can become sons only through faith in God the Father, but only the Son can reveal the Father to us; therefore the Son is necessary for our becoming sons. Absolutely speaking this could have been accomplished by the Son in His increate nature, but according to the Fathers the Increate Son as such was not intended to be the revealer of the Father, 60 nor Mediator of adoption. Our Doctor, therefore, tells us explicitly not only that the Word became incarnate in order to make us sons, as we saw, but also because we are by nature creatures.

But this is the love of God toward man that of whom He is Maker, of them he later also becomes Father; becomes, namely, when men, His creatures, as the Apostle says, receive into their hearts "the Spirit of His Son, crying, Abba, Father." And these are they who, having received the Word, received power from Him to become sons of God; for they could not become sons, being by nature creatures, otherwise than by receiving the Spirit of the natural and true Son. Wherefore, that this might take place "the Word was made flesh," that He might make man capable of receiving the divinity.61

Now if the Incarnation of the Son of God was necessary for our adoption, as St. Athanasius states so often, and if men were predestined to this adoption already at creation, 62 it is rather plain

^{58.} Contra Arianos, IV, 22 (P. G., 26, 500 D - 501).
59. Ibid., I, 39 (P. G., 26, 94).
60. See below, p. 52.
61. Contra Arianos, II, 59 (P. G., 26, 275 A); cf. also n. 61 (26, 277 A).
62. Ibid., II, 76 (P. G., 26, 308). J. B. Berchem, A.A., "L'Incarnation dans le plan divin," Echos d'Orient (1934), p. 326, holds that the divine adoption and immortality are the primary motive of the Incarnation; though on p. 325, footnote 1, he rejects the Scotist view of the Incarnation.

that the Incarnation of the Son of God was willed by God already at creation. That is why St. Athanasius repeats time and again: The Son of God became man in order that men might become sons of God.

CHRIST IS NEEDED FOR OUR GLORY

From a consideration of our deification and of our sonship we pass rather easily to a consideration of our glory. To be deified means to share in God's life, and that in as perfect a manner as possible after life in this world. To be sons of God means to be such in a perfect manner in heaven. So deification and sonship and glory cover about the same field.

It is a fact that Jesus is Mediator of our glory, of our incorruptible life. He is the author of our resurrection, 63 and this, according to the terminology of Athanasius, includes the entire glorious life. Again, he tells us that our salvation is not fictitious, nor merely of the body, but of the body and soul, of the whole man; and that is wrought through the Word.64 The Word of which he is speaking is the Incarnate Word as is clear from the passage that precedes the one quoted.

In this matter, as also in regard to deification and sonship, our Doctor states explicitly that the purpose of the Incarnation of the Word is to make man immortal: "Do you not see that this too was done and written because of us and for us, that the Lord, who has become man, might render us, who are mortal and temporal, immortal and bring us into the everlasting kingdom of heaven?"65 He calls this the first reason of the Savior's becoming man; but sin must necessarily be removed first.68

When did God first will Christ as the Mediator of our glory? Was it only after God foresaw Adam would offend Him? From the fact that St. Athanasius says simpliciter that the Word was made man in order to make us immortal, we can conclude that

^{63.} De Incarn. Verbi, n. 10 (P. G., 25, 113 C); cf. also nn. 7-9 (25, 108 C - 112).
64. Ad Epictetum, n. 7 (P. G., 26, 1061 A); cf. n. 9 (26, 1065 B); Contra Arianos, I, 42 (26, 441 B - 445); III, 57-58 (26, 443); De Decreits, n. 14 (26, 448 D).
65. Contra Arianos, I, 48 (P. G., 26, 112); cf. De Incarn. Verbi, nn. 7 fin. to 9 (25, 108 C - 112).
66. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 10 (P. G., 25, 113 C).

this was in the original plan. It is true, the mediation of Christ in regard to our glory follows His mediation of liberating us from sin.67 However, that is merely because when sin is present man cannot receive grace or glory unless sin is removed. But Christ can still have been willed as Mediator of glory from the beginning. This conclusion is sort of forced upon us when we consider that Athanasius insists that the Incarnation of Immortality is necessary for making man immortal because man is a mere creature. The body is by nature corruptible.

For it was becoming that the flesh, being corruptible, should no longer, in keeping with its own nature, remain mortal, but through the Word who had put it on, should abide incorruptible. For as He, when He came in our body, made Himself conformed to our [condition], so we when we receive Him, partake of the immortality that is from Him.68

Only the Incarnation of the Immortal can make man immortal. "For this reason [that death was intrinsic to man] the Savior with reason put on a body, that the body, becoming closely knit to life, should no longer, as mortal, abide in death, but, as having put on immortality and having risen, should henceforth abide immortal."69 The body that Christ makes rise gloriously immortal is by nature mortal: "But the body [of Christ] having a mortal nature, rose again — something that was above its nature — by reason of the Word which was in it; and it has ceased from the corruption it had by nature, for, having put on the Word who is above man, it has become incorruptible." 70

Now, St. Athanasius also teaches that man was destined from the beginning of creation to an immortal life. "For having brought them into His own garden, He gave them a law, so that, if they kept the grace and remained good, they would enjoy the life in paradise which would be without sorrow or pain or care, besides having also the promise of incorruption in heaven."71

Man was created also that he might "see" God and be enlightened by Him.72 We shall see later that the Incarnation of God

^{67.} E. g., ibid., n. 7 (P. G., 25, 108 C).
68. Contra Arianos, III, 57 (P. G., 26, 444 C).
69. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 44 (P. G., 25, 176 A).
70. Ad Epictetum, n. 10 (P. G., 26, 1068); cf. also n. 9 (26, 1066).
71. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 3 (P. G., 25, 101 C); n. 4 (25, 104 A); Contra Arianos, III, 57 (26, 444 C).
72. Contra Gentes, n. 7 (P. G., 25, 16 B).

was necessary, in the mind of Athanasius, for man to see God; namely, to see Him by the perfect vision of glory. Therefore, also from this angle of our glory the Incarnation of the Word of God was in the original plan of the universe.

We conclude this section by saying that in all probability, according to St. Athanasius, Christ was willed in the very first plan of God as the Mediator of our glory, of our incorruptible life, because for corruptible man to be incorruptible, the Incorruptible God had to be incarnate in corruptible man.

CHRIST IS THE MEDIATOR OF OUR KNOWLEDGE

Supernatural knowledge, revealed by the Wisdom of God, is an important element in the theology and Christology of St. Athanasius. In his very first work it occupies a central position as a primary purpose of the Incarnation. There he arranges the matter in the historical order. At creation God gave man not merely the natural faculty for knowing Him, but also the supernatural aid whereby man could know God as Word and Father. This was lost through sin. God, however, had provided for such a misfortune by granting the faculty of knowing Him through the creation.

For just as He is the Father's Word and Wisdom, so too condescending to created things, He becomes, for knowing and understanding the Father, the very Brightness and Life and Door and Shepherd and Way and King and Ruler and Savior of all, and Giver of life and Light and Providence of all. The Father, therefore, having such a Son begotten of Himself, good [in Himself] and the Maker, did not hide Him from His creatures as invisible, but daily reveals Him to all by means of the constitution and life of all things, which they have from Him. But in Him and through Him He reveals Himself also, as the Savior says: ... (John 14, 10).75

Since we can know the Son of God from the constitution of

^{73.} Ibid., nn. 2-3 (P. G., 25, 8-9); cf. n. 8 (25, 16); n. 30 (25, 60); De Incarn. Verbi, n. 11 (P. G., 25, 113 and 116). Here he speaks of knowledge that differentiates man from the brute; still it is knowledge by which man can know the Father and the Word, that is, the Trinity. In Contra Arianos, II, 77-82 (P. G., 26, 309-321), he writes of a supernatural image in created things at creation.

^{309-321),} he writes of a supernatural image in created things at creation.

74. De Incarn. Verbi, nn. 11 fin. and 12 (P. G., 25, 116-117); cf. ibid., n. 2 (25, 97); Contra Gentes, n. 27 (25, 32); n. 30 (25, 61); nn. 34-35 (25, 68-72); nn. 44-45 (25, 88-92).

^{75.} Contra Gentes, n. 47 (P. G., 25, 94); cf. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 12 (25, 116-117).

things, it might seem that even this knowledge was supernatural. But St. Athanasius does not always clearly distinguish between the natural and the supernatural knowledge we can have of God through the faculty given at creation. Then, too, he might be saying that we can know the Wisdom of God from creatures; but through revelation we know that this Wisdom is a Person.

After the fall of Adam things went from bad to worse. Man did not learn to know God very well through the creatures. So in the fullness of time the Word of God Himself condescended to become part of that visible creation that man might be able to know God again, since the Word is the very Image of God. 78 Consequently, it is a fact that the Word Incarnate, Christ, is the Revealer of the Father. Christ exists for the purpose of revealing the Father.

... to this end the loving and common Savior of all, the Word of God, takes unto Himself a body, and as man holds converse with men and draws the senses of all men to Himself that they who think that God is corporeal may from the things the Lord effects through the works perceive the truth, and through Him recognize the Father... On this account He was born and appeared as man, and died and rose, dulling and obscuring by His own the works of men that ever were, so that wherever men might have failed, from thence He might recall them and teach them of His own true Father, as He Himself says: "I came to save and to find that which was lost." 77

What is the relation of this purpose of the Incarnation to the redemption? Was the Incarnate Word needed as Revealer only after sin came? St. Athanasius, as we saw, holds that the Incarnation was necessary for the deification and for the adoption.78 But to accept the doctrine of deification and adoption the revelation of the Incarnate Word was necessary. See Matt. 11, 27.79 The Word as such was as invisible as the Father:

Hence since it were unworthy of the Divine Goodness to overlook so important a matter, while men were not yet able to recognize Him as administering and guiding the whole, with reason He takes to Himself

^{76.} De Incarn. Verbi, n. 13 (P. G., 25, 120).
77. Ibid., n. 15 (P. G., 25, 121 C and 125); cf. Contra Gentes, n. 1 (25, 5);
Contra Arianos, I, 16 (26, 45).
78. Contra Arianos, I, 39 (P. G., 26, 92 C).
79. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 54 (P. G., 25, 192); cf. Contra Arianos, I, n. 39 (26, 92-93 C).

part of the whole, the human body, as an instrument, and enters it, in order that, since men could not recognize Him in the whole, they might not be ignorant of Him in the part; and since they could not look up to his invisible power, they might be able to reason to Him from the likenesses, and to contemplate Him.⁸⁰

No one save the Only-begotten Son of the Father was able to teach men of the Father.⁸¹ But we know that God had intended a supernatural knowledge for man from the beginning. He must, therefore, have had in mind, from the beginning, to become man at some time.

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^{80.} De Incarn. Verbi, n. 43 (P. G., 25, 172 C). 81. Ibid., n. 20 (P. G., 25, 129).

JOHN PONCE, FRANCISCAN SCOTIST OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

CEVENTEENTH-CENTURY Scholastic philosophy has suffered at the hands of historians. Not only is there a painful lack of histories of philosophy treating the Scholasticism of this period, but the few historians that mention it usually present an incomplete and distorted view. In the general histories of Scholastic Philosophy, the seventeenth century Scholasticism receives as much treatment as the Middle Ages in the older histories of civilization. Both are passed over with a silence that is contemptuous of their achievements.

In very recent times, some of the Scholastics of the seventeenth century are beginning to receive due recognition, as is attested by the many monographs and dissertations that are being written about them and their doctrines. The great Thomistic commentators of this age, e.g., John of St. Thomas, together with Suarez and Vasquez, have slowly earned a well-deserved acknowledgement. Karl Werner, in his voluminous histories of Scholasticism, acquainted the world with some of the most brilliant minds of the seventeenth century.1 Unfortunately, his works, which have never been translated from their original German have, to some extent, become antiquated due to the enormous strides of modern research.

However, in all these histories there is an unscholarly dismissal of everything Scotistic. In Werner's histories, Scotists are dismissed with a mere recital of their names and occasionally a reference to their outstanding works. In a very modern Scholastic historian, Maurice de Wulf, the entire Scotistic School of the seventeenth century is dismissed in one paragraph consisting of a single sentence. To De Wulf's credit, we must admit that the sentence is correct. It reads: "The seventeenth century witnessed a brilliant development of the Scotist School." 2

^{1.} Cf. Werner, Karl, Franz Suarez und die Scholastik der letzen Jahrhunderte (Regensburg, 1861); Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters (Wien, 1881-87, 5 vols.); Grundriss der Geschichte der Moralphilosophie (Wien, 1859).

2. De Wulf, Maurice, History of Medieval Philosophy, (trans. by E. C. Messenger, London, 1926), vol. II, p. 297. In a footnote to this amazing paragraph, De Wulf mentions about six Scotists of this age. In the 3rd English edition and in the 6th French edition of this work, the third volume has not been published; it is hoped that a more generous consideration and a more just appraisal of the Scotistic School will be forthcoming. will be forthcoming. 54

Such a peremptory treatment of the Scotist School of the seventeenth century is blameworthy in the highest degree. That the seventeenth century saw the most remarkable Scotistic revival, that Scotistic authors outnumbered all other Schools combined and, finally, that Scotism was generally accepted in the universities of Europe during this age, make such an omission a crime against truth and justice. Such a neglect is inexplicable except on grounds of culpable ignorance.

To awaken interest in this glorious period of Scotism and to present at least a partial study of a great Scotist of this time, we have chosen Father John Ponce, O.F.M. as the subject of the present paper. Scarcity of bio-bibliographical material has encouraged us to gather the available data into a compendium that will, no doubt, prove useful for future studies of this period and of this School of Philosophy. For the sake of clarity and logical procedure, the paper will be subdivided as follows: I. The Scotistic Revival in the XVIIth Century; II. Biographical Sketch of John Ponce; III. Bibliography of John Ponce; IV. Philosophical Doctrines of John Ponce; V. Appreciation.

I. THE SCOTISTIC REVIVAL IN THE XVIIth CENTURY

Neutral sources, which cannot possibly be accused of partiality towards the Scotistic School, attest to the predominantly Scotistic character of seventeenth-century Scholastic philosophy. The well-known Cistercian, John Caramuel Lobkowitz, attests that at this time Scoti schola numeriosior est aliis simul sumptis.³ A glance through the compendious Nomenclator Literarius of Hurter will alleviate us of all doubts in this matter. Rather than multiply quotations from various sources to establish the historical fact of the triumph of the Scotistic School in the seventeenth century, we will limit ourselves to a lengthy and, generally unknown, quotation bearing on this point and taken from one of the works of John Ponce the subject of this study. He writes:

Quoniam vero quamplurimi a Scoti doctrina amplectanda, praesertim in Theologicis, averti solent, quod minus communis appareat; et in rebus concernentibus conscientiam et dependentibus ab auctoritate, communior

^{3.} Caramuel Lobkowitz, Theologia Moralis Fundamentalis, (Lugduni, 1657, ed. 3), lib. II, n. 568, p. 148.

sententia ut tutior, ita magis arridere soleat, operae pretium duxi, quod ipse saepe animadverti et de quo etiam cum plurimis aliis diversarum Scholarum frequentissime discurri, hic omnibus proponere, hoc est Scoti sententiam re vera communiorem esse quam ipsiusmet S. Thomae. Quod quamvis paradoxon videri posset, facile tamen intelliget, qui fatebitur quod omnino aequum est ut faciat eam esse D. Thomae sententiam, quam Dominicani, eam vero Scoti quam Franciscani communiter amplectuntur. Quamvis enim Jesuitae et alii se etiam D. Thomae sententiam sequi profiteantur, et ita ctiam quod facile est, ipsum explicent, ut eum in suos sensus detorqueant, nemo tamen aequus rerum aestimator facile crediderit, eos ipsius veram mentem potius assequi quam Dominicanos, qui pro suo in ipsum et propriam Religionem affectu, diligentius eius mentem explorare, et constantius tueri credendi sunt; quod et de Franciscanis quoad mentem Scoti, si comparentur cum illis aliis, qui aliter quam ipsi Scotum explicare vellent, sentiendum est. Supposito ergo quod Scoti Sententia sit illa quam Franciscani, et D. Thomae quam Dominicani defendunt, si comparatio fiat inter utramque Religionem, satis constat Scoti esse longe communiorem: nostri enim Professores et discipuli pro maioris Ordinis amplitudine, longe excedunt numero Dominicanos. Quod si conferatur nostra et illorum cum illa, quam aliarum Scholarum Professores, ut Jesuitae et Doctores saeculares docere solent, et ea dicatur communior, quae apud ipsos communius recipitur, etiam sic Scoti opinionem reperiet magis communem, qui, quod certissimum est, consideraverit sex ad minus ex nostris positionibus in rebus quibus non convenimus cum Thomistis, pro qualibet una ex D. Thomae, a Jesuitis et aliis Professoribus communius defendi. Cuius experimentum facile fieri potest, ut ego saepius, si quis generales ex tota Theologia aut quocumque magno tractatu Scotistarum, Dominicanorum, Jesuitarum, ac aliorum Professorum Theses percurrere voluerit; reperiet enim ex nostris Thesibus ad minus sex in Jesuitarum, ac aliorum Professorum Thesibus, pro una ex Dominicanorum: est ergo ipsa Scoti opinio longe communior.

Such a marvellous development and general acceptance of Scotism among seventeenth-century Scholastic thinkers cannot be without a sufficient cause. The vitality shown by Scotism during this time cannot be the result of fortuitous chance or a happy coincidence of history. We cannot ascribe the growth of the Scotistic school merely to the presence of several great contemporary minds that embraced this system for even their espousal of Scotism needs an explanation.

To account, in part, for this remarkable movement, it is safe to say that the following causes played a notable rôle:

a) The intrinsic worth of Scotistic Doctrine

Without entering into a detailed account of the excellencies of

^{4.} R. P. F. Joannis Poncii... Theologiae Cursus Integer ad mentem Scoti, (Lugduni, MDCLXXI), praefatio.

Scotistic doctrine, we can point out the great esteem held for Scotus' opinions during this period. His critical acumen, combined with his Franciscan humility, produced works that were at once simple and profound. With regard to his worthy opponents, he remained impartial, judicious, objective and respectful and by such procedure gained for himself a host of followers. He did not resort to sophisms to make his doctrine acceptable, but rather strove to bring out truth by means of a critical and logical dissection of the problem at hand. His subtle mind and brilliant dialectics combined to produce an amazing body of doctrine which, by its own brilliance, enticed others to embrace it.

Scotus' doctrine likewise received a special value from the fact that it has never been successfully accused of error. Throughout the centuries it has been charged with being heretical or at least bordering on heresy. To this day, however, it has succeeded to withstand these charges without detriment to its lustre. In the meantime it has received the sanctions of the Popes and the Councils. Popes Sixtus IV, Sixtus V, Alexander V, Alexander VI, Clement VII, Pius V and Urban VIII, to mention but a few, commended and encouraged the spread of Scotism. As for the Councils, it suffices to mention the Council of Trent, where the predominant part of the theologians were Scotists and where innumerable Scotistic tenets (e.g., subject-matter of Confession, the Immaculate Conception, justification, etc.) were proposed at the sessions of the Council.⁵ In fact, Scotus achieved such great authority and prestige, that the Church formally acknowledged him to be free from all censure. In the words of Hurter,

tantamque adeptus est (Duns Scotus) nominis auctoritatem, ut S. Congregatio Pauli V iussu declaraverit, immunem esse a censuris doctrinam Scoti edixeritque, ne quis librorum censor prohibere typis auderet, quod certo constaret ex Scoto depromptum esse.⁶

^{5.} The literature about Scotism's relation to the Council of Trent is quite large, although not yet thoroughly worked out. Cf. the following works: Ciganotto, Lodovico, O.F.M., Tra il B.G. Duns Scoto e il Concilio di Trenzo circa la materia "ex qua" del Sacramento della Penitenza. Studio Parallelo. (Motta de Livenza, 1923); Catharinus, Ambrosius, O.P., Disputatio pro veritate Immaculatae Conceptionis Beatissimae Virginis et ejus celebranda a cunctis fidelibus festivitate ad sanctam synodum Tridentinam, (Romae, 1551); Hefner, Joseph, Die Entstehungsgegeschichte des Trienter Rechtfertigungdekretes, (Paderborn, 1909; cf. esp. pp. 51-61, 42-55); Pallavicino, Card., Storia del Concilio di Trento, (Faenza, 1793; cf. esp. vol. II, pp. 153-81).

6. Hurter, H., S.J., Nomenclator Litterarius, (Oeniponte, 1899), vol. IV, c. 369.

Finally, Duns Scotus' doctrine had an intrinsic worth of itself, because it was solidly traditional. Since the time of St. Augustine, the Platonic-Augustinian trend in philosophy and theology held an undisputed priority in Scholastic thought. It is true that Duns Scotus did not neglect the newly created interest in Aristotelian doctrine, but he managed to combine the two currents of thought in such a manner that he did not appear to be an innovator or breaker of traditions. The European mind, rooted in traditions, appreciated this continuity of thought as preserved in Scotistic writings, and its appreciation was practically demonstrated by the adoption and assimilation of Scotistic doctrines. Its traditionalism proved acceptable because it retained the Platonico-Augustinian foundations without the detrimental exclusion of the recent findings of Aristotelian thought.

b) Bzovius' attack on Duns Scotus

Another cause for the increase of interest in Scotus during this period was the uncharitable and unjustifiable attack made upon the Subtle Doctor's life and doctrine by Abraham Bzovius, a Polish Dominican. In his Annales Ecclesiastici 7 Bzovius introduced the legend about Scotus' being buried alive; he calumniated him as being a quarrelsome character and a sophist. The furor he caused is, undoubtedly, the occasion of much literature on Duns Scotus, for the Scotists immediately began to write defenses of their Master. Others, enticed by the controversy, were led to become better acquainted with a Doctor who was the subject of such attention.

Among the Franciscans who took up the attack against Bzovius we can mention the following outstanding friars: Hugh Cavellus, an Irishman, who wrote the Apologia pro Joanne Duns Scoto vindicando ab injuriis allatis per Abrahamum Bzovium; Matthew Ferchius wrote the bitter Correptio scotica I. D. Scoti Doctoris Subtilis vitam et mortem explicans; Anthony Hickey, under the pseudonym of Dermetius Thaddeus, composed the Nitela Religionis Franciscanae et abstersio sordium quibus eam conspuere frustra tentavit Abrahamus Bzovius.8

^{7.} Bzovius, Abraham, O.P., Annales Ecclesiastici, (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1616), vol. XIII, ad annum 1294.

8. Cavellus' work appeared in Antwerp, 1620; Ferchius' at Chambery, 1620; Hickey's at Lyons, 1627.

Lest we be led to believe that only the Franciscans took up the fight, we call attention to others, who realizing the injustice of the accusations and appreciating the personal traits and scholarly achievements of Duns Scotus, took up a defence of the Subtle Doctor. Among the many, we signal out the Jesuits, Possevinus and James Gualter; the Belgian Augustinian Michael Hoyer; Nicholas Vernuleus and Aubert de Myre. Every one of these wrote an apology for Duns Scotus, an apology that usually takes the form of a panegyric.⁹

c) Establishment of St. Isidore's College, Rome

The greatest single cause for the revival of Scotism in the seventeenth century is, undoubtedly, the founding of the renowned St. Isidore's College at Rome. This school became the mother of numerous Scotists who, in turn, cultivated the taste for Scotistic doctrine in the scholasticates of the entire Order of the Friars Minor. Behind all this was the great personality and learning of Luke Wadding. The story of the founding of the College reads like a romance.

The religious persecutions inaugurated by Henry VIII and continued by Queen Elizabeth and James I, resulted in the suppression of churches, monasteries and schools. Unless Seminaries could be established and endowed in other countries, the English and Irish priesthood was doomed to extinction since ordinations were no longer allowed. Within a space of a few years, several

^{9.} Wadding in his Annales Minorum (vol. VI, pp. 156-7) testifies to this splendid defense of the honor of Scotus. He writes: "Hinc tot Apologiae pro Scoti famae indemnitate scriptae, ut solus Matthaeus Ferchius Veglensis, Dalmata, Ordinis Minorum Conventualium, noster amicus, vir gravis et solide doctus, tres ediderit, primam contra Fridericum Matensium, secundam contra Abrahamum Bzovium Polonum, tertiam in Paulum Jovium Novormensem. Aliam scripsit Illustrissimus Dominus Hugo Cavellus Archiepiscopus Armacanus Hyberniae Primas ex Ordin. Minor. reg. observ. assumptus, in eundem Abrahamum Bzovium; alteram ejus discipulus Hugo Magnesius ejusdem Ordinis et nationis, in Nicolaum Jansenium Bzovii consodalem et defensorem: Joannes Stommelis Coloniensis Minorita Convent. docte pro nostris declaravit, necnon vir clarissimus et professor eloquentiae apud Lovanienses Nicolaus Vernullaeus, ostendens et palam demonstrans, Scotum supra invidiam esse. Optime, solide, et nervose pro eodem decertavit auctor Nitelae Franciscanae Hybernus in principio sui operis." Among the specific titles of the apologists we can list the following which are of greater importance: Michael Hoyerus, Oratio Encomiastica de Sanctitate Vitae et Divina Sapientia Venerabilis Joannis Duns Scoti (Duaii, 1637; Romae, 1906); Nicolaus Vernulaeus, Panegyricus aeternae memoriae et famae ven. P. Fr. I. Duns Scoti (Varsaviae, 1622; Coloniae, 1622).

such seminaries were founded in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and France. Father Wadding conceived a plan to procure an Irish Seminary for his confreres who were scattered throughout the world. This idea which was uppermost in his mind, materialized when he arrived in Rome in 1618 on official business.

At this time the Minister General of the Franciscans had a small, unfinished Church and Convent on his hands which was in danger of being sold at public auction due to a heavy debt (3,000 scudi). Not willing to relinquish this site or buildings, the General appealed to Father Wadding to take over. At first, Wadding was unwilling to assume the responsibility, especially since the prevailing conditions did not fit in with his scheme of establishing a College. However, at the insistence of the General, he consented on the condition that he would be free to establish a house of studies and recollection for the Irish Franciscans.

On June 21, 1625, the College of St. Isidore was formally established. It had for its purpose the education of Irish Franciscans who were later to become missionaries in Ireland. There was no intention of founding a Scotistic center of learning. Father Anthony Hickey became the first lector of theology and Father Patrick Fleming the first lector of philosophy. The first three students were John Ponce, Felix Dempsy and Bonaventure de la Hoid. The proressors being eminent Scotists in their own right, produced a love of Scotus in their students who subsequently became Scotists of note. Within a few years John Ponce became professor of philosophy and theology at this college. The tree began to bear fruit throughout Europe. Besides the five Scotists already mentioned, other Scotists were connected with the college, among whom the outstanding were Gaspar de la Fuente, Bonaventure Baron, Francis O'Molloy and Anthony Broudin.

At St. Isidore's there was also collected a remarkable library filled with manuscripts and early editions. During the revolution of 1798-9 a greater part of the library was destroyed, nevertheless, even to this day the collection remains very valuable and useful. It constitutes one of the great Scotistic libraries of the world.¹⁰

^{10.} For further information on St. Isidore's College cf. Cleary, Gregory, Father Luke Wadding and St. Isidore's College, Rome: Biographical and Historical Notes and Documents. A Contribution to the Tercentenary Celebrations 1625-1925 (Rome, 1925); Wadding, Luke, Annales Minorum (vol. I, p. xcvi-xcix).

d) The edition of the Opera Omnia Scoti

In 1639 Wadding and his associates published the complete works of Duns Scotus at Lyons in sixteen volumes (folio). This monumental edition, the first ever to be produced, was conceived by Wadding and carried out by him and his collaborators, Hugh Cavellus and John Ponce. Four years were devoted to the preparation of the texts; the chief libraries of Europe were investigated for manuscripts of Scotus' works and then collated with the best available editions. The entire collection was enriched by critical notes (most of them by Wadding), scholia and sectional commentaries (by Cavellus, Hickey, Ponce and Lychetus). In the first volume, a life of Duns Scotus was inserted.

European scholars bought up the edition avidly so that within .wo years it was out of print. Commentaries on Scotus' works multiplied rapidly; over a thousand of them were printed in the seventeenth century and countless others lie as unedited manuscripts in the libraries of Europe. The study of these unpublished manuscripts is a virgin field of research even to this date. Inspired by the Cursus Philosophicus and Theologicus written by Ponce, other professors undertook to publish their class-notes. The result was that the "cursus literature" grew to the same proportions as the commentary literature did in the previous three centuries.

The revival of Scotism due to this variety of causes is best exemplified in the writings of John Ponce. In a way, he contributed positively to the Scotistic revival by his collaboration on the edition of the *Opera Omnia Scoti*; he helped create an ardent love for Scotus' doctrine by his long career as teacher at St. Isidore's college; and finally, he spread the Subtle Doctor's name through the publication of his masterful treatises on Scotus' life, philosophy and theology. This is the man whom we will treat in this paper.

II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF FR. JOHN PONCE

John Ponce, or as he is commonly known, Joannes Poncius (Pontius), was born in the County of Cork, Ireland, in 1603. Very little is known about his early life. Aware of the vocation to a religious life, he went to Belgium and there entered the novitiate of the Irish Franciscans at St. Anthony's College in Louvain. When

his year of novitiate was completed he was sent by his superiors to Cologne where he studied philosophy. On completing his philosophical studies he returned to Louvain where he studied theology at St. Anthony's College under such able masters and Scotists as Hugh Ward and John Colgan. Before he completed his theological studies, he was sent to the newly established St. Isidore's College at Rome where he became one of the first three students.

Immediately on finishing his studies at St. Isidore's, Ponce began his work there as a lecturer in philosophy. He was the second to hold the chair of philosophy, succeeding Patrick Fleming, his teacher. After lecturing twice on the entire Cursus, he was promoted to the chair of theology at the same college.11 In due time he became Professor Primarius and, finally, Lector Jubilatus, the highest honors he could receive in the Franciscan Order. Towards the end of his life he lectured at Lyons and Paris, but it is hard to determine the exact dates due to the scarcity of sources. The questions asked by Dominique de Caylus regarding the last few years of his life at Paris and his activity during that sojourn remain unanswered to our day. 12 Something is known about his method of teaching because it was incorporated into the statutes of the College. The curriculum demanded that he have two hours of dictation every day and one hour of discussion. Twice a week, on Friday and Saturday, there were two-hour debates. The theologians were obliged to listen to these philosophical discussions to enable them to grasp better the dogmas of religion. Every month there was a public debate to which everyone, even seculars, was invited.

In 1627, Wadding established another college for Irish secular priests across the street from St. Isidore's. Its first rector, Father Eugene Callaghan, died soon after his appointment and the second rector, Father Martin Walsh, O.F.M., was elected Guardian of St. Isidore's a year after his nomination. Ponce succeeded him as

^{11.} Wadding writes: "in Collegium Romanum eorundem Fratrum, me procurante translatus est, ibique absolutis studiis, bis integrum cursum Philosophicum praelegit, deinde per multos annos Theologiam." Scriptores Ordinis Fratrum Minorum, Romae, 196, p. 149.

12. "Le P. Poncius fut-il amené à Paris comme professeur? Combien de temps y demeura-t-il? Quelle fut l'influence qu'il y exerça? Aurait-il été le maître du P. Jean Gabriel Boyvin, ou du célèbre P. Claude Frassen, etc.? Nous aimerions bien que quelqu'un de nos lecteurs nous fournît une réponse à ces différentes questions." Dominique de Caylus, O.F.M., "Merveilleux Epanouissement de l'école Scotiste au XVIIe siècle" in Etudes Franciscaines, XXIV (1910), 497.

third rector of the Ludovisian College on July 8, 1630, to the great satisfaction of the students and the authorities. 13

John Ponce was an active agent at Rome of the Irish Confederate Catholics. He participated in all the great battles the Old Irish waged against outsiders and within their own ranks. An excellent example of his activities in this cause is best illustrated in the so-called Bellings' affair. Paul King (O'Cindeadh), a Franciscan friar, espoused at Kilkenny the cause of Rinuccini and Owen Roe. In 1648 (July), while acting as the Nuncio's official agent, he was arrested by the order of the Confederate Council. While in jail he wrote a letter to Heber MacMahon, Bishop of Clogher, suggesting that Owen Roe should seize Kilkenny before Ormond arrived in Ireland. The letter was intercepted and Paul King probably would have been executed had he not escaped to the Continent. Richard Bellings, who was the Secratary of the Supreme Council, looked upon all this as an atrocious crime, and in his work, called the Vindiciae Catholicorum Hiberniae (Paris, 1650),14 accused Father King of a great number of crimes without, however, specifying them or substantiating his accusations with evidence. While at Louvain, King wrote his famous Epistola Nobilis Hiberni ad amicum Belgam scripta ex castris Catholicis, die 4 maii anno 1649. Bellings devoted the entire second part of his Vindiciae to dissecting this letter paragraph by paragraph. It is at this point of the controversy that John Ponce replied to the Vindiciae with his Vindiciae Eversae wherein he clears Father King of Bellings' aspersions and praises the sterling character of the friar.15

Sbaralea claims that Ponce died at Paris about 1660,16 but this is obviously incorrect. A more accurate statement is given by Cleary who places Ponce's death in 1672 or 1673.17 He is known to have been alive in the early part of 1672 and he certainly was dead in 1673, for he was commemorated among the illustrious deceased

17. Cleary, op. cit., p. 86.

^{13.} Cleary, Gregory, O.F.M., Father Luke Wadding and St. Isidore's College Rome: Biographical and Historical Notes and Documents. A contribution to the tercentenary celebrations, 1625-1925, (Rome, 1925) p. 85.

14. This book was placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum.
15. Cleary, Gregory, O.F.M., op. cit., pp. 116-7.
16. Sbaralea, Hyacinthus, O.F.M. Conv., Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Trium Ordinum S. Francisci, (Romae, 1921), Pars. II, p. 118.

members of the Order in the Intermediate Chapter celebrated at

Toledo, Spain, in 1673.18

There is a beautiful fresco of John Ponce in the Theological Hall of St. Isidore's College, painted by Fra Emanuele di Como in 1672. Above it is a banner with the following inscription:

Virtus invidiam generat, ceu Cynthius umbram Poncy et invidia est Solis ut umbra comes.

Underneath is the following eulogy:

Admodum Reverendus Pater Fr. Ioannes Poncius, Vir zeli in regnum non vulgaris, vitae candore conspicuus. Jubilatus S. Theologiae Lector nominis Magnitudine et valore celeberrimus, Felicitate indolis quam invidiae praebuit materiam, Modestia simul ac Operum soliditate subtraxit ingenius veri investigator.

III. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF JOHN PONCE

No complete bibliography of the works of Ponce has ever been made. The standard bibliographers give a list of his works and some even mention a few editions, but all of them are inaccurate and incomplete. Due to the scarcity of copies of most of these works, which were never printed after the seventeenth century, even the following bibliography will labor under some disadvantages. However, it offers the most complete and most accurate list ever made.

1. R. P. Fr. Joannis Poncii, Corcagia-Hiberni, Ordinis FF. Minorum, Sacrae Theologiae Lectoris Jubilati, Olim in Collegio Romano S. Isidori Primarii Professoris; Philosophiae ad Mentem Scoti Cursus Integer. Primum quidem editus in Collegio Romano Fratrum Minorum Hibernorum. Nunc vero demum ab ipso Authore in Conventu Magno Parisiensi recognitus, ac mendis quibus scatebat, expurgatus: insuperque Moralis Philosophia, variisque Additionibus locupletatus. Lugduni, sumpt. Joannis Antonii Hugvetan, & Marci Antonii Ravaud, MDCLIX (1659)

This edition, the title of which is quoted above and to which I will refer throughout this paper, is a very rare one. In fact, I did

^{18.} Cleary quotes the *Descripcion del capitolo Generale Intermedio* (Madrid, 1673) regarding this honorable mention of Ponce. I have been unable to locate a copy of this work.

not find it quoted in any of the bibliographers. Pluzanski¹⁹ and Harris, 20 who are not very reliable in anything they say about Duns Scotus, quote a Paris edition of 1649. This is an error for no such edition appeared during that year at Paris. A possible explanation is that it should read: Lyons, 1659, or else, Paris, 1648.

This work had five editions within the short space of 29 years, (1643-1672) all editions appearing during the lifetime of the author. The first edition appeared in Rome, "apud Lodovicum Grignanum, sumptibus Hermanni Scheus" in 1643. It comprised three volumes in quarto.21 It has only a historical value for the subsequent editions were greatly enlarged and improved.

The purported second edition is considered to have made its appearance in Rome two years later, in 1645. This time the work is said to have been enlarged to four volumes in quarto and to have contained the excellent Appendix apologetica ad praedictum cursum. Hurter²² and Leary²³ are the only ones to mention this edition and we are doubtful of its existence, neither having seen a copy of it anywhere, nor finding it listed in the standard catalogues and general bibliographies. Wadding, whose authority in this matter is certainly undeniable due to his constant contact with Ponce, claims that the second edition appeared in Paris, in 1648 tomo uno in folio, sumptibus Antonii Berthier ... auctior et correctior.24 This edition we have at hand and its full title is as follows:

Integer Philosophiae Cursus ad mentem Scoti, Primum editus in Collegio Romano Fratrum Minorum Hibernorum nunc vero ab authore, in conventu Magno Parisiensi recognitus, mendis quibus scatebat, expurgatus; Moralis insuper Philosophia, variisque additionibus locupletus. Authore R. P. Fr. Joanne Poncio, Hyberno,

^{19.} Pluzanski, E., Saggio sulla Filosofia del Duns Scoto (trad. di Augusto Alfani, Firenze, 1892), p. 291.
20. Harris, C.R.S., Duns Scotus, (Oxford, 1927, 2 vols.), vol. I, p. 338.
21. Of this edition I have only the third volume at hand. Its full title is: Integer Philosophiae Cursus ad mentem Scoti in tres partes divisus. Tertia pars complectens Libros de Gen. & Corup. Meteoris, Anima, Parvis naturalibus, & Metaphysica. Authore R. P. Fr. Joanne Poncio Hiberno Corcagiensi Sacrae Theologiae Lectore jubilato in Collegio S. Isidori. Romae sumptibus Hermanni Scheus, MDCXXXXIII.
Cf. Scriptores, p. 149; Hurter, op. cit., III, 961.
22. Hurter, op. cit., III, 961.
23. Leary, op. cit., p. 85.
24. Wadding, Scriptores, p. 149; Hurter also quotes this edition but Leary fails to mention it.

fails to mention it.

Corcagiensi Ordinis Minorum, Sacrae Theologiae Lectore Jubilato. Parisiis, sumptibus Antonii Berthier, via Jacobea, sub signo Fortunae. MDCXLVIII.

The third edition quoted by all bibliographers appeared in Paris in the year 1656. This edition as far as we are able to determine, is not found in any of our American libraries. Next appeared the edition of 1659 which we listed at the head of this bibliography. It was followed by a fifth edition in 1672 printed at Lyons, per Stephanum Baritel in fol. to. 1 cum Ethica.25 Hurter calls this printing "auctum et correctum, cum appendice apologetica, in qua plurimae difficultates ac loca Scoti exponuntur." 26

2. Appendix Apologetica. Romae, apud Andream Phaeum sumptibus Joannis Baptistae Smeraldi anno 1645.

Wadding describes this work as follows:

In qua non solum a novis, quibus impetitur, impugnationibus opus vindicatur, sed et plurimae Philosophiae difficultates, ac loca Scoti ad non mediocrem sectatorum ejus utilitatem, ac profectum examinantur, et exponuntur.27

It was appended to all the editions following 1645. In some additions, as for example, in the edition of 1659, it appears in the form of Additiones placed at the end of the respective questions in dispute. It consists principally in a refutation of Mastrius' attacks against Ponce's interpretation of Scotistic doctrine. Here Ponce demonstrates his keen dialectical abilities as well as a thorough understanding of Scotus' thought.

3. R. P. F. Joannis Poncii Hiberni Corcariensis Ordinis Minorum, S. Theologiae Lectoris Jubilati; olim in Collegio Romano S. Isidori FF. Minorum Hibernorum strictioris Observantiae, Primarii Professoris. Theologiae Cursus Integer. Ad Mentem Scoti. Editio novissima Indicibus necessariis locupletata. Lugduni, sumptibus Joannis-Antonii Hugvetan, et Guillelmi Barbier, MDCLXXI (1671).

This work should not be confounded with the Commentaria Theologica of John Ponce. It was published at Paris in the year

Sbaralea, Supplementum, p. 118.
 Hurter, op. cit., c. 961.
 Wadding, Scriptores, p. 149.

1652 "sumptibus Bertier." 28 The only other known edition appeared at Lyons in 1671 the title of which we have quoted above. According to Hurter, this edition is an opus rarum.29 In the preface of this work, Ponce has the remarkable passage (quoted elsewhere in this paper) which gives splendid testimony that during his time ipsa Scoti opinio longe communior (est).30

4. Commentarii Theologici in quibus Subtilis Doctoris Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum elucidantur et illustrantur. Parisiis, 1661 per Sebastianum Cramoisy.

This edition appeared in five volumes in folio, and is called by Hurter, an opus rarissimum.31 Sbaralea, in the Supplement to Wadding's Scriptores Ordinis Minorum, erroneously claims that this work embraced only four volumes in folio (most probably he was misled by the joint binding of two volumes). At the time Wadding was writing his Scriptores, the fifth volume of this work was in the printer's hands. He writes:

Cum vero in eadem editione (i.e. Operum Omnium Scoti) Antonius Hiquaeus de quo loco dictum est, tribus commentariorum tomis librum quartum doctissime exposuisset, et ad tres praecedentes libros similem ad commentationem, in qua firmiori methodo ex oecumenicis conciliis, SS. Patribus aliisque Doctoribus Scoti confirmaretur doctrina, et adversariorum refellerentur objectiones, excogitavisset, ac sex priores distinctiones tertii libri graviter explicuisset, nec ulterius morte abreptus, perrexisset, opus intrepide aggressus Poncius, feliciter, et breviter absolvit, scripto in primum Sententiarum libro uno, in secundum duobus, in tertium totidem, atque hos quinque tomos praelo jam habet paratos.32

5. Supplementa.

This work was added to the Opera Omnia Scoti. It consists in a commentary on every question of the Opus Oxoniense of Duns Scotus, beginning with Book III, distinction 34 and continuing to the end. Francis Lychettus provided the commentaries for the preceding questions, but was prevented by death, from finishing the work. When Vivès reprinted the Wadding edition of Scotus' works, he included this commentary also (vol. XV, pp. 463 ff.).

^{28.} Sbaralea, Supplementum, p. 118. Hurter and Bertoni likewise agree about this edition.

^{29.} Hurter, op. cit., p. 961.
30. Preface of this work.
31. Hurter, loc. cit.
32. Wadding, Scriptores, p. 149.

6. Richardi Bellingi vindiciae eversae. Parisiis, apud Franciscum Piot. 1653. In 8 vo.

This work, of which a history has been given elsewhere, is mentioned by Sbaralea and Cleary, 33 but, for some unknown reason, Hurter fails to mention it.

7. Judicium doctrinae SS. Augustini et Thomae. Parisiis, 1657. In 8 vo.

Sbaralea, Hurter and Cleary cite this work in their bibliographies, but we have been unable to locate a copy of it for perusal.

8. Scotus Hiberniae Restitutus. Parisiis, 1660. Sumptibus Dionysii Becket et Ludovici Bellaine.

John Colgan wrote a book entitled De Vita, patria, elogiis ac doctrina Doctoris Subtilis (Antwerp, 1655) in which he presented his arguments for the Irish ancestry of Duns Scotus. He was immediately taken to task by Richard Angelus a S. Francisco Mason, who in his Apologia pro Scoto Anglo (Douai, 1656) established the thesis that the Subtle Doctor was English. Ponce could not resist the temptation to come to the aid of his countryman, and wrote his Scotus Hiberniae Restitutus in reply to Mason. Modern scholarship has decisively demonstrated that all parties concerned were wrong for Scotus is definitely a Scotsman by birth. Ponce likewise appended this work to his Commentariis Theologicis I. Duns Scoti.

9. Deplorabilis populi Hibernici pro religione, rege et libertate status, Parisiis, 1651.

We have never seen this work and it is not mentioned by any of the standard bibliographers with the sole exception of Cleary, from whom we quoted the title.34

10. Disputationes in organon Aristotelis quibus adversariis veteribus Scoti Logica vindicatur. Venetiis, 1646.

This work is cited by Harris alone³⁵ and is, undoubtedly, spurious.

IV. PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINES OF JOHN PONCE

In his dedication of the Cursus Philosophicus Integer ad mentem Scoti, Ponce calls our attention to the fact that no one has

^{33.} Sbaralea, Supplementum, II, p. 118; Cleary, op. cit., p. 86.
34. Cleary, Cath. Encyclopedia, p. 228.
35. Harris, op. cit., p. 338.

written a complete cursus of philosophy according to the Subtle Doctor.³⁶ He repeats this same deplorable fact in his letter Ad Lectorem. By the time the second edition of his work appeared there were several cursus written, among them a work by Bartholomew Mastrius, in which Ponce was attacked hundreds of times. The edition which will serve as the basis of our study of Poncius's doctrine has his refutation of Mastrius in the form of additiones to the respective questions.

Among the *approbationes* of this work, one is worthy of mention for its synthesis of the opinions of contemporary scholars concerning Ponce's work. It reads as follows:

Philosophiae Cursum integrum... accurate perlegi, & ut verum fatear, opus approbo, laudo, miror: approbo, quia nihil devium ab Orthodoxa Fide reperi, nihil obvium Philosophicae veritati percepi; quin potius omnia sapientissima animadverti; laudo, quia nedum necessarium puto studiosis Scotistis, verum etiam Thomistis, utpote in quo quidquid pro offensione, ac defensione Scoti usque ad haec tempora desideratur, fideliter ac dilucide invenitur, imo studiosis omnibus perutile, in quo omnium authorum sententiae juxta propriam materiam breviter coacervatae, dilucide explicatae, & si opus sit, pro veritate aut ingeniose defensae, aut acerrime vel impugnatae, vel expugnatae, reperiuntur; miror, quia Scotus ipse in legitimo haerede tum nominis, tum patriae, tum ingenii usque ad Non plus ultra contra Neotericos duplicato spiritu seipsum defendit, nisi melius dicam, opus miror, in quo maxime Dei providentia elucet, quia si Thomas Aquinas Thomam Caietanum dignum sortitus est explanatorem, condignum Ioannes Scotus Ioannem Hibernum accepit expositorem.

It is signed by Stephen Quaranta, "Clericus Regularis S. Officii Regni Neapol. & S. Congreg. Indicis Consultor," and hence, cannot be said to be biased or due to sentiment, as would be the case if it were written by a Franciscan or an Irishman.

The division of the work, which consists of a series of tracts, disputations and questions, is as follows:

- I. Introductio ad Logicam
 Disp. 1. De Ente rationis
 - 2. De natura Logicae, seu Dialecticae
- II. Tractatus de Praedicabilibus

^{36. &}quot;Cum autem nemo, quod sciam, integram ante me Philosophiam ad mentem Doctoris exegerit, non mirabilis initia suas habere imperfectiones, quibus numquam hactenus caruere."

- Disp. 3. De Universali ut sic
 - 4. De Genere
 - 5. De Specie
 - 6. De Individuo, seu singulari
 - 7. De Differentia
 - 8. De Proprio
 - 9. De Accidente, quod est quintum praedicabile
- III. Tractatus de Praedicamentis, seu categoriis Aristotelis
 - Disp. 10. De Antepraedicamentis
 - 11. De Praedicamentis in communi
 - 12. De Substantia
 - 13. De Accidente, ut sic
 - 14. De Quantitate
 - 15. De Relatione
 - 16. De Oualitate
 - 17. De Sex ultimis praedicamentis
 - 18. De Postpraedicamentis
 - 19. De Interpretatione (in II libros Perihermenias)
 - 20. In duos Libros Priorum
 - 21. De Demonstratione
 - 22. De Scientia
- IV. Tractatus de Scientia Morali
 - Disp. 1. De Felicitate hominis
 - 2. De actibus humanis ut sic
 - 3. De actibus bonis
 - 4. De actu malo et indifferenti
 - 5. De virtutibus moralibus
 - 6. De conscientia
 - 7. De legibus
 - V. Tractatus in octo libros Physicorum

Liber primus:

- Disp. 1. De natura Physicae
 - 2. De principiis corporis naturalis in communi
 - 3. De materia prima
 - 4. De forma substantiali
 - 5. De privatione et unione
 - 6. De composito substantiali

Liber secundus:

- Disp. 7. De natura
 - 8. De causis ut sic & de causa materiali & formali
 - 9. De causa efficiente
 - 10. De causa exemplari, finali, et instrumentali
 - 11. De collatione causarum inter se & cum suis effectibus
 - 12. De fortuna, casu, fato, monstro

Liber tertius & quintus:

- Disp. 13. De motu
 - 14. De infinito

Liber quartus:

Disp. 15. De loco

16. De vacuo

17. De tempore ac duratione

Liber sextus:

Disp. 18. De continuo

Liber septimus:

Disp. 19. De duabus conditionibus requisitis, ut aliquid moveatur

Liber octavus:

Disp. 20. De motu proiectorum

21. De mundo

22. De natura et essentia, numero & motu coelorum

VI. Tractatus de generatione et corruptione

Disp. 23. De generatione

24. De alteratione

25. De conditionibus aliquibus ad agendum requisitis

26. De nutritione, augmentatione, rarefactione, condensatione

27. De elementis

28. De meteoris

VII. Tractatus de Anima

Disp. 1. De substantia animae

2. De potentiis animae sensitivae in communi

3. De potentiis externis in particulari
4. De potentiis internis sensitivis

5. De anima rationali

6. De potentia intellectiva

7. De voluntate

8. De habitibus

9. De anima separata

10. De parvis naturalibus

VIII. Tractatus in Metaphysicam

Disp. 1. Proemialis in Metaphysicam

2. De ente ut sic

3. De proprietatibus entis ut sic

4. De distinctionibus

We propose to deal with Ponce's philosophy under five headings: A. Logic; B. Moral Philosophy; C. Natural Philosophy; D. Psychology; E. Metaphysics.

A. Logic

Ponce proposes to treat logic succinctly and without diverging into the various subtleties that are often presented in logical treatises. He begins his treatise with the question of the subject-matter of logic and then, in accordance with the Scholastic tradition, immediately treats of the predicables and the categories. Very little extraneous material is inserted, unless the Additiones,

containing his rebuttal against Mastrius' accusations, can be so called. From the logical doctrines of Ponce we select the following points as being of greatest interest.

Definition: Following Duns Scotus, Ponce posits four requisites for definibility. As stated by Scotus there are five conditions, but they can be readily reduced to the four stated by Ponce. Duns Scotus writes as follows:

Ex his sequitur, quod definitio propria dicta est entis positivi, per se unius, realis, compositi realiter, vel quantum ad conceptus, universalis et solius talis.ar

Ponce gives his conditions clearly and logically: a. the thing to be defined must be a real being to be capable of a strict definition (definitio stricte dicta est oratio verum esse significans) - hence negations and privations cannot be defined; b. the thing to be defined must be one per se and not accidentally as has been pointed out by Aristotle; c. the definibile must contain more than one concept so that one of them can be the genus and the other, the specific difference; d. the definible must be a universal expressing the quiddity of the thing. Ponce omits the first condition posited by Scotus, i.e., that the definible must be a positive being, but, nevertheless, he contains it in his first condition about the reality of the definible.38

The conditions of a good definition are four in number:

a. definitio debet esse clarior definito.

He limits this condition when he writes:

Haec tamen conditio videtur spectare ad definitionem verbalem. Si autem reducatur ad definitionem realem et obiectivam, sensus erit quod definitio obiectiva, seu conceptus ipsi correspondens debeat magis deservire ad distinctionem rei definitae ab aliis rebus quam conceptus ille confusus qui habetur de illa re.

b. Definitio debet converti cum definito.

The reason for this condition is put by Ponce as follows:

Ratio autem cur adesse debeat haec conditio est, quia alias non explicabitur natura rei sic, ut possit aliquis habere conceptum proprium definiti, quo possit distingui ab aliis omnibus rebus.

c. Definitio non debet esse diminuta.

^{37.} Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 1, q. 2, n. 3 (XVI, p. 101). 38. Cursus Philosophiae Integer, pp. 8-9.

An incomplete definition is misleading. Here he also calls attention to the essential metaphysical definition which requires the genus and specific difference to be mentioned. If the genus is missing, the second condition cited above is violated and if the specific difference is wanting, this third condition is unfulfilled:

d. Definitio non debet continere superfluum.

It is useless to define man as a "two-legged rational animal."

The conditions given above are for an essential definition and are not necessarily applicable to a descriptive definition.

Hae sunt conditiones definitionis quidditativae: conditiones autem descriptivae sunt ut sit clarior definitio, convertibilis et sine superfluitate: tertia conditio de diminutione non adeo requiritur, modo non sit tam diminuta quin sit convertibilis cum descripto.39

It is likewise noteworthy to call attention to the fact that in treating the subject of definitions, Ponce did not use the Commentary In VIII libros Physicorum often attributed to Duns Scotus and used by very many Scotists. 40 Duns Scotus never gives a professional treatment of the conditions of a good definition while the Commentary on the Physics of Aristotle does contain a very definite statement of them.41

Logical Being: With great precision, Ponce explains the five significations of the term ens rationis. To quote him in full:

Primo significat omne illud, quod subiectatur in intellectu seu ratione. et in hoc sensu actus et habitus intellectus et species intelligibiles, quamvis sint entia realissima, sunt etiam entia rationis.

Secundo significat omne illud quod est producibile per intellectum sive physice, ut actus et habitus intellectuales; sive directive, ut sunt artificialia omnia, quae mediante intellectus directione fiunt, licet haec omnia secundum se sint entia realia.

Tertio significat omne, quod obiicitur intellectui, seu quod consideratur

^{39.} Cursus, p. 8.

^{39.} Cursus, p. 8.

40. It is most probably the work of Marsilius of Inghem.

41. "Prima est, quod definitio debeat sic fieri, quod per ipsam appareat; quae res sit illa, de qua datur definitio. Secunda, quod per illam possint solvi questiones contingentes circa quas est definitio. Tertia, quod per ipsam appareant causae omnium per se accidentium definiti. Et causa est, quia bona definitio non solum debet exprimere quae res est, sed etiam debet exprimere causas definiti, quae sunt causae omnium per se accidentium ejus. Quarta conditio, quod per definitionem appareat causa diversitatis opinionum de definito. Causa hujus est, quia per bonam definitionem debent exprimi omnia significata et connotata partium definiti, ex quorum ignorantia accidit fieri diversas opiniones" (VIII Phys. t. 31, n. 25).

et intelligitur ab intellectu, et in hoc sensu omnia entia realia possunt vocari

entia rationis, quia omnia illa possunt intelligi ab intellectu.

Quarto significat, praccipue apud Scotistas, omne quod non habet actu existentiam realem, quamvis eam possit habere; et in hoc sensu Antichristus est ens rationis: quae autem sunt entia rationis in hac acceptione vocantur alio nomine a Scotistis quibusdam, entia diminuta.

Ultimo denique significat illud, quod non est ens reale ulla ratione,

hoc est, quod neque realiter existit, neque realiter existere potest. 42

This last meaning is the proper sense of the term. Scotus defines this logical being in his Quodlibeta (III) as (ens rationis) est quod praecise habet esse in intellectu. Ponce elaborates this definition into

ens rationis est quod nequit aliquid efficere, neque inexistere alicui potenti efficere, nisi per considerationem potentiae potentis aliquid considerare.

This description offered by Ponce, displeased Mastrius immensely and the Additio contains eight accusations made by Mastrius. Our author refutes them brilliantly, and in this case, rather serenely.⁴⁸

Ponce holds, contrary to Scotus' opinion, that negations and privations are not *entia rationis*. This is one of the very few occasions that Ponce departs from the Subtle Doctor's teaching. In concluding his treatment, Ponce attempts to explain and conciliate his position with Scotus' tenets. He writes:

Quod si Scotus aut ullus alius Doctor, cuius authoritatem negare non placeat, negationes aut privationes vocet entia, debet explicari sic, ut velit quo l sint entia non rigore, prout ens comprehendit sola positiva, sed magis late prout comprehendit quaecumque intelligibilia sive positiva, sive negativa; si etiam vocet eas quandoque entia rationis, debet intelligi sic, ut velit quod sint entia rationis, non formaliter, sed fundamentaliter, quatenus scilicet praebent intellectui fundamentum excogitandi entia rationis.⁴⁴

In defending Duns Scotus or in explaining his doctrine or in conciliating seemingly conflicting opinions held by the Subtle Doctor, Ponce always shows himself to be a master dialectician. In the question whether a cognitum et volitum are logical entities, Scotus' views are apparently at variance with Ponce's doctrine on logical being. To disperse the difficulties Ponce offers five possible ways in which Scotus' statements could be explained to the satisfaction

^{42.} Cursus, pp. 27-28.

^{43.} pp. 28-30. 44. Cursus, p. 33.

ot all concerned. 45 Some might consider this but another example of the subtleties with which some Scotists (and others) were wont to burden their works; to our mind, however, this is but an illustration of the careful study and deep consideration Ponce devotes to any possible objections that could be raised regarding his explanation of Scotistic tenets. In any case, it is an amazingly practical application of logic to problems with which a Scotist is confronted.

Another excellent treatment of a moot question is given by Ponce when he discusses the effective cause of logical being. He seems to admit that the Subtle Doctor holds that the will, just as well as the intellect, can be the efficient cause of logical entities. As for himself, Ponce posits the conclusion that the will cannot be the source of an ens rationis. To my mind, Scotus would agree with Ponce's conclusion notwithstanding Ponce's statement to the contrary. Since Ponce does not quote Duns Scotus directly, it is impossible to point out where he misinterprets the Subtle Doctor's mind

This treatment would not be complete were we not to single out Ponce's disagreements with Mastrius on the division of the logical being, 46 the explanation of first and second intentions, 47 the difficulties concerning the object of science⁴⁸ and the dispute about the distinction between Logica utens and Logica docens. 40 In all these additiones, Ponce successfully defends his position against the most intricate objections raised by Mastrius. The limits of this paper do not permit a thoroughgoing explanation and elucidation of controversies, but a study of them would repay anyone interested in their subject matter.

Principle of individuation: Although in modern times, the treatment of the principle of individuation is found in treatises of metaphysics when unity is discussed, Ponce discusses it in the tract on the Predicables. This is not surprising for it was the traditional locus classicus for such a consideration. This little treatise⁵⁰ is an opusculum in itself and may be considered among the best contributions of Ponce in the field of Scotistic philosophy. His careful

^{45.} pp. 39-40. 46. pp. 47-48. 47. pp. 49-50. 48. p. 54. 49. pp. 63-65.

^{50.} pp. 128-139.

distinction between the various views of Thomists and other Scholastics, his clear refutation of their principles, and the precise exposition of the Scotistic view, have very seldom been surpassed in philosophical literature. His conclusion is:

Principium individuationis rerum, hoc est illud, quo formaliter constituitur individua quaecumque res, sive totalis sive partialis, sive substantialis sive accidentalis, sive materialis sive spiritualis, est aliquid positivum realiter identificatum rei individuatae, formaliter tamen ab ipsa distinctum, quae entitas vocatur singularitas, quia facit rem, in qua est, singularem seu incommunicabilem; vocatur autem haeccitas, quia facit rem determinatam et hanc: vocatur individualitas... quia contrahit naturam specificam ad Petrum et ad Paulum.51

This is the gist of Scotistic teaching on this subject.

His animadversio at the end of the treatise is very clear and important and merits a quotation in full:

Advertendum autem pro complemento huius rei, quod licet illud positivum, quod iam explicuimus, sit principium formale individuationis cuiuslibet rei: tamen, quoties res individua constituitur ex partibus realiter distinctis, quarum quaelibet est singularis, illae partes ut singulares, sint principium radicale individuationis istius rei: nam si non fuisset res constans ex illis partibus, non fuisset illud singulare, quod est, sed aliud singulare: et universaliter quaecumque constituunt intrinsice aliquam rem, possunt vocari principia et radices omnium praedictorum convenientium isti rei de quo non est ulla difficultas. Quando vero res non constituitur ex partibus physicis, sed est physice simplex, tunc non quaerendum aliud principium aut radix individuationis, praeter totam entitatem rei istius simplicis, quae physice considerata potest dici principium omnium praedictorum istius rei. 52

On the question: "Utrum idem accidens numero possit poni in diversis subjectis realiter aeque immediate," Ponce is at variance with what seems to be Scotistic doctrine. He acknowledges that Scotus holds the first opinion which denies such a possibility and even quotes the passage from the Subtle Doctor's works (a procedure seldom found in his works). Most probably, because of the respect he bears for Scotus, he denominates his own affirmative answer as a sententia probabilior instead of making a categorical affirmation.53

Action: Next to the principle of individuation, Ponce devotes the greatest space and consideration to the exposition of praedica-

^{51.} p. 138.

^{52.} p. 139. 53. p. 193.

mental action. Because of its equivocal use,54 the term "action" has caused many misrepresentations and difficulties in the Scotistic system. Ponce, for example, cites six significations of the term "action".

Primo enim significat actiones vitales, quibus potentiae vitales tendunt in sua obiecta, ut intellectus in intelligibile, voluntas in volibile, visus in visibile, quae actiones sunt de praedicamento qualitatis, et non huius prae-

Secundo sumitur aliquando a Philosopho pro reacta, seu pro effectu, qui producitur ab efficiente: et sic etiam non spectat ad hoc praedicamentum,

sed ad illa, ad quae spectat res illa producta.

Tertio sumitur pro respectu, seu relatione, quae supponitur resultare in re, quae aliam rem producit statim atque illam producit; et manet in illa re, quandiu coexistit cum re producta: et actio hoc modo spectat potius ad praedicamentum Ad aliquid, quam ad hoc praedicamentum, si tamen detur talis actio, seu productio.

Quarto, sumitur pro respectu educentis ad formam, quae educitur ab

aliquo agente ex potentia alicuius subiecti.

Quinto pro respectu inducentis ad formam, quam inducit aliquod agens in aliquod subjectum.

Sexto denique sumitur pro respectu transmutantis ad transmutatum, mediante quod scilicet aliquod agens mutat aliquod subjectum.53

In this question, the author does not adhere rigidly to the teaching of Duns Scotus, and several times resorts to explanations of the mens Scoti when the text of Scotus contradicts his position. His entire elaboration of the relation of the inductio and eductio is quite involved and would require more than the limits of this article to explain. It suffices for us to give Ponce's own definition of action and his five conclusions. His descriptive definition is as follows: Action is an

accidens quo mediante formaliter aliquid communicat esse alteri, abstrahendo a modo, quo communicat illud esse, sive scilicet id fiat pre receptionem, sive per informationem, aut inhaesionem, sive sine receptione aut inhaesione aut informatione.56

In answering the question

An detur aliquid medium inter efficiens et effectum, quod habeat rationem actionis.

Ponce derives three conclusions which are in accord with Thomistic

^{54.} Op. Ox., IV, d. 13, q. 1.55. Cursus, p. 244.56. p. 248.

and Scotistic teachings: a. that there is no middle action between cause and effect, when the effect cannot be produced by any other cause; b. that there is no middle action between God and the one effect produced by Him alone; c. that a middle action is required between a secondary cause and an effect which can be produced by another cause. 57 His two other conclusions are purely Scotistic and contrary to the teaching of the Thomists, i.e.

illud positivum in quo formaliter consistit actio, non est quid absolutum, sed est respectus extrinsecus adveniens

and secondly,

actio subjectatur in agente.58

This treatise on action and passion became the source of a bitter polemic with Mastrius. The additio in which the usual refutations of Mastrius are given is exceptional because in it we find the only personal note in the whole work. It shows a certain irritation and scholastic pride and merits to be quoted in full:

In toto articulo 5 Disp. 6 Met. quem incipit num. 46 Mastrius examinat doctrinam meam in hac questione et sequenti de actione et passione. Mihi autem incumbit refellere quae contra opponit, omitto autem tricas illas, quatenus mihi agit gratias quod sententiam et rationes illius ad negandum alias relationes inter producens et productum praeter actionem productivam et passionem ipsi correspondentem amplectar, sic insinuans, quod ab eo illam sententiam et rationes mutuatus fuerim. Sed ne teneatur ulterius eo gratitudinis titulo, nego constanter id verum esse, nam, ut ante dixi in mea Apologia, illam sententiam et rationes habui antequam, an Mastrius esset in rerum natura cognoveram, et reperiri possunt in scriptis meorum Discipulorum, quae sexdecim ab hinc annis excepere. 59

Statements like the above are certainly sarcastic and are indicative of the seriousness with which the two men defended their doctrines. It is hard to fail to see a certain sly insinuation against Mastrius' knowledge and the left-handed dig against his reasoning abilities in such statements as these made by Ponce: "An non crederit aliquis P. Mastrium multa dicendo nihil agere?" — or reviewing Mastrius' argument he puts into parentheses "ut reducam reliquam partem discursus Mastrii ad formam"; which certainly is a disparaging remark to make about Mastrius' logical abilities; or the statement:

^{57.} pp. 249-50.

^{58.} pp. 248-51 (should be: pp. 251-3) 59. p. 251.

"Ut autem hoc et meam doctrinam intelligat Mastrius, de quo certus sum, quod me hactenus non intellexerit..." He also uses the oratorical trick of saying "omitto quod non recte dicat..." and "omitto etiam quod male putet..." and then proceeds to show what Mastrius "non recte" or "male" thinks or says. 60 A refutation of one objection raised by Mastrius is given only to help out "those ignorant of metaphysics" — "haec est responsio Mastrii quam non sufficere, neminem credo esse vel leviter in Metaphysica versatum, qui non videat, adeo ut vix opus esset eam impugnare, nisi etiam minus versatis satisfaciendum esset." 61 The sarcasm reaches its highest peak in the "Inane tibi videtur Mastri? At ego certe non putavi creatos adhuc oculos, quibus id videri posset." 62

This is the longest additio of Ponce and it is likewise the most enjoyable. Though he omitted to retain his usual composure and impersonal treatment of disputed questions, he seems to be justified in his actions for he was harshly and arrogantly treated by Mastrius. When Ponce insinuated that God could, with certain qualifying explanations, be included in the categories, Mastrius attacked him by writing: "Hic Pontius male tractat Deum sicut et alter." In this additio, Ponce has taken his revenge.

B. Moral Philosophy

The tract on Moral Philosophy did not appear in the first edition of the Cursus. In itself, the ethics is not an exceptional tract for it does not contain any unique teachings nor does it have any merit with regard to the elucidation of Scotistic doctrine. The general views of the Franciscan school are accepted and explained but without any notable contributions as to arguments adduced for any particular thesis. For the sake of brevity, we will point out only the Scotistic theses that are sustained by Ponce in opposition to the general tenets of St. Thomas and his School.

Among the first notable Scotistic thesis upheld by Ponce is the one declaring the external act as contributing an added goodness or malice to an internal act. The argumentum potissimum is taken from the practice of the Church. If the contrary were true, then

^{60.} pp. 252-3. 61. p. 254. 62. p. 256.

it would suffice to confess that only an efficacious desire to commit murder or adultery was had although the murder or the adulterous act was indeed committed.⁶³ From this, the author immediately proceeds to consider evil and indifferent acts. Contrary to all Thomists, he holds the thesis that

potest dari actus in individuo, qui neque ex obiecto aut circumstantia ulla habeat esse bonus aut malus moraliter, bonitate honesta aut malitia inhonesta.⁶⁴

The argument is taken from reason for we can act without seeing the goodness or malice of an act, or granting that we see it, without intending it.

With the usual Scholastic identification of an evil act with sin, Ponce proceeds to speak of the distinction of sins. When dealing with the gravity of sins he adduces texts from Sacred Scripture and from the Athanasian Creed; further, when dealing with the question whether God is the cause of sin, he resorts to statements by the Councils (Orange and Tridentine) and quotes St. Chrysostom and St. Augustine. Although he clearly admits the distinction between philosophy and theology, he nevertheless, cannot refrain from using confirmatory arguments from the Scriptures, Fathers and the Councils. This, although it is not reprehensible, is not desired; yet even modern scholastics commit this faux pas.

Three other theses, distinctly anti-thomistic, are held by the author. The first refers to the connection between the moral virtues and reads as follows:

Virtutes morales appetitivae verbi gratia justitia, fortitudo, temperantia, non sunt sic connexae, quin ex illis quaelibet perfectissime non solum physice, sed etiam moraliter posset acquiri sine alia.⁸⁵

The other two refer to law:

Deus potest dispensare in aliquibus praeceptis Decalogi et consequenter in aliquibus praeceptis iuris naturae, quia talia ab omnibus admittuntur praecepta Decalogi; 68

and secondly,

Ordinatio in qua consistit lex humana, est actus voluntatis; non vero solius intellectus, nec intellectus simul et voluntatis.⁶⁷

^{63.} pp. 324-5.

^{64.} pp. 326-7. 65. p. 358.

^{66.} pp. 366-7. 67. p. 369.

C. Natural Philosophy

Jansen treated Ponce's natural philosophy in one sentence by attaching to it the epithet "mittelalterlichen." 68 However, since Ponce's natural philosophy reflects the position of Duns Scotus on many points, we must call attention to several of its specific contributions.

At the very outset of the treatise, Ponce treats at great length and with considerable success, the object of physics. He shows his keen analytical ability by citing and precisely determining seven different opinions on this point. Contrary to many Scotists and Thomists who claim that ens mobile ut mobile is the object of physics, Ponce determines the substantia corporea completa as the object of said science. In explanation of what a substantia corporea completa is, he writes:

Intelligo autem per substantiam corpoream completam, substantiam completam habentem partes extra partes connaturaliter loquendo, qualis substantia vocatur ab aliquibus corpus metaphysicum, non quod sit considerationis metaphysicae, sed ad distinctionem corporis mathematici, quae est quantitas trinae dimensionis, hoc est longa, lata, profunda, et corporis physici, quae est altera pars viventis, ipsum cum anima essentialiter constituens: quod corpus est quid incompletum, et per se quidem considerationis physicae non minus, quam materia et forma, sed non per modum obiecti adaequati, nec per modum speciei directe sub obiecto adaequato contentae. Malui etiam corpus sub hac consideratione assignare pro obiecto adaequato, quam sub consideratione substantiae compositae ex materia et formae, propter dicta conclusione quarta.69

In holding this opinion Ponce is departing from the Scotistic opinion, for Scotus in his Commentary on the Metaphysics (VI Meta. q. 1) asserts that

corpus naturale ut naturale, id est ut habens principium motus et quietis, est obiectum physicae, et idem corpus non tamen ut naturale, sed secundum aliam considerationem nimirum ut est capax quantitatis, est objectum Mathematicae.

Ponce attempts to reconcile his position with Scotus' by recourse to the mens Scoti but finally concludes

^{68. &}quot;Uber die gross angelegte und scharfsinning spekulativ tief durchgeführte Natur-philosophie ist weiter nichts zu sagen, sie ist in der Art des Mastrius, Philipp Faber, Colombo, Dupasquin streng mittelalterlich gehalten." Jansen, Bernard, S.J., "Zu Philosophie der Scotisten des 17 Jahrhundert" in Franziskanische Studien, XXIII (1936), 53.
69. Cursus, p. 376.

quod totum dictum est ad explicationem Scoti in loco praedicto, quamvis non profitear defendere, quidquid ab eo asseritur in aliis operibus praeter libros Sententiarum et Quodlibeta, sicut nec Thomistae defendunt omnia, quae dixit D. Thomas in sententiis, aut aliis operibus praeter Summam.⁷⁰

Such a position towards the genuine works of Scotus is not advisable because many of them contain the ultimate position of the Subtle Doctor on the subject treated; such a procedure is an unscholarly evasion of the difficulties encountered.

In the question concerning the existence and nature of prime matter, Ponce gives a list of appellations given to prime matter among the ancients. This is of interest and hence I quote the passage:

Pro complemento huius quaestionis proponenda videbantur varia nomina, quibus veteres materiam appellare consueverunt, occasione accepta ex eius natura iam descripta. Aegyptii eam faecem vitae dixerunt, quoniam substantiarum a Deo productarum est contemptibilissima: quam etiam ob rationem August. 12 Confess. eam ait esse prope nihil. Iidem Egyptii eam Lunae effigie hierogliphice denotabant, quod Lunae instar, alieno splendore eniteat, pulchritudinem omnem a forma, quam recipit, desumens; et etiam quod nimium mutabilis modo hanc, modo illam speciem induat, qua de causa vocatur adultera, ac etiam malefica; non vero quia machinatur caedem formae, quam possidet, ut alia forma fruatur (ut dicunt Complutenses) hoc enim omnino falsum est, illa enim contentissima est quacumque, et mere passive se habet ad mutationes, quas subit, ut propterea merito posset ab odiosis nominibus vindicari.

Plato eam vocat magnum et parvum: magnum quidem capacitate, quod scilicet omnes formas possit recipere, et in omnibus speciebus corporum naturalium compositorum reperiri; parvum autem, quod ex se nullas formas aut operationes habeat. Idem quoque Matris nomen illi attribuit, sicut et post eum Aristoteles, eo quod instar matris formas substantiales in sinum receptas sustendando foveret; vel quod composita corporea omnia ex ea, tanquam ex communi omnium matre generarentur. Ab Hesiodo et Poetis appelabatur Chaos, quia secundum se est rudis indegestaque moles, quod de chao dixerat Ovidius.⁷¹

Ponce adduces eight proofs for his thesis that prime matter is not a pure potency but is an entitative act. In this he agrees with Scotus against the Thomists.⁷² However, in a subsequent thesis about the possibility of several subordinated substantial forms existing simultaneously in the same matter, Ponce departs from the generally accepted opinion of Scotus and sides with the Thomists

^{70.} p. 377.

^{71.} p. 386. 72. pp. 389-91.

in the negation of such a possibility. His thesis is that naturaliter it is impossible; de potentia absoluta, i.e., supernaturaliter there is such a possibility.78 Even here he wishes to be a good Scotist for he holds his theory not because it is contrary to Scotus but quamvis putem eam non esse difformem ipsius principiis: sed potius conformem.74

When considering the question of time and duration, Ponce holds the Scotistic thesis

Tempus intrinsecum non distinguitur realiter a re succesiva, ut succesiva est, cuius tempus dicitur esse duratio intrinseca: v.g. tempus intrinsecum, seu duratio intrinseca motus, quo navis movetur ex Hibernia in Angliam, seu Sol ab oriente ad occidentem, non distinguitur realiter ab ipso motu.75

Time is formally distinct from motion

quod autem motus et tempus formaliter distinguantur, patet, quia motus consideratur in ordine ad formam, quae acquiritur: tempus vero in ordine ad quantitatem durationis, quam habet motus.76

In this question the spurious work of Scotus, De rerum principio, is used for the first time. It has been discovered by Wadding at the time of the publication of the Opera Omnia Scoti and inserted among his works. Modern research has definitely determined that this work is spurious and is partly the product of Cardinal Vitalis de Fourno and Godefroy de Fontaines.⁷⁷

D. Psychology

Ponce's treatment of the soul is a classic. Here he is more thoroughly Scotistic than in any other tract, with the possible exception of the treatise on the Metaphysics. The practical application of the formal distinction in the Scotistic system is most clearly seen in the treatment of the soul and its faculties and Ponce did not miss the opportunity to bring this out.

The soul: Ponce distinguishes between a triple mode of immor-

^{73.} p. 417. 74. p. 417.

^{75.} p. 567.
76. p. 568.
77. Cf. Glorieux, P., "Pour en finir avec 'De Rerum Principio'" in the Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, XXXI (1939), 225-234; Carreras y Artau, Joaquin, Ensayo sobra el voluntarismo del J. Duns Scot (Gerona, 1923) 74-84.

tality, namely, "si nulla ratione possit desinere, etiam de potentia Dei absoluta" (God's immortality); "quod licet possit de potentia Dei absoluta et etiam de ordinaria desinere, non desinet tamen unquam, sed perpetue conservabitur" (the souls of brutes); "quod licet possit de potentia absoluta desinere esse, sive per corruptionem, sive per annihilationem, sive per conversionem; tamen, ex natura sua exigit connaturaliter in perpetuum conservari" (angels, the heavens and prime matter).78 In natural agreement with other Scholastic theologians and philosophers, Ponce holds that the soul is immortal. As proofs he adduces the arguments from Sacred Scripture, the Councils and from reason. Admitting the proofs from the Scriptures and the Councils, Ponce denies the validity of the arguments from reason. He adduces four of them and refutes them immediately (the four arguments: from the soul's spirituality; from the innate appetite for immortality; from the independent spiritual operations of the soul; and the moral argument based on God's justice). 79 Instead, he upholds the Scotistic conclusion that

non potest demonstrari aut probari ulla ratione evidenti, quod anima sit immortalis, aut ex natura sua, aut ex ullo alio capite, per se vel per accidens. 80

Concerning this problem many have raised the question about Aristotle's position. Ponce manifests a very sane attitude towards the philosophers who spend their time trying to determine what Aristotle actually taught. He writes:

Hanc difficultatem (i.e. quid senserit Aristoteles) plurimi fusissime tractant, quibusdam sustinentibus quod tenuerit partem affirmativam, quibusdam quod negativam; et aliis fuerit omnino dubius, nec quidpiam decideret, aliquando in unam partem propensus, aliquando in alteram: quibus ego assentio: nec rem iudico maiori examine dignam: quoad doctos enim, non deberent moveri autoritate Philosophi, nisi quatenus ratio etiam eam stabiliret, quoad alios vero magis sufficere debet illis autoritas Patrum et Theologorum, ac Philosophorum aliorum, quam Aristotelis.81

The soul is not really distinct from its potencies, or as Ponce puts it,

^{78.} p. 799.

^{79.} p. 800. 80. p. 801. 81. p. 802.

anima rationalis non distinguitur realiter ab intellectu et voluntate, et consequenter potentiae cuiuslibet animae concomitantes ipsam et non includentes aliquid corporis, identificatur ipsi.82

Surprisingly though, he does not assert the formal distinction but simply states

an autem distinguantur formaliter ab anima, aut inter se, dependet ex principiis ex quibus colligitur dari distinctio formalis, de qua in Metaphysica.83

The same might be said about his thesis

non sunt duo tactus realiter distincti, quorum unus haberet pro obiecto unam contrarietatem nempe humiditatem et siccitatem, alter alteram, nempe calorem et frigus.84

Ponce quotes Scotus' statement that "sensus tactus sint formaliter duo" but does not give any arguments for the formal distinction, being preoccupied only with the denial of the real distinction.

The intellect: The object of the intellect is not the "quidditas rei materialis" as proposed by the Thomists. In the words of Ponce,

quidditas rei materialis non esset objectum adaequatum terminativum intellectus humani, neque ex se, neque in status separationis, neque in statu coniunctionis cum corpore.85

Being as such is the primary adequate object of the intellect pro hoc statu; and at the same time, we can know not only the universal concepts but also singular material objects.88 The conclusion that reason does not require the species impressa intelligibilis is in accordance with the best Scotistic teaching. In this case, however, Ponce retains only two of the Subtle Doctor's arguments and then offers three of his own and one adopted from Arriaga.87

There is no real distinction between the active and passive intellects. With Scotus, Ponce admits only the formal distinction between them.88 In answering the question whether the separated soul and the angels possess an active intellect, Ponce affirms with Scotus that they have, 89 although they differ specifically among each other.90

Although intellection is connaturally produced by the intellect,

^{82.} p. 749. 83. p. 751. 84. pp. 784-5. 85. p. 806. 86. p. 808.

^{87.} pp. 810-12. 88. pp. 813-14. 89. p. 814. 90. pp. 814-15.

it can be produced without the effective concourse of the intellect by God.⁹¹ Consequently, intellection can take place in any other subject besides the intellect e.g. in the will. To quote Ponce's conclusion:

Potest intellectio poni in alio subiecto quam intellectu de potentia absoluta, ut in voluntate, quamvis haec distingueretur realiter ab intellectu, et etiam in lapide, si non repugnet hoc ipsi ratione spiritualitatis.92

This position naturally leads to the question about intuitive and abstract cognition about which Ponce holds distinctively Scotistic views.

Intuitive cognition is described as

illa quae repraesentat obiectum eo modo, quo repraesentabile est, quando cognitio terminatur ad ipsum secundum esse suum reale actuale, et non secundum esse intentionale, hoc est, secundum esse quod habet in specie aut cognitione aliqua sui. Cognitio vero abstractiva est, quae non repraesentat ipsum sic, sed eo modo, quo repraesentatur, quando cognoscitur secundum esse intentionale tantum.98

This intuitive cognition takes place only when its object is really existent. Hence, the view held by Arriaga, that the auditory cognition of a non-existent sound is intuitive is false; it is not enough that the sound exist in its species, it must really exist. Scotus' statement (Opus Oxoniense, IV, d. 10, q. 9) that intuitive cognition can take place without an object, must according to Ponce, be understood "de cognitione intuitiva actu repraesentante." 94

Finally, Ponce treats of the existence of intellectual memory. Its existence is commonly accepted by all Scholastics, but the divergence lies in the distinction between the intellect and intellectual memory. St. Thomas and his followers favor the real distinction; Ponce adopts the Scotistic position of positing the formal distinction between them. As proofs he offers Occam's razor, about the non-multiplying of potencies without necessity and also the impossibility of having an intellect that can be understood without remembering.95

The will: Besides the spiritual cognitive faculty, man's soul possesses also a spiritual faculty of appetition, the will. This will

^{91.} pp. 824-25. 92. pp. 825-28. 93. p. 831.

^{94.} p. 831.

^{95.} p. 833.

depends for its acts on a judgment of the intellect as a necessary condition. In general, Ponce retains the position of Scotus on the doctrine of the will, a position that does not differ greatly from that of St. Thomas.

We must call attention, however, to the question of the primacy of the will. Ponce is rather cautious in his answer, admitting the difficulties involved but not refraining from making a conclusion. He writes:

Ego certe difficile esse existimo judicium ferre et fortassis ita se habent hae potentiae, ut neutra altera sit simpliciter perfectior, sed quaelibet perfecta in suo ordine, et una altera perfectior, in una ratione ac imperfectior in alia, instar excedentium et excessorum. 96

Nevertheless, his conclusion is in keeping with the traditional Scotistic doctrine

si altera ex his potentiis sit simpliciter perfectior, debet dici, quod voluntas sit perfectior.97

In presenting the proofs, Ponce is critical of one of them offered by the Scotist Hickey, namely, that the formal object of the will is more perfect. The other two arguments (one based on the more perfect act of the will, which is charity; the other on the dominion of the will over the other faculties) are accepted by him but not over-enthusiastically.

E. Metaphysics

Metaphysics, as has been pointed out by Jansen, "weist die unverwüstlich spekulative Kraft des Scotismus auf." 98 Ponce's mind was pre-eminently metaphysical, and so his work on the Metaphysics of Scotus is of great merit. It must be noted, that although he disagreed at times with Scotus' arguments in other fields of philosophy. Ponce never departs from the Subtle Doctor's reasons in Metaphysics. A review of the principal questions of Scotistic metaphysics will bear out our statement.

The introductory question of the metaphysics deals with its object. This object, to use the words of Ponce himself, is

^{96.} p. 856. 97. p. 856. 98. Jansen, op. cit., p. 53.

ens reale ut sic, quatenus comprehendit omnia entia realia immaterialia ut cognoscibilia naturaliter.99

Metaphysics considers all being

secundum omnia praedicata generica et specifica, quae non includunt materiam primam, nec dicunt per se ordinem ad illam, quatenus ratione naturali sunt cognoscibilia.100

Coming to the question about the nature of being, Ponce begins by denying a univocal concept of being with regard to real and logical being, even though some Scotists (Mauritius de Portu, Bonetus and John Canonicus) held its possibility.101 The objective concept of being is formally distinguished from the inferior grades by which it is contracted to God and creatures, to substance and accidents. 102 He states the main conclusion about the univocity of being as follows:

Ens ut sic praedicatur formaliter univoce de Deo et creatura, substantia et accidentibus, non vero aequivoce aut analogice, prout praedicari analogice opponitur praedicationi univocae. 103

This is one of the basic tenets of Duns Scotus and all the Scotists. Ponce supplies the traditional proofs, but is not very much convinced by their conclusiveness. Humbly he writes:

Haec doctrina, quamvis probabilissima sit vel ob ipsam Scoti et Scotistarum omnium authoritatem, et fortasse in re ipsa vera sit, patitur tamen ingentes difficultates, quas ego fateor me numquam superare potuisse, et quas iam proponam, tum ut ipsa doctrina melius examinandi occasio detur. 104

The chief difficulty, according to him, arises in the attempt to explain how does being, being univocal, escape being a genus. All the objections he can think of are brought forth and answered to the best of his abilities but he remains unsatisfied.

The doctrine about the univocity of being brought the severest attacks of Mastrius upon Ponce. The additiones to these questions are the longest in the entire work, and contain some of his strongest language. Witness, for example, such remarks as these:

Respondeo consequentiam esse dignam Mastrio Authore, de qua potius erubescendum ipsi, quam de Conscotistarum defectu in non advertenda energia ludicri argumenti ab ipso propositi.105

^{99.} p. 876. 103. p. 890. 100. p. 877. 101. p. 879. 102. p. 882. 104. p. 890.

^{105.} p. 887.

Later he writes:

cum enim ipsius impugnatio dependeat a pessima doctrina ipsius de nulla distinctione a parte rei inter ens, et differentias vel modos contrahentes praeter virtualem, certe valere nequit: voco autem illam doctrinam pessimam non absolute, quatenus proponeretur a Thomistis et Recentioribus, qui universim negant distinctionem formalem, sed quatenus proponitur a Scotista, illam distinctionem alibi concedente. 1996 — Non ergo futilis est mea ratio: nec in ea peto principium. Sed utraque haec censura rectius cadit in Mastrium, de quo propterea non tantum hic, sed fere semper, cum ex se censorem agit, recte dici potest: Incidit in foveam quam fecit.107

In this controversy, Ponce brings out several fine points of Scotistic doctrine, especially a treatment of the intrinsic modes which are so important for the proper understanding of the formal distinction. 108

Next to the univocity of being, the denial of the real distinction between essence and existence forms one of the most characteristic features of Scotistic doctrine. Ponce defends this thesis but does not offer any arguments besides the traditional proofs proposed by the Scotistic School. His real contribution in this question consists in a rather thorough refutation of the objections raised by Father Blaise a Conceptione. As a corollary to this problem, Ponce concludes that essence and existence are formally distinct. He admits, however, that this is not the Scotistic position although many Scotists pass it off as such. 109 Duns Scotus denied the real distinction, but as far as we can make out, he never affirmed the formal distinction between essence and existence

Ponce develops other Scotistic theses as, for example, that the supposite adds only a negative note to the singular substance, 110 that the transcendentals are only formally distinct from being, 111 etc. On all these questions he carries on a subtle polemic with Mastrius as he did on other metaphysical problems. Space forbids us to go into detail about these controversies and we must limit ourselves to making a few remarks about the formal distinction.

There is no doubt in Ponce's mind about the existence of a formal distinction. 112 His contribution in this respect does not lie in the adducing of new arguments for he did not, rather it is the

^{106.} p. 891.

^{110.} pp. 913-23.

^{107.} p. 895. 108. pp. 896-900. 109. p. 902.

^{111.} p. 929. 112. p. 941.

clear and logical presentation of the material already generally accepted, and in the masterful solving of the difficulties proposed by Vasquez and Suarez. My only objection is that he distinguished between the formal distinction and formal non-identity. If that were true, it is certainly not Scotistic for the Subtle Doctor expressly states that the formal distinction would better be called the formal non-identity. However, we will reserve the treatment of the formal distinction for another paper, due to its great importance and exceeding difficulty.

V. APPRECIATION AND CONCLUSION

John Ponce is a great Scotist. His love of the Subtle Doctor manifests itself in the long years of study and research devoted to his doctrine and in the tremendous literary output in the view of propagating Scotistic thought. Besides the tedious and backbreaking collaboration in the editing of Scotus' Opera Omnia, where Ponce supplied the valuable commentaries in the third and fourth book of the Sentences, Ponce also has written a complete Course of Philosophy and Theology ad mentem Scoti. He did not spare the time nor the effort to refute the critics, clarify moot questions concerning difficult passages and doctrines, and reconcile seeming contradictions in Scotistic philosophy and theology.

Ponce's greatness lies in his contribution to the philosophical literature. Up to his time, the Commentary on the IV Books of the Sentences, was still in vogue among the Scholastics. Ponce introduced, as he claims, the classical Cursus, or at least, made it popular. We qualify this statement because we know of at least one work bearing the title Cursus that appeared before his day, that of Nicholas de Orbellis.113 Whatever the case may be, Ponce receives the credit for breaking away from the classical Commentaries and the Cursus is always associated with his name. The cursus literature saw its hey-day in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and to some extent appears even in our own day.114

113. Cursus Philosophiae seu compendium mathematicum, physicum et meta-

physicum (Bononiae, 1485).

114. Among the several modern Cursus we may mention: Cherubini, F., Cursus Philosophicus ad mentem Doctoris Subtilis, (Romae, typ. Sallustiana, 1904, 2 vols.).

Ponce is also to be commended for not falling into the error prevalent in his day, i.e., he did not embrace the Conciliatory Scotistic School — a school that attempted to reconcile St. Thomas and Duns Scotus. Rada, Macedo and others founded a movement that, at first sight, seems desirable but when considered in its effects and implications, represents a certain degree of decadence and a dangerous tendency. This conciliatory theory is responsible to no small extent for the various subtleties that were introduced to explain away fundamentally opposing tenets of Thomas and Scotus. Ponce, undoubtedly, saw these disastrous consequences and did not attempt any conciliation of the impossible. He refused to be fashionable and preferred to defend the traditional doctrines, or to simply drop them as untenable.

Despite his love of Scotism, Ponce is not a slavish follower of Scotus. He did not surrender his originality, individuality and academic freedom to the magister dixit. It can be said in all truth, that he accepts the Scotistic position on principle, but on rare occasions he rises above it — not so much to contradict the doctrine, but to disagree with the arguments proposed. This is his position as he himself has said in refuting Mastrius' accusations that he proved to be a faithless disciple of Scotus. He accepts Scotus' conclusions but feels free to deny the strength and convincing power of some of the Subtle Doctor's proofs.

With reference to his character, literary ability and philosophical genius we can justly ascribe to Ponce the estimate made of him by Wadding. Wadding, who knew him as a young man and as a mature scholar, characterizes Ponce in the following words:

Ingenio pollet subtili, sed claro, prompto ad dicendum, facili ad scribendum. In litteris humanioribus non mediocriter versatus illarum cultum non neglexit, quantumvis seriis semper studiis vacaverit; religione et virtute omnibus gratus.¹¹⁵

In these words we have a perfect tribute by a man who is known to have been a marvelous judge of character and talent.

Ponce also had a passionate love of his country, Ireland. He spared neither his precious time nor intellectual abilities to help the Irish Confederate Catholics. He succeeded to a large extent in subduing the petty dissensions that arose among the Irish Con-

^{115.} Wadding, Scriptores, I, pp. 149-50.

federates. His *Vindiciae* are a monument to his patriotism, and a credit to his literary abilities and dialectics. This love of country he possessed always and was mindful of his Irish origin even when writing his profound theological and philosophical works. Proof of this we have in the conclusion to his Ethics and Metaphysics where he mentions St. Patrick in the pious exhortation to God, the Blessed Mother and St. Francis.¹¹⁶

Lest we be led to believe that Ponce possessed no drawbacks, we must mention his faults, or some of them, at least. In common with his Scholastic contemporaries, Ponce fails to avail himself of the scientific and non-scholastic literature of his day. He does mention Calvin and Luther and alios-hereticos, Laurence Valla, the humanist, and a few others, but otherwise he limits himself to Scotists, Thomists and a few Scholastic independent thinkers. This failure to integrate the non-scholastic and scientific contributions to philosophy is Ponce's greatest error, just as it is the stumbling-block of all Scholasticism.

Lastly, we may mention that even Ponce's enemies admitted his greatness. Mastrius magnanimously acknowledged the force of Ponce's reasoning, and admitted that he had thrown light on some of the most abstruse problems in Scotistic philosophy. Ponce's writings were impersonal (with some few justified exceptions which were noted in this paper) and are particularly devoid of autobiographical material. He wrote not to aggrandize his ego but to disseminate truth. The success of his mission is confirmed by history.

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^{116.} Cursus, pp. 372 and 974. 117. Cleary, op. cit., p. 84.

COMMENTARY

A Documented History of the Franciscan Order. 1182-1517²

Dread lest his brothers succumb to the lures of learning was if we may trust tradition a reiterated worry to the Poverello. He advised concerning his successor, "Let him not be a heaper of books nor overmuch given to reading." Recalling many such admonitions, one handles with ironic and awe-struck amusement, Father Huber's noble volume of 1028 pages, - a "Documented History" indeed. As we admire the patient scholarship which has gone to make this record, we may feel a mischievous wish that the Little Poor Man were looking over our shoulder. Father Huber is well aware of St. Francis' attitude; the saint, says he, "wanted no private libraries no matter how small, whereas those intended for the community at large were to be in conformity with the vow of poverty." But he has to chronicle an astonishing reaction to the movement started by Francis. "So much has been written in recent years about St. Francis in book form, tracts, essays, studies, magazines, Quarterlies, and newspapers, ... that it would require a book alone to list these articles and works. I have endeavored to quote only the most important works, that they may serve as an inspiration to the enquiring student for further study and research." And indeed every such student even if he apologize to St. Francis must render humble thanks to the compiler of this truly monumental book. It is not merely a history, though it is that; it is a precious compilation of bibliographical material; we Americans may rejoice especially in the witness it offers to the contribution made in our own country to Franciscan studies. "Verily tribulation shall come such that books useful for naught shall be cast aside into lockers and dark corners." So spoke the saint. Ours are assuredly days of tribulation; but we shall say to him that this book is not "useful for naught"; on the contrary, the exhaustive survey it offers of literature inspired by one of the greatest and most significant movements in Christian history, is a true gift to Christendom. No wonder that the book as the author tells us has behind it the research of thirty years. It covers the same ground as Sessevalle's Histoire Générale de l'Ordre de Saint François; Tome I "but it is far more richly documented."

Parts I and II present the story of the Order to the year 1517, when what is known as the (first) Leonine Union put an end to long conflicts

^{1.} Editor's note:— The "Commentary" section of Franciscan Studies, reserved to publications deserving extended comment, is pleased to recall Miss Vida Scudder to that Franciscan literature which she loves so well. Miss Scudder, who is so richly acquainted with the history of Franciscanism, has requested the extending of her review to article form. The following article, then, bearing upon the work reviewed is representative of her interpretation of the spirit and history of the Franciscan Order.

^{2.} A Documented History of the Franciscan Order. 1182-1517. By Raphael M. Huber, O.F.M. Conv., S.T.D., S.T.M. (Milwaukee and Washington, D.C., The Nowiny Publishing Apostolate, 1944. Pp. xxxiv+1028, \$7.50.)

and tensions, as it gathered into the fold of the Observants sundry lesser groups of what we may call Left Wing tendencies among the sons of Francis, and joined the Observants thus consolidated into a dual organization with the Conventuals, thus ensuring comparative peace. Father Huber proposes to carry the story on in a second volume, to the point when all three bodies of Friars Minor, retaining their independence, were so united by Leo XIII in 1897 that they can function in permanent harmony. The general reader while he waits may solace himself with Father Cuthbert's two volume History of the Capuchins, published in 1929. Meanwhile, there is special value to this careful record of normal and constitutional development; for preceding writers, like the Capuchin Fathers René de Nantes and Gratien, have perhaps thrown into undue prominence the dramatic minor groups seeking through generations of stormy unrest literally to follow the Rule of the Founder. The gradual growth of the accredited Order which spread rapidly over the whole known world, and endures to this day, a continuing glory to the Church, is here carefully and effectively presented. Father Huber's first concern is with the Papal Bulls and other pronouncements through which ecclesiastical authorities sought with anxious honesty to translate into terms of terrestrial possibility the winged and elusive vision of Francis, and with the consequent reactions of the friars. The author may be right in saying that his Part III, which presents with full bibliography various phases of Franciscan life, should be especially appreciated by students. Topics in this Part include the successive Rules; Franciscan Art; Habits; Worship; lists of Provinces; the Missionary Apostolate, of which fuller study is fortunately promised some day, the present notes being obviously inadequate. Possibly the same comment might be made on the cursory section on Franciscan Social Activities. But here too, the record is of value.

The discrepancy between St. Francis' distrust of learning and the tremendous stimulus given it by his movement, is only one of the many paradoxes that movement suggests. Is not every vital movement characterized by paradox, fertile in conflicts? Is peace ever to be found on earth? Certainly not through the U.N.O., if we may trust the news of the moment; certainly not in the Church of Christ, if we may trust history; and assuredly not in the tempestuous story of the sons of Francis, as they wrestled down the centuries with one of the central problems encountered by the seeking Christian soul, - a problem especially critical today; - the relation of our holy faith to property, personal or collective. Yet He who said: "I come not to send peace but a sword" said also: "My peace I give unto you." There is a peace of death, stagnant static and serene. The peace of the Lord of Life is never static, it has no commerce with stagnation; it is a "central peace, subsisting at the heart of endless agitation." Such holy peace, the one vital force in a ravaged and bewildered world, is found to rare degree among men of every alignment during the Franciscan story. Nor has the challengeing drama of their uneasy struggle, which thrills one by strange prophetic power, ever been presented with more scrupulously

honest use of documentary detail than in this volume.

Father Huber, despite his earnest intention to be dispassionate, is not without bias. No mortal can escape bias unless he is a completely desiccated human being. Rightly amazed at foolish people who say that Protestants

have done as much as Catholics in the field of Franciscan scholarship, he yet acknowledges as every one must the impetus given to such scholarship by Sabatier. But it is a grief to any one like the present writer once honored by the friendship of that sincere though Protestant Christian to have him dismissed with an offhand epithet, "the sceptic," in his effort to align the Stigmata with psychical as well as supernatural forces. Note might also well have been taken of Sabatier's abandonment in his later years of the earlier implications which led some readers to the shallow and misleading view of St. Francis as a precursor of the Reformation. More important however than Father Huber's attitude toward Protestants is his treatment of the conflicting groups within the Order. It is all to the good, as has been said, that he makes us realize the comparative unimportance from one historical angle of these stubbornly persistent radicals, — Spirituals, Clareni, Fraticelli, what you will. Such groups were always comparatively small; they were confined to a few geographical areas. They came, they went, they may well seem insignificant despite their dramatic appeal compared with the majestic onward sweep of the permanent Order. At the same time one gets restive under the constant depreciation of a figure like Angelo Clareno, as one recalls the value placed on his Historia Septem Tribulationum by men like Ehrle and Gratien. One may regret the slighting references to that Joachism which despite its vagaries vibrated with vital force through Christendom. Nor is it surely quite fair to say as Father Huber does again and again that the Spirituals sought only the profit of their own souls, though we must acknowledge that extremists are always open to that indictment. Moreover and this is more important, we can not forget our heritage from these movements; for most of the literature which has reached the common heart St. Francis wanted to reach, comes from the discredited radicals in the Franciscan family. We shall continue to rejoice in the Speculum Perfectionis, the Sacrum Commercium, and the Fioretti; for the controversial animus which inspired all these works need not even be recalled, as the beauty of their imaginative and spiritual insights touches the quick of our inner need. These books continue to appear even to our own day in popular editions and translations, they can not be dismissed as mere mediaeval best sellers. And the Lauds of that great poet, Jacopone da Todi, barely listed without comment by Father Huber, should rank among our mystical treasures by the side of St. Bonaventura's Itinerarium Mentis in Deum.

But after all, one's appraisal of a landscape is determined by the angle from which one views it. Father Huber's eyes turn not to marginal groups but to the continuous conflicts within the officially recognized Franciscan family, and he is able to press home to us as no Protestant could the triumphant value of that patient loyalty to the Church and her judgments distinguishing permanent religious movements from the turmoil of religious sects. We become especially conscious of such value as we read the moving record of the evanescent groups revolting in Francis' name against authority which down the generations appear only to disappear. Those who veer off, perish; those who conform, endure. Father Huber's light falls on the latter, forbears of the three existing Franciscan families: the Conventuals; the heirs of the Observants; and the Capuchins, whose story begins just beyond the limits of this volume. With just appreciation,

he quotes Brother Ladislaw of Hungary: "Not Poverty is the highest ideal of a friar, but Obedience and Humility." Since 1897, these three great divisions of Friars Minor, without surrendering differences or independence, have maintained the conscious unity and mutual respect inaugurated in 1517.

Bitter and prolonged were the struggles preceding that happy state. Father Huber's sympathies are throughout with the Conventuals. (See footnote p. 231) He is anxious to show that in name at least they date from the Constitutions of Narbonne and even earlier, and that they rather than any other division are in direct lineage from Francis. But it is difficult to read the admirable chapter of summary concluding Part II without feeling confused by conflicting evidence. At all events, Leo X, as Father Huber candidly states "deprived the Conventuals of their historic rights repeatedly acknowledged by the Popes," giving to the Head of the Observants at least honorary precedence. Such precedence is apparently preserved by the enactments of 1897, the highest official title, even if this be merely honorary, being borne by the Head of the sterner body which while remaining within the confines of strict obedience to ecclesiastical mandates yet presses as close as it can toward literal obedience to that abstinence from possessions enjoined by the Rule... The lay reader can not help being interested in the fact that as time passed the holiest places, the Portiuncula, the Carceri, San Damiano, La Verna, were placed under the care of the Observants; the Conventuals retaining responsibility for the great Church built by Elias, to which Father Huber pays deserved tribute.

But what most imports us is less the divergencies than the agreements of these throngs who pressed restively against walls none can escape:

This stern necessity of things
On every side our being rings.
Our sallying eager actions fall
Vainly against that iron wall.
Submit! Submit!
'Tis common sense, and human wit
Can claim no higher name than it.
Submit! Submit! 1

Such stern necessity was for the friars the necessity of ownership, to which most people are far from objecting. Francis, paradoxical as usual, had rebelled. Not because he was an ascetic: did he not sing the Lauds of the Creatures? Was he not sensitive as few have been to the sacramental joys offered by the natural order? But those joys were poisoned for him the moment the least possessive element entered them, nor could he accept in peace any good that others lacked. "No mind have I to be a thief," said he: "for it would be imputed to us as a theft were we not to give it"... (a mantle)... "to one more needy." Again: "The greatest shame is it to me whensoever I find any one poorer than myself." He was even scrupulous about accepting gifts: "Always have I received less than I might, lest the other needy ones should be cheated of their portion, for to do the contrary

^{1.} Arthur Hugh Clough. Dipsychus.

would have been robbery." Social compunction controlled his conduct, it ran through his every vein. True, as Sessavalle points out, the ideal of Poverty was to him derivative, not primary, it was simply result and condition of the love that is in Christ; but the result was inevitable. Today, such compunction is becoming more and more a living force in religion, impelling all thinking Christians to review not only our personal but our corporate conduct. And today, more perhaps even than in Francis' time, such an attitude toward property is continually balked by assumptions considered essential if the civilization in which we live move and have our being is to be maintained. Submit!

In astonishing rapidity men responded to Francis. And as his Order spread swiftly over Europe, walls of "stern necessity" encompassed the friars seeking to follow their Rule. It is interesting to note on the part of any human beings such resolute distaste as theirs for possessions; and of course one can be as viciously fanatical on the right side as on the wrong. Perils encompassed them, wiles of the evil entangled their poor feet. Who could avoid them? Not many; none wholly; only such as learned the hard lesson of that humility without which any external code spells disaster not salvation. Lamentable and sometimes shocking the tale of the perplexities and dissensions ravaging the Order throughout the period Father Huber presents. A Legend pulsating with sorrow tells how Francis, lover of brotherhood, regarded the condition of his sons.

Yes, a lamentable tale. But glorious too; and, for those who can hear, not lacking a prophetic note. Seen at close range, here is a painful picture of conflicts constantly renewed, of forces clashing then much as they do now. Seen through the historic perspective to which Father Huber helps us, we discern in the whole Franciscan movement of these centuries and beyond, an impressive unity. For one and the same purpose unites the friars be they Conventuals, Spirituals, followers of Paolo di Trinci, the later Observants, or even those Joachimites whom Huber scorns but whose ardor, as René de Nantes says, "entraînait alors les meilleurs esprits dans sa voie excessive." If not a purpose, it is at least an impulse, which to this very day quivers through the veins of many Christians who respond inwardly to the message of the Poverello. Alike, just so far as they deem possible, ... and this is where they differ... the friars seek to avoid ownership. Persistantly down the generations continues their firm endeavor. It contradicts every impulse of the natural man. It is hopelessly, helplessly, at odds with that proprietary system whose very structural lines seem to them through all social change to contradict, for them at least, the laws of Christ. Their struggle may seem futile; but to the Christian watching history defeat is often more illumined than success by Light from Above. And in every decade, we discover Brothers who whatever tensions they may know have attained that "central peace" at the heart of agitation which only those can share who "having nothing live as possessing all things."

> Povertade e nulla avere, E nulla cosa poi volere; Ed omne cosa possedere En spirito di libertade.

(Poverty has nothing in her hand, Nothing craves, — in sea or sky or land; Has the universe at her command, Dwelling in the heart of liberty.)

Jacopone da Todi.

Poverty, as we have said, was to such men when they saw aright, simply the necessary condition of that complete surrender to love which Francis practised and to which they were bound. With what passion they sought it and against what insuperable obstacles! How desperately they tried to be honest! Earnestly, from the time of the Quo Elongati (1230), Popes, lawyers, puzzled doctors of the Church, rally to their aid. With loving goodwill, they try, through Bulls, constitutional enactments, treatises, and endless other documents, to afford help and practical guidance to the bewildered friars. The best thought of Christendom, the finest Christian statesmanship the times can produce, the analytic method in which the mediaeval mind excels, are at their service, Authority exerts itself, seeking to bring them peace, and their own chosen Ministers unite with all these others desirous of putting worldly wisdom under Christian control. Various concrete issues faced are curiously pertinent today; we might wish for instance that Father Huber had reported more fully the keen and interesting discussions foreshadowing much modern thinking, on... to use our present formula... Property for Use versus Property for Power, on the "Poor Use", on satisfaction of conscience through trusteeship and delegated control, etc. Also, while we are about it, we may regret that he does not give us more vivid portraits of leading characters, Popes and others; for in no phase of history do we find people more thrillingly alive than in the Franciscan annals. But one can not have everything; the chief emphasis in this valuable work is, we repeat, on constitutional developments.

Yes, there is a really amazing unity among these uneasy groups. Baffled, perplexed, beset, they stumble on; trying to follow the Saint who sought and reflected in his own life the simplicity which is in Christ. Let us remember that Francis too was often unhappy; nay, was he not stigmatized? Paradoxical, we repeat, is the spectacle of all these diverse men, however their final policies and practices vary, resisting just so far as they deem possible the pressure placed on them to accept Privileges, — or privilege. Those who conform, accepting evasion or compromise, slip into self-indulgence; despite frequent highminded rectitude, there is nothing distinctive about them, they come to present pretty much the conventional monastic pattern. Those who persist in defying authority, fall into a worse sin, self-willed pride, the sin of Lucifer; and too often they succumb to such asceticism as contradicts the joy in natural good which Francis so sweetly, so all-but uniquely, dissociated from all lust of ownership.

How these mediaeval people were tormented! How we are still tormented today! Obstinate differences are always to be expected among those who chafe against existing systems. Absolutists,... (one may think just now of C.O.s.)... withdraw into an isolation seemingly barren; the conventional and conforming majority are likely to become a little dull. Many restless folk, never quite serene in mind, seek refuge in that Via Media

which never really satisfied any sensitive conscience. At present, special sympathy may be naturally felt for the followers of St. Francis, since as even C.O.s perceive more and more clearly, problems centred in Property underlie the problem of war; indeed the Property issue is basic in all our social perplexities and in our hopes for a unified and peaceful world.

As economic life is now ordered, no one can escape private ownership unless he runs away naked into the woods and lives on blackberries. But our attitude is more and more consciously troubled, whether we read the Gospels, consider Franciscan history, or look at Russia. Not Angelo Clareno or Pierre Jean Olivi could be more troubled than we. One of the Beatitudes is very curious. Christians would naturally take it for granted that the meek will inherit heaven; it is possible that they are intended to inherit the earth also? Certainly Father Huber is troubled, like the rest of us... We are tempted to remark, Methinks the author doth protest too much, as we find him repeating on every few pages the indisputable fact that in the world we know, it is "a moral impossibility" for any Franciscan community as it grows in numbers and assumes responsibilities to obey that Rule of Francis to which it is virtually pledged. (See pp. 111, 127, 163, 263, 266, 324.)

Yet the Franciscan Order endures. Its commitments are distinctive, its achievements astonishing. Who can fail to recognize in the constant "concern" shown throughout its history, a prophetic leaven, a challenge to us all? The Church, which knows that Francis humbly based his Rule on the Gospels, is increasingly convinced of our duty to explore more profoundly than ever before the problem of Property personal and corporate as it presents itself to a would-be Christian civilization imbued with social shame. Great Papal Encyclicals help us perhaps more than any other religious thinking to a right attitude; but they do not solve the problem, they merely set our feet in the right path. The Order Francis founded has in all its different branches been exploring that path for centuries. May we not hope that it will have special help today to offer our stumbling and hesi-

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Wellesley, Mass.

tant feet?

MISCELLANEA

SCOTUS' TEACHINGS ACCORDING TO OCKHAM

I. ON THE UNIVOCITY OF BEING

The study of the thought of Scotus presents distinctive and proper difficulties. These are due partly to the actual condition of the texts handed down to us in various editions, partly to the language used by the Subtle Doctor. The first obstacle will be removed by the future edition of the works of Duns Scotus, which, at present, is being prepared in Rome. The second obstacle, however, will remain or, at least, will not be substantially altered. For the language used by Duns Scotus is exceedingly technical. The entire Scholastic period, since the beginning at the early thirteenth century, has gradually developed the armor of Aristotelean terminology to a high degree of precision and has constantly added new notions which will lead the modern reader astray unless he accept them in their exact meaning. Many misinterpretations of Scotistic texts, as well as of later Scholastics, are usually due to a lack of the understanding of Scholastic terminology. Scotus can not be simply read, he must be thoroughly studied. He will be understood only if the reader has Scotus' entire arsenal of technical terms at his ready disposition. Every serious student of Scotism will re-

member his personal, sad experiences.

For these reasons the direction of the Franciscan Studies deemed it advisable to publish texts which could be of help in reaching an exact interpretation of Scotus' teachings. Convinced that the medieval Scholastics understood each other much easier than we moderns understand them. we are offering in the following numbers of the Franciscan Studies summaries of the opinions of Duns Scotus made by William Ockham. This outstanding Franciscan Doctor, who had a great admiration for Duns Scotus in spite of his deep differences, usually presents Scotus' opinions in Scotus' own words. He sometimes even expressly notes that he is quoting Scotus literally. Since Ockham wrote his Commentary in the second decade of the fourteenth century, he can be considered a reliable witness; he must even be considered as such, because he knew very well that he had to face the opposition of a considerable number of outstanding pupils of Duns Scotus; therefore, it is obvious that he had to watch his step. Though he directed his criticism against a man who had been dead about ten years, Ockham, nevertheless, was well aware that he was criticizing a living thought, and hence that he himself had to expect opposition and criticism. It is interesting to note that Ockham, when discussing Scotus' opinions, easily glides from the singular form into the plural, for instance from dicit into dicunt. Now this fact, too, makes it very probable that the texts and summaries offered by Ockham are reliable, at least to a high degree.

Our editions of the following texts will be taken from Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences. For the text-reconstruction we followed the general rules laid down in our study: "The text tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio" in The New Scholasticism, XVI (1942) 203-223. There the reader will find the key to the sigla and other details. The footnotes refer mostly

to the respective texts of Scotus in the Vivès edition, quoted as ed. V. Not many variants are noted, but only some of importance. A comparison with the Vivès edition will show that in several instances Ockham's text is certainly preferable. Since the criticisms of Ockham give valuable evidence for a correct interpretation of Scotus' thought, the second part of it is also published here, but mainly, because it contains further quotations from Scotus.

Now, we shall present the main result which can be obtained from these texts.

In the first place, Ockham agrees with Scotus on the main point, viz. that the concept of being is univocal to God and creatures. Like Scotus he sees in this doctrine the only safeguard of our natural knowledge of God, and for that reason, he defends it.

Ockham, however, disagrees with Scotus: (a) on the proofs of this doctrine. However, his criticism is concerned more with logical subtleties. Ockham gives preference to the third proof. He disagrees likewise (b) on the extent of the univocity of being. Scotus had maintained that every reality is contained at least essentially or virtually in the notion of being, but that the notion of being cannot be predicated in quid about the transcendent simple predicates of being, as unum, verum, bonum, or about the ultimate differences. The former are called the passiones entis convertibiles. Passio is a technical term and indicates that a term is predicated in the second mode of per se predication about its subject. The first mode of per se predication is given when the predicate defines the subject; for instance "rational" is predicated in the first mode of per se predication about the subject "man"; the second mode of per se predication is given, when the subject enters the definition of the predicate, as for instance "risibile," for its definition would be: man who is able to laugh. Since Scotus maintains a formal distinction between the passio entis and ens, he is forced to his position. Since Ockham denies the formal distinction in creatures, not, however, in God, the problem disappears. Likewise the problem disappears as to the ultimate difference, which according to Scotus is formally distinct.

Finally, Ockham clarifies the position of Scotus: (a) Sometimes the objection is made against Scotus that his teaching on the univocity of being is a kind of pantheism or monism or at least leads to these. Only ignorance of medieval Logic or epistemology is responsible for this objection. The questionable distinction of a metaphysical and logical concept sometimes encountered in Neo-Scholasticism, misses the point entirely. For the concept of being is not a logical one — for then it would be a second intention — but a conceptus realis, that is, a concept of reality. But, and this matters, it is a concept and not reality. Neither St. Thomas nor Duns Scotus have ever maintained that a concept or a universal as such has extramental reality. Hence univocity does not extend to reality but only to the order of concepts. Ockham has made this point clear in defending Scotus:

Tertia etiam ratio posset male intelligi. Si enim intelligat, quod aliqua ratio formalis inventa in creatura, sive auferendo ab ea aliquid sive non auferendo, possit Deo attribui et esse in eo, accipit simpliciter falsum;

quia nihil, quod est in creatura realiter, qualitercumque spolietur, potest Deo attribui. Hoc etiam est consonum dictis suis, quia ipse ponit, quod nihil reale est univocum Deo et creaturae, et per consequens, nihil quod est realiter in creatura (extra animam nisi forte vox) per nullam separationem vel ablationem potest Deo attribui; sed tantum attribuitur sibi et creaturae unus conceptus, qui nec est in Deo nec in creatura (extra), quamvis de utroque praedicatur.

The parts in parenthesis probably belong to the second redaction. Cf. likewise I d. 2, q. 6, N:

Septimo: Si natura sic contraheretur per differentiam contrahentem distinctam solum formaliter, aequaliter posset poni univocity realis, hoc est alicuius realis a parte rei univoci Deo et creaturis, sicut potest poni talis univocatio respectu individuorum quorumcumque in creaturis. Consequens est contra eos, qui ponunt praecise, quod est aliquis conceptus univocus Deo et creaturae, et non aliquid a parte rei, sicut ponunt ex parte alia.

(b) The meaning of "ultimate difference" which has caused some confusion is made more explicit by Ockham's criticism. It is neither the ultimate difference of act without potentiality, nor the singularity, but the ultimate distinctive perfection in the quidditative order. In other words, it is that specific difference which cannot be determined further in the same order of quiddity, but which can be determined in another order, viz. of entity, by singularity. The passage in H makes that clear. Cf. also Scotus Ox. I, d. 3, q. 3, n. 15; t. 9, p. 126.

[Guilelmus Ockham, Ordinatio, d. 2, q. 3 in ordine]

I Opinio Scoti de univocatione entis I

In ista quaestione tenetur a multis, quod nullus conceptus nec aliquod universale est univocum Deo et creaturae. Aliqui autem tenent, quod est aliquis conceptus univocus Deo et creaturae, puta conceptus entis. Et primo probant, quod ens est univocum Deo et creaturae, secundo ostendunt, ad quae est univocum.

Primo ergo dicunt, quod est aliquis conceptus univocus Deo et creaturae. "Et¹ ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, conceptum univocum" dicunt, "qui ita est unus, quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem: sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri." ²

"Et 3 univocationem sic acceptam" probant "tripliciter:

Primo sic: omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de diversis habet conceptum, de quo est certus, alium a conceptibus, de quibus est dubius, 4— subiectum includit praedicatum—; sed intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo, 5 quod est ens, dubitando de ente finito vel infinito, creato vel increato; ergo conceptus entis de Deo 6 est alius a conceptu isto et 1 illo, et ita neuter ex se, et 8 in utroque illorum includitur, ergo univocus. Probatio maioris: Quia nullus idem conceptus est certus et dubius; ergo vel alius, quod est propositum, vel nullus, et tunc non est certitudo de aliquo conceptu..." 9

"Secundo 10 acquitut "sic: Nullus conceptus realis causatur in intellectu viatoris" nisi ab his, quae naturaliter sunt motiva intellectus nostri; sed illa sunt phantasmata, vel obiectum relucens in phantasmate, et intellectus agens; ergo nullus conceptus simplex naturaliter fit in intellectu nostro modo, nisi qui potest fieri virtute istorum. Sed conceptus, qui non est 12 univocus alicui relucenti in phantasmate, sed omnino alius 13 prior ad quem iste baberet analogiam, non potest 14 fieri virtute intellectus agentis et phantasmatis...; ergo talis conceptus alius analogus, qui ponitur naturaliter in intellectu viatoris, numquam erit, et ita non poterit aliquis conceptus de Deo naturaliter haberi, quod falsum est. Probatio assumpti: Obiectum quodcumque, sive relucens in phantasmate sive in specie intelligibili, cum intellectu agente vel possibili cooperante 15 secundum ultimum suae virtutis facit 16 sicut effectum sibi adaequatum conceptum suum proprium et conceptum omnium essentialiter vel virtualiter inclusorum in eo; sed ille alius conceptus, qui ponitur analogus, non est essentialiter nec virtualiter inclusus in isto, nec etiam est iste; ergo iste non fiet ab aliquo tali movente." 11

"Tertio" 18 arguitur "sic: Omnis inquisitio metaphysica de Deo sic procedit: considerando formalem rationem alicuius et auferendo ab illa ratione formali imperfectionem, quam habet in creaturis, et reservando illam rationem formalem et attribuendo sibi omnino summam perfectionem et sic attribuendo illud Deo. Exemplum de formali ratione sapientiae vel intellectus vel voluntatis: consideratur 19 enim in se et secundum se, et ex boc, quod ista 20 ratio non includit formaliter imperfectionem aliquam nec limitationem, removentur ab ea imperfectiones, quae comitantur eam in creaturis, et reservata eadem ratione sapientiae et voluntatis attribuuntur ista Deo perfectissime. Ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem univocum, quem accepit 21 ex creaturis" etc. 22

I Ad quae est ens univocum I

Secundo dicunt,²³ "quod ens non est univocum dictum in quid de ²⁴ differentiis ultimis nec de passionibus propriis entis."

Quod non "de 25 disserentiis," probatur "dupliciter.

Primo sic: Si disferentiae includunt ens univoce dictum de eis, et non sunt omnino idem, ergo sunt diversa aliquid idem entia; talia autem sunt proprie disferentia,²⁶ ex 5° et 10° Metaphysicae²⁷; ergo disferentiae illae ultimae erunt proprie disferentes. Ergo aliis disferentiis disferent; quod si ²⁸ illae aliae includunt ens quidditative, arguitur de eis sicut de prioribus, et ita esset ²⁹ processus in insinitum in disferentiis, vel stabitur ad aliquas ³⁰ non includentes ens quidditative: quod est propositum.³¹

Secundo sic: Sicut ens compositum 32 componitur ex actu et potentia in re, ita conceptus compositus per se unus componitur ex conceptu potentiali et actuali sive ex conceptu determinabili et determinante. Sicut ergo resolutio entium compositorum stat ultimo ad simpliciter simplicia, scilicet ad actum ultimum et ad 33 potentiam ultimam, quae sunt primo diversa, ita quod nibil unius includit aliquid alterius, alioquin non hoc 34 primo esset actus nec illud primo esset potentia — quod enim includit aliquid potentialitatis, non est primo actus —, ita oportet in conceptibus omnem conceptum non simpliciter simplicem et tamen per se unum resolvi in

conceptum determinabilem et determinantem, ita quod resolutio stet ad conceptus simpliciter simplices, videlicet ad conceptum determinabilem tantum, ita quod nihil determinans includat, et ad conceptum determinantem tantum; qui non includat aliquem 30 conceptum determinabilem; ille conceptus tantum determinabilis est conceptus entis, et determinans tantum est conceptus ultimae differentiae. Ergo isti erunt primo diversi, ita quod unum nihil includet 31 alterius."

"De 34 passionibus entis" probant idem "dupliciter:

Primo sic: Passio per se secundo modo praedicatur de subiecto, 1° Posteriorum; 49 ergo subiectum ponitur in definitione passionis sicut additum. ex eodem 1' et 7' Metaphysicae; 40 ergo ens in ratione suae passionis cadit ut additum, habet enim passiones proprias, ut patet per Philosophum 4° Metaphisicae; 41 si cadit ut additum, ergo non est per se primo modo in ratione quidditativa eorum." 42

"Secundo sa sic: Ens videtur sufficienter dividi sa tamquam in illa, quae includunt ipsum quidditative, in ens increatum et in decem genera et in partes essentiales decem generum; sed passio sa entis non est aliquid decem generum — patet sa — nec ex se est ens increatum, quia convenit entibus creatis; ergo esset species in aliquo genere vel principium essentiale alicuius generis. Sed hoc est falsum, quia omnis pars essentialis in quocumque genere et omnes sa species cuiuscumque generis includunt limitationem, et ita quodcumque transcendens esset de se finitum, et per consequens repugnaret enti infinito, nec posset dici de ipso formaliter: quod falsum est, quia omnia transcendentia dicunt sa perfectiones simpliciter et conveniunt Deo in summo.

Tertio argui potest, et in hoc consirmatur prima ratio ad istam conclusionem: Quia si unum includit ens quidditative, non includit praecise ens, quia tunc ens 49 esset passio sui ipsius; ergo includit ens et aliquid aliud. Sit illud A: aut ergo A includit ens aut non. Si sic, unum bis includeret ens et esset processus in infinitum. Vel ubicumque stabitur illud ultimum, quod est de ratione unius et non includit ens — vocetur A —, unum ratione entis inclusi non est passio, quia idem non est passio sui, 50 et per consequens illud aliud inclusum, quod est A, est primo passio et tale, quod non includit ens quidditative. Et ita, quidquid est primo passio entis, ex hoc non includit ens quidditative."

[Contra opinionem Scoti]

Quamvis ista opinio quantum ad conclusionem principalem, quam tenet, sit vera... videtur tamen in duobus deficere. Primo, quia illae rationes illo modo, quo nunc fiunt, non videntur concludere, saltem aliquae. Secundo est falsum, quod dicit, quod ens aliquibus est commune univocum et non omnibus existentibus ⁵¹ a parte rei...

Contra secundum, quod dicitur, quod ens non est univocum differentiis ultimis nec passionibus, illo modo quo ipse intelligit differentias ultimas et passiones, arguo sic, et ostendo, quod ens non plus est univocum differentiis non ultimis quam ultimis; quia omnis res vel est per se in genere vel pars essentialis alicuius existentis per se in genere; sed per te differentia ultima

est aliquid reale extra animam; ergo oportet quod per se sit in genere vel quod sit pars essentialis componens cum alia parte ab ea realiter distincta. Sed sive sic sive sic, secundum eos ens praedicatur in quid et per consequens univoce. Maior probata est prius, ubi probatum est, quod nulla est distinctio a parte rei in creaturis nisi distinctio rerum.

Praeterea: Maior est convenientia unius differentiae ultimae cum alia quam cum Deo; et istae differentiae ultimae realiter distinguuntur; ergo secundum principia istorum per aliquid distinguuntur et in aliquo conveniunt; sed illud in quo conveniunt praedicatur de eis in quid, ergo est aliquid univocum eis. Et ita habetur propositum. Maior videtur manifesta, quia omnis res creata plus distinguitur a Deo quam a quacumque re creata; ergo cum conveniat cum Deo aliquo modo, sequitur quod plus convenit cum quacumque re creata et eadem ratione cum qualibet realitate creata. Et ex hoc potest argui sic: Quaelibet creatura plus distinguitur a Deo quam ista realitas creata a quacumque realitate creata; sed non obstante distinctione creaturae a Deo, Deo et creaturae est aliquid commune univocum; ergo istis realitatibus est aliquod commune univocum.

Praeterea arguo, sicut ipse arguit: Omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de duobus habet alium conceptum neutrum ab illis duobus; sed aliquis potest esse certus de A quod est ens, dubitando an sit differentia ultima vel non ultima; ergo est aliquis conceptus communis differentiis ultimis et non ultimis.

Ad istam rationem respondet tripliciter:

Primo,⁵² quod talis intellectus, quamvis sit certus de tali, quod sit ens, non tamen est certus, quod sit ens quidditative sed quasi per accidens.

Secundo, 53 quod ,talis conceptus est simpliciter simplex, et ideo non potest secundum aliquid concipi et secundum aliquid ignorari..., et ideo circa ipsum non est deceptio; vel enim totaliter attingitur vel non attingitur. et tunc omnino ignoratur. De nullo igitur simpliciter simplici potest esse certitudo secundum aliquid eius et dubitatio secundum aliqui," et ideo ,tale simpliciter simplex est omnino ignoratum, nisi secundum se totum concibiatur."

"Tertio 54 modo" respondet, "quod ille conceptus, de quo est certitudo. est alius ab illis, de quibus est dubitatio, et si ille certus salvatur cum alterutro illorum dubiorum, vere est univocus; 55 sed non oportet quod insit utrique illorum in quid, sed ut sic univocus est eis, vel 56 ut determinabilis ad determinantes, vel ut denominabilis ad denominantes. Unde" dicunt, quod "est univocum omnibus, sed conceptibus non simpliciter simplicibus est univocum, sed 57 vel ut determinabile vel ut denominabile, non autem," ut dicunt, "dicitur de eis in quid, quia hoc includeret contradictionem."

Istae responsiones non videntur sufficere:

Prima non: Tum quia sicut dicis, quod intellectus non potest esse certus de tali differentia, quod est ens quidditative, quamvis sit certus, quod est ens, ita dicerent aliqui, quod nullus intellectus potest esse certus de Deo, quod est ens quidditative, hoc est, quod iste conceptus praedicetur de eo quidditative, quia ponerent, quod nullus conceptus possibilis nobis praedicatur de Deo nisi denominative, illo modo quo conceptus negativi et connotativi praedicantur de Deo. Tum quia talis differentia est ens quiddi-

tative, et per consequens potest esse certus, quod est ens quidditative. Assumptum patet, quia quando aliqua componunt tertium, qua ratione unum illorum est vera res et essentialiter extra animam et reliquum; ergo si illud, cui additur differentia ultima, quidditative et essentialiter est ens, eadem ratione et differentia ultima addita sibi.

Practerea: Secunda responsio non videtur sufficiens: Quia tanta simplicitas vel maior est in Deo, quanta est in quacumque differentia ultima; sed non obstante tali simplicitate Dei Deus potest cognosci in aliquo conceptu univoco sibi, quamvis ignoretur in se; ergo eadem ratione realitas quaecumque ultima potest cognosci in aliquo conceptu univoco sibi, quamvis in se ignoretur.

Tertia etiam responsio non videtur sufficiens: Quia sicut dicit, quod oportet, quod ens sit univocum differentiis ultimis, non tamen de eis dicitur in quid, ita dicerent alii, quod nullus conceptus possibilis nobis pro statu isto praedicatur in quid de Deo. Unde dicerent, quod nihil praedicatur de Deo nisi tale, puta quod est causa omnium, immortalis, incorruptibilis, separatus a materia, quae omnia non praedicantur de Deo in quid.

Praeterea: Quod simplicitas non impediat praedicationem in quid entis de tali differentia, videtur: Quia accipio humanitatem vel animam intellectivam, cui additur differentia ultima, ⁵⁹ et quaero, aut est simpliciter simplex aut non. Si sic, ergo de illa non praedicatur ens in quid, quod negas. Si non, tunc accipio illa componentia — sint A et B, ita quod A sit differentia et B sit illud, cui additur differentia —, et quaero: aut A est simpliciter simplex aut non. Si non, quaero de componentibus, sicut prius. Si sit simpliciter simplex, contra: Per te omnis realitas communicabilis est quidditativa et econverso; sed ista realitas est de se communicabilis, quia non est de se haec; ergo est communicabilis, et certum est quod non nisi differentiis ultimis individualibus; ergo de differentiis ultimis individualibus praedicatur aliquid in quid et univoce, quod negas.

Si 60 dicatur, quod differentia ultima animae intellectivae non communicatur differentiis individualibus — Contra: Omnis realitas, quae non est de se haec, est de se communicabilis pluribus; sed nihil quod est de se communicabile pluribus communicatur primo nisi suis per se inferioribus; igitur differentia ultima animae intellectivae communicatur primo suis per se inferioribus et primo contentis sub ea. Et tunc quaero: Quae sunt illa primo contenta sub differentia ultima animae intellectivae, aut diversae 61 animae distinctae numero, aut differentiae individuales illarum animarum intellectivarum. Non animae intellectivae, quia illae primo continentur sub anima intellectiva, quae comprehendit differentiam ultimam animae et aliquid cui additur. Ergo primo communicatur illis differentiis individualibus, et per consequens de eis praedicatur in quid et univoce.

Et si dicatur, quod differentia ultima animae intellectivae est differentia individualis et de se haec — contra: accipio hoc commune homo, et quaero: aut homo est simpliciter simplex, et tunc de eo non praedicaretur ens in quid. Aut non est simpliciter simplex, et tunc accipio unam partem eiusdem communitatis cum illo toto, cuius est pars, et quaero: aut est simplex, et per consequens de ea non praedicatur ens in quid, et non est de se haec, et ita erit communicabile, et habetur propositum. Aut non est simpliciter simplex, et quaero tunc de componentibus, et arguo sicut prius. Et ita vel erit pro-

cessus in infinitum, vel stabitur ad aliquid simpliciter simplex, quod non est de se hoc, et per consequens erit communicabile pluribus, et habetur propositum, quia illud non poterit esse nisi differentia ultima, cum non sit passio.

Per consimilia argumenta potest probari, quod ens dicitur univoce de passionibus, si passiones sint aliqua ex parte rei, sicut iste Doctor imaginatur.

PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O.F.M.

^{1.} Cf. Scotum, Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 2, n. 5; ed. Vivès, t. 9, p. 18. 2. unum, sic fere omnes editiones Scoti, sed editio Garcia Fernandez, Quaracchi babet uniri.
3. l.c. n. 6; p. 18; cf. etiam d. 8, q. 3, n. 4 ss.; t. I, p. 582 ss. 4. sed add. ed. V.; pro sequenti sed ed. V. et. 5. aliquo ed. V. 6. aliquo ed. V. 7. vel ed. V. 8. sed. ed. V. 9. sequentem probationem minoris et confirmationem om. Ockham. 10. l.c. n. 8; p. 19. 11. naturaliter add. ed. V. 12. esset ed. V. 13. et add. ed. V. 14. posset ed. V. 15. sequentes textus Scoti om. FMa cum nota: etc. quaere in Scoto d. 3 et 8 primi libri. 16. in intellectu add. ed. V. 17. sequentem confirmationem om. Ockham. 18. l.c. n. 10; p. 20. 19. primo add. ed. V. 20. istorum ed. V. 21. accipit O et ed. V. 22. sequentem objectionem om. Ockham. 23. Cf. d. 3, q. 3, n. 6; t. 9, p. 102. 24. omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de add. ed. V. 25. om. F¹ob T. 26. marg. T. et add. in textu entia. 27. Metaph. V, 9, 1018a 12 et X. 3, 1054b 25. 28. om. ed. V. 29. erit E F O et ed. V. 30. omnino add. ed. V. 31. quia illae solae erunt ultimae add. ed. V. 32. in readd. ed. V. 33. om. EMob et ed. V. 34. hoc non transp. ed. V. 35. om. ed. V. 36. om. E; talem T. 37. includit O ed. V.; includat ed. V. 38. Cf. l.c.; p. 103. 39. l.c. 4, 73b. 40. l.c. 5, 1030b. 41. l.c. 2, 1004b 10 ss. Ed. V. add. textum Aristotelis ad sensum. 42. eorum O et ed. V. sequentem confirmationem om. Ockham. 43. l.c. n. 7; p. 103. 44. videtur.../ sufficienter dividitur ed. V. 45. sed passio/quidquid sit de istis, non videtur habere plura dividentia quidditative quin sint in istis; igitur si unum ut unum inccludat quidditative ens, continebitur sub aliquo istorum; sed ed. V. 46. om. ed. V. 4q. omnis et postea includunt ed. V. 48. dicuntur ed. V. 49. idem ed. V. 50. quia.../ om. ed. V. 51. om. FMa (Tillegibilis); videtur esse additio redactionis secundae. Sequens discussio trium rationum Scoti ommittiur. 52. Non invenimus istam responsionem in ed. V, sed in ed. antiquiore (Jod. Badius 1519) paulo ante textum sequ

Notes on Old Books

TEDALDO DE CASA OF MUGELLO, O.F.M. CONV., COPYIST OF MANUSCRIPTS

In the annals of Italian Humanism the Friar Minor Tedaldo de Casa of Mugello occupies a conspicuous place as a zealous transcriber of the works of the classical authors. He lived at Florence, where he came in contact with the leaders of the Renaissance movement. In 1378 he went to Padua to copy there some of the works of Petrarch with great accuracy to prevent eventual loss and to insure a good transmission of text to posterity. Apparently his friend Coluccio Salutato, the chancellor of the Republic of Florence, had suggested this work to him. In Florence he continued his transcription of Petrarca's writings from their autographs. Of classical authors he transcribed the tragedies of Seneca, the Heroides of Ovid, Latin translations of Xenophon and Lucian. Besides he copied Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and some works of St. Basil the Great. The zeal and patience displayed in this work of transcription must have been immense as he transcribed also a goodly number of theological works, among them the voluminous commentaries of Nicolas of Lyra on the Old Testament. The last mentioned work occupied him three entire years. Friar Tedaldo's transcriptions are scrupulously accurate and the friar gloried in this. He indicated by a sign that the author has accidentally omitted a word in the text; likewise he pointed out what should be changed or cancelled. If a word could be read in different ways, he placed the variant reading on the margin with an "alias." If the text contained an evident mistake, he placed the correct reading on the margin with a lege. Friar Tedaldo, moreover, compiled alphabetical indices to the works transcribed whenever this addition seemed necessary. Apparently Salutado inspired Friar Tedaldo in this matter also. It seems even probable that Friar Tedaldo could also transcribe in Greek letters the Greek quotations found in the Latin works. Such a copyist who fully understood the text of his author and followed the text with great fondness ranked immediately after the professional philological editor. Friar Tedaldo was no mercenary copyist; he labored privately and bequeathed his transcriptions to his confrères of Santa Croce in Florence. From the library of that monastery many of these manuscripts passed into the Laurentian Library of Florence where they are still preserved (Bandini, Catalogus codicum latinorum bibliothecae Medicae Laurentianae, Florentiae 1776, IV, 160, 163, 168, 174, 175, 180, 189, 196, 198, 207; Georg Voigt, Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums, Berlin, 1893, I, 397-398). On October 4, 1409, Alexander V nominated Friar Tedaldo Apostolic Chaplain describing him in his Breve as an old religious who spent many years in the service of God, in the study of Sacred Scripture, and in edifying his confrères by word and example (Wadding. Annales, Quaracchi, 1932, IX, 622).

ANTONIO DA RHO, ORD. MIN. (d.c. 1450), HUMANIST

Friar Antonio, born in the village Rho near Milan (called in Latin Raudensis), was one of the four Franciscan Friars who took part in the Renaissance movement and for this reason found a place in the annals of classical scholarship. In 1431 Friar Antonio was nominated head of the school in Milan to succeed the celebrated Gasparino de Barzizza. He was principally a theologian, but he was also an excellent Latin grammarian, and well versed in classical lore. Little is known about his activity as professor of classical language and literature. Seemingly the duke Fillippo Maria Visconti who appointed Friar Antonio to his office took little interest in the school, and the scions of nobility for whom the school was intended likewise did not take much interest in classical scholarship.

However, the writings of Friar Antonio created a sensation by his

selection of peculiar topics.

In 1443 this friar published his Three Dialogues on the Errors of Lactantius which he dedicated to Pope Eugene IV. The work is a series of dialogues in imitation of Cicero. The interlocutors are almost all laymen. Friar Antonio introduces himself as a mere listener and thereby he cautiously can waive the responsibility for the rather bold assertions made by his interlocutors. Thus not only St. Augustine and the Schoolmen but also the pagan writers like Cicero, Seneca, Livius and Demosthenes can voice their opinions. All interlocutors agree in praising the polished and eloquent style of Lactantius. Yet some of the interlocutors criticize Lactantius for his florid style in that he seizes every opportunity to make a display of rhetorical phrases. Finally Lactantius is attacked with all the theological weapons furnished by Scholasticism: a long list of theological errors is enumerated as found in his work, the Institutiones. The list of errors was printed in many editions of Lactantius' works, but the whole series of dialogues is still unpublished. Naturally, the theologians were shocked by these attacks on a Father of the Church; more so the Humanists who had chosen Lactantius as their favorite writer. Friar Adam Montalto of Genova wrote bitter epigrams about the foolish Milanese who abuses one of the "pious lights of Holy Church." These invective distichs are also often printed in the works of Lactantius. Francesco Filelfo in a letter dated December 30, 1443, tells his friend that it is sheer folly to attack such a learned and eloquent author in such a shameful way. This attack on Lactantius was surely more serious than Valla's criticism of St. Jerome's Latin version of the Bible and the interpretations of Duns Scotus and Lyra; Friar Antonio charged the Father of the Church with dogmatical errors.

Friar Antonio gave proof of his grammatical and rhetorical learning in another work styled *De Imitatione* which pursued the same object as Valla's *Elegantiae*, namely to teach how to write elegant Latin by supplying several thousands of elegant Latin phrases to the students. Apparently Friar Antonio precedes Valla in this field. We conclude this from Valla's strange behavior. Valla claims that he himself had invented a particular grammatical rule prior to Friar Antonio. In proof of this contention Valla does not refer to his own work, the *Elegantiae*, but he accuses Friar Antonio of having learnt this rule from one of his disciples, and thus of

having made use of it. Valla and Friar Antonio had been friends, but henceforth they were enemies. Actuated by petty jeanousy and quibting pedantry, Lorenzo Valla denied to Friar Antonio every qualification of writing about Latin eloquence, and tried to find fault with his work by every kind of hair-splitting, until his Investing in Antonio and his works in the shade. All we know about Friar Antonio's work is what we can glean from Valla's criticisms. (Voigt, George, Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Aiterthums, I, 3rd, edit., Berlin, 1893, pp. 509-510.).

FRIAR PETER OF ARAGONA AND ARMENIAN MORAL THEOLOGY

As early as 1321 the Dominican missionaries translated into Armenian that portion of Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae relating to the Sacraments. In 1339 the then youthful Sicilian Friar Minor Peter of Aragona compiled a Book of Vices and Virtues in Armenian which was well received both by Schismatics and Catholics, and was employed as a text-book. Apparently it was not an original composition but a translation made under supervision of the Friar and with the assistance of native scholars. The most famous moral-theology book of those days was the Book of Vices and Virtues ascribed to the Friar John of Wales (d. 1285), and perhaps this Armenian work was a translation of this same. (Arpee Leon. Highlights of Armenian Mediaeral Ecclesiastical Literature, in Church History, December, 1944, XIII, 277; the attribution of the original to Isidore of Seville by the author is evidently wrong).

FRANCIS LICHETTO'S PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT AT SALO IN 1517

Paganino Paganini, a native of Brescia and celebrated printer at Venice since 1485, moved his press to the beautiful city of Salô in 1517 in order to print there two works of the celebrated Scotist Francesco Lichetto. The latter had established a study-house for the students of the Province of Brescia on a small island in the Gulf of Salô which was the property of his family and called Isola Lechi or Isola dei Frati. In this college the printer Paganini set up his press, and began to print, under supervision of Lichetto, two of his Scotistic works. Conrad Pellikan on his return from the General Chapter in Rome in 1517 paid a visit to this institution; he writes in his Hauschronik: "There is a monastery of our Order in Salô. The Provincial of the Province of Brescia, Franchis Lecher (sic), a learned Scotist, took us over to his Scotist study-house on an island in the lake nearby. Forty Friars lived there studying Scotus. The explanations together with the commentaries were just then printed at this place under personal supervision of Lecher" (Pellikan's Hauschronik, Strassburg, 1892, p. 59). Lichetto's Commentary to the Second Book of Scotus left the press on May 8, 1517, and Scoti quaestiones quodlibeticae

towards the end of 1517. Paganini printed Franc. de Alexandro here also. Viaggio ai Luoghi Santi was issued from Paganini's press on December 7, 1517. After this date we do not hear anything more about Paganini's work. On July 11, 1518, Lichetto was elected Minister General of the Order and the printer Paganini apparently had died some time before. (Fumagalli, Gius. Lexicon typographicum Italiae, Florence, 1905, p. 365).

FRIAR MICHAEL DE CARCANO'S CONFESSIONAL IN A CROATIAN EDITION OF 1496

The Rev. Blaz Baromic, canon of Senj in Croatia, now Yugoslavia, conducted a printing establishment from 1494 till 1508 in Senj for the publication of books in the Croatian language. On April 25, 1496, he issued at Senj a Croatian translation of Friar Michael de Carcano's (d. 1485) Confessional (or guide as to how to make a good confession). The booklet comprises thirty-seven leaves or seventy-three pages in print, in octavo format and twenty-five lines to a page. The letters of the booklet are glagolitic type which were first used at Venice in 1493 by the printer Andrea Torresanus to print the glagolitic Breviary. The translator of the work from the Latin is Jakov Blaziolovic. The booklet bears the imprint of Senj and of Blaz Baromic, but the latter was not the printer; the canon had hired a regular printer, as he had hired Torresanus in 1493 and the Magister Gregorius of Senj in 1507. At present only one copy of this edition of the Croatian confessional is known to exist; it is preserved in the library of St. Francis Xavier Monastery of the Friars Minor at Zagreb in Yugoslavia. (Gesamtkatalog der Wiegendrucke, vol. VI, n. 6127, Ergaenzungen, coll. 1-2).

JOHN M. LENHART, O.F.M. Cap.

Franciscana Notes

FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE OF FAMILY STUDIES OPENED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MONTREAL

In September 1945, L'Institut d'Etudes Familiales, staffed and directed by Franciscans, was annexed to the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Montreal. This Institute, spontaneously integrating itself with the pontifical program of Pope Pius XII for the restoration of the Christian home, aims to train specialists and teachers equipped for aiding in and working for the restoration of the family as the basis of society. It undertakes the scientific study of the process of integration and disintegration of the family in order to achieve the physical, mental, moral and spiritual wellbeing of that unit, as well as to furnish a university and intellectual guidance to the forces working for this attainment.

Operating in complete cooperation with the Faculty of Philosophy of the Institute of Psychology of the University of Montreal, l'Institut d'Etudes Familiales carries a three-year program of studies completed by examinations for the degree of bachelor, licentiate, or doctor. The program for the first year includes: general ethics; law; psychology (general), psychophysiology (genetics, embryology, endocrinology); an introductory course on the origin, history and structure of the family, statistics and family re-

search. The Institute has as director Hervé Blais, O.F.M.

Dr. A. G. LITTLE DIES

On October 22, of last year, Dr. A. G. Little died at Sevenoaks, Kent,

England, aged eighty-two years.

Dr. Little was one of the foremost scholars of English Franciscan history. At Clifton, where he was in Browne's house (1878-82), he came under the influence of his lifelong friend, Charles Edwyn Vaughan, afterwards professor of English Language and Literature at Cardiff, Newcastle and Leeds. Vaughan taught Little to appreciate great literature and turned

his attention to history.

In 1882, Dr. Little went to Balliol College, Oxford. He took a first class in Modern History in 1886. During 1886-8, he was in Germany at Dresden and Göttingen where he received instruction in palaeography and modern historical research under Weiland and Steindoff. During 1888-92, he worked in Oxford and London on his first book, "The Grey Friars in Oxford," which was printed for the Oxford Historical Society during 1892 and remains an acknowledged critical work. From 1892 to 1901, Dr. Little taught history at University College, Cardiff, first as lecturer and then as professor. In 1902, he accepted an invitation to teach palaeography in the new University of Manchester and continued this work for more than a quarter of a century, 1902-28.

Dr. Little also founded the British Society of Franciscan Studies in 1902. This society was reconstructed in 1907 as a Society for the publication of original studies and documents. The first volume published was from the pen of Dr. Little and was an edition of a "Liber Exemplorum ad usum praedicantium" (A Book of Examples for use in preaching). Following the death of Paul Sabatier, Dr. Little became president of the Society which he had founded. Having edited the first volume published by the Society, it seemed fitting that the last book of the British Society of Franciscan Studies should likewise bear evidence of Dr. Little's work. And such was the case. In 1937, the society decided that its work was completed through the publication, that year, of the twenty-second and last volume under the title "Franciscan History and Legend in English Mediaeval Art." Dr. Little was the editor; he also wrote the Preface and two of the six lengthy chapters.

Franciscans and those interested in Franciscanism owe Dr. Little a tribute of gratitude for his immense contribution to historical knowledge. It was through his initiative and persevering application that many ancient Franciscan manuscripts appeared in print. He also brought to publice notice the literary and scientific works of outstanding English friars, long dead, which were known to few and available to only scholars like himself. Because of this indebtedness, it is most fitting that a Franciscan, a former member of the British Society of Franciscan Studies, and one who knew Dr. Little and corresponded with him, should present this short and condensed biography of a great student in the field of Franciscan history.

The Very Rev. John M. Lenhart, O.F.M. Cap., was reelected a member of the board of directors of the Catholic Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania at a meeting on October 9.

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The Rev. Thomas Borgmeier, O.F.M., editor of the Revista Eclesiastica Brasiliera and the Revista de Entomoligia, who was accorded an honorary Doctor of Science degree from Saint Bonaventure College the past summer in recognition of his prominent work in the study of entomology, has been warmly felicitated by His Holiness Pope Pius XII on the occasion of his silver jubilee in the priesthood. In recognizing the worthy labors which have made Father Borgmeier's priesthood outstanding tum verbis, cum maxime scriptis, the rescript dwells particularly on his accomplishments as editor of the Revista Eclesiastica which he has guided tanta peritia sollertiaque... caritatem ceterasque virtutes in Evangelii ministris fovendo.

The Very Rev. Jerome Kobel, O.F.M. Cap., of the Friary of the Immaculate Conception, Garrison, N.Y., was killed June 21, 1945, when

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the U.S.S. Curtis, of which he was the chaplain as Lieutenant (s.g.), was hit by a Japanese airplane near Okinawa. He was buried in the Kerama Retto cemetery on Zamamai Island. Father Jerome will be remembered for his intense interest in English literature, shown particularly in his scholarly paper, "Literature and Morality: A Prefatory Essay," which he read at the meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference, Detroit, Michigan, June 24-26, 1940. It was published in the report of that year.

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In November 1944 the first centenary of the birth of Dom Vital, Bishop of Olinda, Brazil, was widely celebrated. The supplement of the Jornal do Brazil on November 26, 1944, was devoted almost exclusively to that event. This bishop entered the Capuchin Order receiving the name of Vital Anton Gonzalves d'Oliveira. As bishop of Olinda he condemned the Freemasons in 1872 and 1873 and interdicted the Catholic confraternities which had elected Freemasons as their presidents. Thereupon he was imprisoned in 1874 and kept in prison for sixteen months. After his liberation he returned to his diocese but owing to the opposition of the Freemasons resigned and returned to a Capuchin monastery in Italy where he died on July 4, 1878.

The Rev. Father Placide, O.F.M. Cap., missionary of the Micmacs has published a neat six-page folder: The Mission Point: Ste. Anne de Ristigouche, Province Quebec, Canada. It tells of the glorious past, decribes the present status, and enumerates the historical relics contained in the mission's museum. The hull of the ship Le Marquis de Malauze, which was sunk by the English in 1760, is preserved in the museum at Restigouche, as well as remnants salvaged from the ship.

This same Father Placide obtained from one of the Micmac Indians, whose ancestor received it in 1778, the so-called "Washington Letter." The letter was written in French and was printed on board the French warship Languedoc while in the harbor of Boston. Under date of October 28, 1778, it was sent to the French Canadian settlers and the Indians of Canada by the commander of the French squadron, Charles Henri, Comte d'Estaing. The letter had the approval of Washington and was passed among the Indians as a personal message from him. As a result, many of the unmarried Micmacs joined the other Indians in Maine against the British, while those remaining in Canada preserved a friendly neutrality and thereby caused much trouble to the British. This particular copy, addressed to "My Brother Joseph Claude and other Micmacs," was translated into English and published, December 10, 1778, in the Mass.schusetts Spy of Worcester, Massachusetts. It was reprinted in the Magazine of American History, XXII (1889), 427-429. Copies of the letter seem to be rare. Only three copies have thus far been listed.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Concept of Dread. By Soren Kierkegaard. Translated, with an Introduction and Notes, by Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. xiii+154. \$2.00.)

The main theme of this book concerns the problem of original sin, viewed by the author as man's dread as he becomes aware of the infinite and indeterminate possibilities of his freedom; thus it was God's command prohibiting the fruits of the tree of knowledge which engendered sin in Adam and brought his innocence to its extremity, rather than Adam's disobedience of this command. Dread is distinctively human and its intensity is a measure of the spirit in man: "If man were a beast or an angel, he would not be able to be in dread, and the greater the dread the greater the man." And further, dread differs from fear in its lack of a definite object, for it is simply the trembling of the spirit in man at "the alarming possi-

bility of being able."

Strange as this conception of original sin may seem, making man's fall begin with God's command rather than with man's willful disobedience, S. K. proceeds in the light, or perhaps better, in the darkness of this preconceived notion, to interpret the account of Genesis, "trying to put aside the fixed idea that it is a myth." We shall see very soon how little he succeeds in this attempt to accept the story of Paradise as a statement of fact rather than as a myth, for a little later we find him saying that he prefers to admit bluntly that he can associate no definite thought with the serpent. Therefore, at least this part of the story must be rejected on the grounds that only those parts of the story can be admitted which are, in Kierkegaard's own words, "dialectically consistent," namely, those parts which can be adjusted to Kierkegaard's preconceived idea of what should have happened. Now obviously a dialectically consistent story is not necessarily a true one; and so we must come to the same conclusion as the translator, who says in his introduction that "although S. K. denounced the disposition to treat the story of Adam and Eve as a myth, he nevertheless treats it pretty much as if it were."

Briefly stated, S. K.'s interpretation of the story of Paradise consists in the view that Adam and Eve were in a state of innocence until God gave His command to Adam saying: "Only of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat," and adding the threat of punishment: "Thou shalt surely die." Kierkegaard repeatedly identifies innocence with ignorance, and hence it is a matter of course that Adam did not understand the prohibition, "for how could he have understood the difference between good and evil, seeing that this distinction was in fact consequent upon the enjoyment of the fruit?" And yet although Adam could not have understood the command, the prohibition alarms him, i.e. induces a state of dread, because "the prohibition awakens in him the possibility of freedom." "Thus innocence is brought to its last extremity. It is in dread in relation to the prohibition and punishment. It is not guilty, and

yet it is in dread, as though it were lost.'

The consequence of Adam's dread which overcame and anulled his innocence is that sin came into the world and that sexuality was posited. "Without sin there is no sexuality and without sexuality no history." Further on he says: "By eating of the fruit of knowledge the distinction between good and evil came into the world, but with that also the sexual

distinction as a propensity."

It is difficult for a Catholic thinker to offer any constructive criticism of this book, precisely because it is hard to find the grounds on which the author stands: Does he accept the revelations of Sacred Scripture? Does he admit any teaching authority? Does he recognize any tradition? Is he willing to be assisted and enlightened by the scholarship and thought of the Fathers and the Doctors of the Church, by whose collective efforts from age to age every problem of theology is explored in the light of the complete story of creation and redemption, and every part is related to every other part? Is he willing to abide by the decisions of the Councils? Or finally, does he perhaps rest his cause merely on the grounds of natural reason? It is obvious that S. K. has little regard for tradition, as is evident by the peremptory manner in which he dismisses traditional statements and definitions, some of which are admitted even by Protestants. His loyalty to Sacred Scripture is not beyond question: we have already noted the translator's remark according to which S. K. treats the story of the fall as if it were a myth. A typical example of the manner in which he handles Sacred Scripture is his reference to a verse in St. James, according to which God tempts no man (Jas. 1: 13), in order to discredit the story of the serpent with which he "can associate no definite idea." The only meaning of this verse in harmony with so many other passages of Sacred Scripture is that God does not tempt any man directly, because nothing could be clearer than that God does allow man to be tempted, as happened to Job and even to our Lord himself; and our Lord teaches us to pray to God the Father to "lead us not into temptation." This same example, besides illustrating S. K.'s irresponsible use of texts from Sacred Scripture, puts in relief his ignorance or at least complete disregard of Christian tradition where he says: "I prefer to admit bluntly that I can associate no definite thought with the serpent." Throughout history and in all parts of the world, the serpent has been used in Christian art and literature as a symbol of Satan; and yet any one acquainted with the traditional way of interpreting Sacred Scripture should know that this spiritual meaning presupposes a real serpent in the literal sense, and does not justify an airy or mythical treatment of this or any other part of the story.

But if S. K. means to rest his cause on the grounds of natural reason, may we not ask whether the question could even be raised on such grounds? The story of Adam's fall is the beginning and not the end of a far longer story which finds its culmination on Calvary and which is continued every day throughout the world on the altars of the Catholic Church. As first revealed in the opening chapters of Genesis, the story leaves many points obscure and in need of further elucidation; it becomes clearer and clearer all the time in all the later revelations of Sacred Scripture and in the gradual unfolding of God's redemptive plan. It is only within this Catholic (which, among other things, means complete and comprehensive) tradition that the doctrine of original sin makes any sense, or the questions raised

by it, and the problems regarding God's justice and love, can find an adequate answer. Of this complete Catholic tradition, which contains the problems and the solutions, the questions and the answers, S. K. chooses to accept certain parts and also to reject certain others; the result is that S. K. finds on his hands a set of problems which could not possibly arise in natural philosophy and which could only be answered after the complete acceptance of the very thing he chooses to accept only partially. No human mind, not even that of a genius, could have figured out, all on its own, the precise manner in which God provided at the creation of man for supernatural and preternatural gifts in order to secure the harmonious functioning of His composite creature, nor the precise manner by which our first parents forfeited these gifts. Let us note at least one or two of the many pitfalls to which S. K. was led by presuming to give a personal and original interpretation of this dogma without guidance from any tradition

or teaching authority.

S. K. concludes to his own satisfaction, that Adam's pre-fall state was a state of complete ignorance, and so we find him saying repeatedly that innocence is ignorance. This view degrades at the same time two pure perfections, namely, knowledge and innocence. To the Catholic, this idea could not even occur, for these two beautiful perfections are exemplified simultaneously and without any defect both in Christ and in his Mother. It would be a very long story to try and bring out all the absurdities involved in this theory of Adam's pre-fall ignorance. We must be satisfied for the present to refer the reader to any standard orthodox treatment of the problem. St. Thomas, for example, teaches us that man's original justice and innocence consisted in his referring everything to God as to his final end. Adam's innocence thus interpreted is the highest kind of knowledge by which man's intelligence retraces, so to speak, the steps of the creative act and moves quickly from every created object back to its source and examplar in the wisdom and love of God. It is this kind of innocence that the saints seek to regain; it is also that same supreme wisdom we learn from St. Bonaventure's Reductio Artium ad Theologiam. This view preserves the dignity and beauty of innocence and the nobility and goodness of knowledge. About the tree of knowledge, St. Thomas says: "This tree is called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, not because it had the causative power of knowledge, but because man by eating of it learned by experience the difference between the goodness of obedience and the evil of disobedience." (The Compendium Theologiae. Translated by Ross J. Dunn, M. A. Chapt. 188) It is the actual experience of evil and not the mere speculative knowledge of it that is a defect incompatible with the state of innocence; otherwise we would have to assert that Christ does not know what sin is, or else, that He is not innocent!

Of even greater danger to Christian thought and culture is Kierke-gaard's group of ideas regarding sex and its relation to human nature and to the fall. "Without sin there is no sexuality and without sexuality no history... If Adam... had not sinned, he would the same instant have passed over into eternity." If this were true, then we might rightly ask, why did God create man, and even matter, in the first place? Why was not man created as another order of angels? "A perfect spirit, says S. K., cannot be conceived as sexually differentiated." But the issue is not whether

a pure spirit can be conceived as sexually differentiated, but whether such differentiation is incompatible with the idea of a perfect man, whether such differentiation could not have been included in God's first conception of man as part of his nature. A composite creature, as man is, made of spirit and matter, must have development, generation and history. If Adam had not sinned, we would have had a very different kind of history; man's would have been a different story to tell in eternity; but there would have been a story all the same, or else God would never have created the kind of creature man is. That S. K.'s doctrine is unjustified, can be demonstrated by the fact that in the beginning and before the fall, God created them man and woman, "and God blessed them, saying: Increase and multiply, and fill the earth."

There are many passages in this book which indicate a profound dissatisfaction with Hegelianism, idealism, rationalism and other trends of thought which were beginning to invade the mind of Protestantism in his time; and yet, in spite of all that, it is not true to say that S. K. was even oriented in the direction of the truth, certainly not as far as this book goes. How could Kierkegaard, who spent his life thinking and writing about religious problems, miss the simple and obvious solution? How could he fail to discover the sweetness of the yoke of Christ? Why all this "fear and trembling," "sickness unto death," when one has the good news of the Gospel to tell, a story which, even in the sufferings of the saints and the torments of martyrs, is bursting with joy? It may be that S. K. himself gave us the answer to all such questions: "But men are not willing to think eternity seriously, they dread it, and dread discovers a hundred ways of escape."

FAKHRI MALUF

Cambridge, Mass.

Moral Theology. By the Rev. Heribert Jone, O.F.M. Cap., J.C.D.; Englished and adapted to the Code and Customs of the U.S.A., by the Rev. Urban Adelman, O.F.M. Cap., J.C.D. (Newman Book Shop, Westminster, Md., 1945. Pp. xx+634. With analytical and alphabetical indexes. \$3.00.)

Father Heribert Jone, O.F.M. Cap., J.C.D., published his Katholische Moraltheologie in 1929. It met with such universal success in Germany and Austria that it was republished in as many as nine editions. Written "with special reference to the stipulation of the German, Austrian and Swiss Codes," this successful German edition was translated and adapted to French law and custom by Marcel Gautier in 1936. The present edition, written entirely in English, was translated and adapted to the Code and American customs by Fr. Urban Adelman, O.F.M. Cap., J.C.D., journalist and editor.

The present American edition fills a real need in that it supplies the American priest with a ready and handy reference book of moral science adapted to the customs of his own country. Many will find it of primary value since it is conveniently written in English. Its main advantage, however, consists in the fact that it is a comprehensive study of moral theology

in the light of American law and custom. Fr. Urban has captured the essentials of the subject and has admirably succeeded in presenting these abstract principles in a clear, concise and orderly style. The brevity of exposition does not, as it might possibly seem to the scholar, obviate the necessity of consulting larger and better-equipped manuals of theology. Rather it presupposes a knowledge of these authors without which such a brief summary would be of little value. Therefore, it is not recommended as a substitute for the ordinary manuals of Moral Theology but only as

a vade-mecum for quick and accurate reference. Although all the tracts are well done, the most interesting ones are those on "Ownership in General" and "Titles to Ownership." In speaking of the subject matter for contracts the author notes that every contract must have four qualities: The matter must be possible, belong to the disposing contractants, morally lawful, and estimable in price. Discussing the second condition, viz. the rightful ownership, the author makes the following interesting observations: "No one can transfer the ownership of a thing which is non-existent nor can he sell what he does not own... The transfer of an inheritance not yet possessed is void. The only exception to this principle is the doctrine of potential existence. This still exists in all those states that have not adopted the Uniform Sales Act. As the subject matter is non-existent (e.g. a farmer contracts to sell his future crop), all that is really contracted for is the expectancy. In exceptional cases the conveyance of another's property is valid" (par. 280). In regard to the third condition, i.e. that the matter of the contract must be morally licit, Fr. Urban states: "We distinguish between legal agreements, i.e. those that are forbidden by statute (e.g. gambling, Sunday agreements in Mass., Conn., N.J., Pa.) and agreements contrary to public policy which, though they do not contravene any law, are injurious to peace, morals, etc., so that the court will not enforce them (e.g., an agreement to break up a marriage, or one that tends to corrupt public officials) (par. 280).

In regard to gambling he observes that "in case of fraud or coercion the contract can be voided at the option of him against whom such means have been employed... if the cheater wins he is bound to restitution... He is guilty of cheating, e.g. who purposely takes such a position that he can see the cards in his opponents hands. According to general practice it is not considered cheating to look at another's cards which he holds carelessly..." (par. 309). It is interesting to note that in regard to horse racing "gambling is not countenanced by law, although betting on horse races is legalized in half a dozen states. Some forms of gambling are criminal offenses, but usually the only penalty for private gambling is the unenforceability of the transaction in the court. Most of our States have passed laws against gambling, some of them very severe. In almost all states of the Union lotteries are prohibited by law..." (par. 309).

This summary is recommended to all priests and students of moral theology. It will be especially handy for the junior clergy or seminarians in preparation for their canonical examinations.

BONAVENTURE A. BROWN, O.F.M.

Cardinalis Hosii Doctrina de Corpore Christi Mystico. By Gregory M. Grabka, O.F.M. Conv., S.T.D. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1945. Pp. xviii+279).

In order to vindicate their claim to be the true church established by Christ, the theologians of the Protestant Reformation tried to prove that the Church is an invisible society which embraces all the just who believe in Christ. It was then a simple matter to deny the necessity of the priesthood and of the sacred hierarchy, and to hand each one the Bible for his own interpretation.

The leading Catholic theologian of the sixteenth century who rose to the defense of the faith was Cardinal Stanislaus Hosius (1504-1579), Bishop of Ermland, East Prussia, which was then under Polish rule. Cardinal Hosius has been acclaimed by historians as savior of the Catholic faith. The mere fact that one of his works, the Confessio Catholicae Fidei Christiana (1553) even within the author's lifetime ran to thirty-two editions indicates how much it was esteemed and how extensive was its influence.

Due to social conditions, Poland became an asylum for heretics who had to flee their homeland. When these began spreading their pernicious doctrines, deceiving the faithful, Cardinal Hosius became the champion of orthodoxy. In his many writings he constantly bases his conclusion that Catholicism is identical with Christianity upon the mystical body of Christ,

the central doctrine of his theology.

Since the Protestant writers endeavored to prove their thesis particularly from St. Augustine, Hosius drew extensively from the same source arguments to refute the Reformers. And well he knew the doctrines of St. Augustine whose works he had read six times. According to the Bishop of Hippo both the just and the sinners are members of the church which is the body of Christ, but in this visible society those who are in the state of grace form an invisible union of charity with Christ from which the sinners are excluded. Cardinal Hosius developed this thought and divided the members of the mystical body of Christ into two groups: the corps of the elect, the just, the members of the mystical church; and the corps of the called, the sinners, the members of the empirical church. The mystical church forms a circle of the elite within the larger circle of the empirical church. Members of both groups constitute the mystical body. The true church of Christ is a visible church; Christianity is identical with Catholicism.

Father Gregory has made a thorough study of this doctrine of Cardinal Hosius. He gives a brief, clear statement of the various positions taken by the Protestant theologians. Then for the sake of comparison the author outlines the doctrines of other sixteenth century Catholic theologians, and shows their contributions to this controversy with the heretics. The doctrine of the visibility of the Church, and the doctrine of the mystical body are very important in Catholic apologetics, and since the Encyclical of Pope Pius XII on the Mystical Body, interest has been aroused anew in these doctrines. Whoever desires to trace the development of this Catholic teaching as opposed to the heresies of the Protestant Reformers will find well worthwhile the perusal of Father Gregory's book.

BASIL HEISER, O.F.M. Conv. Our Lady of Carey Seminary,

Carev. Obio.

Forming a Christian Mentality (Chapters for the Religious Guidance of Youth for Priests, Parents and Teachers). By Kilian J. Hennrich, O.F.M. Cap., M.A., K.C.H.S. (New York: Wagner, 1945. Pp. xii+288.)

Reading Fr. Kilian's book is like enjoying a glass of rare, old wine. Just as such wine, rich and mellowed with age, pleases the taste and satisfies the whole man, so this work, the fruit of long years of study and experience, opens new vistas pleasing to both heart and mind. Alive to the needs of souls and thoroughly Catholic, the famous and venerable author implements here the recommendation of Pope Pius XII that human society be re-placed upon a Christian foundation. The Holy Father's program has been given on many occasions, notably in an address to Italian youth in 1940. There he tells us that to make society Christian once more the Bible "with its moral precepts must again be esteemed and honored. The family must be re-elevated, and motherhood must again receive the halo of its sacramental dignity. The married must learn and understand their duties, and must fulfill their responsibilities conscientiously" (P. 17).

Attune to these needs of society, Fr. Kilian has written a book to form a Christian mentality. There is a crying need for such a mentality. The author writes: "Pope Pius XII stresses first, Holy Scripture as an excellent means to promote Christian living. He then desires that people should become better acquainted with the holy state and obligations of matrimony, and that all Christians young and old, should better fulfill the duties essential to Christian living" (Ibid.). Fr. Kilian shows that religious knowledge alone is not sufficient to make society Christian. "The knowledge of religion has not made all doctors of theology truly spiritual-minded. Fortunately, it is not necessary to be steeped in the science of religion in order to lead a very holy life" (Ibid.). Additional instruction helps people but such instruction must be brought into relation with their daily lives and with the whole body of revelation and the liturgy. It is earnest meditation on the truths of faith together with personal application to life that makes us Christian-minded and holy. Merely to know the faith and not to live up to it in all phases of life is the deplorable condition that must be remedied.

Living as we do in a post-Christian world filled with the miasma of pagan "isms," we must be on our guard to preserve a clean and healthy Christian outlook. To do this is not so simple as may at first appear. Witness the many false notions among Catholics! To guide us we have indeed Scripture and Tradition, the works of the saints and the ever increasing encyclicals of the Popes; yet the Holy Father asks for a new vitalization of society on sound Christian principles!

The clarion call of the Holy Father is echoed and amplified in Fr. Kilian's splendid book. It has a surprising amount of pregnant and clear doctrine. Based on faith as given us in Scripture and Tradition, the work shows the vital relation of faith to daily life. The author's masterful treatment of the sacred liturgy and its application to life also offers a timely and sorely needed remedy for the laxity and worldliness of our day and land. Not only priests, parents and teachers, but all who seek an answer to our present world problems will find in this book a harmony of doctrine

and life given with many surprising and shrewd observations gleaned from a rich and varied pastoral experience. Fr. Kilian does not fear to tell the truth. He applies the knife to the wound. Though he cut and burn, it is unto salvation, and the balm of truth and light is poured out in abundance.

Forming a Christian Mentality strikes at the root of domestic and social evils, not merely by castigating them, but by showing the dignity of the human soul, the glory of human personality, the splendor of holy matrimony, the magnificent role of the Christian family in society and the crowning effulgence of God's grace. The world suffers from lack of reverence. This can be regained by teaching reverence for self, family, all men and all lawful authority. Fr. Kilian achieves this by using the Bible and the liturgy to teach the grand truths of Redemption, Regeneration, the holiness of marriage and the full Christ-life in grace. By explaining the whole liturgical cycle and applying it to life, the author gives wealthy material to prove again the oft-repeated adage, quoted by Pius XI in his Encyclical on Christ the King, that "The Liturgy is the Catechism of

the people."

He treats profound truths in a simple and attractive manner. His work will be a great incentive to further study of the Bible and the Liturgy, and will send many a reader to hunt facts in Church History, and to study morals and ascetics. The modern age with its moral scepticism and moral positivism sadly needs instruction and inspiration in regard to the fundamentals of religion and decent living. The Church has ever used her venerable Liturgy to raise up the nations by every year giving them the drama of Redemption unfolded in its multiple aspects. Thus she teaches noble truths and suggests lofty aspirations. Fr. Kilian's book makes such teaching more practicable. The volume is packed with excellent hints for preachers, parents and teachers, and may be found helpful in preparing sermons and cathechetical instructions. Priests will be aided to apply a remedy to the cancer of modern evils by applying the fruits of Christ's teaching and His Blood through faith and the Liturgy. Thus we will have a liturgical people who will hunger for justice and truth, and who will be satisfied in the Mass, in the sacraments, and in holy living.

This work should have an honored place among modern pastoral literature. The application of modern encyclicals, the quotations from several recent ones of Pius XII, and the many apologetic remarks enhance its value; its historical notes and ready material on saints, churches, customs and feasts make it welcome and interesting reading for school and home. An annotated bibliography, a supplementary bibliography, and a fine index

give a happy completeness.

Without a Christian mentality in the individual, society will languish and grow ever worse. To stop leakage in the Catholic Church, to make Catholics more fervent, and to help them to a greater living and understanding faith, we must help to form in them a Christian mentality through that liturgy which gives us faith, morals and Scripture in a dramatic and impressive way. It is up to the leaders in the Church to implement the program and teaching of Christ and the Popes by not fearing the world and by giving "sound doctrine." Such is the merit of Fr. Kilian's book.

Mary Immaculate Friary, Garrison, N.Y. CUTHBERT GUMBINGER, O.F.M. Cap.

A Preface to Newman's Theology. By Edmond D. Benard (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1945. Pp. xv+234. \$2.25.)

The centenary of Newman's conversion to Catholicism has witnessed a spiritual revival of interest in his works, ideas and his legacy to the world. Among the current books on Cardinal Newman, Fr. Benard's *Preface to Newman's Theology* merits particular attention due precisely to the scope the author has set for himself in this attractive little volume, namely, the vindication of Cardinal Newman's theology against adverse criticism.

The purpose of the book is clearly defined and its limits are well fixed. It does not pretend to be anything more than an introduction to Newman's theological thought. The fact that Newman has been accused of hostility to the traditional notion of Catholic dogma, of subjectivism in his understanding of the nature of faith, and of having laid the foundations for the Modernist heresy, has led the author to re-examine the whole subject of the interpretation of Newman's theology.

The author highly esteems Newman as a theologian, but he is careful to note, and frankly admits, that Newman was not a professed scientific theologian in the usual meaning of the term. He did not belong to any theological school, and never intended to erect a theological structure. His theology "lies for the most part along the margin rather than in the central current of the theological stream" (p. 23). His major contributions to theology are in the field of the development of Christian doctrine and in his highly useful, modern approach to the traditional apologetics of

the Church (p. 23).

The book is divided into two main parts, the first of which deals with the background material necessary for the interpretation of Newman's theological thought. The second part is devoted almost exclusively to the examination in the light of the four principles of interpretation, enuntiated in the first part, of the most important criticisms leveled against Newman's two major works, Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine and Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Fr. Benard has acquitted himself well of his task of answering the criticisms of Catholics and Protestants. His objective method of approach to the interpretation of Newman's works succeeds in lifting the shadowy cloak of suspicion of Newman's orthodoxy on the problem of the development of Christian doctrine and of the genesis of belief in the individual.

A detailed examination of the contents of the book will enable us to evaluate it more accurately. Lest we exceed the limits of this review, we will confine ourselves to a few remarks. The four principles of interpretation, on the necessity of which the author strongly insists, are by no means original; they are the common basic principles of correct interpretation of the works of any author. Yet they are quite indispensable, and the author does well to insist on them, for the neglect of any one of them might easily lead to misrepresentations.

The third principle of interpretation, viz., to grasp Newman's thought we must be certain that we know exactly what he means by the words he uses (p. 64), helps but a little to remove the difficulties in interpreting Newman's works. The difficulty lies precisely in Newman's terminology. One would expect a Catholic author to adhere to some extent to a definite

terminology in any work on Catholic theology; failure to do so often results in misunderstandings. This is the case with Cardinal Newman. Consequently a burdensome task is imposed upon the reader of Newman's theological works, namely, an extremely careful reading of the context, or a recourse to parallel places in his writings, where the same word is used in a similar matter. To some extent the author has cleared away some of the difficulties; but nevertheless difficulties remain. For example, he says (p. 93), we find that Newman used the word "probability" according to a distinct meaning of his own. "A 'probable argument' to him was not one concerning which there was a founded fear of error; he used 'probable' in contrast, not to certain, but to demonstrative" (p. 93). Yet we find that in a letter to Renouf in 1868 Newman used the word "probability" in contrast to certainty (cf. Wilfrid Ward, The Life of John Henry Cardinal Newman. New York: Longmans, 1912, II, 236).

One may legitimately inquire whether these four principles of interpretation may be employed to smooth away every doctrinal point of Newman's theology, especially his idea on the infallibility of the Pope. If not, then it would only be logical, in a book of that kind, to determine with some accuracy the extent of the application of these principles, or at least to indicate some exceptions. Newman's position on the Vatican Council's definition of the infallibility of the Pope is untenable, hence it would be inaccurate and harmful both to the Church and to Newman himself to apply these four principles of interpretation to the Cardinal's views on this point.

The author has rendered a valuable service to the student of Newman by his well-arranged chronological list of Newman's writings. The various editions with their respective places and dates of publication are carefully noted. Noteworthy also is the relatively long, but not quite complete, bibliography.

Except for few incidental inaccuracies, which are not worthy of mention, the book has many excellent qualities. It will long remain a safe guide to the theology of Cardinal Newman.

GREGORY GRABKA, O.F.M. Conv.

S. Hyacinth Seminary Granby, Mass.

The Morality of American Civil Legislation Concerning Eugenical Sterilization. By Rev. Joseph B. Lehane, S.T.L. (Washington, D.C., Catholic University Press, 1944. Pp. 118.)

"The moral code of humans is tending more and more to be governed solely by questions of health and fitness." In this pithy observation Arnold Lunn neatly summarizes the utilitarian philosophy of modern eugenists. According to these modern utilitarians the very essence of morality is dependent upon the passions and fancies of men. Their false philosophy has worked itself deep into the fabric of our civilization. Modern thought is impregnated with this philosophy of utility.

We can see ample proof of this fact in the contemporary attitude toward eugenical sterilization. Father Lehane's doctoral dissertation is a complete and thorough study of the subject from the viewpoint of American

Civil legislation.

Sterilization is "generally applied to any operation affecting a person in such a way that it becomes impossible for that individual to take part in the human process of reproduction" (p. 1). Sterilization is eugenic if it is performed to prevent the conception of unfit offspring; it is therapeutic if performed for the physical welfare of the individual.

Eugenical sterilization of the so-called "unfit" has found many adherents in America. Francis Galton, relative and student of Charles Darwin, is accredited by modern eugenists as the founder of this utilitarian science. The primary postulatum of eugenists is the betterment of the human race. Their means of achieving this end is the sterilization, voluntary or involuntary, of the "unfit," i.e. the criminal, the mentally deficient, and the physically incapacitated. It is their ambition to foster the "growth of desireable stock" and "prevent the propagation of undesireable and defective

stock" (p. vii).

Surely it is shocking to hear that a "total of 36,505 operations for sterilization had been performed in the United States under the foregoing laws (i.e. state laws) up to Jan. 1, 1941 (p. 27). Nor do these figures include private operations performed in state and private hospitals for the mentally defective. We can imagine how many abuses must have crept into these private institutions! It is interesting to note also that of the thirty states of this Union which have sterilization laws twenty-eight of these same states have compulsory laws for defective persons. California has the highest record. In that state over 15,195 operations have been performed up to 1941. If Fr. Lehane had given us the figure inclusive of last year, he would have noted that California has 33,000 legally sterilized citizens! The man chiefly responsible for the enforcement of these sterilization laws "for the betterment of the human race" is none other that a certain former professor of the Communist School in Los Angeles, Dr. Aaron J. Rosanoff (cf. America Oct. 6th, 1945, p. 8f.).

Up until the time of Pope Pius XI's encyclical Casti Connubii many Catholic theologians disagreed concerning the liceity of eugenical sterilization. Foremost among these adherents Father S. M. Donovan maintained (with Fr. Laboure) that "the use of sterilization to prevent the perpetuation of crimes and to check the self-perpetuation of defective and degenerated parents" was lawful. Fr. Donovan asserted that "just as a man could voluntarily remove himself from the use of his reproductive power through the vows of the religious state, or the reception of Orders, so society could justly deprive individuals of the same function in order to promote the common good" (p. 67). But the majority of Catholic theologians have always maintained that the State has not the right to sterilize individuals for purely eugenic reasons (p. 72). "The person exists logically before the State and, in the absence of fault, cannot be declared to have forfeited his personal rights and privileges..." (p. 102).

The author concludes that "mutiliation is gravely illicit unless necessary for the conservation of life or the pre-eminent good of the whole body" (p. 75). Man is not the master of his bodily integrity but is merely the custodian of God to Whom the dominion of all created things belong. He may, it is true, remove a defective member if it is injurious to the welfare of the entire body. A mutilation such as vasectomy or castration "performed for genuine therapeutic purposes in accord with the findings of medical science does not conflict with the individual's obligation to conserve

the bodily integrity conferred on him by the Creator" (p. 76).

This work of Fr. Lehane is heartily recommended to all readers of Franciscan Studies. His bibliography is excellent although he could have profitably added the noteworthy contribution of Fr. Antoine D'Eschambault's D.D., D.C.L., Eugenical Sterilization (Winnipeg, 1937).

BONAVENTURE A. BROWN, O.F.M.

Holy Name College, Washington, D.C.

Head Above the Stars. By Rev. Giles Staab, O.F.M. Cap. (New York, N.Y.: Frederick Pustet Co., Inc., 1945. Cloth. Pp. xv+171. \$2.00.)

This is an excellent book for recommendation to religious and the laity alike for light spiritual reading. Divided into three parts, it presents thirty-two essays on subjects taken from the life of Christ, and religious mysteries and teachings, with practical reflections. These reflections always to the point are frequently gripping. The book, written in a beautiful language and style, is simple enough for the average Christian but to the better educated it suggests profound thoughts for meditation. Although intended for leisurely spiritual reading, a busy preacher might find in these pages some useful material and practical suggestions.

KILIAN J. HENNRICH, O.F.M. Cap.

Our Lady of Sorrows Friary, New York. N.Y.

Moira — Fate, Good and Evil in Greek Thought. By William Chase Greene. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944. Pp. viii+450. \$5.00.)

The present opus is the only single 1 work which has appeared which "undertakes to deal with the group of questions that confronted the author." It is detailed and complete, and shows a thorough familiarity with the bibliography of the subject-matter. In style it is for the most part clear, although the wealth of material cited sometimes obscures the main progress of the argument. The first chapter is an outline of the whole book; the second deals with early Greek poetry; the third, with orthodoxy and mysticism; the following four with tragedy and the three tragedians; the next three with Socrates and his predecessors, Plato and Aristotle; the final chapter on Fate and Providence summarizes the Stoics and Epicureans, the New Academy, Neo-Platonists, and the transition to Christianity. A series of some sixty-eight appendices (a paragraph each in length) gives additional bibliography and discusses various points in greater detail.² The "Bibliography" itself is excellent and the book concludes with two indexes:

^{1.} Other works on the same or related themes cited in the bibliography are by: Allègre, Berry, Leach, Pack, Russell, Tournier, and others.
2. Particularly fine are numbers 28, 30, 31, and 35.

one of names and subjects (in English and transliterated Greek), and the other of Greek words and phrases.³ Under Moira, for example, can be found a topical summary of the sections of the book dealing with fate.

The author's attitude, philosophically, is on the whole optimistic (3); and in scholarly matters, conservative. In a sense, the whole work is an attempt to explain the origin and nature of the concept of evil among the Greeks (3-4) and of the freedom of the will 4 as against law and causality. Fate is first conceived by the poets as equivalent to the will of the gods (though free-will also exists and not all evil comes from the gods); by the philosophers, more impersonally, as law or power; by men generally, as itself, fate. These ideas were superceded by chance, popularly; and by providence, ultimately (the Stoics and Christianity). A development can be traced from an external to an internal conception of life. While no ultimate answer was possible (4), a progress of ideas does exist, with evil ultimately explained as the absence or incompleteness of good. In morality various virtues developed corresponding to these attitudes and the essential problem of justice is raised (first by Theognis). why do moderation (sophrosyne) and pride (hybris) both meet the same fate.

The heart of the work is in the chapters on tragedy, Plato, and Aristotle. All the extant plays are considered. Aeschylus, though essentially attempting to justify God's ways to man, nevertheless shows free-will and a consideration of motive. The jealousy of the gods (as in Herodotus) is refined by Pindar and Aeschylus and connected with human hybris and nemesis (retribution). Sophocles assumes the ultimate justification of the divine order and concentrates his attention on human character. He thus justifies man to man. Euripides, baffling because baffled, primarily a rhetorician, orator, and intellectual, often moves on a completely human plane — at least until the last moment in the deus ex machina. The role of chance, or human fortune, becomes greater, the human element is even more stressed, and there is less fatalism.

^{3.} The extreme inconsistency throughout the book in the use of Greek and Roman type for words, abbreviations, and the titles of works, is very annoying.

^{4.} The first great analysis of the will the author finds in the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Bk. III). The term *proairesis*, refers basically to the intellectual process of choice, but emotive factors are also connoted. It may be asked whether physical "chance" (the arbitrary swerve of atoms) in the Epicurean system really saved free-will (334). The author remarks that discussions of the problem of free-will after Boethius belong to Christian theology and "cannot be here pursued." Yet he discusses Grotius and Milton.

^{5.} The word *moira* (fate), according to Greene, is not found in Aristotle except in virtual quotations. Also the idea of cause (without moral connotation) first meets us not in Aristotle but in the Hippocratean corpus.

^{6.} Tyche occurs first in Archilochus.

^{7.} The first distinct statement of the problem of the origin of evil seems to be in Plato's Republic.

^{8.} Theognis was also the first to protest against the punishment of the innocent children of the wicked.

^{9.} Theognis treats of several virtues and Simonides by his general interest in virtue, was a forerunner of the Sophists, who in turn had a profound influence upon the dramatists. Sophocles also profited by the newer studies on human nature of the medical writers and Thucydides.

By the preceding summary of the author's views in the first half of the work, it will be seen already that in speaking of Greek thought the author has reference to works of literature and philosophy. Of religion, morality and law he says relatively little. Thus, in the concept of good, the content is lacking. Precisely what acts did the Greeks regard as good? A more systematical treatment of these matters would have prepared the way for, and helped to answer, the moral questions raised in tragedy, such as: patria potestas (110 and n. 38), murder of husband vs. murder of parent (1345) and the double standard (Euripides' Medea). With regard to Oedipus (159), Professor Greene might better have advised him to avoid killing any men, and marrying any older woman. May not the whole play be Sophocles' way of saying, contrary to the usual tone of earlier society, that murder in general is bad. Nor should it be implied (170) that this provocation to murder was sufficient. He is guilty of excessive anger, disproportionate to the cause. Hamartia is usually defined as a mistake in judgment rather than a moral flaw (93),10 but is this true of Oedipus (95)? Oedipus himself should be called an ennobled, rather than a noble character (158).11 The story itself, like the tragedy of Heracles (153) is just as much a tragedy of character (155) as any other, but "character" has operated before the play begins.

The first definite statement of the moral decline of man is ascribed to Solon. To the theory of cosmic degeneration (as in Hesiod), the author gives no serious treatment, although the tradition of the existence of a golden age is maintained by many anthropologists. This is but one of the many instances of cases where a closer study of the Orient and its influence on Greek thought would have been very profitable. The same is true of the sketchy treatment of the pre-Socratics (224-228). This tends to give the general impression that the Greeks were entirely original, whereas especially in the early period relationships with the Orient are considered by many as having been well established.¹²

The chapters on Plato and Aristotle are good, but more detailed concerning their general systems (particularly the metaphysics) than would be necessary in a work of this nature. The concluding chapter, especially in its fine treatment of Plotinus, brings us to Christianity. There are many illuminating references to Christianity ¹³ in the earlier portions also, particularly to the Incarnation and the ways in which it was anticipated philosophically. The treatment of Augustine is disappointing. The author feels that predestination is implicit in his thought in such a way that it prepares for Jansen and Calvin and robs man of moral responsibility!

^{10.} But see p. 116.

^{11.} Similarly the comparison between Euripides' Heracles and Steinbeck's Of Mice and Men is essentially unfair (186, n. 60). He is not a moron.

^{12.} The sixth edition of Zeller is mentioned in the notes (though not in the bibliography), but the Italian translation of Mandolfo, rich in bibliography in this respect, is not cited.

^{13.} References to the Old Testament also are frequent; e.g.: pp. 39, 42, 74, n. 143. The usual comparison of Prometheus (121) to Adam is lacking.

Professor Greene has written an excellent book which will demand the serious study of all scholars in the field, and will well repay the attention of a more general audience.¹⁴

WILLIAM RICHARD TONGUE

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Psychologia. By Gerard Esser, S.V.D. Revised and enlarged ed. (Techny, Ill.: Mission Press, 1945. Pp. xvi+449. \$3.00.)

Father Esser published the first edition of his psychology in 1931. This present 1945 edition is practically a new book. Hardly a sentence of the 1931 edition has been left in its original form. The general plan remains the same, but the entire text has been recast and greatly enlarged. Many more facts and systems of thought have been embodied in the book, with numerous quotations from modern sources. The scientific portions have been amplified considerably and brought up-to-date. The second edition is thus a great improvement over the first.

The author follows the general line of thought traditionally found in Scholastic textbooks on psychology. He is very fair in his treatment of controversial problems, even when he definitely favors one side. As an instance, one might mention his discussion in the present edition of the problem of the evolutionary origin of the human body, as compared to

that in the first edition.

The arrangement of material is sometimes at fault. For example, the

14. The following should be noted: Incomplete documentation of the Prometheus trilogy (117-119) and of Stesichorus (201) Incomplete references: 56 n. 43, 109 n. 33, 120 n. 83, 176 n. 16. Misprints: 16.11: "folllowed" for followed"

18.28: delete the period
37 n.15: for ";" read "and"
44.27: 'έρδειν for 'έρδειν
44.28 'έρδοντι for 'έρδοντι
55.10: "he" for "she"
55.21: "one of" for "one of the"

68 n.105.5: close parenthesis 97 n.31.3: 'Αριστόζευος for 'Αριστόζευος

98.39: "at times" repeated

118 n.73.4: "change" for "charge" 142.4: comma after "suffering"

155 n.76: τοιαίδε for τοιαίδε

168.3: for "Antigone... brother" read "Antigone)... brother"

241.1: "wrappings" for "rappings" 267.28: "discussion" for "dissention"

298 ad fin.: "from evil" for "of evil"

324 n.57.7: 'επιπνοία for ἐπιπνοία

349.21: "according" for "according to"

author discusses the truth-value, essence, and intentional entity of external sensation (pp. 38-70) immediately after his exposition of the external senses and their functions. Yet much of the discussion refers rather to 'perception" than to "sensation" strictly as such; and at times items pertaining to the internal senses are brought into the argument, although the student presumably is still unacquainted with the internal senses and their functions. There is such a close connection between external and internal sensation and perception, that the entire question should have been delayed until all the facts of sensory life, both external and internal, had been explained and discussed. Similarly, in the section devoted to the internal senses, sensory consciousness is given first place (p. 76ff.) and treated as if it were a distinct internal sense. Consciousness, however, is a phenomenon which accompanies all sense activity, whether internal or external. Every sense is a medium of "knowledge" in some form or other, and we cannot "know" anything without becoming aware or "conscious" of it. The author himself admits this (p. 76-77). He should, therefore, have waited with the discussion of sensory consciousness until all the facts of sensitivity, both external and internal, had been brought to the knowledge of the student. As it is, too many factual items are introduced here (e.g., imagination, memory, Ego, etc.) which belong to later sections. This must be confusing to the student.

The Latin is fluent and relatively clear. To study a difficult subject through the medium of a foreign language, naturally places a double burden on the seminarian. Hence, a clear Latin text is a boon. Since, however, the student will always discuss philosophical problems in the vernacular, it would have been both advantageous and advisable if the author had made more extensive use of the English equivalents of technical terms by including them parenthetically in the text. All in all, however, Father Esser's work is an excellent textbook for our seminaries. It is complete, it is

thorough, it is scholarly.

C. N. BITTLE, O.F.M. Cap.

Milwaukee, Wis.

Personal Mental Hygiene. By Dom Verner Moore, M.D. (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1944. Pp. 331.)

Within this quarter of a century attempts have been made to sift the chaff from the wheat of psychoanalysis. Further efforts have been directed to a synthesis of the results with traditional Catholic learning. Among the scholars engaged in these processes is Dr. Moore, whose latest book, reflecting his interest in both these endeavors, is another of the fruits of his long and successful contact with the theories and practices of psychology and psychiatry.

This book follows Dr. Moore's well-known volume on *The Nature* and *Treatment of Mental Disorders*. A large portion of its matter is the amplification and logical development of much that was established in his previous work. Its new content is formed for the most part by the synthesis

of Christian asceticism with sound principles of mental hygiene.

While this volume may well serve as a textbook, it was primarily intended for individual reading. Its conversational style makes it a book

both easy and pleasant to peruse. It takes the reader into the inner recesses of the mind and shows him the motivating factors of human conduct. It points out to him the principles and ideals which must regulate human life if man is to be successful, healthy and happy. Excellent illustrations of these facts are given by citations of clinical cases and the lives of various

historical and literary personalities.

Among its chapters there are some which have more than a personal-hygiene value. Spiritual directors will find material especially helpful to them in Chapter IV which discusses anxiety and scrupulosity. Chapters X to XV, which treat of mental hygiene in the home, will be of particular interest and value to parents. For those teaching in the grades, Chapter XVI, which treats of the application of mental hygiene in the school, will be useful. The student of English literature will find interesting psychological studies of the poets — D. G. Rossetti, Swinburne, Shelley and Kilmer in the final chapters.

To those cognizant of the defects and inherent limitations of modern psychiatry, Dr. Moore's work will be welcomed for more than its personal value. Day by day, more and more people are seeking the aid of psychiatrists. And it is a sad fact that among those who are acting as the guides of human beings in their conflicts and perplexities, few are found who realize the therapeutic value of intellectual and religious matters, or who employ them in their therapeutic procedures. It is to remedy this defect of modern psychiatry and psychiatrists that Dr. Moore composed

his volume.

Personal Mental Hygiene is a definite contribution to the Catholic book-shelf. To accomplish its full purpose it must reach the hands of teaching and practicing psychiatrists. Personal Mental Hygiene, together with Dr. Moore's earlier work, The Nature and Treatment of Mental Disorders, answers a need long felt by many Catholics in their own work and in their discussions with non-Catholic psychiatrists.

BRIAN LHOTA, O.F.M.

Holy Name College, Washington, D.C.

Catholic Art and Culture. By E. I. Watkin. (New York, Sheed and Ward, 1945. Pp. 226. \$4.50.)

In this illuminating study, Mr. Watkin delineates the character and the history of "Catholic religion-culture" and its expression in art. According to him, this culture forms a cycle whose early stages coincide with the decline of Antiquity and the death of old paganism; it reaches its summary summit in the Gothic period and its rich autumnal stage in the Baroque era; with modern times winter sets in: Catholic religion-culture dies away in a more and more barbarized world of crude and irreligious materialism. Yet, the first buds of a new Catholic religion-culture are already ascertainable, forecasting new spring. The coming culture will harmonize the horizontal movement of secular humanism with the vertical movement towards God and the depths of the human soul in a more perfect manner than was ever achieved before. Contemplative Christendom led by mystics will dominate this future development.

The historical philosophy of the author is influenced by Spengler's idea of cultures as organisms subject to birth, rise, decline, and death. By combining with this view the older theories of steady and spiral cultural progress achieved in the Hegelian way of dialectical evolution, he arrives at a brighter and more optimistic outlook than the author of The Decline of the West. He deviates also in other respects. He does not care for the Spenglerian fate, and his approach to history is pragmatic. Cultures are not based on blood and soil but on religions. Every former culture was a religion-culture and so is ours. Catholic religion-culture arose within the old Hellenistic-Roman-Oriental world and survived it; it was passed over to the then young peoples of Europe as the basic and creative force of their cultural development; mass-civilization put an end to it when it turned to one-sided secularism, thus disrupting the necessary harmony between the horizontal and the vertical movement. The author's vision of the future is similar to Spengler's "second religiosity" with its mystical leanings and its longing for quiet, meditative, spiritual life. Mr. Watkin, however, does not look at this attitude as a characteristic phenomenon of tired and exhausted cultures, but conceives it as the final result of former dialectical development and the opening phase of new cultural evolution, the dawn of the coming kingdom of the Holy Spirit.

In spite of these differences there is an intrinsic similarity between Mr. Watkin's conception of Catholic religion-culture and Spengler's Faustian or Germanic culture. Both are of dynamic character, ruled by the aspirations of an emotional and will-dominated soul. Both authors are deeply rooted in the Romanticism of the nineteenth century although Mr. Watkin does not agree with the pantheistic attitude of these predecessors. Like them he believes in dynamic religiosity. He emphasizes the rôle of irrational mysticism as represented in medieval times by men like Joachim de Floris, or, in the times of counter-Reformation, by the great Spanish mystics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Among artists, Mr. Watkin prefers those who reach beyond the barriers of classic equilibrium and harmony; in Italy, the impetuous art of Michelangelo seems to him more Catholic than the harmonious art of Raphael. Michelangelo excepted, Renaissance artists and the Renaissance itself are regarded rather cooly. The Renaissance is the time of the disintegration of the medieval order and, within the cultural cycle, merely late summer, a sequel of Gothic times and Gothic splendor. In this, the author joins Schmarsow, Neumann, Burdach, and again Spengler.

Mr. Watkin concentrates his affection upon the emotional and dynamic qualities of the art of the Gothic and Baroque periods as they appear, particularly, in Northern art. The striving element in Northern Gothicism, conceived by the Romanticists and their modern successors as Germanic, appeals to him as particularly Catholic. He accepts the rather questionable theory of the revival of this spirit as an essential of Baroque culture and Baroque art, which has been developed by Worringer, Schubart, Scheffler, et alii. The examples he uses in order to prove this point are mainly chosen from German art, where the Gothic tradition showed a remarkable tenacity

and outlived the Renaissance.

We should consider, however, that Baroque writers and artists were not aware of any relation to Gothicism and rejected Gothic art in spite of all emotional affinities. Continuing the tradition of the Renaissance, the Baroque writers used the term "Gothic" synonymously with barbarous. Poets like Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio, philosophers like the great Scholastics who introduced Aristotelianism into European thinking, and artists like Giotto, were not included in this condemnation: they were not considered Gothic, but ranked among the founders of modern times. Italy had never fully accepted Northern Gothicism, and France, where Gothic art had reached its most sublime heights, had turned away from it to the renaissance of classic harmony earlier and with more determination than the Germanic nations of Europe. Up to this day, the spirit which Baroque rejected in the form of Gothicism, remained repugnant to the Latin world, as the example of Santayana shows, who calls the world dominated by it "morose and barbarous at its inmost core."

In his reasoning, Mr. Watkin makes wide use of analogies. Such proceeding is not unscientific in itself and particularly its heuristic value can hardly be underestimated; but it harbors the danger of linking objects and thoughts on the basis of subjective and sentimental associations and symbolic interpretations without the establishment of logical relations. Mr. Watkin has not always succeeded in eluding this temptation. Thus, the value of his book seems less based on a strictly scientific approach to its matter, than on the broad humanity and great erudition of the author and his ardent belief in higher cultural values. Even where we may hesitate to accept fully his conclusions, his ideas stimulate reflection. By the power of his intuitional vision, Mr. Watkin succeeds in integrating the almost unbounded mass of facts into a unity, the unity of Catholic religion-culture. In this way, he wins a point from which light is thrown on many controversial facts in the history of the Western-European mind. Sincerity and warmth of feeling characterize his representation. Thus, Mr. Watkin's book, which demonstrate also a comprehensive knowledge of the pertinent literature, guides the reader with insight through the involved problems of the cultural development brought about in Western-Europe under the dominating influence of Catholic thought and the Catholic view of the world.

HARRY B. GUTMAN

New York City.

Escritos Completos de San Francisco de Asis y Biografias de su Epoca. Edited by Juan R. de Legisima, O.F.M., and Lino Gomez Canedo, O.F.M. (Madrid: Editorial Catolica, S.A., Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1945. Pp. xliii+871.)

In the midst of the abundance of books in Spain's present-day market, one may wonder why the writings of the Poverello of Assisi should be selected for publication in Spanish. Undoubtedly the case deserves our comment and our consideration. Very soon after the tragic Spanish civil war the leaders of Spanish Catholic Action realized the need of providing a sound and adequate reading material for the educated Catholic people who lacked the necessary classical as well as modern literature of a formative nature. The Spanish Catholic reading public had in many instances been forced to import their books from abroad without having first been instructed in how to use the proper bibliography to make the selection adequate.

There was no well classified and organic library possessing the indispensable works which deal with the main sciences of the spirit. That might have accounted for the unsatisfactory education of one section of

the people, and for the poor and out-of-date formation in others.

To meet this urgent need a *Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos* (Library of Christian Authors) was founded under the auspices and direction of the Pontifical University of Salamanca. His Excellency Fr. Francisco Barbado, O.P., Bishop of Salamanca and Chancellor of the same University was named president, and a board of prominent Spanish Catholic scholars was appointed to give assistance in the editing and selecting of books published in this series. The program outlined by the Editors of the *Biblioteca* of Christian Authors covers the following fields: Theology, Spiritual Life, Philosophy, History, literary and critical, Canon Law and Hagiography.

Two years ago the *Biblioteca* published its first volume: it was the Holy Bible. The Very Rev. Alberto Colunga, O.P., Dean of the Faculty of Sacred Scripture in the University of Salamanca, had made, with the help and collaboration of other prominent scholars, a direct translation of the Bible into Spanish from the Greek and Hebrew texts. The translation had the special merit of being the first one ever made into Spanish directly from the Hebrew and the Greek. Critics were unanimous in stating that

the work was sound and scholarly.

So far the Biblioteca has brought out four volumes: The Holy Bible, Suma Poética by José María Pemán and M. Herrero García, the Obras Completas Castellanas of Fray Luis de León by Félix García, O.S.A., and Escritos Completos of St. Francis of Assisi by Juan R. de Legísima, O.F.M., and Lino Gómez Canedo, O.F.M., both well known in the field of Franciscan studies.

With the publication of these volumes two important facts are established: the serious scholarship of the editors, and the high and wise scope of their vision in presenting such books. Fourteen other volumes are announced for publication in the near future. The author of this note found the critical edition of the works of St. Bonaventure very much advanced when he left the Iberian Peninsula some months ago. Frs. León Amorós, Bernardo Aperribay, and Miguel Oromí, well-known in the field of Franciscan Mediaeval Studies had been entrusted with the edition. The titles of other volumes and the specialists that are taking part in the editing of the same give us no obscure indication of the great service the *Biblioteca* of Christian Authors is rendering to the Catholic Hispanic world. May Heaven grant peace to those people so that they may carry out their laudable task!

Frs. Legisima and Gómez Canedo open this volume with a very fine and complete introduction in which the influence that Franciscan ideals and the Franciscan philosophy of life have had in the souls of generations since the time of St. Francis is pointed out. Moreover, it shows how Franciscan spirituality as found in the writings of the Poverello, the "Little Flowers," Biographies of St. Francis by Celano and St. Bonaventure, The Legend of the Three Companions and the Mirror of Perfection, has the message the present world needs to obtain a lasting Christian peace in

harmony with the dictates of Western Civilization.

This desire of spreading the Franciscan philosophy of life has prompted the Editors of this volume to insert the "Little Flowers," since — they

assert — they have besides their symbolical and legendary value an historical one worthy of consideration. For those who are anxious to know and have a serious interpretation of Franciscanism a very useful note containing the main works on St. Francis and Franciscan life appears in pages xxiii and xxiv of the Introduction.

The authors have also made the book more useful by the insertion of an "Index of Names and Subject Matter." Numerous illustrations reproducing paintings of the more famous Franciscan artists and a map of Franciscan Italy add greatly to the usefulness and value of the volume.

We wish to express our sincere congratulations to the *Biblioteca* for their fine edition of the writings of our Seraphic Father. Frs. Legísima and Gómez Canedo deserve the compliments of all lovers of St. Francis. This book adds prestige to their glorious and brilliant careers.

RODERICK A. MOLINA, O.F.M.

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Father Theobald Mathew: Apostle of Temperance. By the Rev. Patrick Rogers, M.A., D. Litt. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1945. Pp. 166. \$2.50.)

Here truly is a definitive biography of the Apostle of Temperance. Dr. Rogers with all the diligence and training of the skilled historian has limned the figure of Fr. Mathew so artistically that one sees the great Capuchin live again in the pages of the book. The few illustrations (photographs of a painting of Fr. Mathew, the Friary in Cork, Holy Trinity Church in Cork, etc.) all serve to fix the picture of the man and his sur-

roundings upon the eye and so upon the mind.

Dr. Rogers begins with the early years of Theobald Mathew in the immense mansion of Thomastown. He sketches in the ancestors of the friar to show how many of the good qualities and even the apparent weaknesses of character were part of a family strain. The story of the boy's vocation to the priesthood is told, his schooling, his leaving of Maynooth, his joining the Capuchins. The trials of his early priestly years are set against the background of the Penal Laws and the subsequent dissatisfaction of Irish Bishops and secular clergy with the continuance of the plenary faculties given the friars in Penal days.

A misunderstanding arising from the restrictions put on the friars in the see of Ossory sent Fr. Mathew from Kilkenny to Cork. Here for twenty-four years he threw himself into work among the poor. He attained

a great reputation as a confessor and a popular preacher.

In his work among the people he saw the evils of drink. Many times he had been approached to join the crusade for temperance. In 1838 with the words "Here goes in the name of God," he began the apostolate that was to take him all over Ireland, Scotland, England, to twenty-five states in America, an apostolate that was to close only with his death.

The lights and shadows of that apostolic life are portrayed with photographic sharpness by Dr. Rogers. We see Fr. Mathew giving lectures, administering the pledge, hurrying, ever hurrying to new fields to sow the

good seed. Crowds, crowds, 6,000, 10,000, 30,000, listening to the words of Fr. Mathew, waiting to take the pledge from him. A tangible proof of the success of the crusade lies in the decrease of revenue from Irish spirit duties -- £1,434,573 in 1839; £852,418, in 1844. One might go on, as Dr. Rogers does, listing the eulogies bestowed on Fr. Mathew by his contemporaries, as further proof of his success. But the figures above speak in a language all conclusive.

The biography continues with Fr. Mathew's work in the years of the Great Famine in Ireland. Chapter IX deals with his visit to the United States, a real contribution to the history of the Church in America. The closing days of his life are poignantly drawn in a chapter headed "Nunc

Dimittis."

One puts the book down with the feeling that here was a man wholly human, wholly Franciscan, wholly Christlike. His greatness and his weakness (witness his financial difficulties, his surprise at poverty in the United States!) are in the book for all to read. It is a portrait of a man that Dr. Rogers has given us, but of a man who could give his all: "Here goes in the name of God."

The book has an excellent introduction by the Right Reverend David Mathew, the most distinguished living representative of the Mathew family, and a thought-provoking, laudatory foreword by the Very Reverend Father James, Provincial of the Irish Capuchin province. The thorough work of Dr. Rogers is further apparent in his Bibliography (Pp. 153 to 158) and his Index (Pp. 159 to 166).

ARNOLD YANKER, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Fidelis Seminary, Herman, Pa.

Historia y Empresas Apostolicos del Siervo de Dios P. Esteban de Adoain por el Revdo P. Gumersindo de Estella, O.F.M. Cap. (Pamplona: Editorial Aramburu, 1944. Pp. 510.)

As a young man, Father Stephen was called "dumb," yet his voice, like that of the Apostles, was to reach to the ends of the earth. The greater part of his active life was spent as a missionary in Latin America. Venezuela, Cuba, Guatemala and El Salvador were the fields of apostolic labor of this missionary. In reading the life of this indefatigable missionary, one seems to follow the footsteps of another Saint Paul; the same apostolic fatigues, anxieties, persecutions and successful preaching of the Word of God.

In all his missions he carried the banner of the Divina Pastora unfurled; and in 1870 he succeeded in having her proclaimed the principal patron of the Capuchins in Central America. Throughout the book the heroic virtues of Father Stephen are brought to light. The author not only speaks of the external activity of the missionary, but stresses his religious

fervor, both as subject and superior, and his priestly zeal.

At a time of great internal crisis the government of El Salvador turned to him for aid as the only one who could ward off civil strife. This he did with great success. The student of Spanish and Latin American civil and ecclesiastical history will find many interesting sidelights on the turbulent

events of the last century.

The flora and fauna of Venezuela are described in some detail by

Father Stephen himself.

After the Servant of God was finally expelled from Guatemala, he spent a brief period in Milwaukee as a member of the Capuchin community there. His last years were devoted to the restoration of the Capuchin Order in Spain, which was the crowning glory of his life.

The life of Father Stephen is well documented; the footnotes, brief and to the point, do not detract from the readableness of the history. At times there is a certain sameness in the narration which is due to the continuously prodigious activity of the missionary, nevertheless one is irresistibly carried on to the end. It is thrilling.

The author of the book who is the vice-postulator of the cause of beatification of the Servant of God, writes in a very fluent and pleasing Spanish. He has produced a work worthy of the purpose for which it is

intended — the preparation of the cause of beatification.

This great but relatively unknown lumen in our great Franciscan galaxy deserves to be more widely known. The book should be on the shelves of every mission library. Upon finishing it the impression remains that here is a missionary's missionary.

KEVIN SMYTH, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Anthony's Friary, Marathon, Wis.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- ST. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J.:

 Heroes of the Cross, by Marion A. Habig, O.F.M. (Revised edit.) (254pp.;

 \$2.50); Sanctity in America, (Revised edit.) by Most Reverend Amleto Giovanni
 Cigognani, Apostolic Delegate to the United States (xvi+244pp.; \$2.00); Eleven
 Ludy-Lyrics and Other Poems, by Fray Angelico Chavez, O.F.M. (xi+96pp.;

 \$1.35); Our Lady of the Aztec, by Josephine M. O'Neil (72pp.; \$1.00).
- THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C.:

 Cardinalis Hosii Doctrina de Corpore Christi Mystico in luce Saeculi XVI, by
 Gregory Grabka, O.F.M. Conv. (xviii+279); The Social Thought of American
 Catholics, 1634-1829, by C. J. Nuesse (x+315pp.; \$3.00).
 The New Scholasticism, "Fifty Years Ago" (Reprint), by Miriam Theresa Rooney.
- UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, CHICAGO:

 General Biology and Philosophy of Organism, by Ralph Stayner Lillie (215pp.; \$3.00); Franciscan Education and the Social Order in Spanish North America (1502-1821), by Pius Joseph Barth, O.F.M. (xi+431pp.).
- Düsseldorf, Germany:

 Die Gewissheit des Gnadenstandes bei Andreas de Vega, O.F.M., by Miguel Oltra, O.F.M. (111pp.).
- GRUNE & STRATTON, NEW YORK, N.Y.:

 Personality Factors in Counseling, by Charles A. Curran, Ph.D. (310pp.; \$4.00).
- MILWAUKEE, Wis.: (publ. privately)

 Catholics and the Civil War, by Benjamin J. Bleid, Ph.D. (162pp.).
- MINISTÉRIO DA EDUCAÇÃO E SAUDE, RIO DE JANEIRO:

 Publicações do Serviço do Patrimôno Historico e Artistico Nacional, nos 7 and
 12 (219pp. and 340pp.).
- THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, NEW YORK, N.Y.:
 St. Athanasius, The Incarnation of the Word of God, transl. by a Religious of the C.S.M.V. S.Th. (96pp.; \$1.50).
- B. HERDER BOOK Co., St. LOUIS:

 St. Dominic and His Work, transl. by Mary Benedicta Larkin, O.P. (xiv+487; \$5.00).
- INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITIES PRESS, N.Y.:

 German Education and Re-Education, by Lewis M. Ternan (147pp.; \$2.00).
- LIBRAIRIE SAINT-FRANÇOIS, MONTRÉAL:

 Québec et l'Eglise aux Etats-Unis, by Laval Laurent, O.F.M. (xxxv+258pp.).
- UNIVERSITY OF LAVAL, QUEBEC, CANADA:
 L'Enseignement Secondaire au Canada, Tables générales des XXVI premières années, (207pp.; \$1.00).
- THE BRUCE PUBLISHING COMPANY, MILWAUKEE, WIS.:

 The Mystical Body of Christ, by Friedrich Jurgensmeier, D.D. (309pp.; \$3.00);

 The Priest of the Fathers, by Edward L. Heston, C.S.C. (171pp.; \$2.50).
- EDITIONS PAX ET BONUM, MONTRÉAL:

 Culture de la Liberié au foyer et à l'école, by Alcantara Dion, O.F.M. (32pp.).
- LOGMANS, GREEN AND Co., New York, N.Y.:

 A Newman Treasury, by Charles Frederick Harrold (xii+404pp.; \$4.00);

 John Henry Newman, by same author (xi+472pp.; \$3.50).

- New Directions Press, Norfolk, Connecticut:

 Selections from the Note-Books of Gerald Manley Hopkins, ed. by T. Weiss (32pp.).
- THE DEVIN-ADAIR COMPANY, NEW YORK, N.Y.:

 Eastern Catholic Worship, by Donald Attwater (xvii+224pp.; \$2.50).
- THE NEWMAN BOOK SHOP, WESTMINSTER, MD.:

 The Spiritual Doctrine of Father Louis Lallemont, by Alan G. McDougall (xvi+304pp.; \$3.00). The Third Day, by Arnold Lunn (xlii+177pp.; \$2.75);

 The Practice of the Presence of God, by Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection, transl. by Sister Mary David, S.S.N.D. (127pp.; \$2.25).
- Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:

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Cum permissu superiorum.

OCKHAM'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

Our previous investigation has sufficiently shown that already in the thirteenth century the theory of signification and at least an equivalent of the theory of supposition were linked up with the theory of truth. This historical sketch has proved that Ockham's theory of truth, which is more explicitly based on the theory of supposition than that of any other previous system, remains within the pale of the Scholastic tradition; but it has also prepared the way for making the difference between his own theory and that of his predecessors evident. The Venerabilis Inceptor is in agreement with his predecessors in maintaining that the relation which constitutes the truth of propositions is a relation of correct signification or supposition; but he disagrees with them — in different degrees — regarding the exact specification of this relation.

Ockham follows Aristotle¹ when he refers the predicate "true" or "false" only to propositions, whether spoken, written or mental. Propositions are composed of spoken, written or mental terms. The terms in a proposition have a certain supposition, and supposition in its turn is related to signification. Hence we have to start our analysis with a discussion and explanation of Ockham's theory of signification.

The present article will quote Ockham's texts extensively, partly because these texts are not easily accessible, and mainly because they are almost all revised according to the best manuscripts known to us.

1. THE MEANING OF SIGN NOT CONFINED TO LANGUAGE

A faithful account of Ockham's Semantics must avoid the danger of confusing different types of signs, because he himself

^{1.} Secundo notandum, quod raro invenitur a Philosopho quod ponit aliquam veritatem vel falsitatem nisi in propositione, et ideo, ut communiter, Philosophus non vocat aliquid verum vel falsum nisi propositionem. Expositio super 1th librum Perihermenias, ad: Est autem quemadmodum in anima... Cf. P. Wilpert, "Zum Aristotelischen Wahrheitsbegriff," in Philosophisches Jahrburch der Görres-Gesellschaft 53 (1940) 1-16, especially p. 16: "Für eine Entwicklung im Wahrheitsbegriff des Aristoteles können wir feststellen, dass die ontologische Wahrheit Platons mehr und mehr zurücktritt und an ihre Stelle die logische Wahrheit den ersten Platz einnimmt, wenn auch die ontologische Bedeutung des Begriffes nie ganz verschwindet."

has carefully distinguished them. "Sign" can be taken in a very broad sense, but then signs which are terms (spoken, written or mental) are not necessarily a sub-class of sign in general, though they may partly be characterized by the properties of sign in general. Or "sign" can be taken in the specific meaning of language-sign; and so it needs a specific characterization. We shall first deal with the meaning of sign in the broader sense.

According to Ockham, a sign in the broad meaning of the term is everything which, when apprehended, makes something different from itself, which is already habitually known, actually known:

(Signum accipitur) pro omni illo, quod apprehensum aliquid aliud in cognitionem facit venire, quamvis non faciat mentem venire in primam cognitionem eius, sicut alibi est ostensum, sed in actualem post habitualem eiusdem.2

This notification of the meaning of sign is undoubtedly inspired by the much quoted definition offered by St. Augustine:

Signum est enim res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire.3

However, we note immediately that Ockham's wording differs in important details from the definition given by St. Augustine. In fact, Ockham's definition while wider in its scope yet adds a certain limitation.

It is wider in its scope. For Ockham's calls "everything which makes something different from itself known" a sign. Hence, by definition, the function of sign is not confined to sensible facts; on the contrary, everything, whether it is a thing or a sign, a material or an immaterial reality, can be a sign in this sense if it is the cause of the knowledge of something else. Smoke, for instance, is a sign in this sense, for it can be the cause of the knowledge of fire; or a word, too, is a natural sign in this sense, for it is a natural sign of its cause, viz., the speaker. Furthermore, the barrel hoop in front of an inn is also a sign in this sense, since it can be the cause of knowing that there is wine in the inn.4 And,

^{2.} Summa Logicae, I, cap. 1.
3. De Doctrina Christiana, II, cap. 1 (1); PL t. 34, col. 35; cf. the distinction between natural and artificial signs, loc. cit. cap. 1 (2) and 2 (3).
4. Et sic vox naturaliter significat, sicut quilibet effectus significat saltem suam causam; sic etiam circulus significat vinum in taberna. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 1.

let us add, though Ockham does not enumerate an immaterial sign amongst the instances, that a sign in this sense would also be a concept, the cognition of which can call to my mind the cognition of the corresponding word, or the cognition of another concept.

The limitation added by Ockham is very significant. Since it has been usually misunderstood, we are forced to enlarge on it here. Our previous characterization has shown that sign in this sense always means the cognition of something which, in a broad sense, is the cause of the cognition of another thing. Hence, it implies two cognitions, which are distinct, and two objects which are known. By this it is already distinguished from language-sign, for not every language-sign implies two cognitions. This distinction is made even more evident by Ockham when he says that the second cognition, which is caused by the first cognition of a thing (which is the sign), is a secondary cognition or a recordative cognition; that means, the second cognition, which is had through the cognition of the first thing (the sign), has been previously obtained, was stored in the memory (hence habitually known), and is revived or called back or actually known, because of the cognition of the sign. It is the general thesis of Ockham that no sign in this first sense can give us the primary cognition of another thing.

Let us at once take the most shocking case: since an effect is the natural sign of its cause, the effect, too, can lead only to a secondary cognition of its cause. If, therefore, the cause was never experienced before by intuitive cognition, the effect cannot lead to the cognition of the cause. To put this more *in concreto*, if the knowledge of fire is not yet habitually possessed by the knower, the cognition of smoke cannot lead him to the cognition of fire. He must have already had the habitual knowledge of fire and must already know that fire produces smoke before smoke can lead him to the cognition of fire.

We purposely formulated the preceding "illustration" vaguely in order to make understandable (not, however, justifiable) the shock which is usually experienced by those who understand Ockham in such an imprecise manner, and who express his genuine thought in a similar imprecise manner. Anyone who does not follow Ockham himself in his precise terminology will invariably misinterpret

Ockham's texts, and the other picture of Ockham as an anticipation of Hume or as a skeptic is then easily constructed.

In order to avoid such confusion we have to bear in mind that Ockham does not say anything about deduction or any kind of inferential operation; he is not even strictly speaking of propositions. He only speaks of cognition. He never has denied the *inference* from an effect to a cause. However, he has constantly denied the transition from one simple cognition (which is no proposition) to another simple cognition, if this other simple cognition is not more universal than the former.

What he means by this is best explained as regards one special sign, viz., that of an image or vestige since in dealing with this problem Ockham explains what he means by secondary cognition in opposition to primary cognition, and since he again refers here to his treatment in the prologue of the Ordinatio of the transition from one simple cognition to another. Both image and vestige have this in common, that the things which are images or vestiges, are signs making something different from themselves known. For instance, the tracks in the mud bring, or may bring, to one's mind the cognition of an ox. In this case, we have two distinct cognitions: the first is the cause of the second. But, and here is the problem, does the first cognition, viz., that of the tracks, cause a primary cognition of the ox, so that by itself or with the intellect this first cognition is sufficient to cause for the first time the simple and incomplex cognition of the ox which was never before known?

Before answering this question, Ockham introduces distinctions as regards the transition from one cognition to the cognition of something different from it. Such a transition can be from one cognition either to another primary cognition or to another secondary cognition. The secondary cognition is always understood as recordative knowledge or knowledge which was previously obtained by immediate experience or intuitive cognition and is stored in the memory, and which is therefore, when actually known, the revival of a primary cognition; and for this reason it is called secondary cognition. Now Ockham admits the transition from one cognition

^{5.} q. 5a principalis seu 9a in ordine. Ockham refers to this question in the *Ordinatio*, d. 3, q. 9, which is used here, and he probably refers to both questions in the above-quoted text in footnote 2.

to another primary cognition that is a non-recordative knowledge, in two cases: (1) the transition from the cognition of a singular to that of a universal, and (2) the transition from the cognition of the premisses in a syllogism to the cognition of the conclusion. Hence, as regards, the cognition of universals and of the conclusions of inferences, the acquisition of primary cognition is explicitly admitted by Ockham, and in these cases no further direct and immediate experience is necessary.6 But Ockham does not admit such a transition from one cognition to a primary cognition of another thing, if this primary cognition is simple (not composed of more than one notion), if it is proper (not a notion common to several things), if it is in se (not in a part of it), if it is incomplex (not a proposition). In such cases inference is ruled out by definition, and simple, proper, in se, and incomplex cognition rules out any other cognition which is not directly based on intuitive knowledge.7 Hence, Ockham does not contradict himself when he admits that we have knowledge of God by a proper concept composed of common notions, though we do not have a proper and simple knowledge of God.

Let us apply this to our illustration: the tracks in the mud can

^{6.} Alia conditio, quod tam vestigium quam imago ducit in notitiam illius, cuius est imago vel vestigium. Sed tamen aliquid ducere in notitiam alicuius potest intelligi dupliciter: vel tamquam causativum notitiae alterius mediante sua notitia, ita quod notitia ipsius sit causa notitiae alterius; vel immediate sine notitia, sicut intellectus ducit tamquam causa in notitiam cuiuslibet intelligibilis. Primo modo contingit dupliciter: quia vel ducit in primam talem notitiam vel cognitionem, vel tantum facit rememorationem de aliquo habitualiter noto. Primo modo notitia singularis est causa notitiae universalis, et notitia praemissarum est causa notitiae conclusionis. Ordinatio, d. 3, q. 9, B.

7. Sed isto modo numquam notitia unius rei incomplexa est causa notitiae

^{7.} Sed isto modo numquam notitia unius rei incomplexa est causa notitiae primae alterius incomplexae, sicut dictum fuit in prologo; et maxime non est causa sufficiens cum intellectu et aliis quae requiruntur a parte potentiae, sive sit causa partialis cum obiecto sive non. *loc. cit*.

The addition "simple and proper" to incomplex knowledge in our explanation is warranted by Ockham's own back-reference to Prolog. q. 9 (in ordine). Here we read:

Ideo quantum ad istum articulum dico primo, quod universaliter numquam notitia unius rei extra incomplexa est causa sufficiens etiam cum intellectu respectu primae notitiae incomplexae alterius rei... Primum declaratur per experientiam: Quia quilibet experitur in se, quod quantumcumque intuitive et perfecte cognoscat aliquam rem, numquam per hoc cognoscit aliam rem, nisi praehabeat notitiam illius alterius rei. Verbi gratia, si cognoscam ista inferiora et numquam vidissem corpora superiora, nullam notitiam haberem de sole, luna et stellis et huiusmodi corporibus. Et ratio est, quia omnis notitia abstractiva alicuius rei in se [vel notitia simplex propria alicuius rei], naturaliter loquendo, praesupponit notitiam intuitivam eiusdem rei; sed notitia intuitiva alicuius rei numquam potest haberi naturaliter nisi effective vel mediate vel immediate ab illa re, ergo nec notitia abstractiva, et per consequens nulla. Maior patet, et maxime de notitia acquisita, quamvis aliter posset fieri per divinam potentiam; quia, sicut prius argutum est, inter causam et effectum est ordo et

lead us to the cognition of some cause in general, of which they are the effect, but that is common knowledge obtained by inference; they can, however, not lead us to the proper and simple knowledge of the particular ox, if we have never seen that ox before. Conse-

dependentia maxime essentialiter et tamen ibi notitia incomplexa unius rei non continet notitiam incomplexam alterius rei. Hoc etiam quilibet in se experitur, quod quantumcumque perfecte cognoscat aliquam rem, quod numquam cogitabit (cogitatione simplici et propria) de alia re, quam numquam prius apprehendit, nec per sensum nec per intellectum. Sicut si aliquis intuitive videret substantiam, numquam per hoc distincte cognosceret aliquod accidens in particulari. Ordinatio, Prol. q. 9

(in ordine), F.

The text in the first parenthesis (italicized) is in EF1MOOb, but lacking in FTMa (for the meaning of the sigla, cf. our article: "The Text-Tradition of Ockham's Ordinatio," in The New Scholasticism 16 (1942) 206 ss.). According to our investigations, this addition favorable to our interpretation, is most probably not authentic. On the other hand, the addition in the second parenthesis has to be considered authentic. It is an addition made by Ockham in his second redaction, since it is authentic. It is an addition made by Ockham in his second redaction, since it is lacking in F and is a marginal note in T. Ockham made this addition probably because he foresaw a possible misinterpretation, which unfortunately was not even prevented by both the additions which are actually in the edition used by all modern interpreters. We are sorry to be forced again to state that Prof. Gilson's treatment and interpretation of this same passage simply misses the point; cf. Unity of Philosophical Experience, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1937, pp. 86 ss. Seen in the light of Ockham's text itself and within its proper setting, the explanations offered by various authors, to say the least, appear to us very confusing. Has not Ockham himself to remind his Scotistic critics (Cf. l.c. E) that Scotus whom he is criticizing speaks only of incomplex knowledge, and that he is criticizing Scotus only in this regard? On the other hand, Ockham's denial does not concern general common knowledge, that is, abstractive knowledge of the type of universals, nor does it concern inferential knowledge in general, and certainly not the validity nor does it concern inferential knowledge in general, and certainly not the validity of the principle of causality. Cf. the following text:

Concedo, quod notitia unius obiecti continet notitiam alterius obiecti, et hoc contingit per illationem, sicut quando conclusio infertur ex praemissis, vel per compositionem, sicut quando ex notitia termini vel terminorum cognoscitur evidenter aliqua propositio sive contingens sive necessaria; vel per abstractionem, sicut cognito aliquo singulari virtute illius notitiae potest abstrahi aliquod commune et sic cognosci, et tamen sine omni notitia praevia cuiuslibet singularis non potuit cognosci, et ideo notitia illius singularis erit causa notitiae illius communis. Tamen notitia unius singularis numquam est causa sufficiens cum intellectu notitiae alterius singularis, quae

non est communis sibi. loc. cit. L.

A little before this text the inference from complex knowledge (proposition) of an effect to that of a cause is expressly admitted by Ockham. The following text has bearing on the problem of sign in this connexion, and shows, in an addition,

how anxious Ockham was not to be misunderstood:
Ad aliud: quod quando notitia similitudinis causat notitiam illius, cuius est similitudo, illa non est causa sufficiens cum intellectu, sed necessario requiritur notitia habitualis illius, cuius est similitudo. Unde si aliquis videret statuam Herculis et nullam notitiam penitus haberet de Hercule, non plus per hoc cogitaret de Hercule quam de Achille; sed quia prius novit Herculem et remanet in eo notitia habitualis Herculis, ideo, quando postea videt similitudinem suam, virtute illius notitiae habi-tualis et istius visionis similitudinis ducitur in actum rememorandi de Hercule et non in notitiam primam ipsius Herculis. (Et ideo dictum est prius, quod notitia unius rei extra non ducit sufficienter cum intellectu in notitiam primam alterius rei in se. Et voco notitiam rei in se, quando illa incomplexa cognitione nec aliqua parte ipsius aliquid aliud ab illa re intelligitur, per quod excluditur instantia, per quam probatur, quod cognosco Papam, quam numquam vidi). 1.c. L.

The text in parenthesis is lacking in F and is a marginal note in T, a sure

sign that it is an addition of the second redaction.

quently, the primary cognition of the ox cannot be caused by the mere intuition of the tracks. Likewise, no one can get the primary knowledge of a person whom he has never seen before, by merely looking at an image of him; for instance, when he is looking at a statue of Hercules, whom he has never seen before, this cognition as such does not lead him to the first cognition of Hercules himself, for as far as the observer is concerned it may resemble any person unknown.

Therefore, what Ockham is driving home here is the fact, confirmed by unbiassed experience, that from the incomplex, proper, and simple cognition of one fact, an incomplex, proper and simple cognition of another fact never before experienced cannot be obtained. The transition between such cognitions has been categorically denied by Ockham, but not the transition by inferential operations.8

From all this it follows that Ockham takes "sign" in this sense for anything which recalls something else to the knower; only such a sign "re-presents," that is, presents again to the knower what he formerly had known, if we take to "re-present" in its strict meaning.9

2. THE MEANING AND FUNCTION OF LANGUAGE-SIGNS

Whilst the term "sign" as explained before has universal applicability, since everything can function as sign in this sense, "sign" in a more restricted sense, which is moreover not necessarily subordinated to the former, applies only to those signs which compose language. Hence, we shall call them "language-signs." Of course,

^{8.} Ex superabundanti let us add one of the earliest texts of Ockham, where the Venerabilis Inceptor expressly admits inferential knowledge of facts which are not experienced and this with the help of common notions:

Item ex notitia incomplexa alicuius rei in se non potest causari notitia incomplexa alicuius rei in se, sicut in prologo dictum est (texts quoted in the preceding footnote). Unde quantumcumque videas essentiam divinam clare, numquam videbis per hoc asinum in se, ita quod una notitia causetur ex alia; igitur si notitia incomplexa creaturae duceret in notitiam incomplexam Dei, hoc erit in conceptu communi creaturae et Deo. Et hoc modo concedo, quod notitia incomplexa alicuius creaturae in se ducit in notitiam alterius rei in conceptu communi. Report., lib. III, q. 9, R.

^{9.} Secundo modo una res incomplexa mediante notitia sua potest esse causa partialis rememorationis alterius rei habitualiter notae, ita quod notitia habitualis necessario concurrit in ratione causae partialis. Et tale sic cognitum potest vocari repraesentativum alterius, nec est aliquid aliud proprie repraesentativum. Ordinat. d. 3, q. 9, B.

language is by origin related to speech or the utterance of words. However, we do not always take language in this narrow sense, but shall use the term language for written or mental or any other type of language as well, provided it satisfies certain conditions which are to be made explicit. In the course of this investigation, the difference between language-signs and signs in general will become evident.

a. General Characterization of Language-Signs

Ockham defines language-signs in reference to language. Hence the logical course to follow would be, first, to explain what he means by language in general, or mental, spoken and written language. Unfortunately, Ockham has never given us such a general definition of language. He has, however, at least explained what he means by *oratio* as oral expression and locution. From this we are able to gather, in an indirect manner, what he means by language in general. The meaning of mental language, not of written language, will then present certain problems, which will be discussed as we go along.

An oral or spoken language or *oratio* is a composition of verbal expressions or words. Words are sounds which fulfill the following conditions. (1) They must be *voces*, that is, they must be produced by the vocal apparatus of a living being; hence, sounds of instruments, etc., are not considered *voces*. (2) They must signify something or they must have significative function. Hence, they must at least be able to make known something different from themselves. This will be explained more definitely later. (3) Their signification is assigned to them by a voluntary act of man; hence, they are artificial and not natural signs; for natural signs do not signify *ad placitum*, but regardless of any instituted or artificially assigned signification by man.¹⁰

^{10.} This characterization of "word" is taken from Ockham's explanation of Aristotle's definition of "noun:" Nomen ergo est vox significativa secundum placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars est significativa separata. But, as the following text will show, it refers also to words in general:

Secundo notandum, quod per hanc particulam 'vox' excluditur sonus, qui non est vox, cuiusmodi est sonus instrumentorum musicorum et aliorum inanimatorum. Per hanc particulam 'vox significativa' excluduntur voces insignificativae sicut verba et huiusmodi. Per hanc particulam 'ad placitum' excluduntur voces significativae naturaliter, sicut risus, ploratus et huiusmodi... Quinto notandum, quod vox signi-

It is neither our intention nor our task to go into a detailed discussion of the different kinds of words used in the construction of oral language. Ockham, too, leaves most of this to grammarians.

Oratio, which is the placing together of words, that is, of significative sounds as explained, can be understood either in a wide sense or in a narrow and strict sense. In a wide sense, any aggregation of words is called oratio. Thus understood, an oratio may have, for instance, a verb, or it may not, since a mere aggregation of nouns and adjectives would already be an oratio. Similarly the aggregation of one noun and one adjective would be an oratio, and of course the aggregation of a noun and a verb, etc. In a strict sense, however, oratio is a suitable arrangement of words, composed of a verb and a noun or the equivalent of it. What is suitable has to be established by grammar; Ockham does not enlarge upon it. Such orationes — let us now call them by the common name of sentences, are of various types: they may be imperative sentences which express a command, deprecative sentences which express a prayer or a wish, interrogatory sentences which express a question, etc., and declarative sentences which express a state of affairs. 11 The declarative sentences are also called propositiones or enuntiationes. They are characterized by their capability of receiving the predicates true or false. Whilst the rhetorician, the poet, and of

ficativa tripliciter accipitur, scilicet strictissime, stricte et large: Strictissime loquendo coniunctiones et praepositiones non sunt significativae dicente Boethio: Coniunctiones et praepositiones nihil omnino nisi tantum aliis coniunctae significant; immo etiam isto modo signa universalia et particularia et universaliter omnia syncategoremata, sive sint nomina large accipiendo nomina sive verba, si quae sunt talia, sive adverbia sive aliae quaecumque partes orationis non sunt significativae: et hoc, quia nullius rei determinatae intellectum faciunt nisi coniunctae cum aliis. Stricte autem vox significativa est illa, quae alicuius rei determinatae intellectum facit, sive per se posita sive cum alio. Et isto modo participia, interiectiones, pronomina et quaedam adverbia sunt significativa, sicut patet de istis: bene, male, legens, disputans et huiusmodi... Tertio modo accipitur large vox significativa pro omni voce, quae sive per se significat sive quae significat cum alia; et isto modo omnes partes orationis sunt significativae. Expositio super Periherm. c. 1, ad: Nomen ergo est vox significativa... This is a revision of the very corrupted text of the edition.

^{11.} Intelligendum est, quod oratio dupliciter accipitur: Uno modo large; et sic omnis congeries dictionum est oratio; et isto modo definitio quaelibet est oratio sicut tales definitiones: animal rationale, substantia animata sensibilis, informatum albedine; isto modo hoc quod dico: homo albus, et similiter album animal et huiusmodi sunt orationes. Aliter accipitur oratio stricte, et sic oratio est congrua dictionum ordinatio, ubi verbum contingit et nomen vel aliquid loco nominis. Et sic oratio dividitur in indicativam, imperativam, optativam, etc. Et sic definitiones et talia: homo albus, Sortes musicus, non sunt orationes. Expos. super Perihermenias, cap. 3, ad: Est autem oratio...

course all people in ordinary speech make extensive use of all types of sentences, the logician is interested only in those sentences which are true or false.¹² Hence for the rest we shall confine ourselves to propositions or declarative sentences, and to the signs which are found in such sentences.

Since Ockham has explained the parts of spoken propositions to which the parts of mental propositions correspond, we can now from the structure of oral propositions indirectly ascertain what he means by mental language. He uses the following principle as guiding rule: whatever is necessary in oral propositions for a distinct signification, has a corresponding part in mental propositions.¹³ This practically comes down to the more definite rule: whatever changes the truth or falsity of a proposition, has its corresponding part in the mental proposition.14 Then we can say that at least the following parts of oral propositions have an equivalent in mental propositions. (1) Nouns, verbs, conjunctions, prepositions, and adverbs have corresponding or equivalent instances in mental language. (2) The common accidents of nouns, as case and number, too, have corresponding instances in mental language. (3) The common accidents of verbs, as mood, person, tense, and number, again, have corresponding instances in mental language.

As to the other grammatical properties of oral expressions, Ockham partly denies that they have corresponding instances, partly he leaves it in doubt. He is inclined to hold the opinion

^{12.} Dicit (Aristoteles) igitur primo, quod non omnis oratio est enuntiativa, sed illa sola, quae est vera vel falsa. Quod autem non omnis oratio sit enuntiativa patet: quia oratio deprecativa est oratio, et tamen neque est vera neque falsa, et per consequens non est enuntiativa. Et ideo tales orationes, quae nec sunt verae nec falsae, et per consequens non enuntiativae, relinquantur, quia tales magis spectant ad rhetoricam vel poeticam quam ad dialecticam; quia ad dialecticam non pertinet considerare nisi tantum de oratione enuntiativa. Expos. super Perihermenias, cap. 4, ad: Enuntiativa vero...

^{13.} Sed quod oporteat ponere talia nomina mentalia et verba et adverbia et coniunctiones et praepositiones ex hoc convincitur, quod omni orationi vocali correspondeat alia mentalis in mente; et ideo sicut illae partes propositionis vocalis, quae sunt propter necessitatem significationis impositae, sunt distinctae, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondenter sunt distinctae. Summa Logicae I, cap. 3.

^{14.} Quod patet ex hoc, quia omni orationi vocali verae vel falsae correspondet aliqua mentalis composita ex conceptibus; ergo sicut partes propositionis vocalis, quae imponuntur ad significandum res propter necessitatem significationis vel expressionis, — quia impossibile est omnia exprimere per verba et nomina solum quae possunt per omnes partes alias orationis exprimi, — sunt distinctae partes, sic partes propositionis mentalis correspondentes vocibus sunt distinctae ad faciendum distinctas propositiones veras vel falsas. Quodl. V, q. 8. Cf. also Summa Logicae I, 3, where, however, the text is unfortunately corrupted.

that participles have no corresponding instances.15 He leaves it in doubt whether pronouns have corresponding instances in mental language, and likewise whether abstract and concrete terms must also be distinguished in mental language.16

We are not interested here in a detailed discussion of this correspondence. We are interested only in the fact that according to Ockham mental language has a structure similar in a certain degree to that of spoken language, so that every structural element which is in mental language is in spoken language also; but not vice versa. 17 For the rest, we shall confine ourselves to signs which have corresponding instances, for they and only they have logical bearing, whilst the others are added merely for the sake of adorning spoken and written language.

Now, we are finally in a condition to understand Ockham's definition of language-signs as distinct from signs in the general meaning of the term. Language signs must fulfill the following conditions: (1) They must be signs, that is, they must make something else known or must be able to make it known. Of course, they share this condition with signs in general; however, Ockham omits here the former characterization that such signs lead only to a secondary cognition on the basis of habitual knowledge derived from a primary cognition. This should not be over-looked, since it shows how careful Ockham is not to burden his logic with epistemological difficulties. Though it is obvious that oral languagesigns can function and usually do function like signs in general, this is certainly not generally true for mental language-signs. For according to Ockham these mental language-signs are, as we shall see later, intellections. Since these mental language-signs are intellections or cognitions, which are obtained by intuitive knowledge and not through a species or any other intermediary, they are either the first or direct cognition of an object, and thus make it known or signify or represent it, or they are merely the revival of

^{15.} loc. cit. As to the participle cf. Quodl. V, q. 8: Nulla est necessitas ponendi talem pluritatem in mente, quia verbum et participium verbi sumptum cum hoc verbo 'est' in significando aequipollent et sunt synonyma...

16. Cf. Summa Logicae, I, chapters 5 ss., where Ockham treats this question in detail by distinguishing various modes of concrete and abstract terms.

^{17.} Est autem inter nomina mentalia et vocalia differentia: quia quamvis omnia accidentia grammaticalia, quae conveniunt nominibus mentalibus, etiam nominibus vocalibus sint convenientia, non tamen econverso. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 3.

a former cognition, in which cognition again the object is known without any intermediary. Hence, there is no need for the former double relation between the cognition of a thing which leads to the cognition of another thing. Finally, it is very hard to see how certain language-signs as the *syncategoremata* can have this double relation. (2) They must have a significative function within the realm of language; that is, they must be able to have this function, though it is not always necessary that they actually exercise this function in propositions. Such signs, again, can be of a different type according to their definite or not-definite signification, that is, they can be either categorematic or syncategorematic terms or verbs and other parts of language, or they can be compositions of these different kinds of language-signs or whole propositions. ¹⁸ In summarizing we may say that anything which can exercise a significative function in language is a language-sign.

b. The Nature of Mental Language-Signs.

Assuming that the nature of written or spoken language-signs¹⁹ does not present a specific problem within the framework of our present inquiry, we shall deal here only with the thorny question of the nature of mental language-signs. An understanding of Ockham's real thought on this problem will be reached only if we take into account the fact that his teachings on the nature of universals underwent an important development, which we can

^{18.} Cf. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 1: Aliter accipitur signum pro illo, quod aliud facit in cognitionem venire et natum est pro illo supponere vel addi in propositione, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata et verba et illae partes orationis, quae finitam significationem non habent, vel quod natum est componi ex talibus, cuiusmodi est oratio vel propositio. Summa Logicae I, cap. 1.

^{19.} Ockham adopts this distinction from Boethius and partly from St. Augustine. Est autem sciendum, quod sicut secundum Boethium 1° Perihermenias triplex est oratio, scilicet scripta, prolata et concepta tantum habens esse in intellectu, sic triplex est terminus, scilicet scriptus, prolatus et conceptus. Terminus scriptus est pars propositionis descriptae in aliquo corpore, quae oculo corporali videtur vel videri potest. Terminus prolatus est pars propositionis ab ore prolatae et nata audiri aure corporali. Terminus conceptus est intentio seu passio animae aliquid naturaliter significans nata esse pars propositionis mentalis et pro eodem nata supponere. Unde isti termini concepti et propositiones ex eis compositae sunt illa verba mentalia quae beatus Augustinus 15° De Trinitate dicit nullius esse linguae, quae in mente manent et exterius proferri non possunt, quamvis voces tamquam signa eis subordinata pronuntientur exterius. Summa Logicae I, 1. Cf. Boethius in Perihermenias editio 2a; PL. t. 64, col. 407 AB; in B Boethius states that this is the common doctrine of the Peripatetics.

now trace more exactly than was possible for Hochstetter.20 We know now that at the beginning of his career Ockham assigned to the universals and to concepts in general only the being of thought-objects (esse objectivum) and not the being of real things as qualities of the mind (esse subjectivum). This first opinion or the Fictum-theory was held by Ockham in his Reportata and in the first redaction of the first book of the Commentary on the Sentences. After a short period of hesitation (noticeable in his Exposition of Aristotle's Perihermenias and in the second redaction of the Ordinatio), he firmly decided in favor of the theory which identifies the universals and concepts in general with acts of cognition, that is, with intellections. We, therefore, have good reason to describe the nature of mental language-signs exclusively according to the so-called intellectio-theory. According to this theory the following can be stated: Mental language-signs are acts of thought, intellections, or cognitions, by which something is thought or conceived.

They are also called concepts, mental terms, passiones animae, intentions, at least in so far as they are elements of mental propositions.

They are psychic realities. Hence they are singular things, belonging to the category of quality, inherent in the soul as whiteness is inherent in the wall.²¹

^{20.} E. Hochstetter, Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham, Berlin 1927, Walter de Gruyter, p. 81 ss. For further references cf. also footnote 4 and our forthcoming article in Traditio IV (1946): "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham." Cf. also J. R. Weinberg, "Ockham's Conceptualism" in Philosophical Review 50 (1941) 523-525.

^{21.} This concerns their status as mental or psychic realities. In so far as they have universal meaning, that is, in so far as their significative function is concerned, 'quality' could not be predicated about them. Ockham is already very sensitive as regards that paradox of predication which is countered by modern logicians with various devices, one of which is Russell's theory of types.

The two aspects of universals are distinguished in the following text: Dicendum

The two aspects of universals are distinguished in the following text: Dicendum est igitur, quod quodlibet universale est una res singularis, et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 14. Cf. also the following text which we offer here, since the text of our editions is in a very bad condition: Dicendum, quod qualitas spiritualis non praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis significative sumptis, sed sumptis pro signis tantum. Et propter hoc non sequitur, quod sit in plus quam quodcumque praedicamentum. Nam superioritas et inferioritas inter aliqua sumitur ex hoc, quod unum significative sumptum praedicatur de pluribus quam aliud significative sumptum. Unde ista est talis difficultas qualis est de hoc nomine 'dictio'; nam hoc nomen 'dictio' est unum contentum sub nomine; nam hoc nomen 'dictio' est nomen, et non omne nomen est hoc nomen 'dictio'; et tamen hoc nomen 'dictio' est quodammodo superius ad omnia nomina et ad hoc nomen 'dictio'. Nam omne nomen est dictio, sed non omnis dictio est nomen.

These cognitions or intellections conceive either one singular object and represent or signify it in an act of intellection — and then we speak of singular concepts, or they conceive many things indifferently and equally and represent or signify them accordingly in an indiscriminate manner — and then we speak of universal concepts. The latter are also called universals or *intellectiones confusae*, because of their being capable of confused supposition or distribution, as will be explained later in dealing with supposition.²²

The relation of these mental signs to the things signified by them is that of a natural sign to that which it naturally signifies. This means that their signification does not depend on an act of will: or in other words, they are not instituted ad placitum; positively expressed, their signification depends only on the natural relation between intellection and the object conceived by this intellection. In particular, this relation is that of an effect to its cause, since the object, which becomes known and is conceived in an act of intellection, acts as a partial cause on the intellect, which is the other partial cause. It is well to note here that Ockham has in mind the specific causality between the object of cognition and the intellect and the cognition as the effect of both. Hence the cognition, which is the effect of univocal causes, is similar both to the object and the intellect, to the latter by being immaterial or spiritual, to the former by being a similitude of it; in other words, the act of cognition is a spiritual assimilation of the object known. To specify this similarity further, seems to be impossible, since we are facing here an ultimate fact of cognitive psychology. In order to make clear or rather to suggest what is meant by this assimilation of the intellect with the object in cognition, Ockham uses circumlocution when he says that the concept or the intellec-

22. Cf. Quaestio de universali, G, at the beginning of Ockham's Exposition of Perihermenias, edited in Traditio IV (1946): "The Realistic Conceptualism of

William Ockham" (in print).

Et ita videtur quod idem respectu eiusdem est superius et inferius. Et ita videtur esse de hoc communi 'qualitas'. Quod potest solvi dicendo, quod argumentum concluderet, si in omnibus propositionibus, in quibus ponuntur tales termini, dicti termini supponerent uniformiter; nunc autem aliter est in proposito. Si tamen hic vocetur inferius, de quo aliquo modo supponente praedicatur aliud et de pluribus, quamvis illud, si aliter supponeret, non praedicaretur de eo universaliter sumpto, potest concedi, quod idem respectu eiusdem est superius et inferius, sed tunc superius et inferius non sunt opposita, sed disparata. l.c.

tion, be it a singular or universal one, expresses, explains, declares, imports, or signifies the thing.²³

Summarizing we can say, therefore, that a mental sign of a singular represents or expresses to the mind one thing or one singular object, for instance, the individual Socrates or Plato; a universal mental sign represents or expresses to the mind in an act of intellection the nature, essence, or quiddity of many things indiscriminately, that means, such a universal intellection equally expresses many things without their individual differences.

Further details and a discussion of the process, by which the intellect passes on from singular intellections to universal intellection do not fall within the scope of the present inquiry. It is sufficient for us to have established that according to Ockham there are mental language-signs which are psychic realities and which, because of their natural similitude with their objects, naturally signify their significates. It is their capability of signification which enables them to enter and to form propositions.

c. The Relation between Mental and Spoken Language-Signs.

We mentioned already that mental and spoken (and written) language-signs are in a certain correspondence, if they have corresponding instances at all. As Ockham stated before, there is correspondence between the elements of mental propositions and the elements of spoken propositions, so that every element of the former has an instance of the latter, but not vice versa.²⁴ In fact synonyms have only one corresponding mental language-sign: equivocal nouns and also analogical nouns which according to Ockham and Aristotle are equivocal nouns (aequivocum a consilio), however, have distinct corresponding mental language-signs.²⁵ Considering only those mental and spoken language-signs which are corresponding, we must now inquire into which relation of signi-

^{23.} Cf. art. cit. Second thesis: The content of our thought is in the relation of similitude with reality.

^{24.} Cf. footnote 17.
25. Cf. the treatment of such language-signs in the Summa Logicae, I, cap. 13, and also the problem of the synonymity of certain abstract and concrete terms in the Summa Logicae, I, cap. 5 ss.

fication these mental and spoken signs fall. Is it such that spoken words immediately signify mental words, and that only mental words immediately signify the significates? For instance: is it so that the spoken word "tree" immediately signifies the concept tree, and that only the concept or mental language-sign "tree" signifies immediately the things which are trees? This question was, as it seems unanimously attirmed, at least by the great Scholastics before Scotus.26 All these Scholastics quote in their favor Aristotle's remark at the beginning of Perihermenias, where he says that spoken words (owni) are symbols -- the Scholastics read in their translation notice — of the passiones, that is, of the concepts which are in the soul.27 There can be no doubt that Boethius gave ample support for this idea of an indirect signification of spoken words as regards things signified directly by the concepts only.28

However, Scotus already broke with this interpretation of Aristotle's text, maintaining that the significate of the word, generally speaking, is not the concept but the thing, and that both word and concept immediately, though in subordination, signify the same significate or thing.²⁰ In this the Doctor Subtilis was followed by Ockham, although not in every detail, at least in so far as the general idea of direct signification of words is concerned. According to Ockham the word, for instance homo, and the corresponding concept of man immediately signify everything which is a man or

^{26.} In St. Thomas, however, who elsewhere is clearly in favor of an indirect signification of the significate by the word, we read: Et ideo cum in omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc habet proprium ista scientia, quod ipsae res significate per voces, etiam significant aliquid. Illa ergo prima significatio, qua voces significant res, pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus vel litteralis. Illa vero significatio, qua res significatae per voces, iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis... Summa Theol. I, 1, a. 10; cf. also: Sicut iam dictum est, sensus isti non multiplicantur propter hoc, quod una vox multa significet, sed quia ipsae res significate per voces, aliquim rerum possunt vox multa significet. Ad primum ipsae res significatae per voces, aliarum rerum possunt esse signa. loc. cit. Ad primum. 27. Perihermenias, c.l.; 16a 3s.

^{27.} Perihermenias, c.l.; 16a 3s.
28. Cf. De Interpretatione ed. 1a, lib. I; PL. t. 64, col. 297ss. and editio 2a lib. I; col. 405 ss. Boethius refers to the history of this problem presented by Porphyry (1.c. col. 405 Cs.): Sed Porphyrius hanc ipsam plenius causam originemque sermonis huius ante oculos collocavit, qui omnem apud priscos philosophos de significationis vi contentionem litemque retexuit.
29. Oxon. I, d. 27, q. 3, n. 19; ed. Vivès t. 10, p. 378: Ad secundum, licet magna altercatio fiat de voce, utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus, tamen breviter concedendo, quod illud quod significatur per vocem proprie est res, sunt tamen signa multa ordinata eiusdem significati littera, vox et conceptus... A thesis (by Fr. John B. Vogel, O.F.M.) is being written under our direction on the problem of the direct signification of the thing according to Scotus; he has discovered a considerable discrepancy between the treatment of this problem in the Oxoniense and the Quaestiones in Perihermenias, opus primum and secundum.


has been a man or will be a man or is possibly a man. Hence both signs, the natural, which is the concept, and the artificial, which is the noun, are parallel in their signification. Nevertheless, the word or noun homo signifies only because it is subordinated under the mental language-sign which expresses man. The spoken sign does not signify primarily and without the mental sign. For only the mental sign signifies the thing primarily and absolutely, that is, without regard to any other sign (the spoken or written one). The spoken language-sign signifies the thing immediately, but in dependence upon the mental language-sign. That is what is meant when Ockham says that the spoken language-sign signifies immediately and directly the significate, which is the thing and not the concept, and in subordination to the mental language-sign or concept.³⁰ Thus, when somebody uses the noun homo appropriately in the proposition Homo est animal, the word certainly does not signify the concept homo, for this concept homo is not an animal, nor is the concept homo the concept animal, rather the same thing - any individual man - which is signified by the noun or the mental sign bomo is also signified by the noun or mental sign "animal" 81

Here we have an excellent case which will enable us to appreciate the distinction which Ockham makes between the two kinds of signs previously explained. The mental language-sign or the concept is a sign in the restricted meaning of the term "sign," since it makes something known, being the cognition of it, and can take the place of the thing known in a proposition. The same is true for a spoken language-sign. On the other hand, a spoken language-sign is a symbol, since it is an artificial sign. As such it possesses two sign-relations. The first and main relation is that of signifying the significate: thus it is a sign in the restricted meaning. The second is the relation with the mental language-sign. This sign-relation is that of sign in the broader meaning of the term "sign"; since the cognition of the word brings to my mind or revives in my mind a former or an habitual knowledge of the mental language-sign. Wherever a sign, mental or spoken or written language-sign, takes the place or is able to take the place of a

^{30.} Cf. the text of Perihermenias edited in *Traditio A*. (cf. footnote 22). 31. As to the proof see *loc. cit. A*.

thing in a proposition, that is, wherever it has significative function within a proposition, there the language-sign is a sign in the restricted meaning of the term "sign"; where, however, it does not fulfill this condition but revives a cognition associated with the sign, it acts as a sign in the broader meaning of the term "sign." The latter sign-relation, therefore, could aptly be called associative signification.82

The following scheme is a visual presentation of the relations between the things signified and the mental and spoken and written language signs. The solid lines indicate the relations of sign in the restricted meaning, the broken line the relation of sign in the broader meaning.



3. GENERAL DIVISIONS AND DISTINCTIONS AS REGARDS LANGUAGE-SIGNS

Of the many distinctions and divisions given by Ockham we shall now select only a few, which will prove to be useful in the forthcoming discussions on supposition. At the same time they will throw more light on Ockham's theory of signification. The word term will be used to designate any incomplex language-sign.³³

^{32.} Ockham seldom calls this relation signification, obviously not to confound the two kinds of signification. Cf. however, Ordinatio d. 27, q. 2, EE: Ad argumentum in oppositum dico, quod non est intentio beati Augustini, quod verbum vocale semper significet verbum mentale, proprie accipiendo significare, sed improprie, secundum quod unum signum significat aliud, quia scilicet imponitur ad significandum illud idem, secundum quod significat aliud signum... For further details about the relation between vox and conceptus cf. Ordinatio, dist. 22, q. 1, per totum.

33. Of the three meanings assigned by Ockham to the word "tetm" we retain, therefore, only the second, which Ockham also usually retains: Uno modo vocatur 'terminus' omne illud, quod potest esse copula vel extremum propositionis categoricae, videlicet subiectum vel praedicatum, vel determinatio extremi vel verbi. Et isto modo etiam una propositio potest esse terminus, sicut potest esse pars propositionis. Haec enim est vera: 'Homo est animal, est propositio vera,' in qua haec tota propositio: 'Homo est animal,' est subiectum, et: 'Propositio vera,' est praedicatum. Aliter accipitur hoc nomen 'terminus', secundum quod distinguitur contra orationem. Et sic omne incomplexum vocatur terminus; et sic de termino in praecedenti capitulo sum locutus. Tertio modo accipitur 'terminus' praecise pro illo, quod significative

a. Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms.

At the time of Ockham, this important distinction of languagesigns elaborated already by the logicians of the early thirteenth century, was generally accepted.³⁴ In fact it is very useful for logic and, like many other important discoveries in logic, seems to go back to the Stoics. Approaching this distinction first from the point of view of modern logic, we could vaguely characterize syncategorematic terms (the syncategoremata) as the constants of logical discourse which constitute the invariant part of the logical propositions, whilst categorematic terms (the categoremata) are terms or instances of the variables in logical frames. Such a frame, for instance, would be:

Omnis () est ().

Here omnis and est are constants or syncategoremata; everything which can be placed in the blanks or the parentheses is a categorema, for instance homo and albus.

Though this modern approach is not altogether alien to medieval logic, nevertheless, Ockham and all the Scholastics rather explain this distinction from the view of signification. A syncategorematic term is a sign which has a definite and limited signification, that is, it signifies a certain well-defined class of significates, so that taken alone this sign can represent or take the place of the significates in a proposition, either as subject or as predicate. Thus the categorematic term "man" has the definite and limited meaning or signification of being the sign of men only.³⁵ A syncategorematic term, on the other hand, does not have a definite and limited meaning as regards the significates and does not signify

sumptum potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis. Et isto modo nullum verbum nec coniunctio nec adverbium nec praepositio nec interiectio est terminus. Multa etiam nomina non sunt termini, scilicet nomina syncategorematica... Summa

Multa etiam nomina non sunt termin, sense Logicae, I, cap. 2.

34. One of the early tracts on the syncategoremata was edited by J. Reginald O'Donnell, C.S.B., "The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood," in Medieval Studies, III (1941) 46-93. The following syncategorematic terms are treated: Omnis, Totum, Uterque, Nullus, Nihil, Neutrum, Praeter, Solus, Tantum, Est, Non, Necessario, Contingenter, Incipit, Desinis, Si, Nisi, Quin, Et, Vel, An, Ne, Sive.

35. Termini categorematici finitam et certam habent significationem, sicut hoc

nomen 'homo' significat omnes homines, et hoc nomen 'animal' omnia animalia, et hoc nomen 'albedo' omnes albedines. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 4.

a certain class of objects; it only modifies or determines the signification of categorematic terms. Hence, if taken alone, it has no proper meaning of its own. Consequently it signifies only in connection with categorematic terms. For this reason it is called *syncategorema* or co-predicate. Such syncategorematic terms are the signs of quantification, as *Omnis. aliquis. nullus.* etc., the copula est (and in so far as it is contained in every verb, the verb also), the forms of denial, as non. ne. quin. etc., the conjunctions si, vel, et, cum. etc., exclusive, restrictive and reduplicative signs as tantum. solum. inquantum. etc., prepositions and interjections, etc.³⁶

We can always determine a given term as a categorematic or syncategorematic sign by testing it when taken alone to find whether it can be meaningfully employed as the subject and predicate of a proposition. According to this rule *omnis* is not a categorematic term. For though *omnis* can be the subject of the proposition *Omnis est terminus*, nevertheless, it cannot exercise a significative function as such, and neither can it do so as predicate. The same is true of the copula *est* or the verb.³⁷

Of course, there is always the possibility that certain categorematic terms may function at times as syncategorematic terms, or have categorematic terms included in their meaning and *vice versa*. This occasions equivocations often warned against by Ockham.

^{36.} Termini autem syncategorematici, cuiusmodi sunt tales: omnis, nullus, aliquis, totus, praeter, tantum, inquantum et huiusmodi, non habent finitam significationem et certam, nec significant aliquas res distinctas a rebus significatis per categoremata; immo sicut in algorismo cifra per se posita nihil significat, sed addita alteri figurae facit eam significare, ita syncategorema proprie loquendo nihil significat, sed magis additum alteri facit ipsum significare aliquid, sive facit ipsum pro aliquo vel aliquibus aliquo modo determinato supponere, vel aliud officium circa categorema exercet. Unde hoc syncategorema 'omnis' non habet aliquod certum significatum, sed additum homini facit ipsum stare seu supponere actualiter sive confuse et distributive pro omnibus hominibus; additum autem lapidi facit ipsum stare pro omnibus lapidibus; et additum albedini facit ipsam stare pro omnibus albedinibus. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 4. "Cifra" in the text means "zero."

^{37.} Sed contra est, quia numquam conceptus syncategorematicus potest supponere pro aliquo, quia tunc posset esse subiectum vel praedicatum, sicut nec dictio syncategorematica. Sed sive dicat conceptum copulae absolutum vel respectivum, solum synactegorematicus est. Igitur non obstante, quod potest significare respectum realem, non tamen potest supponere nec praedicari de aliquo primo modo dicendi per se. Et conceptus categorematicus est qui per se positus aliquid unum significat, sicut homo, animal et talia, quae possunt esse subiecta et praedicata in propositione. Syncategorematica sunt illa, quae per se posita, nihil significant, sicut est 'esse per se', 'inquantum', 'formaliter'... Reportatio II, q. 1, M.

b. First and Second Intention.

Another distinction which will play an important rôle in Ockham's theory of supposition and consequently in his theory of truth is the distinction between first and second intentions. The matter is, however, a little complicated because this distinction divides not only the mental language-signs, but also the spoken language-signs wherein a new distinction must be introduced, viz. that of first and second imposition. We first present the more simple distinction of first and second intention as regards mental language-signs.

Intention is usually taken in the sense of conceptus animae. passio animae, intellectus, similitudo rei, that is in the sense of a mental word in opposition to the spoken and written word.³⁸ Intentions are therefore natural language-signs in opposition to artificial language-signs. Since they are natural language-signs, they are able by their very nature to take the place of the things signified by them in mental propositions; in other words, they can supposite for the significates, or they can be parts of mental propositions, as for instance the syncategoremata.39

An important distinction must be made within intentions of this class. All intentions naturally signify something, either alone or together with another intention. Some intentions, however, naturally signify only such natural signs as are intentions; others naturally signify, alone or together with other intentions, things which are not signs. The intention or the concept of the mind genus, for instance, naturally signifies the intentions or natural signs — 'animal,' 'color,' etc. — which in turn signify animals, colors, etc. In other words, they signify the concept of 'animal' or 'color,' etc. For the mental proposition: Animal is a genus, is a

^{38.} Illud autem existens in anima, quod est signum rei, ex quo propositio 38. Illud autem existens in anima, quod est signum rei, ex quo propositio mentalis componitur, ad modum quo propositio vocalis componitur ex vocibus, aliquando vocatur intentio animae, aliquando conceptus animae, aliquando passio animae, aliquando similitudo rei; et Boethius in commento super Perihermenias vocat intellectum... Unde quandocumque aliquis profert propositionem vocalem, prius format interius unam propositionem mentalem, quae nullius idiomatis est, in tantum quod multi frequenter formant interius propositiones, quas tamen propter defectum idiomatis exprimere nesciunt. Partes talium propositionum mentalium vocantur conceptus, intentiones, similitudines et intellectus. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 12.

39. Ideo pro nunc sufficiat, quod intentio est quoddam in anima, quod est signum naturaliter significans aliquid, pro quo potest supponere vel quod potest esse pars propositionis mentalis. Summa Logicae I, cap. 12.

meaningful proposition. However, 'animal' and 'color' do not signify natural signs, they signify things.

First intention, then, is a natural sign of something which itself is not a sign. If we include within the class of first intentions the syncategoremata also, we take 'first intention' in its large meaning; if we exclude them, we take it in its strict meaning. Second intention, on the other hand, is a natural sign which signifies natural signs or first intentions, or is a natural sign which naturally signifies natural signs. Whilst, for instance, the intention or the concept 'man' signifies all men and each individual man, and hence signifies something which is not a sign, the second intention 'species' is a sign of the natural sign 'man' and of other species-intentions, since 'man' as concept is signified by the intention 'species.' It is obvious that the distinction between first and second intention opens the way for a clear understanding of the Praedicabilia and Praedicamenta, the former being second intentions, the latter first.

c. Nouns of First and Second Imposition and Intention.

Whilst mental language-signs are either of the first or the second intention, since they are natural signs and therefore independent of a voluntary act of man, the artificial language-signs, which are symbols created by man, admit of another general division. Spoken words or nouns (in a broad sense) are either of the first or of the second imposition, and within this general distinction of nouns, the distinction of first and second intention is only a subclass.

^{40.} Tale autem signum duplex est: Unum, quod est signum alicuius rei quae non est tale signum, sive significet tale signum simul cum hoc sive non, et illud vocatur intentio prima, qualis est illa intentio animae quae est praedicabilis de omnibus hominibus, et similiter intentio praedicabilis de omnibus albedinibus, nigredinibus et sic de aliis. Verumtamen sciendum est, quod intentio prima dupliciter accipitur, stricte et large... Intentio autem secunda est illa, quae est signum talium intentionum primarum, cuiusmodi sunt tales intentiones: genus, species et huiusmodi. Sicut enim de omnibus hominibus praedicatur una intentio communis omnibus hominibus, sic dicendo: Iste homo est homo, ille homo est homo, et sic de singulis, ita de illis intentionibus, quae significant et supponunt pro rebus praedicatur una intentio communis eis sic dicendo: Haec species est species, illa species est species, et sic de aliis. Similiter sic dicendo: Lapis est genus, animal est genus, color est genus, et sic de aliis, praedicatur una intentio de intentionibus ad modum quo in talibus: Homo est nomen, asinus est nomen, albedo est nomen, praedicatur unum nomen de diversis nominibus. Summa Logicae I, cap. 12.

All nouns, that is, all artificial, spoken language-signs (and proportionally all written language-signs), are arbitrarily (ad placitum) connected with certain significates, that is, they are imposed by man on certain objects by the relation of signification. Such spoken terms or nouns are of two main types: nouns of the first and nouns of the second imposition. Nouns of the second imposition are nouns of nouns, that is, they are artificial signs or spoken terms which signify artificial signs or spoken terms, as long as and only if they are signs. Thus the spoken term 'noun' signifies every noun, for instance 'homo,' 'animal,' 'album,' etc. If we restrict the meaning of the term 'second imposition' to the signification of those nouns which express properties of the spoken language only, that is, of such properties as have no corresponding instances in mental language, then we take the term "second imposition" in its strict meaning; then nouns, which are exclusively used by grammarians and in which the logician is not interested, will be nouns of second imposition. If, however, we include those nouns of nouns which have corresponding instances in mental language, we take the term 'second imposition' in a larger sense. Thus the noun 'conjugation' is a noun of second imposition in the strict sense, since there is no first or second etc. conjugation in mental language; the nouns nomen and verbum are not nouns of the second imposition in the strict sense, since they have corresponding instances in mental language; nevertheless they are nouns of the second imposition in the larger sense, since they are nouns of nouns.41

Nouns of the first imposition, on the other hand, are all nouns which are neither nouns of the second imposition in the strict nor in the large sense.⁴²

If we confine the extension of the term 'noun of the first imposition' only to those which are not syncategorematic terms, we take

^{41.} Verumtamen hoc commune 'nomen secundae impositionis' potest dupliciter accipi, scilicet large, et tunc omne illud est nomen secundae impositionis, quod significat voces ad placitum institutas, sed non nisi quando sunt ad placitum institutae, sive illud nomen sit commune etiam intentionibus animae sive non. Talia autem nomina sunt huiusmodi: Nomen, pronomen, verbum, coniunctio, casus, numerus, modus, tempus et huiusmodi, accipiendo ista vocabula illo modo quo utitur eis grammaticus. Et vocantur ista nomina nominum, quia non imponuntur nisi ad significandum partes orationis... Stricte autem dicitur nomen secundae impositionis illud, quod non significat nisi signa ad placitum instituta, ita quod non potest competere intentionibus animae, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'coniugatio', 'figura'. Summa Logicae, I, cap. 11.

42. l.c.

'noun of the first imposition' in the strict sense; if we include the syncategorematic terms also, we take 'noun of the first imposition' in a larger sense.⁴³

Within the class of nouns of the first imposition in the strict sense Ockham introduces the above mentioned distinction between nouns of the first and second intention, applied here of course to spoken words and not to intentions or mental language signs. The nouns of the second intention are those nouns which are imposed precisely in order to signify intentions of the soul which are natural signs and other signs which are instituted ad placitum or signs which follow such signs. Such signs are for instance 'Genus,' 'species,' 'universal,' 'predicable.' 44

It is obvious that the term 'predicable' can be applied to the intention corresponding to the noun of the second imposition coniugatio even in the strict sense of the term second imposition. For this reason Ockham introduces a further distinction within the realm of nouns of second intentions. In a large sense a noun of the second intention is any noun which signifies all the mentioned intentions including those intentions which also signify nouns of second imposition. Hence, as regards this large sense of second intention, it is possible that a noun of second intention, for instance, "predicable," and of the first imposition is also a noun of second imposition.⁴⁵

Nouns of the first intention are all those nouns which are nouns of the second intention neither in the broad nor in the strict sense. Such nouns precisely signify things or objects which are not signs and which are not derived from signs, as for instance Plato,

^{13.} l.c.

^{44.} Nomina autem primae impositionis stricte accipiendo nomen primae impositionis sunt in duplici differentia: quia quaedam sunt nomina primae intentionis, et quaedam sunt nomina secundae intentionis. Nomina secundae intentionis vocanturilla nomina, quae praecise imposita sunt ad significandum intentiones animae, vel praecise intentiones animae (vel... omitted by half of the manuscripts and the edition), quae sunt signa naturalia, et alia signa ad placitum instituta, vel conse quentia talia signa. Et talia nomina sunt omnia talia. Genus, species, universale, praedicabile et huiusmodi; quia talia nomina non significant nisi intentiones animae, quae sunt signa naturalia, vel signa voluntarie instituta. I.c.

^{45.} Large illud dicitur nomen secundae intentionis, quod significat intentiones animae, quae sunt naturalia signa, sive etiam significat signa ad placitum instituta, tantum dum sunt signa, sive non. Et sic aliquod nomen secundae intentionis et primae impositionis (et... is omitted by two manuscripts out of nine and by the edition) est etiam nomen secundae impositionis. I.c.

46. i.e. signs of signs.

whiteness, etc. However, some nouns as white, column former, vic the transcendentals, signify things and signs, but nevertheless are considered nouns of the first intention.47

Hence Ockham can conclude, somewhat summarring the preceding: From all this one may gather certain nouns precisely signify signs instituted ad placifier, and only when they are signs, certain nouns, however precisely signify signs, but both those which are instituted ad placified and natural signs, certain signify precisely things which are not such signs as are pasts of a proposition; certain induferently signify such things, which are not parts of a proposition or of language, and also such things, such are the nouns thing, being, something, one, etc. 18

The first are nouns of second imposition, the second are nouns of second intention in the broad meaning, the third and fourth are nouns of the first intention. The first concern the grammatical structure of speech, the second the logical structure of thought, the third and fourth the ontological structure of reality. The first belong to Grammar, the second to Logic, the third to the science

4. THE VARIOUS MEANINGS OF "TO SIGNIFY"

Without going into the further details of Ockhain's semantics, and especially leaving out his extensive discussion on the various significative functions of concrete and abstract terms, which are partly the same as connotative and absolute terms, " we shall now explain what is meant by the term "to signify." This will afford us an opportunity partly to summarize what has been said before, and partly to clarify some points by way of application

In his Surveya Logarie and in his Oneillerin to Ockham dis

¹¹ Nomina autem primae intentionis vocantin omnia alia nomina a praedictis. quae videlicet significant aliquas res, quae non sint signa ne, consequentia (alia signa, crimsmod) sunt omnia (alia Homo, animal, Sortes, Plato, albedo, album, verum, bomim et humsmodi, quorim aliqua significant praecise res, quie non sunt signa nata supponere pro alus, aliqua significant (alia signi) et simul cum box alias res. l.c.

^{188 7.6.}

¹⁰ For finther deliable of F. Moody, for fig. of B. S. or O. co. 50 O. C. Norman, I. g. or I. cap. 33, and Queell V. to which his almost little falls the same treatment of this division. Our presentation is a paraphrase of both texts.

tinguishes four meanings of the term "to signify." The first two of these types take "sign" only in the restricted sense of language-sign, the other two take "sign" also in the broader sense of "sign."

a. In a first and very restricted sense, "to signify" means that a sign is actually used or can actually be used in a proposition which is categorical and not modal and of the present, so that this sign can be truly predicated about that for which it stands. For instance: Homo est albus; albus in this proposition is used as a sign or signifies in this sense, if there is actually a man who is white, for then we are able to point to this individual, saying: This is white. Hence we can say, that if, and only if, at least one white thing exists, that "white" signifies in this restricted sense. It is obvious that a sign does not signify in this sense, if the thing signified by it does not exist, or that a sign loses its signification, if the thing formerly signified by it ceases to exist. Hence signification varies with the actual existence of its significates, and can reach zero-signification, if no significate actually exists.

As a matter of fact this restricted sense of "to signify" is rarely used by Ockham, though it played a major rôle in earlier and later logicians of the Middle Ages. The corresponding use of this signification in a proposition would be *Appellatio*, which Ockham, after having mentioned it once in his *Summa Logicae*, simply dismisses.⁵¹

b. That a sign is actually used or can be used in a proposition of the past, the future, or the present, and in a modal proposition, and in such a way that it takes the place of the significate if a proposition is formulated, constitutes the meaning of "to signify" in a second and broader sense. Since this signification regards not only actually existing significates, but also past or future and even possible significates, it is obvious that a sign still signifies, even if no significate actually exists. For it may signify significates of the

^{51.} We presume here that Ockham understands appellatio in the sense in which Petrus Hispanus takes it in his Summulae Logicales: "Appellatio est acceptio termini pro re existente..." Other logicians refer appellatio to the indirect signification of connotative terms, that is to connotation, cf. John Buridan's Summulae, tract. IV, De Appellatione: Sunt autem terminorum aliqui appellativi et aliqui non appellativi... Sed omnis terminus connotans aliud ab eo, pro quo supponit, dicitur appellativus, et appellat illud, quod connotat, per modum adiacentis ei, pro quo supponit, ut album appellat albedinem tamquam adiacentem rei, pro qua iste terminus album est innatus supponere. Ed. Janonus Carcani, Venice, 1499, with commentary of John Dorp.

past or future; and even if no significate has ever existed or actually exists or will exist (as, for instance "a white thing"), nevertheless, the term "white" can signify or have a significate in a modal proposition (for instance in the proposition: *Album potest currere*) provided only that this proposition is true. Ockham therefore adds with reason: "in a true modal proposition," for the possibility or the non-contradiction of the term has to be assumed.

It is in this sense that Ockham generally takes signification of terms.

c. In a third sense "to signify" prescinds from the possibility or aptitude of taking the place of the significate in a proposition. Ockham has in mind mostly connotative terms, which directly, at least in the second mode of "to signify," signify their subjects, but indirectly signify or connote something else, which they do not signify in the second mode. We may take the instance of albus in the proposition: Homo est albus; albus here directly signifies the individual man who is white, but indirectly signifies, that is, connotes, "whiteness." However, it does not signify whiteness in the second mode; for the proposition: Albedo est alba is false. Since, however, the term albus calls albedo to mind it is said to signify it or to be a sign of it, though it is not a sign of albedo in the strict meaning of language-sign.

d. In a fourth sense, "to signify" is taken very generally. Thus any sign that either can be a part of a proposition or a proposition itself may be said to signify when it imports or means something primarily or secondarily, or when it makes something understood or connotes something, or when it signifies something in any mode whether affirmatively or negatively. For instance the term "blind" signifies "sight" negatively, or the term "immaterial" signifies "matter" negatively. In this sense every term signifies.

However, the second, which is only an extension of the first, is the most important meaning of "to signify." This, therefore, will be called the proper meaning of the term to "signify." When we use the expression "significative function" we shall always refer to this meaning. In other words, a term has significative function, if and only if it represents something different from itself and so that it can be predicated about it or about the pronoun which stands for it.

Further details of Ockham's semantics are beyond the scope of the present investigation. We intend only to pave the way for a better understanding of Ockham's theory of supposition. Our next task will be to explain this theory of supposition, and to show finally how the predicates "true" and "false" are intimately connected with correct supposition.

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A SPECIAL ASPECT OF ATHANASIAN SOTERIOLOGY

PART II

CHRIST IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE ENTIRE SUPERNATURAL ORDER

PROVERBS 8, 22, which the heretics twisted to their own schemes, is followed by another verse which they asserted proves that the Word was a creature: "He founded me before the world." St. Athanasius retorts that this, like the preceding verse, was not said of the divine nature of the Word, but of the human nature, of the Word's corporeal advent.

For He says, not, "Before the world He founded me as the Word or Son," but simply, "He founded me," to show again, as I have said, that not for His own sake [as Word] but for the sake of those who are built upon Him does He say also this, after the style of proverbs, For knowing this, the Apostle also writes: "For other foundation no one can lay, but that which has been laid, which is Christ Jesus" (I Cor. 3, 11). And it is necessary that the foundation be such as the things built upon it, so that they can be closely joined together. Since, then, He is the Word, as Word He has none like He Himself is, who may be closely joined with Him; for He is Only-begotten; but having become man, He has His equals, those, namely, whose flesh of like nature He has put on. Therefore, according to His humanity He is founded that we, as precious stones, can be built upon Him and may become a temple of the Holy Spirit who dwells in us. Now just as He is the foundation, and we the stones built upon Him, so He is also the Vine and we are joined to Him as branches - not according to the essence of the divinity, for this indeed is impossible; but according to His humanity — for the branches must be like the vine, since also we are like Him according to the flesh... Thus He says, not, "He has made me a foundation," lest He might seem to be a work and to have a beginning of being, and in this they might find a shameless occasion for irreligion; but [He says] "He founded me." Now what is founded, is founded for the sake of the stones which are set upon it;... Therefore, the Lord also, when He was founded, did not acquire a beginning of being - for He was the Word before that; but when He put on our body, which He severed and took from Mary, then He says, "He founded me"; which is like saying, "Me, being the Word, He has covered with an earthy body." For so He is founded for our sakes, receiving what is ours, that we, having become one body with Him and having been closely joined together and bound with

Him through the likeness of the flesh, may attain unto a perfect man and abide immortal and incorruptible.¹

It is especially worth noting that the supreme goal of Christ as our foundation is a life of immortality and incorruptibility. Our Doctor insists that this foundation, Christ, was laid already before the world was made; it was eternally in God's mind.

The words "before the world" and "before He made the earth," and "before the mountains were settled," should not disturb anyone. He rightly joined them to "founded" and "created"; for this again touches the economy according to the flesh. For the grace which came to us from the Savior, appeared just now, as the Apostle says, and has come when He sojourned among us. It was, however, prepared even before we existed, rather, even before the foundation of the world. The reason for this is propitious and wonderful. It was not becoming that God should counsel later concerning us, lest He should appear ignorant of our fate. The God of all, therefore,creating us by His own Word, and knowing the things that concerned us better than we, foreknowing also that, having been made good, we should later be transgressors of the commandment and be cast out of paradise because of disobedience, - since He is full of love for man and good, prepared beforehand in His own Word (by whom He also created us) the economy of our salvation, so that, even though, having been deceived by the serpent, we should fall, we might not remain completely dead, but, possessing in the Word the redemption and salvation which was prepared for us, and having again risen, we might abide immortal, whenever He should have been created a beginning of ways for us, and when He who is the "Firstborn of creation" should become the "First-born of the brethren," and should have risen as "First-fruits of the dead." This Paul the Blessed Apostle teaches in writing; for interpreting the words of the Proverbs "before the world" and "before the earth was," he thus speaks to Timothy: ... (2 Tim. 1, 8-10). And to the Ephesians: ... (1, 3-5).2

In that paragraph St. Athanasius stresses the fact that Christ was willed as the foundation from all eternity lest God seem oblivious of us. He was willed as a security in case man should fall. Man actually fell and Christ came. That Christ was willed as a security in case man fell is true.³ But was Christ willed only as a security in the sense that His existence would depend entirely on the existence of sin? Hardly. Even in this text the incorruptible life is made the goal of this foundation. But we saw above that

3. Contra Arianos, II, 73 (P. G., 26, 301).

^{1.} Contra Arianos, II, 74 (P. G., 26, 304-305); cf. n. 72 (26, 300).
2. Ibid., II, 75 (P. G., 26, 305 B and 308); cf. De Synodis, n. 3 (26, 682 and 685).

this incorruptible life was not possible except through the incarnation of God. And that was stressed as the supreme goal of being founded in Christ in the preceding quotation. He stresses it also in the following.

How then has He chosen us before we existed, except, as He Himself has said, in Him we were modelled beforehand (προτετυπωμένοι)? Moreover, how at all, did He predestine us unto adoption before men were created, except the Son Himself has been "founded before the world," taking on Himself the economy that was for our sakes? Or how, as the Apostle goes on to say, "having been predestined, have we an inheritance," except the Lord Himself was founded "before the world," and so He purposed for us to take on Himself by means of the flesh all the inheritance of the judgment which was against us, and we henceforth were made sons in Him? How also did we receive "before the eternal times," when we had not yet come to be, but came to be in time, except the grace which has come to us was stored up in Christ? Wherefore also in the judgment, when each shall receive according to his conduct, He says, ... (Matt. 25, 34). How, then, or in whom, was it prepared before we came to be, except in the Lord who was founded for this purpose "before the world"; that we, built upon Him as well-fitted stones, might partake of the life and grace which is from Him? This has taken place - as is reasonably suggested to a pious mind — that, as I have said, we, having risen from the dead after a short time, may be capable of living eternally. Of this we would not have been capable, men from the earth that we are, except the hope of life and salvation had been prepared for us in Christ before the world. Therefore, with reason, the Word, on coming into our flesh and on being created in it as a "beginning of ways for His works," is made a foundation, just as the Father's will was in Him, as has been said, before the world,... that, though the earth and the mountains and the forms of visible things pass away at the end of the present age, we may not grow old after their pattern, but may be able to live even after them, possessing the spiritual life and blessing which, prior to these things, were prepared for us in the Word Himself according to election. For thus shall we be capable, not of a life which is temporary, but of abiding after these things [have passed away] by living in Christ; since, even before these things our life had been founded and prepared in Christ Jesus.5

In this long and beautiful passage the Doctor explains how we can be founded in Christ before we existed and before the Incarnation. He answers that it is because He who is the Eternal Word was chosen to be our foundation through His Incarnation; and He is the foundation of our grace and glory, which amounts to an

^{4.} Ibid., II, 74 (P. G., 26, 305 A).

^{5.} Ibid., II, 76 (P. G., 26, 308-309).

unending incorruptible life with Christ and in Christ — that is our supreme goal. And to attain this we needed the help of the Incarnate God as our foundation since we are mere creatures. This necessity is not caused by sin, but by our very nature as creatures formed from earth. Note too that the very purpose of the Incarnation of the Word is to be the foundation of our incorruptible life, which is the ultimate reason of our existence. Therefore, it would seem certain that according to Athanasius the Incarnation was willed at least when we were destined to glory. However, in the following quotation we run into a difficulty.

In no other was it fitting that our life should be founded, except in the Lord who is before the ages, and by whom the ages were made; that we too might be able to inherit everlasting life since it was in Him. For God is good; and being good always, He has willed this, knowing that our weak nature needed the help and salvation which is from Him. And just as a wise architect, when planning to build a house, at the same time has a mind to repair it, if perchance later after having been built it should be destroyed; and when planning this he makes preparation and gives to the builder the materials necessary for repair — [thus] the reparation for the repair takes place before the house; - in the same way the restoration of our salvation is founded in Christ before us, that in Him we might be created anew. Both the plan and the purpose were made ready "before the world," but the work was effected when the need required and the Savior sojourned [among us]. For the Lord Himself will take the place of all things for us in heaven when He admits us into everlasting life.6

St. Athanasius began this quotation by telling us that it was proper for the Eternal Word, who also created us, to be the foundation of our eternal life because in Him was eternal life and that would make us heirs of that life. He had spoken of the necessity of the Incarnation of God as the foundation of such a life. Next he shows by a parable how God chose Christ as our foundation before we existed. A wise architect who plans on building an edifice will at the same time plan also the means of restoring the building in case it should be destroyed. God is a wise Architect; He foresaw that we might collapse, and since He willed our restoration, He planned the means of that restoration before He actually created us or the world. This "means" which is Christ was actualized when the need arose. Now because of this last statement one might

^{6.} Ibid., II, 77 (P. G., 26, 309).

wonder if Christ would ever have been actualized if there had been no sin. The picture we seem to get from this passage is this: God willed us, but at the same time He willed Christ as the foundation in case we should collapse. Was Christ to exist only in case there would be a collapse? Hardly! Christ the foundation was willed to exist some time, sin or no sin, because this foundation was necessary for us to attain eternal life as St. Athanasius maintains. He was hardly a foundation only in the sense that God could fall back upon that idea for saving man if he fell. Rather Christ was foundation in the sense that the building was immediately raised upon Him from the beginning and could again be raised upon Him as a secure foundation, if the building were destroyed; for, we saw that our grace and glory were actually founded on the Incarnate Word, and that He was necessary for us to attain incorruptible life because we are creatures. And as a matter of fact, St. Athanasius ends this passage with the idea that Christ gives us life everlasting. It is monstrous, too, to think that Christ, so great and eminent a foundation, should forever remain a mere plan unless man would sin and destroy the original building.

Would we be doing justice to Athanasius' beautiful doctrine if we were to limit the Incarnation to the sin of Adam? St. Athanasius could have expressed this point a little more openly; however, it seems that he does not, in order not to mention the operation of the Incarnate Word before the actual Incarnation lest he seem to concede something to the Arian heresy about the Word as a creature before all other creatures, as was noted once before.

CHRIST WILLED FOR HIS OWN SAKE

Until now we have had more than one occasion to note that St. Athanasius stresses the truth that the Word did not receive any benefit from the Incarnation; it is we who received the benefit; the Word did not become incarnate for Himself but for us. In the fourth book *Contra Arianos* we find a beautiful passage in regard to this mediatorship of Christ.

But in regard to the feeble and human notion of the Arians... we must say that our Lord, being Word and Son of God, bore a body and even became Son of Man in order that, having become Mediator (μεσίτης)

of God and men, He might minister the things of God to us, and ours to God. When therefore He is said to hunger [etc.]... He receives from us and offers to the Father, interceding for us, that in Him they may be made void. And when He said, "All power is given to Me," and "I received," and [when St. Paul writes,] "Wherefore God exalted Him," these are gifts from God to us, given through Him. For the Word was not in want and has not come into being at some time. Again men were not sufficient to minister these things to themselves, but they were given to us through the Word; therefore, being given to Him, they are imparted to us. For this was the reason of His becoming man, that, being given to Him, they might pass on to us. For a mere man would not have been worthy of such gifts; and again the Word alone did not need them. The Word, therefore was united to us and then imparted to us power, and exalted us. For the Word being in man, exalted man; and when the Word was in man, man received. Since then the Word being in flesh, man himself was exalted, received power, for this reason these things are referred to the Word since they were given on His account; for on account of the Word who was in man were these gifts given. And as the "Word was made flesh," so also man himself received the gifts which came through the Word. For all that man has received, the Word is said to have received, that it might be shown that man, though unworthy to receive as far as his own nature goes, nevertheless, has received because of the Word who was made flesh. Wherefore if something is said to be given to the Lord, or anything similar, we must consider that it is given, not as to one in need, but to man through the Word. For everyone interceding for another himself receives the gift, not as one in need, but on account of him for whom he intercedes.7

Statements of this kind are made so strong that, if taken by themselves, one would think that St. Athanasius excludes all benefits to the Word even as Man.

If for our sakes He sanctifies Himself, and does this when He is become Man, it is quite plain that the Spirit's descent on Him in the Jordan was a descent upon us, because of His bearing our body. And it did not take place for a betterment of the Word, but again for our sanctification, that we might share His anointing, and that of us it might be said, "Do you not know that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?" (I Cor. 3, 16).8

Or what the Word did receive, He seems to have received merely to pass on to us, not for His own advantage.

But concerning all these things the Savior makes things rather clear when He says to the Father: "And the glory thou has given me, I have

^{7.} *Ibid.*, IV, 6 (*P. G.*, 26, 476-477); cf. also n. 7 (26, 477). 8. *Ibid.*, I, 47 (*P. G.*, 26, 108); cf. II, 55 (26, 261).

given to them, that they may be one, even as we are one" (John 17, 22). Because of us, then, He asked for glory, and the words "received" and "gave" and "exalted" are spoken that we might receive, and to us might be given, and that we might be exalted in Him; just as for us He sanctifies Himself, that we might be sanctified in Him.9

In all this we must remember that St. Athanasius is defending the divinity of the Word. It is really only the Word as such, Christ in His divine nature, that received nothing, because He was always perfect and full.

But if He is God and the throne of His kingdom is everlasting, in what way could God advance? Or what was wanting to Him who sits on His Father's throne? And if, as the Lord Himself has said, the Spirit is His, and receives of His, and if He even sends Him, it is not the Word, as the Word and Wisdom, who is anointed with the Spirit which He Himself gives; but it is the flesh assumed by Him which is anointed in Him and by Him in order that the sanctification which came to the Lord as man, may come to all men from Him.¹⁰

And so the neglect of Christ's humanity, on the part of Athanasius, is only apparent. He acknowledges and writes about the great advantages of the Incarnation for Christ as man, especially when these are attacked, as can be seen in the *Epistle to Adelphium*.¹¹

As Man, Christ was exalted immensely. St. Athanasius stresses this repeatedly; in fact, he treats it *ex professo* when he explains the exaltation of Christ about which St. Paul wrote to the Philippians. See numbers 40 to 50 in the first book *Contra Arianos*. By way of example, note this passage:

And this word "exalted" does not signify that the essence of the Word was exalted; for He always was, and is, "equal to God," but the exaltation is of His manhood. Therefore, this was not said before, only after the Word had been made flesh, that it might be plain that "humbled" and "exalted" are spoken of His humanity; for where there is a lowly state, there too it is possible to be exalted; and if because of taking flesh, "humbled" is written, it is clear that "exalted" is also said because of it. For of this was man in want because of the lowly state of flesh and of death. Since, then, the Word, being the Image of the Father and immortal, took the nature of a slave, and as man underwent death in the flesh for us, that thus He might offer Himself for us by means of death to the Father; on this

^{9.} Ibid., I, 48 (P. G., 26, 113 A); cf. n. 47 (26, 108 C); III, 53 (26, 436 A). 10. Ibid., I, 47 (P. G., 26, 108); cf. nn. 43 and 44 (26, 99 and 101). 11. Ad Adelphium, nn. 1-4 (P. G., 26, 1072-1077).

account He is said to be exalted as man also because of us and for us... He who sanctifies all, says also that He sanctifies Himself to the Father for our sakes, not that the Word may become holy, but that He may sanctify all of us in Himself, in like manner, then, must we take the present phrase, "He exalted Him..." 12

St. Athanasius also tells us in what Christ was exalted. Christ's body was saved and even liberated, and we are saved after its pattern, being incorporated in Him.13 The remark about being liberated must be referred to human nature in general. Men are renewed in imitation of, and by participation in, the perfect newness that was first in Christ. 14 He received life, 15 and grace, and was anointed by the Spirit. 16 And through all this He was sanctified. "Nevertheless, He who as the Word and Splendor of the Father, gives to others, is now said to be sanctified, because now He has become man, and the body that is sanctified is His." 17

The greatest gift that Christ received was His deification through the personal union with the Eternal Word. The Word was not made imperfect by assuming the body, rather the Word deified the Body it assumed.¹⁸ The exaltation of Christ was simply His deification.

... to show that it is not the Father who was made flesh, but it is His Word who has become man, and receives, as men do, from the Father, and is exalted by Him, as has been said. It is plain, nor would anyone doubt it, that what the Father gives, He gives through the Son. And it is marvellous and truly admirable; for the grace which the Son [receives] from the Father to give [to us], the Son Himself [as man] is said to have received; and the exaltation which the Son gives [having received it] from the Father, by that the Son has Himself been exalted. For He who is the Son of God also became the Son of Man. As Word, He gives [what He received] from the Father - for all things which the Father does and gives, He does and furnishes through Him; as the Son of Man, however, He is said to receive as men do what proceeds from Himself, because the body which is His own and of none other, has the nature which is capable of receiving, as has been said. For He received it as far as the Man Thuman nature] was exalted; the exaltation however was its being deified. The

^{12.} Contra Arianos, I, 41 (P. G., 26, 96-97); cf. also De Incarnatione et contra Arianos, nn. 9 and 12 (26, 997 and 1004); Contra Apollinarium, II, 3 (26, 1136).
13. Contra Arianos, II, 61 (P. G., 26, 277 C and 280).
14. Contra Apollinarium, I, 21 (P. G., 26, 1130).
15. De Incarnatione et contra Arianos, n. 2 (P. G., 26, 988 A).
16. Cf. Contra Arianos, I, nn. 45-47 (P. G., 26, 105 B - 112); n. 50 (26, 117).
17. Ibid., I, 47 (P. G., 26, 109 B); cf. nn. 41 and 46 (26, 97 B and 108 B).
18. Ibid., I, 42 (P. G., 26, 100 A); III, nn. 38-39 (26, 404-408).

Word, himself, however, always had this according to His Father's divinity and perfection, which was also His.19

The Word assumed the body precisely to deify it in Himself. "For He assumed the created and human body, that, having renewed it as its Maker, He might deify it in Himself and thus introduce us all according to His likeness into the kingdom of heaven.20 But if He introduces us into heaven according to His pattern, and after having been deified according to His pattern, then He Himself as man will enjoy a very exceptional glory. The glory that Christ as man received through the Incarnation is another point which St. Athanasius stresses. Christ possessed this glory in order to give it to us.21 This glory of the body came to Christ through His Resurrection and rendered the body which was naturally corruptible, incorruptible.22 But St. Athanasius considers the Incarnation itself as rendering an immense service to Christ in making His corporal life immortal.

And they were ignorant of this that the Word has not become flesh because of an increase to the divinity, but in order that the flesh may rise. Nor did the Word proceed from Mary that He might be bettered, but that He might redeem the human race. How, then, can they think that the body, redeemed and vivified by the Word, makes an addition in regard to the divinity to the Word which had vivified it? Rather, a great increase has come to the human body itself from the fellowship and union of the Word with it; instead of mortal, namely, it is become immortal; and, though being an animal body, it is become spiritual, and though having been made from the earth, it penetrated into the heavenly gates.23

Because of the advantages to Christ through the Incarnation, His body is most beautiful: "Nor can the beauty or glory of the body of Christ be expressed by the mind of man." 24

In consequence of these considerations we can say that the Incarnation was willed merely for us if therein we include the

^{19.} Ibid., I, 45 (P. G., 26, 105 A).
20. Ibid., II, 70 (P. G., 26, 296); cf. III, 38 (26, 404 C), quoted in the first part of this study at footnote 45; III, 39 (26, 405 and 408); De Decretis, n. 14 (25, 448 D), quoted in the first part of this study at footnote 46; De Incarnatione et contra Arianos, n. 3 (26, 989 A).
21. Contra Arianos, I, 48 (P. G., 26, 113), quoted above at footnote 9; cf. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 22 fin. (P. G., 25, 136 B); n. 32 fin. (25, 152 C).
22. Ad Epictetum, n. 10 (P. G., 26, 1068 A).
23. Ibid., n. 9 (P. G., 26, 1065); cf. De Decretis, n. 14 (26, 448 D).
24. Contra Apollinarium, I, 22 (P. G., 26, 1132 A).

humanity of Christ. St. Athanasius says time and again that whatever we received, we were able to receive because Christ had received it first and gives it to us.25 Consequently, when St. Athanasius says so often that Christ received for us, he includes the human nature of Christ; and that primarily. Christ is the first and greatest recipient of the benefits of the Incarnation. And St. Athanasius can speak of our receiving those things, and he does not always distinguish with clear-cut divisions between our receiving and Christ's receiving, because he considers Christ and us as one, as one body: whatever Christ received, that we received; whatever we received, that Christ received first.26 This doctrine is contained also in the fact that Christ was made the "Beginning of our ways" (which we discussed above), and in the doctrine of His being the Firstborn (which we shall discuss presently).

Now if Christ's human nature received such immense glory, and incorruptible life, and deification par excellence by personal union with the Eternal Word and Immortal Life, should He not have been willed with as much independence from sin as all men? Should he not have been in the very first plan of God's world of goodness, He who is the greatest recipient of God's goodness? St. Athanasius implies an affirmative answer in extolling the glories of the human nature of Christ so much. Certainly, according to him, the Incarnation as such is not the humiliating thing for Christ it is too often pictured, because of a false application of Philippians 2, 8. "Much less was the all-holy Word of God, the Maker of even the sun, defiled by being made known in the body; but rather, being incorruptible, He vivified and cleansed also the body which was mortal.27

^{25.} Cf., e. g., Contra Arianos, I, nn. 42 and 50 (P. G., 26, 100 and 117); II, 61 and 70 (26, 278 B and 296); IV, 6 (26, 476-477).

26. Cf. Contra Arianos, I, 42 fin. (P. G., 26, 100); nn. 47-48 (26, 108-113); Apologia pro Fuga Sua, n. 13 (25, 661); cf. also E. Mersch, Le Corps Mystique du Christ, 2 vol. (Paris, Desclée du Brouwer, 1936), pp. 387, 392, 396.

27. De Incarn. Verbi, n. 17 (P. G., 25, 125 D). In the light of what was said in this section and also above under deification, adoption and glory, one can easily see how much J. Rivière misses Athanasius' mind when, speaking of physical redemption, he asserts that the redemption was accomplished by the Incarnation merely in the sense that the Incarnation was the condition sine and no of redemption, and in the sense that the Incarnation was the conditio sine qua non of redemption, and that Athanasius confuses matters and mistakes a condition for an efficient cause. The Doctrine of the Atonement, translated by Luigi Cappadelta (St. Louis, Herder, 1909), I, 174. Athanasius rightly considers the Incarnation, that is, the act from which resulted the Incarnate Word, as the causa efficiens and exemplaris and finalis of our adoption, grace, glory, and deification. Athanasius has a more positive view of theology than some theologians have. His Christology and soteriology is not bound down by the fetters of sin.

The Incarnation as such brought immense benefit to the human nature of Christ; greater benefits by far than to all other created natures taken together. His benefits are the source of the benefits for others. The Incarnate Word of God, the Man-God, is the Masterpiece of the Divine Architect.

EXCURSUS: FIRST-BORN OF EVERY CREATURE

In explaining the extent of the work of the Word Incarnate as expressed in Proverbs 8, 22, St. Athanasius explains also the meaning of Colossians 1, 15: "The First-born of every creature." Since Franciscan theologians use this expression to prove the Absolute Primacy of Christ, it might be well to give St. Athanasius' explanation in full.

The Arians said that Christ was the First-born of all creatures because He was created first in point of time and all others were created through Him as an instrument. St. Athanasius rejects that as being against the divinity of the Word, and gives his own interpretations. He gives various reasons for calling Christ the First-born. These reasons are not exclusive of each other, much less do they contradict each other. Here, as elsewhere, St. Athanasius wishes to give a number of legitimate reasons from the same text, the more to confound the Arians in their false interpretations.

Athanasius tells us that it is the Eternal Word that is called First-born. He considers the expression a proof of Christ's divinity because he puts it on a par with "Image of the invisible God," which he certainly refers to the Word as such.²⁸ If Christ were not God and Son, He could not be called "First-born of the whole creation."

He, therefore, is by nature an Offspring, perfect from the Perfect, begotten before all the hills (Prov. 8, 25), that is before every rational and intelligent essence, as Paul also in another place calls Him "the First-born of the whole creation" (Col. 1, 15). But, by calling Him First-born he makes it clear that He is not a creature, but Offspring of the Father. For to be called a creature would not be in keeping with His divinity. For all things were created by the Father through the Son; the Son alone was

^{28.} Contra Gentes, n. 41 (P. G., 25, 84 B). Judged by the context of passages in Athanasius, I think that he understands Col. 1, 15 as First-born "of the whole creation," rather than "of every creature."

eternally begotten from the Father, whence God the Word is "the Firstborn of the whole creation" unchangeable from unchangeable.29

Now if St. Athanasius insists that the term First-born refers to the Word and implies that He is not a creature, he does thereby not say that it refers to the divine generation without any relation to creatures. He himself rejects that idea.

Now if He is really First-born, He should not be called Only-begotten; for the same one cannot be Only-begotten and also First-born, except under different aspects; namely, Only-begotten because of His generation from the Father, as has been said; and First-born because of His condescension to the creation and His making the many His brethren. By all means, since those two terms are inconsistent with each other, one should say that the attribute of being Only-begotten rightly has the preference in the case of the Word, because there is no other Word, or other Wisdom, but He alone is true Son of the Father. Furthermore, as was stated before, "the Onlybegotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" (John 1, 18), has been said of Him not in connection with any cause, but absolutely. But the term First-born has again the reason connected with it, namely, the creation, which Paul adduces, saying, "for in Him all things were created" (Col. 1, 16). But if all the creatures were created in Him, He is other than the creatures, and is not a creature, but the Creator of the creatures.30

Now He who is first-born is such because he has brothers. The Son has acquired brothers in several ways. First, He is First-born by His condescension to creatures at creation.31 At first reading it might seem as if the Word became First-born by creation as such; but it is really through grace at creation that He becomes First-born. As was noted above, St. Athanasius does not always keep the state of creation and of elevation apart because they both began at the same time. Men were created and adopted as sons by the same Word at the same time.

It is plain that also in calling the Son First-born, it is not for the sake of classing Him with the creation that He is called the First-born, but for a proof of the creation and adoption of all things through the Son. For just as the Father is First, so also is He [the Son] first, as Image of the First; and, because the First is in Him [the Son], [He is] also Offspring from the Father, and in Him all creation is created and adopted unto sonship.82

^{29.} Expositio Fidei, n. 3 (P. G., 25, 204 C - 205); cf. also De Decretis, n. 26 (26, 464 D); Contra Arianos, II, 45 (26, 241 C and 244).
30. Contra Arianos, II, 62 (P. G., 26, 280).
31. Cf. e. g., ibid., II, 63-64 (P. G., 26, 280 C - 284); n. 75 (26, 305 C).
32. Ibid., III, 9 (P. G., 26, 340 C).

There is no text from which one could prove clearly that the Word became First-born merely through creation. There is plenty of evidence, however, that He is First-born through the grace of adoption at creation. Besides the text just quoted, note the following:

Now if He is also called "First-born of the creation," He is, nevertheless, called "First-born" not as if He were made equal to the creatures, and is first of them in point of time, — how, namely, [could that be] since He is Only-begotten? — but it is because of the Word's condescension to the creatures, by which He has also become the brother of many. For the Only-begotten is only-begotten where there are no brothers, but the First-born is called first-born because of brothers. Wherefore, it is nowhere said in the Scriptures, "The First-born of God," nor "the creature of God"; but "Only-begotten" and "Son" and "Word" and "Wisdom," are referred to the Father and are proper to Him... "First-born," however, indicates His condescension to the creation; for of it was He called the First-born; and "He created" indicates His grace towards the works, for them, namely, is He created.³³

Toward the end of this number St. Athanasius remarks that the Son is called "First-born of creation" precisely because, as St. Paul adds, creatures were created in Him. The Word, therefore, is First-born because He is the Type of creatures. The Word put His impression, His likeness, into man at creation, and in so far men are like the Word whose brothers they are, even though, as St. Athanasius tells us, the Word as such need not be like us.³⁴ About this image that was impressed on man at creation, St. Athanasius says more in numbers 78 till 82 of book two *Contra Arianos*. We touched upon it above when discussing Prov. 8, 22.

According to Athanasius, then, the Eternal Son is First-born of every creature because of the grace of adoption given at creation. Can the *Incarnate* Word be called the First-born of every creature? Yes, because of the *redemption* which benefited all creatures in some way.

Therefore, not because He was from the Father, was He called "First-born," but because in Him the creation was made. And as before the creation He was the Son through whom the creation was made, so also before He was called "the First-born of the whole creation," nevertheless,

^{33.} *Ibid.*, II, 62 (P. G., 26, 277 C · 280). 34. *Ibid.*; and n. 64 (P. G., 26, 284).

the Word Himself was with God and the Word was God... And "Firstborn of the whole creation," because of the Father's love toward man, by which not only "all things hold together" in His Word, but creation itself, of which the Apostle speaks, waiting for the revelation of the sons of God, will be delivered at one time from its slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the sons of God. [See Rom. 8, 19-21]. Thus of this liberated [creation], the Lord will be the First-born, — both of it and of all those who are made children, that by His being called "first" those that come after Him may abide, depending on the Word as on a beginning.85

The Incarnate Word is First-born also by the Incarnation itself, which makes Him more similar to us, and already through the Incarnation He acquires many brothers.

... but if we become sons by adoption and according to grace, it is clear that the Word also, when He had become man because of the grace toward us, said, "The Lord created me." Moreover, when he had put on a created nature. He became like us in body and with reason, therefore, was He called both our Brother and First-born. For though He was made Man after us for our sakes, and our Brother because of the likeness of the body, still because of this He is called and is First born of us, because, all men being lost by virtue of the transgression of Adam, His flesh was saved and liberated before all others, having become the Word's body; and henceforth we, being one body with it, are saved by virtue of it. For in it the Lord becomes our Leader to the Kingdom of heaven and to His Father... Whence again He is said to be the First-born from the dead, not that He died before us, for we died first; but because, having accepted death for us and abolished it, He rose first, as man, for our sakes raising His own body. For, He having risen, we too, henceforth, in due order shall be raised from the dead by Him and because of Him...36 He is called "First-born among many brethren" because of the relationship of the flesh.37

Still more, St. Athanasius considers the Incarnate Word, Christ, "First-born of the whole creation" because of the adoption of sons through Him.

But because the Word, when at the beginning He made the creatures, condescended to the things created that it might be possible for them to be. For they could not have borne His nature, being pure splendor of the Father, unless having condescended because of the Father's love for man, He had assisted them, and having taken hold of them, had brought them into existence. Secondly, because the Word condescended, the creation too is made a son by Him, in order that, as has been said, He might be "First-

^{35.} *Ibid.*, II, 63 (*P. G.*, 26, 280 C · 281). 36. *Ibid.*, II, 61 (*P. G.*, 26, 277); also nn. 62-63 (26, 274-281). 37. *Ibid.*, II, 63 (*P. G.*, 26, 281 B); cf. n. 61 (26, 277 B).

born" of it in all respects, in creating and in being brought into this world for all. For so it is written, "When He brings the First-born into the world, He says, let all the angels of God worship Him" (Hebr. 1, 6). Let Christ's enemies hear and tear themselves to pieces, because His coming into the world makes Him called "First-born" of all. Thus the Son is the Father's "Only-begotten," because He alone is from Him; and He is "the First-born of the creation," because of this adoption of all as sons. And as He is "the First-born among many brethren" and rose from the dead "the first fruits of them that slept"; so, since it was proper that "He hold the first place in all things," therefore He is also created a beginning of ways," that, having walked along it and having entered through Him who says, "I am the Way," and "the Door," and having partaken of the knowledge of the Father, we also may hear the words, "Blessed are the undefiled in the Way" (Ps. 118, 1), and "Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God" (Matth. 5, 8).38

In this passage, then, St. Athanasius holds that Christ as Man-God is the First-born of the whole creation though the adoption of sons. Even the angels must worship Him; and it seems implied that they too received the adoption through Christ, Christ, therefore, both as Eternal Son and as Incarnate Son, is "the First-born of the whole creation" and "the Beginning of the Ways." 39 He is the Primate of all creation.

St. Athanasius says nowhere that the creation was adopted in the beginning through the Incarnate Word; but he seems to imply that sufficiently. Earlier in this study it was noted that the Incarnate Son was necessary for adoption and that man was destined to divine adoption from the beginning. Consequently, the Incarnate Son seems to have been the Type and Mediator of that adoption from the beginning. And He is therefore the First-born of all creation from the beginning.

^{38.} Ibid., II, 64 (P. G., 26, 284 B).
39. Hence A. Spindeler, Cur Verbum Caro Factum? Das Motiv der Menschwerdung und das Verhaeltniss der Erloesung zur Menschwerdung Gottes in den Christologischen Glaubenskaempten des vierten und fuentten Christlichen Jahrhundert, in Forschungen zur Christlicher Literatur und Dogmengeschichte (Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1938), XVIII, n. 2, pp. 79-86, has a very incomplete idea of St. Athanasius doctrine in regard to Col. 1, 15, when he merely asserts that Athanasius distinguishes "First-born of the whole creation" from "First-born among many brethren," referring the first to Christ as God, and the second to Christ as the God-Man; and for that he quotes only Contra Arianos, II, 68. Moreover, Spindeler's criticism that even theologians like Frassen and Scotus use Col. 1, 15, to prove the divinity of Christ is pointless, since, according to Athanasius, even though it refers to the Incarnation, it implies that this First-born is the Son of God. Pope Pius XII in the Encyclical on the Mystical Body also cites "First-born of every creature" of Christ as God. But he hardly wishes to exclude the interpretation referring this title to Christ as the God-Man, for which there is an overwhelming amount of evidence in Tradition.

CHRIST IS THE EXEMPLAR OF MAN

In proving the Absolute Primacy of Christ, authors use as an argument that Christ was intended by God to be the Exemplar of man, both in the natural and in the supernatural order, already at creation. Do we find anything in Athanasius to substantiate this? St. Athanasius speaks very often of the Word as the Image of God, and of man's being created according to that Image. However, did God create man and elevate him to the supernatural order after the pattern of Christ? St. Athanasius says explicitly that we are at present deified and exalted and adopted and glorified according to the pattern of Christ, and that Christ's being our foundation from the beginning means that He is also our Exemplar, and that His being called "First-born of the whole creation" implies that He is the Exemplar of the adopted sons that we are. To give all the citations for these points would involve a repetition of what was given in the discussion of the various points just mentioned. There it was shown that Athanasius considers the God-Man present in the mind of God already in the first plan of creation. It seems, therefore, that, according to Athanasius, the God-Man was God's Exemplar for man's creation and elevation to grace and glory. Perhaps St. Athanasius was not more explicit on this point in order to avoid giving the Arians any pretext for accusing him of holding the same as they do, as we know he did in regard to the mediation of Christ before the time of the Incarnation.

CHRIST WAS WILLED AS THE FINIS OF ALL CREATURES AND FIRST OF ALL

The Eternal Word of God became man not merely to redeem us, but also to rule over us as King;40 but that means that we must serve the Incarnate Word, He is our goal, we really exist for His sake. The angels, in fact, who were ever worshipping the Lord, now worship Him in the Name of Jesus; and even as man, Christ must be worshipped. In heaven He will be worshipped forever.41

^{40.} Contra Arianos, I, 49 (P. G., 113 C). 41. Ibid., 42 (P. G., 26, 97 and 100).

Christ is really the final cause of our resurrection. "For, He having risen, we too, henceforth, in due order shall be raised from the dead by Him and because of Him." ⁴² Of course, no one can deny that Christ is actually the End of all creation as Redeemer. But was Christ willed as the End of all creation from the first moment of creation? St. Athanasius has an argument about the Eternal Word, which seems to be to the point. It was always used by Franciscans as a valid argument for the ultimate purpose of the Incarnation.

This argument, too, will put you to shame. If God, when willing to create originate nature, and having deliberated concerning it, designs and creates the Son, that through Him He may make us, consider how great an irreligion you have dared to utter. First, the Son appears to have been brought into being for us, rather than we for Him; for, [as you say], we were not created for Him, but He is made for us; so that He owes thanks to us, not we to Him, as woman to man. "For the man," says Scripture, "was not created for the woman, but the woman for man." Therefore, as "the man is the image and glory of God, and the woman the glory of the man" (I Cor. 11, 7.9), so we have been made God's image and to His glory; but the Son is our image and would exist for our glory. And we have been made so we might exist; but God's Word has been made, according to you, not that He might exist; but for our need, as an instrument, so that we are not for Him, but He is constituted for our need. Do not men who merely think such things surpass all folly? For if the Word has been made for us, He is not first of us with God; for He, having Him with Himself, did not take counsel about us, but having us in Himself, He counselled concerning His own Word, as they say. But if this be so, the Father did, perhaps, not even will the Son at all; for not as willing Him did He create Him; but willing us, He made Him for our sake; for He designed Him after [designing] us, so that, according to these irreligious men, the Son who was made to be an instrument, is superfluous since they for whom he had been created, have been made. But if the Son alone was made by the Father alone, because He could endure [being made by Him], but we, because we could not, were made by the Word, why does He not first take counsel about the Word, as about one who could endure it, instead of about us? Or why does He not give preference to Him who could endure, rather than to us who were weak? Or why, when making Him first, does He not counsel about Him first? Or why, when counselling about us first, does He not make us first, since His will is sufficient for the constitution of all things? But He creates Him first, yet counsels first about us; and He wills us before the Mediator; and while He wills to create us and counsels about us, He calls us creatures; but Him, whom He makes for our sakes, He calls Son and His own Heir, But we' for whose

^{42.} *lbid.*, II, 61 (P. G., 26, 278); cf. IV, 7 (26, 477): "So we are exalted for His sake."

sake He made Him, ought rather to be called sons; or it is clear He ought to think first of, and will, Him who is His Son, for whose sake He makes us all. These things are the vomit and the nauseating things of the heretics. But the thought of the truth in this matter must not be [passed over] in silence, but it is proper that especially this be declared loudly. For the Word of God has not been made for us, but rather we have been made for Him, and "in Him all things were created" (Col. 1, 16).43

In this long passage St. Athanasius is arguing for the divinity of the Word: The Eternal Word could not have been made for us and be at the same time prior to us and eternal. He would be a mere instrument and almost worthless in comparison with men. He would have to thank us for having occasioned His existence. Or we might state his argument thus: If the Word was created primarily to be an instrument for creating us who were first in God's mind, then we are His finis, and not He ours. But that cannot be, because then He would not be prior to us - the finis must be prior to the means. Nor would He be esteemed by God as much as we are; but neither can that be, because God even called Him Son and Heir, whereas we are merely called creatures.

If, then, in the mind of Athanasius, this is certainly true of the Eternal Word, we have at least an a pari argument for the Incarnate Word; namely, if we were thought of first and Christ only as an instrument of our salvation, we are greater than He and we are His finis. But great as Christ is as man, according to Athanasius He could not have been willed primarily for man; He had to be willed primarily for Himself. He received greater gifts through the Incarnation than we did. In fact, St. Athanasius does not exclude the Incarnate Word from this argument because he calls the Son the Heir. Christ, not the Word as such, was called the Heir according to St. Paul. If that can be urged, then St. Athanasius would be making an a fortiori argument from the primacy of Christ to the primacy of the Word as such.

As I said above, nearly all defenders of the Absolute Primacy of Christ have used this passage of St. Athanasius, or at least the idea. Note well that the reasoning of St. Athanasius can be used as an a pari argument for Christ as man, even though St. Athanasius uses it only of the Word: If Christ was willed primarily for our

^{43.} Ibid., II, 29-31 (P. G., 26, 209-212); cf. II, 71 (26, 297); IV, 11 (26, 482).

redemption, He is not our *Finis*, but we are His *finis*, because had it not been for us, He would never have existed as man.

Throughout this study I have occasionally referred to authors who either directly or indirectly treated the question of the motives of the Incarnation according to St. Athanasius. I shall give a summary and criticism of those who have come to my notice.

J. A. Moehler, in his well-known work on St. Athanasius, enumerates eleven reasons for the Incarnation according to Athanasius: to restore the knowledge of God, to destroy sin, to merit immortality, to put an end to idolatry, to liberate us from Satan, to restore trust in God, to reconcile us with God, to deify us, to perfect us, to unite us with God. He tells us that Athanasius takes all of these motives as one. For that reason he can say of each motive that it is the end ($\tau \epsilon \lambda_{05}$) of the Incarnation, because what is said of one holds of all. However, it is easy to see that Moehler does not decide the question whether St. Athanasius considered all of these motives dependent on sin or not.

L. Atzberger gives this summary of the motives of the Incarnation according to Athanasius: The first purpose was that the justice of God demanded the punishment of Adam, but the wisdom of God demanded his restoration. Both purposes could be realized in the death of the God-Man. Again, sin was rooted in the very nature of man; God had to become incarnate in that nature to destroy sin. Besides this work of restoration, the Incarnation was also meant to perfect the original work of creation. You were though Atzberger does not treat the question of the priority of motives directly, it seems evident that he favors the Thomistic view. And it is just as evident that this arrangement proves merely that the Incarnation of God was necessary for the redemption. It does not prove that the work of redemption was the primary purpose of the Incarnation.

G. A. Pell wrote on the redemption according to Athanasius. 46

^{44.} J. A. Mochler, Athanasius der Grosse und die Kirche seiner Zeit, besonders im Kampfe mit dem Arianismus (Mainz, Kupferberg, 1884), pp. 163-165.

^{45.} L. Atzberger, Die Logoslehre des hl. Athanasius: Ihre Gegner und ihre unmittelbaren Vorlaeufer (Muenchen, 1880), pp. 210-214.

^{46.} Die Lehre des hl. Athanasius von der Suende und Erloesung (Passau, 1888), pp. 167-170.

I was unable to consult his work. However, J. B. Berchem⁴⁷ remarks that Pell refuted the theory of Voigt48 that Athanasius taught the Word would have become incarnate even though Adam had not sinned. His refutation was most likely along the usual line of Atzberger (above) and Spindeler (below).

H. Straetter rightly emphasizes the importance of the Incarnation as such in the soteriology of St. Athanasius. 49 He writes: "Sie [die Menschwerdung] galt ihm als die Grund-und Centralidee des Christenthums"; and in his idea of the Incarnation "liegt seine eminente Groesse, seine epochmachende Bedeutung fuer das religioese Denken und Leben der Christenheit." 50 However, he does not treat directly the question of the priority of motives. All he does is explain the need of the Incarnation for the redemption, and in this he depends on Atzberger.51

I. B. Berchem wrote ex professo on the question of the place of Christ in the plan of God according to Athanasius. He rightly notices that on reading St. Athanasius one is immediately struck by the importance he attaches to the mystery of the Incarnation. Athanasius' doctrine is dominated by one idea, the Incarnation. All his other doctrines center around this one. 52 Berchem posits the usual question in regard to the final motive: "If man had not sinned, would the Word have become man?" He answers that according to Athanasius there is only one cause of the Incarnation, the redemption from sin — the Word became man for our salvation. In fact, St. Athanasius, says Berchem, goes farther and insists that our necessity brought the Son of God to us.⁵³ And then he writes that, although Athanasius considered the actual decree of the Incarnation and did not express the question in the terms of the theologians of the middle ages, still he insists so much on the connection in the present decree between sin and the Incarnation that it seems he favors the doctrine of the Thomists. In fact, we

^{47.} J. B. Berchem, A.A., "L'Incarnation dans le plan divin," Echos d'Orient (1934), 325, footnote 1.
48. Die Lehre des Athanasius von Alexandrien (Bremen, 1861), pp. 156-159.
49. H. Straetter, Die Erloesungslehre des hl. Athanasius (Freiburg in B., 1894), pp. 140-143.

^{140-143.} 50. *Ibid.*, p. 201. 51. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-65. 52. *Art. cit.*, p. 317. 53. *Ibid.*, pp. 329-330.

find no other motive mentioned except reparation from sin. It seems therefore that without the need of reparation the Incarnation would have been without an object.⁵⁴

That last statement sounds very strange — and is untrue coming from one who rightly emphasized the positive character of the work of salvation, namely, adoption and deification.⁵⁵ As was observed in this study, St. Athanasius stressed deification and adoption so much as the motive of the Incarnation and as necessary not merely because man had sinned but because man is a creature, that he really envisioned the Incarnation as planned before the fall was foreseen. At any rate, Athanasius would never consider the Incarnation void of all purpose if there had been no sin. Such an idea is totally foreign to his doctrine. See again what was said about the glorification of Christ's own human nature. Likewise, Berchem's statement that Athanasius insists so much on the connection between sin and the Incarnation, is false in the light of what we discovered in Athanasius on deification, adoption, glory, and even in the notion "our salvation." "Propter nos et propter nostram salutem," may I repeat, means, in the mind of Athanasius, primarily for the salvation - deification, namely, and glorification - of Christ's human nature. If "our necessity" brought the Word to us, that is primarily our need as creatures, and equally the need of Christ's human nature.

A. Spindeler wrote an entire book to prove that the Scotist view has no solid foundation in the Fathers. His work was occasioned by the Encyclical of the late Minister General, the Most Rev. Leonard Bello, O.F.M. Naturally he had to deal with St. Athanasius a number of times. I have already referred to his false interpretations in regard to Prov. 8, 22 and Col. 1, 15. Besides, when he says that the Fathers, including especially St. Athanasius, know no other cause of the Incarnation than the salvation of man, and concludes that Christ's coming is entirely dependent on sin, ⁵⁶ he is misinterpreting St. Athanasius. First, as was proved above,

^{54.} Ibid., p. 330. 55. Cf. "Le rôle du Verbe dans l'œuvre de la création et de la sanctification d'après Saint Athanase," Angelicum, XV (1938), 201-232; "Le Christ Sanctificateur d'après Saint Athanase," ibid., 515-558. 56. Op. cit., pp. 46 et seq.

"propter nostram salutem" in Athanasius means also on account of Christ's human nature. Secondly, deification is spoken of as the purpose of the Incarnation, and so decreed prior to the foreknowledge of sin. Again, when he claims that the Fathers, writing against Arius and Apollinaris, taught that Christ had a perfect human nature, because he had to redeem man, he draws an unwarranted conclusion in maintaining that thereby the Fathers held that the Incarnation is wholly dependent on sin.57 The Fathers merely taught that the Incarnation of God in a complete and perfect human nature was necessary for a perfect redemption. That is a far cry from holding that the redemption is the primary purpose of the Incarnation. He makes a similar false deduction from the fact that the Fathers insist on the divinity of Christ for the work of redemption.⁵⁸ Certainly, the work of redemption demanded an Incarnate God; still that Incarnate God could have been destined to glory for His own sake prior to the need of the redemption for man.

From this we can judge what value his concluding statement has: "If we sum up this section of the history of dogma, which was most strongly influenced by Athanasius, we cannot do it better than by using the phrase of the Nicene Council: Et incarnatus est... propter nostram salutem. 59 As we saw more than once, this Nicene clause does nicely sum up the purpose of the Incarnation, but "salutem" is to be taken in a broader sense than salvation which necessarily involves redemption from sin; and "nostram" includes the human nature of Christ. And so Christ's own glory and deification is primary.

Those who favor the Franciscan view of the Incarnation, draw some proofs from St. Athanasius, and, as we saw, rightly so. Until recent years, the authors contented themselves with some few quotations from Athanasius. For instance, Frassen quotes the passage about Christ's having to give thanks to us if He exists primarily because of the redemption from sin. 60 Within the past half

^{57.} Ibid., p. 68.
58. Loc. cit.
59. Ibid., p. 69.
60. Claudius Frassen, Ord. Min., Scotus Academicus (Romae, 1720), tom. 7, p. 255 a.

century more extensive use has been made of Athanasius. Father Risi, in his huge four-volume study on the motives of the Incarnation, gives twenty-five pages to Athanasius. His choice of texts and their analysis is in general good.

Père Chrysostome, O.F.M., cites a number of passages from Athanasius to prove various points that enter into the notion of the Absolute Primacy of Christ.⁶² He does not give much of an analysis of the texts.

Père J.-B. du Petit-Bornand, O.F.M. Cap., quotes passim from Athanasius. I referred to his opinion about Athanasius on Prov. 8, 22. He rightly claims that Athanasius referred Col. 1, 15 to the Incarnate Word because of His relation to creatures from the very beginning. 63 However, his analysis of Athanasius on this point is incomplete. Again, he merely quotes, without analyzing, Contra Arianos, II, 29-30, to prove that Christ does not depend primarily on sin; De Incarnatione Verbi, n. 54, and Contra Arianos, II, 70, for the deification of man; Contra Arianos, II, 67 and 70, and III, 23, for the deification of man and of the universe through Christ, who is therefore independent of sin; Contra Arianos, II, 74, for Christ as Foundation of all creatures. 64

"Ad majorem laudem et honorem Christi," let us conclude with the concluding words of the fourth book *Contra Arianos* of the great Doctor of the Incarnate Word:

"For I the Word am the chrism, but the Man is anointed by Me. Apart from Me He would not be called Christ, but He who is with Me and I in Him [He can]. Therefore the mission of the Word which was mentioned, points out the union with Jesus, born of Mary, whose name means Savior; not because of anything else except His having been made one with God the Word... Therefore, He Himself is God the Word; and Christ, from Mary, is God-Man;

^{61.} Franc. M. Risi, Ord. S. Joan. a Deo, Sul motivo primario dell' Incarnazione del Verbo (Roma, Desclée, 1898), III, 138-163.

^{62.} P. Chrysostome, O.F.M., Christus Alpha et Omega seu de Christi universali regno, (Lille, Berges, 1898), ch. 1-10, passim.

^{63.} J.-B. du Petit-Bornand, O.F.M. Cap., Proludium de Primatu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi et Causa Motiva Incarnationis; translated by Ambrosius a Saldes, O.F.M. Cap. (Barcinone, apud Subirana Fratres, 1902), pp. 235, 237, 238, 254.

^{64.} Ibid., pp. 111 et seq., 204, 220, 301 et seq.

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not some other Christ, but one and the same; He who is before ages from the Father, He also, in the last times, is of the Virgin; ... To Him be the veneration and the worship, who was before and is now and ever shall be, even unto all ages. Amen." ⁶⁵

DOMINIC UNGER, O.F.M. Cap.

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^{65.} Contra Arianos, IV, 36 (P. G., 26, 524).

CAPUCHIN CHAMPIONS OF NEGRO EMANCIPATION IN CUBA (1681-1685)

THE COLONISTS had never considered the Negro as belonging to the pale of Christianity. Only from time to time the humanitarian world heard a few protests like that of the two Capuchins who were imprisoned in Havana because of their inveighing against the failure on the part of the planters to provide for the religious instruction of the Negroes. Being in the minority these upright pioneers too often had their voices hushed in persecution, as it happened in the case of the two monks." These words of Carter G. Woodson, the eminent historian of the Negroes of America, do not do full justice to the two Capuchins. These fathers did more than "inveighing against the failure on the part of the planters to provide for the religious instruction of the Negroes." They fearlessly attacked the institution of slavery itself.

The two Capuchins who, in 1681, championed Negro emancipation in Cuba were Epiphanius of Moirans and Francis Joseph of Jaca. Father Epiphanius was born about the year 1640 in the city of Moirans in southwestern France and joined the Capuchins of the province of Burgundy. Applying for the foreign missions, he was sent by the provincial of the province of Normandy, with Father Bonaventure of Courtray, to the mission of Cayenne in South America.

As early as 1635 Capuchins of the province of Normandy had begun their apostolate in French Guiana, sometimes at the cost of their lives. When the colony came under the direct control of the French crown in 1674, the government requested Father Francis of Marneville, provincial of the Capuchins in Normandy and prefect of the missions in the French West Indies and French Guiana, to send missionaries to the colony. Accordingly he or-

^{1.} Carter G. Woodson, History of the Negro Church (Washington, D.C.), pp. 3-4.

dered Fathers Bonaventure and Epiphanius to depart for Cayenne, with the obedience of the minister general and the faculties of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda.²

When the two missionaries were ready to leave in 1676, the Dutch had blocked the sea route and had taken possession of the French colony of Cayenne. No French shipping being available, they went to Lisbon hoping to cross the ocean on a Portuguese vessel. This plan miscarried because the government had forbidden embarkation for non-Portuguese possessions. The missionaries then moved to Genoa in Italy to seek an opportunity for embarkation. Whilst they waited, they received a letter from the nuncio in Paris announcing that, since the French had recaptured Cayenne towards the end of 1676 and had annihilated the Dutch fleet off the island of Tobago in the West Indies, in April 1677, the sea route was again open to them.³

Before the two missionaries took ship at Genoa, they wrote to the secretary of Propaganda in Rome, under date of July 10, 1677, asking for credentials. They stated that there were no regulars in the mission of Cayenne; that they desired to take over this mission field together with four or six other Capuchins, fervent and filled with zeal; that they had the necessary faculties from the French king, Propaganda, and their own superiors. Therefore they petitioned for two distinct decrees. One should give them the island of Cayenne as a mission field, the other should assign Guiana to them. The former diploma was intended for use with the French authorities, the latter with the Spanish government. Thus they would be able to reserve at least one of the territories to themselves by right, even if they could actually appropriate only the other. Since they knew that Propaganda made it a practice not to answer simple missionaries, they asked that their petition be presented directly to the Pope. The secretary of Propaganda endorsed the letter with the one word: "Nihil." 4

Nothing else could be expected. The two fathers had never

^{2.} Cf. Document V. 3. Propaganda Archives, series: Acta de anno 1677, August 2, p. 183; quoted Rocco da Cesinale, O.F.M. Cap., Storia delle Missioni dei Cappuccini, III (Roma,

^{4.} Thomas Aloysius Hughes, S.J., History of the Society of Jesus in North America, I (New York, 1908), 313, quoting Propaganda Archives: America, Antilles, I, 258.

been in America and had no clear notion about the geographical position of their mission field, as can be seen from a note of Father Epiphanius as late as 1685, describing his mission as situated between the Orinoco and Amazon rivers.5 While the missionaries were waiting for the opportunity to embark, they learned that Spaniards were also located in those regions. At the last moment they therefore applied for faculties to work also in the Spanish colonies. Even if Propaganda had granted such faculties, the missionaries could not have used them. Two years later Father Epiphanius learned from sad experience how risky it was for a French missionary to venture into Spanish territory. Since at the time of the petition the secretary of Propaganda had better information, he refused the petition.

Discussing the petition of the two Capuchins, the Jesuit Father Thomas Aloysius Hughes finds "their case very instructive," but "it looks like an enterprise of adventure, when two men try to arrange with the secretary of Propaganda for the purpose of taking over the island of Cayenne and the mainland beyond, and then establishing a prefecture with the help of four or six others. The whole career of the Jesuits Pelleprat, Méland, Béchamel, Grillet, had served to open up the country of Guiana and Cayenne from 1652 onwards, and to start the missions there; and now, twentyfive years behind time, these two men, touching land at Genoa, put in a hurried and urgent claim to take over the entire country, without the slightest allusion to the circumstance that there may be antecedent rights and interests already in existence. It is at the moment when Father Grillet had been taken prisoner by the Dutch conquerors of Cayenne, and been brought over to Europe." 6

Father Hughes, otherwise well informed, was misled by his sources in this point. There were antecedent rights and interests, but they militated in favor of the Norman Capuchins. Seventeen years before the Jesuit Fathers opened their missionary career in Guiana and Cayenne Norman Capuchins had labored in the fort and on the island of Cayenne, sharing the common lot with the French colonists: dying without leaving a written record. In 1638 a new settlement was made at the Maroni river and about Cap

Cf. Document V.
 Op. cit., pp. 312 et seq.

Nord, and in 1640 Capuchins were sent there. The results were the same: the colony was broken up and no more was heard of the Capuchins. In 1643 a new colony was established at Mount Cepéron, not far from the site of the vanished colony of 1635. Capuchins again went to this colony, and within less than two years all but two were killed. From 1604 to 1645 about 600 Frenchmen died in Cayenne, among them at least six Capuchin missionaries. In 1647 two other Capuchins suffered violent deaths on Cayenne.7 Thus the Norman Capuchins had established a prior claim to the mission of Cayenne. In 1652, when the Jesuits "opened up the country," two Capuchins were laboring on Cayenne,8 and the Capuchin provincial of Normandy, as prefect apostolic of the French Antilles and French Guiana, saw to it that missionaries were despatched to the mission from time to time.

Fathers Bonaventure of Courtray and Epiphanius of Moirans reached their destination some time in the fall of 1677. Since 1673 the French settlers, assisted by French military forces and the Caribs, had made frequent assaults on the Spanish settlements. When therefore in 1679 Father Epiphanius, en route from the island of Grenada to the island of Cayenne, stopped over in an Indian village on the Spanish coast, he was taken captive by a detachment of 240 Spanish soldiers — 40 cavalrymen and 200 of the infantry. Since Father Epiphanius was accompanied by some of his converted Caribs, it was thought that he was leading a marauding party.9

Eventually he was set free. He then joined the Spanish Capuchins who were doing missionary work among the Indians on the Plains (Llanos) of western Venezuela, where they had been stationed since 1658.10 There he met Friar Francis Joseph of Jaca, who was a native of the city of Jaca in the province of Aragon, Spain, where he was born about the year 1645. He became a Capuchin in Spain,

^{7.} Rocco da Cesinale, op. cit., pp. 690-693.

8. Godefroid de Paris, O.F.M. Cap., P. Pacifique de Provins: Le Voyage de Perse et Brève Relation du Voyage des lles de l'Amérique (Assisi, 1939), p. xxxvi, note 3. Concerning the seven abortive settlements by the French, 1604-1654, and their location cf. La Grande Encyclopédie, XIX (Paris), 632.

9. Cf. Document V. In 1675 or 1676 the French destroyed an entire Spanish settlement and several Indian reductions in Venezuela, and later continued their depredations against the neighboring Spanish colony. Cf. Baltasar de Lodares, O.F.M. Cap., Los Franciscanos Capuchinos en Venezuela, I (Caracas, Venezuela, 1929), 93.

10. Lodares, op. cit., pp. 48, 94.

but we do not know anything further about him until the year 1676, when he is found as a missionary among the Indians of the Plains in Venezuela.11

In 1681 both priests, together with a large number of other religious, took ship for Havana at Cartagena in Columbia.12 The reasons for this sailing are not known. Apparently it was quite regular, for in the later indictments the episcopal officials make no mention of it. Moreover, in 1682 Father Epiphanius complained to Propaganda that he was forcibly detained in Spanish territory. He must have had a good reason to leave a country in which he had virtually been kept a prisoner. Similarly Father Francis Joseph must have had some good reason to leave the country, otherwise the cardinals would later not have espoused their cause so energetically.

At first the two missionaries lived with the Franciscan Priars Minor of the Observance in their monastery of Saint Francis at Havana. Later they occupied a small hermitage about three miles outside the city. Then Friar Francis Joseph began to attack Negro slavery in his sermons. He declared that Negroes who had been carried away to be sold and kept as slaves were in reality not slaves at all, that their supposed owners were bound in conscience to set them free, together with their children, and that these owners were also obliged in conscience to pay them for the work done in the past and that to be done in the future. The two Capuchins went even further by refusing absolution to all who did not promise to set their slaves free and to pay them wages for the work done during the enslavement.

Such humane preaching and such aggressive steps taken against the institution of slavery in the Spanish colony caused a great stir among the slave-holders. They tried to justify themselves with the contention that they had bought the slaves in good faith and had therefore acquired a just title of ownership. Their title, they further alleged, was even more secure in view of the fact that the Negroes could never be trusted, and that the slaves outnumbered the freedmen and the Spaniards, so that emancipation would be a most dangerous expedient.

^{11.} Ibid., p. 94. 12. Cf. Documents I and V.

The ecclesiastical authorities of the island on their part tried to stop these attacks on the time-honored institution of slavery. The provisor, or vicar, of the bishop of Cuba admonished the two friars to cease such preaching, and he threatened them with denunciation to the royal council. But they advised him that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of the local bishop in these matters. As Capuchins and apostolic missionaries, they asserted, they were amenable only to the Roman authorities. And they continued to preach against Negro slavery.

When the complaints of the slave-holders increased, the provisor issued orders that the Capuchins be taken to a monastery in the city in order to silence them. He also threatened to suspend their faculties of preaching and hearing confessions if they would not obey his orders. Relying on papal exemption, they paid no attention to the episcopal official. Thereupon the provisor carried out his threat by withdrawing from them the faculties of preaching and confessing. When this did not stop them, he took the extreme measure of declaring them excommunicated.

The two Capuchins evidently submitted, for they came to Havana and were placed in custody in the monastery of St. John of God, where they lived quietly until January 10, 1682. At that time they seem to have reached the conclusion that their detention was unjust, and accordingly they compiled an appeal to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda in Rome. Then they opened a new campaign of preaching against the orders of the episcopal provisor, and even against the bishop, declaring that the bishop, like the provisor, was under excommunication and deprived of his office. They based their contention on a declaration of Pope Sixtus V, by which bishops were constrained under pain of mortal sin from inflicting censures on any member of the order of Friars Minor, and on the extension of this exemption to the Capuchins by Pope Clement VIII. Consequently, they asserted, the bishop, his official, and all abettors, had incurred the excommunication canonis for their part in the excommunication and incarceration.

The provisor now drew up an official report of the affair and presented it to the *promotor fiscalis*, who demanded that the fathers show the papers that proved their exemption from the jurisdiction of the bishop "whilst they lived outside their mon-

astery." After three ineffectual summons, they answered that they recognized only the Pope and the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda as competent judges in their case and they would consequently submit to no others. The consequence was that they were kept as ecclesiastical prisoners.

Since, in their minds, their own exemption was a publicly acknowledged fact and the bishop had no jurisdiction over them, they did not consider it necessary to bring forth any further proof of their exemption to him. Their living outside the monastery did not alter the fact because they had all necessary permissions for this. That was the reasoning of Father Epiphanius, a competent canonist.

Resenting their incarceration — entirely unjust in their eyes — the missionaries now began to write letters to the priests and religious of the island, asserting that they had the obligation to avoid the provisor as a publicly excommunicated person and to refuse obedience to his orders. In consequence of the resulting confusion, the prior of the monastery of St. John of God asked to be relieved of his prisoners. Since there was no ecclesiastical prison in the diocese, the provisor handed them over to the custody of the civil authorities, even though this was forbidden by ecclesiastical law.

The civil authorities separated the two fathers, placing each in a different castle. The royal council of the Indies, when informed of the matter, decreed that they must be taken from the civil prisons and must be transferred to Spain, where they were to be placed in the custody of the Capuchin guardian at Cadiz.

Meanwhile the imprisoned missionaries had appealed to the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda in Rome. The provisor of Cuba's bishop also drew up a report. In October, 1682, it was in the hands of the papal nuncio at Madrid, Cardinal Savio Mellini, who forwarded it to the Roman authorities with the remark that the cardinals ought to consider the embarrassment of the king that was brought about by the commotion in America.

The case came up for discussion in the meeting of the cardinals of Propaganda on November 10, 1682. Cautiously they decided that Cardinal Mellini should be instructed to have the papers of the missionaries carefully examined. If he should find that they

were not missionaries, as they asserted, he should prosecute them. For this purpose the faculty to delegate suitable officials was granted to him.

Meanwhile the imprisoned fathers asked the permission of the government to repair to Madrid in order to present their case. The papal nuncio referred the matter to the provincial and to the guardian at Cadiz, asking that they arrange the matter. They, however, begged to be excused, alleging that the incriminated missionaries might disappear on the way and that new troubles would come upon them on account of the spite usually shown by the civil authorities against religious who had caused any kind of disturbance in America. The cardinal then ordered the guardian of Cadiz to keep them as prisoners at his requisition until he should receive new orders from Propaganda; and he was advised to be careful lest the ecclesiastical immunity be violated while they were kept as prisoners in their own religious house.

Before the Propaganda decision of November 10 had reached the nuncio in Madrid, he had dispatched to Rome an autographed letter of Marquess d'Astorga, in which the difficulties were pointed out that might be caused to the government if the two missionaries were given permission to leave Spain.

On December 31, 1682, the nuncio reported to the cardinals in Rome that he had received their orders and that he had entrusted the archbishop of Seville with the duty of examining the credentials of the missionaries, for they had been transferred from Cadiz to the Capuchin monastery in Seville because it was not considered safe to keep them in Cadiz. He also stated that he had discussed the affair with Prince Vincent Gonzaga, who approved the precautions taken in regard to the transfer of the missionaries but expressed doubts as to the possibility of obtaining the permission of the king to have the two fathers transferred to Rome, where they might plead their case in person. He also remarked that the Capuchins were suspected of being Frenchmen, sent by the French government to America in order to cause disturbances in the Spanish colonies, and that this suspicion was taken very seriously by the king of Spain.

Meanwhile the letters and documents of the two Capuchins had been presented to the cardinals of Propaganda. They gave

a detailed account of all that had happened from the arrival of the missionaries in America until their detention in Cadiz. The fathers then asked that they be permitted to come to Rome in order that they might put their case before the cardinals of Propaganda directly. They also asserted that they could reveal many important and serious matters. The papers of the Havana provisor had also arrived in Rome. When the Capuchins heard of this, they objected to the formal reading of this report before they themselves had been heard. The cardinals then decided that Cardinal Mellini be instructed to insist that the Capuchins be exempted from the civil authority of the council of the Indies and that they be permitted to come to Rome. They also suggested, as they had already done to the Spanish ambassador in Rome, that he should make it clear to the secretary of state that there were safe means of transporting the prisoners. In order to remove all fear of future trouble, he might state that the two fathers would not be permitted to return to their former mission.

On January 24, 1683, the nuncio answered from Madrid that the council of the Indies had not arrogated any powers over the two priests, but had only ordered them to be given into the custody of the Capuchin guardian at Cadiz, who had been charged by the nuncio to keep them in custody at his disposition. By order of the nuncio they were now in the monastery at Seville. All this was done, the cardinal remarked, without any violation of ecclesiastical immunity and without prejudice to the Church. Regarding the permission for them to go to Rome, he requested that such permission be not given, at least not for some time, for it was necessary to act with the greatest caution in this matter. He also stated that he had done all he could to obtain the permission from the government, but he was convinced that it could be obtained only with the greatest difficulty.

Copies of the authentic credentials of the two fathers, with the affidavit of the archbishop of Seville, now also arrived in Rome. They were found satisfactory: the fathers were really apostolic missionaries, exempt from the jurisdiction of the bishop.

On February 11, 1683, the nuncio reported that the Spanish government still insisted on keeping the two Capuchins in Spain, at least for some time, and would not set them at liberty. He had

also conferred with the minister, Prince Gonzaga, who said that it would be impossible to overcome this obstacle set by the government. He believed, however, that the king would not object to having the Capuchins placed in a monastery in the interior and keeping them there at the disposition of the Pope or the nuncio. He had proposed to Prince Gonzaga that the friars at least be permitted to go to Madrid to defend themselves, yet he thought that this request would also be refused because the government feared that they might be abetted by some influential person, and while there might be able to press their cause with greater vigor, thus creating new difficulties to the government.

While the nuncio awaited a final decision of Prince Gonzaga, the latter reported, under date of April 8, 1683, that he could no longer interest himself in the case but must await the decision of the king and the Marquess d'Astorga, for the matter was not within his jurisdiction but had to be decided by the council of state. However, the cardinal petitioned Propaganda to obtain some relief for the two Capuchins who had now been imprisoned for three years. He stated that, if they could come to Rome, much important information could be had from them.

In the meeting of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda on May 31, 1683, the cardinals decided that the two friars should be sent to the Capuchin monastery at Valladolid, and that they should remain there free and unmolested until the Pope or the nuncio should decide otherwise.¹³ The decision clearly shows that the cardinals tried scrupulously to avoid any hurt to the feelings of the Spanish king and his officials, while at the same time they upheld the ecclesiastical immunity. The friars were therefore placed in the interior of the country, where they could be kept from contact with influential men who might aid them in their fight for liberty. Although they had won their case against the bishop, they lost their struggle against the government officials.

The two defenders of the oppressed Negroes were detained at Valladolid for well-nigh two years. We lose trace of them until the month of March, 1865, when they finally turned up in Rome to plead their case. But nov it had taken on another aspect. It was

^{13.} Cf. Documents I and IV.

no longer treated as a personal affair of missionaries whose acts were under consideration; the very policy of the government on Negro slavery was impugned.

The two Capuchins presented their case in some papers, entitled Libellus Juridicus Formatus. One paper was presented in the name of both fathers and contained four separate affidavits in corroboration of some statements in the report. This commences with a description of the incarceration in Havana, and concludes with the following petitions: 1. that they be reinstated in the monastery of St. John of God in Havana, from which they had been violently expelled, and that they be granted the right to return to their former missions; 2. that the processus formatus of the provisor be declared null and void, since it was made under compulsion and without proper jurisdiction, and that the provisor be declared to have incurred the censure of excommunication, even though he had meanwhile been absolved and rehabilitated; 3. that, finally, a declaration be given stating that excommunication had been incurred by the governor of Havana, the fiscal officer, the prior of the monastery of St. John of God, and all others who had in any way taken part in or consented to their incarceration or transportation. Regarding the guardian of the Capuchins at Cadiz, who had received them as prisoners from secular persons and had given a report of the consignment to the Spanish general of the Indies, as much of the punishment due to him by canon law might be remitted as was thought fit.

The other document, presented only in the name of Father Epiphanius, describes his case from the first imprisonment in 1679, on the occasion of his passage from the island of Grenada to Cayenne, until his association with Father Francis Joseph. Various affidavits, testifying to the veracity of the statements, were included. The document concludes with the petition: 1. that he be returned to the place from which he had been carried, that he be granted leave to return to the mission in Cayenne, and that all those who had violated the ecclesiastical immunity and had done harm to the missions in Cumana be absolved as such who had publicly and notoriously incurred the censures; 2. that the various manuscripts he had written during the incarceration be returned to him.

Later the processus formatus of the provisor of Havana and

the reports of the Madrid nuncio were also placed in the hands of the cardinals of Propaganda, so that they might make proper decisions.14

The report of Father Francis Joseph of Jaca was discussed in the meeting of the cardinals of Propaganda held on March 12, 1685. He describes how the Spanish officials in America oppressed the Indians. Under the pretext that these poor Indians were vassals of the king, they were carried from their huts and were forced to work in the mines, where they died within a short time, leaving their wives and children in extreme misery. Besides other cruel treatment, against the laws of Spain, the Indians were not given sufficient food and were not paid their wages. The father begged the cardinals to stop that brutality, which brought untold misery to those poor Catholic aborigines. The cardinals decided to instruct the nuncio at Madrid to take proper steps in this matter. 15

The two Capuchins tried to obtain even more from the cardinals: they petitioned for the condemnation of Negro slavery in the same meeting of March 12, 1685. They described how "the Capuchin missionaries of America and Africa had witnessed various unjust methods of enslaving the Negroes of those continents, how the slave-hunters attacked them with weapons, how they captured their victims by fraud and snares, and how at times they waged war against them for the purpose of enslaving them." The slaves thus captured are sold to merchants who do not pay any attention to the fact whether the slaves thus bought are justly or unjustly detained. On the transport ships many slaves die during the voyage from Africa to America on account of the overcrowded conditions and bad treatment. On board the ships both adults and children are baptized by aspersion and without any previous instruction in the articles of faith. It was done to circumvent the law which prohibited the sale of unbaptized slaves in the Spanish and Porruguese colonies.

With the same want of charity, the slaves were sold in America to be kept slaves all their lives. These slave-holders, instead of instructing their slaves in at least the most necessary articles of faith, permitted them to live in concubinage, and thereby enriched

^{14.} Cf. Document IV. 15. Cf. Document II.

themselves by making the children their own slaves. In general, the slave-holders treated their slaves inhumanly. They forced them to work in the mines, but would not give them sufficient food. They beat them most cruelly and at times killed them without any reason.

Constrained by Christian charity, the two Capuchin missionaries petitioned the cardinals of Propaganda to make provisions for the safe-guarding of so many poor people groaning under these burdens by denouncing and prohibiting the cruel traffic and cruel treatment. For that purpose they asked the cardinals to declare the following propositions erroneous and prohibited under pain of censure: 1. That it is lawful to enslave Negroes and other savages with force and by fraud, when they had done no wrong. 2. That it is lawful to sell or buy such innocently enslaved Negroes and other savages, and to dispose of them in any other way. 3. That it is permitted to buy slaves indiscriminately in case innocently enslaved men and women are mixed with justly enslaved ones and are offered for sale. 4. That the buyers of slaves are not obliged to investigate whether the slaves offered for sale are justly or unjustly enslaved, even though they know that many of them are enslaved unjustly. 5. That the slave-holders of Negroes and other savages are not obliged to free their slaves who were deprived of their liberty by fraud and deception. 6. That the masters and buyers of slaves are still less obliged to make good the damage done to their slaves. 7. That these same masters and buyers are permitted, on their own authority, to expose their slaves to manifest dangers of life, to wound and kill them. 8. That it is permissible to baptize Negroes and other pagans without previous instruction in the mysteries of faith necessary for salvation, and to let baptized Negroes live without any instruction, and to sell baptized and instructed slaves. 9. That the masters of Negroes and other slaves are not obliged to prevent their slaves from living in concubinage. 10. That it is lawful to keep the slaves in bondage, even though they were captured and enslaved after baptism, either justly or unjustly. 11. That it is permitted to buy Negro slaves directly or indirectly from heretics, or to sell slaves to heretics, and to keep such slaves in bondage, no matter whether the slaves are brought to them by heretics in good or bad faith.16

^{16.} Cf. Document III.

These eleven pointed sentences, if condemned, would have blocked the subterfuges employed by Catholic slave-holders to quiet their consciences. They show the casuistry used to circumvent the dictates of natural law. The remark in the document concerning the Capuchin missionaries in America and Africa shows that the Capuchin missionaries of Congo and other African mission-fields, where the slave-hunters carried on their infamous business, had made common cause with the two fathers of Cuba.

The decision desired by the Capuchin missionaries did not fall within the competency of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda. Therefore these cardinals directed the fathers to apply to the Holy Office, which could make such decisions.¹⁷ Thus, even though the missionaries could not at that time obtain an explicit condemnation of slavery by Propaganda, they have the distinction of having raised their voices against the slave trade at a time when the powerful Spanish government was protecting it as a lucrative business.

The case of the two missionaries was not ended. In May, 1685, Father Epiphanius and Father Francis Joseph tried once more to have a full hearing. They laid the same matter before Propaganda, and repeated the same requests. The reply was given at the meeting of the cardinals on June 5, 1685. It stated that the matter in general should be held over (relata), but that the manuscripts of Father Epiphanius must be returned to him by Cardinal Mellini. Naturally the request that the Capuchins be permitted to return to their missions could not be granted because their extradition from Spain had been obtained only on the promise that such a return would never be effected.

The books written by Father Epiphanius during his detention, and now ordered returned to him, were the following: 1. The Crucified Christian, in five parts; 2. A short treatise on the Gifts of the Soul, or Mystical Theology; 3. An appendix to his literal commentary on the Apocalypse according to the mind of Blessed John, and a supplement; 4. Collection of Mystical Sentences; 5. History of the Apostles, in two parts; 6. Office in Honor of St.

^{17.} When we tried to get definite information through the Very Rev. Raphael Huber, O.F.M. Conv., as to whether the Holy Office had rendered a decision on the eleven points, he answered that nothing was found.

18. Cf. Documents IV and V.

Bonaventure, submitted for approbation; 7. Notes, letters, and some other writings.¹⁹

After the close of the proceedings, Father Epiphanius was permitted to return to his province in France, Father Francis Joseph was sent back to his province in Spain. The latter was not left undisturbed. By order of the minister of state he was detained in the Capuchin monastery of Madrid, on the pretext that his innocence had not been formally announced by Propaganda in the suit brought against him by the Spanish government. On December 17, 1685, the cardinals of Propaganda accordingly instructed the nuncio in Madrid to have him set free.²⁰ It is the last we hear about the two intrepid defenders of the Negro slaves.

As the accompanying documents reveal, the cardinals in Rome were well disposed towards these champions of the downtrodden slaves. They succeeded in having them extradited, and then set free. The superiors of the Capuchin Order gave their complete moral support in Rome to their courageous subjects. Numbers of Capuchin missionaries in Africa and America made common cause with these champions of the Negro. The case of the two Capuchins was a cause célèbre in the administration of the Spanish colonies in America. A great mass of correspondence was exchanged between the cardinals of Propaganda and the Spanish government, of which the subjoined documents represent only a small part. At the present we are unable to state with certainty whether the Roman authorities definitely settled the case against the bishop of Cuba and the officials of the island.

The story of the persecution endured by the two Capuchin missionaries, however, reveals how safely slavery was entrenched behind the walls of Spanish officialdom, both ecclesiastical and civil, and how utterly futile any effort of an individual to abolish slavery would prove to be. The struggle of the two fathers on behalf of the downtrodden Negro slaves apparently ended in a draw; yet they had preferred to suffer incarceration rather than yield to the current opinion of the abettors of slavery. They have come down in history as fearless abolitionists, in the best sense,

^{19.} Cf. Document IV. 20. Rocco de Cesinale, op. cit., III, 726-727; Propaganda Archives: Acta de anno 1685, December 17, p. 231.

at a time when the number of such enlightened men was very small. These Capuchin missionaries propounded the teaching that only personal crimes created a title for enslavement; they taught and preached that all other enslaved persons must be set free and must be paid wages for their services during the period of their enforced enslavement.21

DOCUMENT I

REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING OF MAY 31, 1683

Avvisò il Signor Cardinale Millini22 sino del mese di Ottobre prossimo passato e fu riferito nella Congregazione delli 10 novembre susseguente che dalli PP. Capuccini Francesco Giuseppe di Jacca in Aragona, et Epifanio di Moirans in Borgogna carcerati nel convento della loro Religione in Cadice, gli veniva fatta istanza di poter portarsi a Madrid per giustificarsi delle accuse dateli, sopra le quali disse l'Emin. Millini d'haver scritto al P. Provinciale, et al Guardiano di Cadice di concedere ai suddetti padri la desiderata licenza, ma essendosi scusati di non poter ubidire ai comandamenti suoi, non tanto per il timore che fuggissero per il camino, quanto per altri inconvenienti che potevano risultare, attese le gelosie de' secolari avvezzi a sentire tentativi di Religiosi in materia di Stato in quelle parti, replicò l'Eminenza Sua al Guardiano che dovesse tenerli prigione a sua requisitione, e sino a nuovo ordine dell' EE. VV. mentre non veniva a patire l'immunità ecclesiastica, stando essi in custodia dentro la propria religione.

Le colpe delle quali venivano imputati, erano che essendo approdati dell' anno 1681 nel porto d'Havana alcuni vascelli venuti di Cartagena tra molti altri Religiosi, si trovarono ancora li due sopranominati, che si spacciarono per missionari apostolici, e dopo esser stati qualche tempo nel convento di S. Francesco, andarono in un eremitorio una lega lontano dalla città a vivere extra claustra, dove cominciò il P. Jacca a spargere dottrine, che li negri, che si portavano a vendere e si tenevano per schiavi erano liberi, e che li possessori erano tenuti dar la libertà si a loro come alli figli, e la mercede del servitio prestato, onde negando l'assolutione a quelli che non gli promettevano di ciò esseguire, ne risultavano gravissimi scandali, e per la buona fede e giusto titolo di possessori, che pretendevano haverne e per l'ardire che pigliavano li schiavi, che ivi sono in maggior numero

delli liberi, e delli Spagnuoli.

Sopra di che il Provisore o Vicario del Vescovo, per quanto apparisce dalla di lui relatione, disse d'haverli esortati a lasciare simili dottrine, overo rappresentarle a Sua Maestà nel suo Real Consiglio, ma non volsero farlo, e crescendo i lamenti procurò di ritirarli in un convento in città, affinchè

XVI (1933), 130-138. 22. Savio Mellini, nuncio in Madrid, was created a cardinal on September 1, 1681. Cf. Pastor, Geschichte der Paepste, XIV (Freiburg, 1930), 964.

^{21.} A summary of the foregoing facts was published in The Seraphic Chronicle,

s'acquietassero protestandoli di levar loro le licenze concesseli di predicare, e confessare, come fece, e non havendo ne meno voluto ubbedire fu obligato intimarli la scommunica maggiore latae sententiae per la quale si portarono in città e furono posti nel convento di S. Giovanni di Dio, dove

stettero quieti sino alli dieci gennaro 1682.

Ivi fatti di nuovo tumultuanti ardirono intentar giudizio contro il medesimo vescovo, dichiarandolo scomunicato, privato degli offici e beneficii, e citandolo per procedere contro di esso. Intorno a che havendo egli, a preghiere del fiscale, fatto intendere ai medesimi padri che esibissero i loro ricapiti, da dove constasse esser esenti dalla giurisdizione ordinaria vivendo extra claustra, risposero che non tenevano altro giudice che Sua Santità, e la S. C. de Prop. Fide, e così furono lasciati prigioni nella loro cella del medesimo convento.

Ma divenuti sempre più insolenti, e non potendo quel P. Priore soffrirli, facendo istanza si levassero di là, fu astretto il Provisore, che non haveva carcere ecclesiastica, d'invocare il braccio secolare, e porli in due castelli, separati l'uno dall'altro, finchè per parte del Real Consiglio dell'Indie, furno poi portati e consegnati con prenderne ricevuta, al Guardiano di Cadice.

Attese tali circonstanze il signor Cardinale Millini supplicò l'EE. VV. considerare l'impegno che poteva havervi il re per le turbolenze che li detti Religiosi venivano accusati di haver mosse in quelle parti, onde ordinarno si scrivesse a Sua Eminenza di riconoscere le patenti degli accenati Padri e quando non fossero stati missionari, come si erano dichiarati, di procedere contro di loro in quella forma che fosse parsa più propria all'Eminenza Sua, con facoltà di delegare.

Prima d'havere tali risolutioni di questa S. Congr. tramise il sig. Card. Millini, sotto li 3 decembre, un biglietto originale del signor Marchese d'Astorga in cui rappresentava gl'inconvenienti, che ne sarebbero risultati al servitio del re, se si fosse data la libertà, o permesso alli detti Padri, che

uscissero di Spagna.

E sotto li 31 del medesimo mese replicò il signor Cardinale che per esseguire gli ordini delle EE. VV. di fare riconoscere le patenti dei Padri n'haveva già incaricato Monsignor Arcivescovo di Siviglia, dove stavano custoditi nel loro convento, poichè in quello di Cadice non si stimavano sicuri.

Di più che haveva communicato l'affare col signor Principe D. Vincenzo Gonzago da cui era stata giudicata conveniente la diligenza, conchiudendo però che dubitava non fosse per ottenersi da Sua Maestà l'uscita di quei Religiosi fuori di Spagna, che si tenevano per francesi ambedue, e mandati a posta nell'Indie per muovere sollevationi, e che haveva fatto grande impressione la gelosia di Stato che n'havevano concepita.

In questo mentre capitorno le lettere de' medesimi Padri con alcune scritture, nelle quali rappresentano quanto era successo ad ognuno di loro dal principio che si portorno alle missioni sino all' arrivo loro in Cadice, e fecero istanza di venire a Roma per esporre molte notitie in servitio della Sacra Congregatione, e nello stesso tempo venne un processo mandato dal Provisore o Vicario di Havana in cui dice le cause per le quali ha proceduto contro di loro, e la forma tenutane, che passato a notitia de medesimi Padri fecero istanza non si leggesse senza esser ancor essi intesi.

Dopo di che si replicò al Signor Cardinale Millini d'insistere d'essimere li Padri dalla soggettione al Consiglio dell' Indie, et ottenerli la permissione di venir a Roma insinuando a S.C. come si fece al signor agente di Spagna, che venne espressamente a parlarne con Monsignor Segretario, che non sarebbero mancati modi di farli venire sicuri da Cadice a Roma, e per levare tutte le gelosie che potessero più causare torbidi nell' Indie, si sarebbero potuti inhabilitare alle missioni. Rispose Sua Eminenza sotto li 24 gennaro che il Consiglio delle Indie haveva ordinato solamente la consegna dei Padri al Superiore di Cadice, a cui era stato incaricato dalla Eminenza Sua il tenerli a sua dispositione, e che alla medesima stavano hora nel convento di Siviglia, nè ciò portava seco alcuna offesa dell' immunità ecclesiastica, nè del decoro della Religione, che non si stimava di lasciarli uscire da quei regni almeno per qualche tempo, e che era necessario caminare con somma circospettione, e finalmente che non haverebbe lasciato di fare tutte le parti convenevoli perchè si permettesse la loro venuta qui, ma lo stimava difficile.

Intanto vennero qui le copie delli loro ricapiti legitimi riconosciuti dall' arcivescovo di Seviglia, et il Sig. Card. Millini sotto li XI febraro replicò che s'insisteva nel dettame politico di non lasciarli uscire, almeno per hora dalli regni di Spagna e molto meno di metterli in libertà, e che il signor Prencipe Gonzaga, con lui haveva rinnovati gli uffici gli haveva fatto comprendere che non sarebbe stato possibile il superare questa difficoltà. Bensi potersi sperare che Sua Maestà fosse stata per adherire di ammetterli in uno dei conventi nel centro di quei regni a dispositione di Sua Santità e del Signor Cardinale Nuntio, e che havendo proposto al Signor Prencipe Gonzaga, che almeno si permettesse ai Padri di portarsi a Madrid per giustificarsi, temeva che non fosse per riuscirgli ancor questo in riguardo che potrebbero ricorrere a certa protettione con piu vigore, stando presente con mettere in impegno quel governo.

Mentre però ne aspettava la risolutione dal signor Prencipe, gliene fu tolta la sperenza, come si vede dalla lettera degli otto aprile, essendosi dichiarato Sua Eccellenza di non potervi più metter la mano, ma doversene attendere le risolutioni da Sua Maestà e dal signor Marchese d'Astorga,

come di materia passata in Consiglio di Stato.

Sono pertanto supplicate l'Eminenze Vostre degnarsi di prendere qualche provedimento per sollievo dei suddetti Padri carcerati da tre anni in quà, dalli quali, quando potessero venire a Roma, o andare a Madrid, se ne ricaverebbero molte essentiali e necessarie notitie, attesochè gli inconvenienti. che accennano sono stati rappresentati in voce altre volte a questa Sacra Congregazione, e sono tali che il medesimo Padre di Jaca ne stava scrivendo una relatione per mandarla a Sua Maestà Cattolica nell'atto che fu carcerato.

Rescriptum.

Eminentissimus curet remitti Patres nominatos ad conventum Vagliadolid, et ibi manere cum omni libertate ad dispositionem Sanctitatis Suae et ipsius Eminentiae.²⁸

^{23.} Propaganda Archives, series: Acta de anno 1683, no. 34, May 31, fol. 112-116. Listed C. R. Fish, Guide to Materials for American History in Roman and other Italian Archives (Washington, D.C., 1911), p. 131.

DOCUMENT II

REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING OF MARCH 12, 1685

Il P. Francesco Giuseppe di Jacca, già missionario Cappuccino nell' America rappresenta all' EE. VV. come li ministri di Giustitia nel regno di Santa Fede, et altre provincie nell' India, sotto pretesto che li poveri Indiani sono vasalli di Sua Maestà Cattolica, li conducono dalle loro case a lavorare con varie estorsioni nelle miniere, con evidente pericolo della vita, lasciando le loro moglie e figli in estrema miseria, et oltre a molti altri crudeli trattamenti, contro gli ordini del re, ne meno gli somministrano le cose necessarie, e la loro mercede, onde supplica l'EE. VV. degnarsi provedere in qualche modo a tanti danni in quelle povere anime cattoliche.

Rescriptum.

Scribatur Emin. mo Nuntio pro opportuna provisione.21

DOCUMENT III

SECOND REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING OF MARCH 12, 1685

Li Padri Capuccini missionarii nell' America e nell' Africa, rappresentano li varii et ingiusti modi con li quali si fanno schiavi li negri in quelle parti, andando contro di essi armata manu, e con fraude et inganno,

et alle volte con occasione di guerra mossa a questo fine.

Dopo fatti schiavi nei modi sudetti, sono comprati da mercanti, senza prender alcuna notitia della loro giusta o ingiusta servitù, che li trasportano dall' Africa nell' America, con manifesto pericolo di morte, attesa la gran quantità di essi, e li mali trattamenti che li vengono fatti sopra la nave, dove tanto li adulti come li fanciulli vengono battezzati per aspersionem senza alcun ammaestramento e notitia della fede.

Parimente sono venduti agli habitanti nell' America con la medesima negligenza, e da essi tenuti sino alla morte, et in vece d'insegnarli le cose necessarie alla salute, viene anzi loro permesso di vivere in concubinato, e di fruttificare li loro padroni da quali sono trattati inhumanamente, facendoli per forza lavorare nelle miniere, privi de' necessarii alimenti, battuti

crudelmente et anco ammazzati senza causa.

Mossi da pura carità christiana li suddetti missionarii supplicano l'EE. VV. degnarsi di provedere alla salute di quelle povere anime oppresse da tanti mali, condannando e prohibendo simili illeciti contratti, et eccessi, al qual fine si giungera, con dichiarare erronee e prohibite sotto le pene e censure ecclesiastiche le seguenti propositioni:

1. Che sia lecito con forza e fraude far schiavi li negri, et altri sel-

vaggi, benchè non danneggino veruno.

2. Che sia lecito vendere e comprare tali negri, o selvaggi fatti schiavi

con la forza, e con l'inganno, e fare di essi ogni altro contratto.

 Che quando tali negri presi ingiustamente sono mescolati con altri giustamente vendibili, sia lecito comprare tanto li buoni come li cattivi.
 Che li compratori non sono obligati investigare del titolo giusto

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^{24.} Propaganda Archives, series: Acta de anno 1685, no. 14, March 12, fol. 35-37. Listed C. R. Fish, op. cit., p. 132, with wrong heading.

o ingiusto delle loro servitù, benchè sappiano che molti di essi siano fatti schiavi ingiustamente.

5. Che li possessori di tali negri, o altri selvaggi presi con dolo e

fraude non sono tenuti a dimetterli.

6. Ne meno sono tenuti li possessori e compratori a compensare li loro danni.

- 7. Che sia lecito alli medesimi possessori con privata autorità esporre a manifesto pericolo di morte, ferire et ammazzare li suddetti negri o altri schiavi.
- 8. Che sia lecito battezzare li negri et altri infedeli senza instruttione de' misterii della fede necessarii alla salute, e lasciarli senza tale notizia dopo battezzati et anco instrutti li vendono.

9. Che li padroni dei negri o altri schiavi non sono obligati impedire

che non vivano in concubinato.

10. Che sia lecito tenere in servitù li schiavi anco dopo il battesimo

siano giustamente o ingiustamente presi.

11. Che sia lecito comprare li negri mediatamente o immediatamente da gli eretici, e venderli ad essi, e dopo qualsivoglia contratto seguito intorno ai medesimi ritenerli in servitù.

Rescriptum.

Ad Sanctum Officium.25

DOCUMENT IV

REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING OF JUNE 5, 1685

Sino dell'anno 1682 avvisò il signor Cardinale Millini, che dalli Padri Capuccini Epifanio di Moirans di Borgogna, e Francesco Giuseppe di Jacca in Aragona carcerati nel convento della loro religione in Cadice, gli veniva fatta istanza di poter portarsi a Madrid per giustificarsi delle accuse dategli. Sopra di che disse l'Eminenza Sua n'havendo scritto al Guardiano di Cadice et al Provinciale di concedere ai suddetti Padri la desiderata licenza, si era l'uno e l'altro scusato di non poter ubbedire a suoi commandamenti non tanto per il timore che fuggissero per il camino, quanto per altri inconvenienti che potevano risultare, attese le gelosie del Governo secolare avvezzo a sentire torbidi suscitati da Religiosi in materia di Stato in quelle parti.

Le colpe delle quali venivano imputati si riducevano al solo punto, che capitati dell'anno 1681, nel porto di Avana, cominciasse, particolarmente il Padre di Jacca a spargere dottrine, che li negri, li quali si portavano a vendere e si tenevano per schiavi, erano liberi, che li possessori erano tenuti dar la libertà si a loro, come alli figli, con pagarli la mercede del servitio prestato. Onde negando l'assolutione a quelli che non gli promettevano di ciò esseguire, ne risultavano gravissimi scandali per la buona fede, per il giusto titolo che pretendevano di haverne li possessori, e per l'ardire che pigliavano li schiavi che ivi sono in maggior numero di liberi, e delli Spagnoli.

Intorno a che il provisore e Vicario del Vescovo per quanto si ricava dalla relatione, che ne ha data alla Santità di Nostro Signore nel foglio

^{25.} Propaganda Archives, series: Acta de anno 1685, no. 26, March 12, fol. 35-37. Listed C. R. Fish, op. cit., p. 132, with wrong heading.

segnato A, lo esortò a lasciare simili dottrine, o vero rappresentarle a Sua Maestà nel suo Real Consiglio, ma non volsero farlo, e crescendo i lamenti procurò di ritirarli in un convento in città, affinchè si acquietassero, protestandosi di levar loro le licenze concessegli di predicare e confessare, come fece, ma non havendo ne meno voluto ubbedire, fu obbligato d'intimargli la scomunica maggiore latae sententiae, per la quale si portono in città nel convento di S. Giovanni di Dio, dove stettero quieti sino alli 10 gennaro 1682 et hebbero poi licenza di celebrare e confessare.

Soggiunge il medesimo Provisore che fatti da ciò più tumultuanti li Padri ardirono intentar giuditio contro di lui, dichiarandolo scemunicato, privato degli uffici e beneficii, e citandolo di procedere contro di esso, che egli consegna questo atto al Promotor fiscale, per cui mezzo fece ricercare alli Padri che esibissero li loro ricapiti, da dove constasse esser essenti dalla giurisdittione ordinaria vivendo extra claustra, e dopo tre ammonitioni risposero che non tenevano altro giudice che Sua Santità, e la Sacra Congregatione de Propaganda Fide. Per il che furono lasciati nella cella dell' istesso convento.

Divenuti pertanto più arditi scrissero al clero e prelati regolari, che dovessero fuggire il Provisore come publico scommunicato, e negargli l'obedienza, e prevedendo egli maggiori tumulti, stimò opportuno, non havendo carcere ecclesiastica d'invocare il braccio secolare, e porli in due castelli separato l'uno dall'altro, sino che per parte del Real Consiglio delle Indie furono poi condotti al Guardiano di Cadice.

Su tali circostanze havendo il signor Cardinale Millini supplicato l'EE. VV. di considerare l'impegno che poteva havervi il re per le turbolenze che detti Padri venivano accusati di haver mosso nelle Indie, ordinarono si scrivesse a Sua Eminenza di riconoscere le loro patenti, e quando non havesse trovato esser missionarii, come si erano spacciati, di proceder contro di loro in quella forma che avesse stimata più propria con facoltà di delegare.

Riconobbe il Signor Cardinal Millini per mezzo dell'arcivescovo di Siviglia li loro legittimi ricapiti, et avvisò nell'istesso tempo, che essendo maggiormente cresciuto l'impegno politico, havendo quel Governo appreso che li suddetti religiosi fossero francesi, mandati a posta nelle Indie per muovere sollevationi, non si stimava di lasciarli uscire di Spagna, almeno per qualche tempo, et era perciò necessario di caminare con somma circospettione, e l'EE. VV. scrissero a Sua Eminenza di procurare che li Padri fossero mandati in Vagliadolid et ivi lasciati in libertà a dispositione di Nostro Signore e di questa Sacra Congregatione.

In questo mentre capitorno lettere de'medesimi Padri con alcune scritture nelle quali rappresentarono quanto era successo ad ogn'uno di loro dal principio, che si portarono alle missioni sino al loro arrivo in Cadice, e fecero istanza di venire a Roma per esporre molte notitie a questa S.C., e perchè nel medesimo tempo seppero che il Provisore di Havana havea qui trasmesso il processo formato contro di loro, affinchè si vedesse la necessità che n'haveva havuta, e la forma tenuta da lui, supplicavano non si leggesse senza esser intesi ancor essi.

Pertanto essendo comparsi quà, supplicano l'EE. VV. degnarsi di considerare le scritture da essi presentate, e di benignamente condescendere

alle loro petitioni. Le scritture consistono principalmente in alcuni fogli intitolati Libellus juridicus formatus, con fondamenti canonici. L'uno fatto a nome d'ambedue li Padri suddetti con quattro fedi separate in corroboratione d'alcuni capi espressi in esso, e comincia dalla carceratione seguita in Havana, conchiudendo coll'istanza:

1. d'esser restituiti nel convento di S. Giovanni di Dio in Havana, di dove furono violentemente estratti, et habbiano il libero ritorno alle

missioni.

2. Che sia dichiarato nullo il processo formato dal provisore, come fatto violentemente, e senza giurisditione e pronuntiandolo incorso nelle

censure, sia poi dispensato, et habilitato.

E finalmente che si dichiarino incorsi nelle censure il Governatore d'Havana, il fiscale, il Priore del convento di S. Giovanni di Dio e tutti quelle n'hanno havuto qualsisia parte o consenso nella carceratione, o transporto loro.

Quanto al Guardiano di Cadice, che li ha ricevuti in consegno da secolari, come presi da essi, e rilasciò fede della loro recettione al Generale

delle Indie, si rimettono a quanto dichiareranno de jure l'EE. VV.

L'altro libello giuridico presentato a nome del solo Padre Epifanio de Moirans comincia dalli primi incontri della sua carceratione dell'anno 1679 seguita mentre passava dall'isola Granada in America alla Cayenna sino al tempo che si uni poi in Havana col Padre di Jacca. Lo accompagna con diverse fedi, che attestano la verità de' particolari da lui accennati, e termina con supplicare:

1. d'essere restituito nel luogo, dove fu preso, di havere libero il transito alla missione nella Cayenna, e che si assolvano, come publicamente e notariamente incorsi quelli che hanno violato nella Provincia di Cumana

l'immunità ecclesiastica e le missioni,

2. Che gli siano restituiti manoscritti, che compose nella sua carcera-

tione de quali dà la lista.26

Si trasmette poi all'Emin. mo ponente ancora il processo formato dal Provisore di Havana, affinchè colla relatione di Sua Eminenza si degnano prendere quelle risolutioni, che le pareranno più proprie.

Rescriptum.

Ad primum paragraph: Relata

Ad secundum: Che gli siano restituiti.

Scribatur Emin. mo Millino ut secumferat enuntiatas scripturas.27

DOCUMENT V

REPORT OF EPIPHANIUS OF MOIRANS SUBMITTED TO THE MEETING OF PROPAGANDA ON JUNE 5, 1685

Emin.tis.mi et Rev.dis.mi Domini:

Frater Epiphanius de Moyrans Concionator Capucinus et missionarius Apostolicus Reverenter exponit EE. VV. is, quod zelo Christi Ductus et Salvationis infidelium in Regione Americae Latissimae inter Magnum fluvium

^{26.} Cf. Document V. 27. Propaganda Archives, series: Acta de anno 1685, no. 24, June 5, fol. 87-91. Listed C. R. Fish, op. cit., p. 132.

Orinoque nuncupatum et flumen Amazonum Degentium Sine fidei Lumine et Missionariis, qui Instruant eos ad illos transfetavit cum Socio, facultatibus Summi Pontificis, iteratis P. Nostri Generalis obedientia, et mandato P. Francisci de Marneville Provinciae Normanniae provincialis, Et harum Missionum Praefecti a Sacra Congregatione de propaganda fide Declarati.

Verum dum ab una regione ad aliam pertransiret Cum Paganis Suac Missionis tempore pacis et totius Europae et omnium Indorum, in littore maris, in portu indorum, quem Appulerat Anno Domini 1679 Captus fuit a Cohorte quadraginta Equitum et Ducentorum peditum, quam miserat Gubernator Provinciae Cumanae ad eum Comprehendum, (sic) necnon per quinque annos remansit Captivus in Regionibus hispaniarum Regi Subjectis, ad quas Violenter advectus fuit.

Propterea de his omnibus et aliis anno Dni 1682 quaerelam transmisit in forma juris ad EE. VV. as, Nunc autem Personaliter Comparens humiliter petit, ut EE. VV. ae dignentur revidere Libellum juridicum et totum processum Cum probationibus, quas profert per publica Instrumenta, et juxta

summam Prudentiam Suam providere.

2. Petit, ut iterum remittatur ad illas Regiones Continentis Americae, inter flumen magnum Amazonum, et flumen Dictum Orinoque, Seu a Linea Aequinoxiali ad Latitudinem decem graduum Borealem, in qua Vastissima regione pereunt omnes gentes, Cum nemo sit qui Doceat eas et frangat eis panem, quem dociliter recipiunt, Aut saltem EE. VV. ae pro Suo zelo provideant, ut illuc mittantur operarii; quoniam multi Sunt Capucini in Provinciis Galliae zelo fidei Succensi, qui has gentilium regiones adire peroptant.

3. Cum Spoliatus fuerit omnibus illis, quae in Usum Suum et Ecclesiae habebat, Sed praesertim rapta fuerint Manuscripta eius et Libri quos captus Composuit, et pervenerint ad manus Emin.issimi Dñi Cardinalis Mellini, Nuntii Apostolici in Regnis hispaniarum, Supplicat EE. VV. as, ut Scribant quatenus ad ipsum transmittantur omnia manuscripta praefata, Vel ad eius Superiores majores, ut videantur in ipsis Gloriosa opera, quae fecit Deus Optimus Maximus in terra Continenti ad Infidelium Conversionem.

Series autem Dictorum manuscriptorum est ista: 1. Christianus Crucifixus in quinque partes divisus. 2. Bona Animae paucis Expensis, Sive Theologia Mystica. 3. Appendix ad Expositionem Suam Litteralem Apocalypsis ad Sensum B. Joannis et Complementum illius. 4. Sententiarum Mysticarum Practicae Sententiae. 5. Historia Apostolica in Duas Partes Divisa. 6. Officium S. Bonaventurae Approbandum, Ac alia quaedam notata, Epistolae, aliaque nonnulla. Et habebit pro gratia.

Quas Deus etc. Datum Romae.

Frater Joannes Baptista, Procurator Generalis Capucinorum.28

St. Augustine Friary, John M. Lenhart, O.F.M. Cap. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

^{28.} Propaganda Archives, series: Scritture riferite, America settentrionale, I, fol. 57. Listed C. R. Fish, op. cit., p. 159. Friar John Baptist Carampelli of Sabbio filled the office of procurator general of the Capuchin Order May 27, 1678 - June 8, 1685. Cf. Analecta O.F.M. Cap., XIII (1896), 153. The procurator general transacted all official business between the Capuchin Order and the Apostolic See. The document of Friar John Baptist shows that the Capuchin Order officially espoused the cause of the two incriminated missionaries.

THE ABBREVIATIO OF THE OXONIENSE OF SCOTUS BY ROGERIUS ANGLICUS

THE edition of Rogerius Anglicus found in the following pages is prepared from the one manuscript of Rogerius known to exist. It is written on vellum in two columns of 40 lines each, with folio dimensions of 22 x 18 cms. There are approximately 47 pages of text to which a Table of Contents is added, bringing the complete work to 50 folios. The *Explicit* bears the signature of the scribe, Paulus Barianus, and is dated August 4, 1474.

Nothing is known of its history prior to the time it was presented to the University of Pittsburgh as a gift of Thomas Mellon, who procured it from William M. Voynich some years ago. It has since been transcribed and made the subject of a Doctoral thesis by Kevin Guinagh, and presented as such to the same University.¹ This present edition is offered as a transcription independent of Dr. Guinagh's work.

Extended research has failed to identify the author of the Abbreviatio. Who Rogerius was can only be conjectured at this time. He cannot be Roger Bacon, since Bacon preceded Scotus in point of activity. The same is true of Roger Marston. Another English Franciscan by the name of Rogerus Varro seems to have lived and flourished about the year 1290, if we can accept the statement of Joannes Pitseus in his De Illustribus Angliae Scriptoribus, which Wadding saw fit to include in his Annales (V, p. 268). Others, including the unknown author of the Collectanea Anglo-Minoritica (Anthony Parkenson?), mention the name of Rogerus Varro and tell us that he wrote learnedly. We have not included these other references since all of them seem to quote Pitseus as their source of information.

Wadding in a second instance (Annales, VI, p. 137) mentions Rogerus Varro as one of the names carved on the tomb of Scotus (the tomb which existed prior to the translation of Scotus' body

^{1. &}quot;An Unpublished Manuscript of Rogerius Anglicus," Univ. of Pittsburgh Bulletin, XXVIII (December: 1931).
2. Part I (London: 1726) iii, 103.

Editor's note: Our intention to publish the entire text of the Abbreviatio is canceled in favor of its separate presentation toward the end of the current year as a FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE PUBLICATION.

in 1619). If such a Rogerus lived at all, his name would be engraved on Scotus' tomb only because of his association with Scotus or with the Franciscans in general. However, Sbaralea maintains that

Rogerus Varro, unus ex his, qui insculpti sunt in latere tumbae Scoti, est Guglielmus Varro, eius magister, dictus per errorem Rogerus; vel etiam Rogerus Baccon dictus corrupte Varro.³

Here the question must rest, until further investigation proves, or disproves, Sbaralea's statement.

The Abbreviatio is not a collection of select passages from the Oxoniense, but rather an epitome of Scotus' doctrine presented in the author's own style and his own words. The thought is Scotus, but the presentation is the author's own. As a rule, Rogerius presents his Questions in the words of Scotus, uses Scotus' references, and then selects one argument from Scotus which he transfers into his own words. Not all the Questions proposed by Scotus have been used by Rogerius, but sufficient to give us the gist of the doctrine contained in the Oxoniense.

The spelling found in this edition has been made to conform with modern usage in order to present a more workable text. Chapter headings, divisions into Questions, etc., have been provided where the manuscript fails to do so.

We wish to express our thanks to A. L. Robinson, Acting Librarian of the University of Pittsburgh, for permission to edit the text of Rogerius Anglicus, and to our confrère, Fr. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., for his valuable assistance and encouragement.

Incipit Abbreviatio operis egregii doctoris subtilis Magistri Ioannis Scoti super quatuor libros sententiarum reducta per egregium patrem ac in sacra pagina virum doctissimum fratrem Rogerium Anglicum ordinis minorum.

^{3.} Sharalea, H., Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores Waddingi, III (Rome: 1936) 75.

[PROLOGUS]

[QUAESTIO 1]

UTRUM HOMINI PRO STATU ILLO SIT NECESSARIUM ALIQUAM DOCTRINAM INSPIRARI AD QUAM NON POSSIT NATURALITER ATTIN-GERE.

Quod non videtur: quia potentia, quae potest habere actum suum naturaliter circa primum obiectum, potest etiam habere actum suum naturaliter circa quodlibet obiectum per se contentum sub primo obiecto. Exemplum: de colore sub quo continetur album et nigrum. Sed intellectus viatoris potest habere actum suum circa ens sine omni revelatione quia, secundum Avicennam 5 capitulo primi libri Metaphysicae^a: Ens prima impressione imprimitur. Ergo quodlibet contentum sub ente potest naturaliter a viatore intelligi; ergo non requiritur aliqua revelatio.

Contra: Ad Timotheum Secundae, capitulo 3b: Omnis doctrina divinitus inspirata utilis est ad arguendum. Ergo aliqua doctrina est nobis divinitus inspirata sed non sine necessitate; ergo est necesse aliquam ins-

pirari.

Respondeo: dimissa opinione philosophorum qui dicunt quod sicut intellectus possibilis est quo omnia fieri, ita intellectus agens est quo omnia facere naturaliter, dicendum quod necesse est secundum theologiam ponere doctrinam aliquam viatoribus revelari. Probatur: nam agenti propter finem cuiusmodi est homo necessaria est distincta cognitio sui finis. Sed finis hominis est Deus cuius distincta cognitio non potest naturaliter haberi. Ergo necesse est eam revelari. Minor patet ex secundo Metaphysicaec ubi dicitur quod intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus noctuae ad lumen solis. Dices quod ab effectu cognito potest homo cognitione naturali ascendere ad cognitionem causae sine aliqua revelatione. Sed homo est effectus Dei et naturaliter1 ordinatur ad Deum tamquam ad suum finem beatificum et est capax gratiae et gloriae. Ergo cum homo possit naturaliter cognosci potest etiam finis eius naturaliter cognosci. Respondeo: dico quod intellectus noster non est a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis ut est capax gratiae et gloriae quia naturalis ordo quo transit homo in Deum ut in suum finem beatificum fundatur in homine secundum suam propriissimam rationem secundum quam non est a nobis naturaliter cognoscibilis in via. Unde philosophi, volentes cognoscere Deum distincte cognitione naturali, errabant, sicut concludendo Deum ab effectu produxisse mundum ab aeterno non contingenter, sed ex necessitate naturae et quod intelligentiae essent perpetuae et secundum numerum orbium numeratae, et multa alia quae falsa sunt. Ad argumentum philosophorum: quando dicitur quod sicut intellectus possibilis est quo omnia fieri, dicendum quod necessarium est respectu obiecti naturalis fantasma non autem

^{1.} et naturaliter marg.

a. Tr. I, cap. 6, f. 72b A. Editio Venetiis, 1508 b. II Tim. 3, 16 c. l.c., 993b, 9 ss.

respectu cuiuslibet obiecti simpliciter, et ita non respectu obiecti supernaturaliter revelati.

Ad argumentum principale dicendum: quod ens secundum suam totam communitatem prout se extendit ad sensibilia et insensibilia non est primum obiectum intellectus coniuncti, prout accipit Avicenna. Tamen bene concedo quod ratio entis potest cognosci sed non per omnia ut patebit Distinctionis tertiae quaestione prima. Sed ens sensibile in quantum tale ens est obiectum intellectus viatoris.² Et ideo debet concedi quod omnis res sensibilis potest naturaliter cognosci in via et hoc concedendum est et non plus.

[QUAESTIO 2]

UTRUM DEUS SIT OBIECTUM THEOLOGIAE.

Quod non: Magister. Dicit enim Boethius, 1 de Trinitate d quod forma simplex subjectum esse non potest; Deus autem est forma simplex omnino. Ergo, etc.

Contra: Augustinus, 4 de Civitate^e, capitulo 1 : Theologia est sermo vel ratio de Deo; ergo Deus est subiectum.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur:

Posito quod Deus sit subiectum sub qua ratione est hic subiectum.

Respondeo: pro absolutione illarum quaestionum praemitto duas distinctiones, quarum prima est illa: quod quaedam est theologia in se; quaedam quoad nos. Theologia in se est illa quae nata est haberi de suo subiecto ab intellectu proportionato cuiusmodi est intellectus Dei et beatorum; theologia in nobis est quae est nata haberi ab intellectu nostro in via. Secunda distinctio: quaedam est theologia necessariorum; quaedam contingentium. Veritates necessariae sunt per respectum ad intra ut 'Deus est trinus et unus' et huiusmodi, veritates vero3 contingentes sunt per respectum ad extra, ut 'Deus creat', 'Filius est incarnatus', et huiusmodi. His praemissis respondeo ad primam quaestionem: quod loquendo de theologia in se tam quoad veritates necessarias quam quoad contingentes Deus est primum4 obiectum. Quod probo: quia primum obiectum habitus continet in se virtualiter omnes veritates illius habitus et adaequatur obiecto. Alias habitus excederet obiectum suum primum. Sed nihil continet omnes veritates Dei ad intra vel ad extra nisi Deus. Ergo, etc. Intelligendum tamen quod obiectum primum non eodem modo continet veritates necessarias et contingentes, quia necessarias continet determinate, sed contingentes contingenter. Tunc ad secundam quaestionem respondeo: quod Deus sub ratione Deitatis est subjectum theologiae in se consideratae. Cuius ratio [est] quia omnis alia ratio sive absoluta, puta infinitatis vel attributalis, sive

^{2.} ens est ...] marg.

^{4.} Ms. purum et in sequentibus sed interdum correctum in primum.

d. PL 64, II, col. 1250, D e. PL 41, VIII, 1, col. 225

respectiva, puta redemptionis, facit unum per accidens vel unum per aggregationem. Sed talis ratio cognoscendi non est plena. Nam cognitio quiditatis est perfectior cognitione per accidens. Cognitio etiam per aggregata non est perfecta quia praesupponit cognitionem utriusque partis illius aggregationis. Cognitio etiam respectiva praesupponit cognitionem absolutam. Loquendo etiam de theologia ut in nobis dico ad primam quaestionem quod Deus est ibi subiectum primum propter rationem superius positam, quia solus Deus continet omnes veritates tam necessarias quam contingentes nobis notas.

Sed sub qua ratione est subiectum nostrae theologiae? Dicendum quod non est sub ratione Deitatis quia illa ratio est ratio subiecti theologiae Dei et beatorum, et est prima ratio. Ergo sequitur quod ratio subiecti theologiae nostrae sit aliqua ratio secundaria, non prima. Perfectissima autem ratio inter secundarias est ratio infinitatis quia ad dictum conceptum referimus omnes conceptus nostros in via. Nam ideo credimus Deum esse trinum et unum et posse incarnari et posse creare et huiusmodi, quia scimus ipsum esse infinitum. Deus ergo est subiectum theologiae tam in se quam nostrae. Sed Deus sub ratione Deitatis est subiectum theologiae in se et sub ratione infinitatis est subiectum theologiae in nobis.

Ad argumentum principale dicendum: quod Boethius loquitur ibi de

subjecto formae accidentalis.

[QUAESTIO 3]

UTRUM THEOLOGIA SIT DE OMNIBUS.

Quod non videtur: quia res aliae a Deo possunt facere suam propriam cognitionem in intellectu quocumque. Non ergo subiectum theologiae facit cognitionem earum; ergo theologia quae est de Deo non extendit se nisi ad cognitionem quae est de Deo.

Contra: Deus et essentia divina continet omnia eminenter et virtualiter; ergo theologica cognitione possunt omnia alia cognosci. Sed cognitio theologiae versatur circa essentiam divinam; ergo et circa omnia

alia

Respondeo: theologia in se et ut est Dei est de omnibus quia de divina essentia ut de primo obiecto quae eminenter continet omnes quidditates et etiam omnes proprietates, et per consequens omnes veritates contentas in illis quidditatibus et proprietatibus. Unde tria sunt signa. In primo, ipsa divina essentia causat distinctam et perfectissimam cognitionem de seipsa; in secundo de quidditatibus quae suas veritates continent virtualiter, puta de sapientia, scientia, bonitate et huiusmodi. In tertio signo causat essentia distinctam et perfectam cognitionem de omnibus veritatibus quae illae quidditates continent in seipsis. Theologia ergo beatorum est de divina essentia quam distincte vident et de omnibus veritatibus quae sibi Deus voluntarie ostendit. Sed theologia viatorum est de veritatibus primi distincte voluntarie revelatis vel per se vel per solam creaturam; sic patet quomodo theologia Dei est de omnibus et theologia creaturarum non.

^{5.} interl.

^{6.} marg.

Ad argumentum principale dicendum: quod loquendo de Deo quidditates rerum non causant cognitionem in intellectu divino quia tunc divinus intellectus vilesceret. Sed essentia sua causat omnem cognitionem. In creaturis autem tam beatis quam in via Deus causat veritates earum, tamen propter hoc theologia eorum non est omnis cognitio quae potest haberi per habitus cognoscitivos humanitus acquisitos, quia quidditates rerum faciunt etiam⁷ propriam cognitionem, et compatiuntur se illae duae cognitiones in intellectu creato, scilicet, cognitio in verbo et eiusdem rei in genere proprio.

[QUAESTIO 4]

Utrum theologia sit scientia. Secundo quaeritur: utrum respectu alterius scientiae sit subalternans vel subalternata.

Ad primam quaestionem dicendum: per Philosophum 1 Posteriorum^f ubi definitur scientia quod scientia stricte sumpta habet quatuor conditiones: prima quod sit cognitio certa; secunda quod sit de obiecto necessario; tertia quod obiectum habeat evidentiam vel quod sit natum facere evidentiam ipsi intellectui; quarta quod talis scientia habeatur per discursum syllogisticum a praemissis ad conclusionem. Primae tres conditiones dicunt perfectionem; quarta vero dicit imperfectionem tum quia principium causat cognitionem conclusionis minus perfectam quam sit cognitio sui ipsius et ita non est eius causa univoca sed aequivoca et per consequens imperfectior, tum quia quando intellectus est sub cognitione praemissae adhuc est in potentia passiva respectu conclusionis et ita est imperfectior. Modo ad propositum dicendum quod theologia in se et ut est in intellectu divino est verissime scientia quantum ad primas tres conditiones, sive ut est necessariorum sive contingentium quae contingentia ut relucent in verbo habent infallibilitatem; sed nullo modo quantum ad quartam. Theologia autem viatorum est scientia quoad duas primas conditiones et quoad quartam sed non quoad tertiam. Potest tamen dici scientia prout scientia distinguitur contra opinionem et suspicionem prout accipitur 6 Ethicorums. Theologia etiam beatorum est scientia quantum ad tres primas conditiones. Sed utrum sit scientia quoad quartam dubium est. Videtur enim posse dici quod non habet quartam conditionem per Augustinum libro de Trinitateh capitulo 1: "Fortasse non erunt in patria volubiles cogitationes, quia totam scientiam nostram unico intuitu videbimus." Oppositum videtur, quia discursus non semper requirit ordinem temporis sed naturae. Quidditates enim relucentes in Deo prius natae sunt causare cognitionem de seipsis quam de veritatibus in ipsis contentis quae sunt conclusiones sicut etiam quando sunt in re extra. Nec auctoritas Augustini cogit quia loquitur dubitative dicens 'Fortasse'; vel si assertive, loquitur de essentia et essentialibus quae omnia intuitive videntur et sine discursu. Sed contra: secundum hoc videtur quod

^{7.} interl.

<sup>f. l.c., Chap. II, 71b
g. l.c., Chap. III ss., 1139b ss.
h. PL 42, XV, 16, col. 1079</sup>

etiam sic intelligendum sit ab intellectu divino scilicet cum discursu8 secundum signa naturae, ut prius dictum est; quia natura rerum sic exigit. Ad hoc dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum et ideo ille ordo naturae, scilicet, ab essentia ad quidditates, a quidditatibus ad veritates contentas in quidditatibus, ut supra dictum est, non est talis discursus quod secundum cognoscatur per primum et tertium per secundum, qualis discursus est in beatis, sed sicut ordo effectuum subordinatorum respectu eiusdem essentiae. Et talem discursum oportet necessario ponere in Deo et in scientia Dei.

Ad secundam quaestionem dico: quod theologia non est subalternata nec subalternans. Primum patet; quia licet subiectum eius aliquo modo contineatur sub subjecto Metaphysicae, tamen nulla conclusio theologiae probatur per principium Metaphysicae nec per aliquam conclusionem eius, quod tamen oportet si esset ei subalternata. Secundum patet, quia nulla scientia humanitus acquisita resolvit suas veritates in veritates theologicas.

Contra: Omnes veritates scientiarum possunt resolvi ad claram visionem ipsarum in Verbo ubi certius apparent quam in aliquo obiecto per se noto,

et tamen talis visio est theologia. Ergo, etc.

Respondeo: conditio necessaria9 scientiae subalternae est quod causetur ex cognitione scientiae subalternantis sicut conclusio ex suo principio. Sed visio veritatum in Verbo non est causa veritatis aliarum scientiarum quia sine tali visione alio modo possunt cognosci, scilicet, 10 ex principiis propriis per se notis.

[QUAESTIO 5]

UTRUM THEOLOGIA SIT PRACTICA VEL SPECULATIVA.

Videtur quod non sit practica: quia 3 de Animai, et 6 Ethicorumi, dicitur quod subjectum practici habitus est contingens. Sed subjectum habitus theologiae non est contingens sed necessarium. Ergo non est habitus practicus.

Contra: Romanos 3: "Finis legis est dilectio." Dilectio est practica;

ergo lex Dei est practica.

Iuxta hoc quaeritur UTRUM HABITUS SIT PRACTICUS EX COM-PARATIONE AD FINEM VEL AD OBIECTUM.

Respondeo: primo ad illam secundam quaestionem ex cuius solutione pendet solutio ad primam. Vult ergo Scotus dicere opinio aliquorum est quod intellectus dicitur practicus ex obiecto sed actus et habitus ex fine. Sed transeundo infinita quae hic dicit Scotus et tenendo quod ab eodem dicatur intellectus esse practicus et actus et habitus, dicendum quod practicum dicitur a praxi. Praxis autem alicubi reperitur originaliter et inchoative ut in obiecto operabili ubi est prima ratio praxis. Alicubi formaliter et inhaesive, puta în duplici respectu aptitudinali actus alterius potentiae ab intellectu, scilicet posterioritatis naturalis et conformitatis volitioni rectae.

^{8.} scilicet ...] marg.

^{9.} interl.

^{10.} interl.

l.c., Chap. X, 433a, 13 ss.

l.c., VI, Chap. IV, 1148, 11 ss. Rom. 13, 10

Alicubi vero finaliter et terminative, puta in fine. Habitus autem magis debet denominari practicus denominatione extrinseca ex praxi sui finis quam sui principii. Quia cum ratio practici denominantis intrinsece consistat in duplici respectu aptitudinali et talis respectus potius est ad terminum quam ad principium, patet quod praxis denominans extrinsece habitum accipitur a fine, originaliter tamen et principative accipitur ab obiecto. Dimittendo ergo praxim primo modo describit eam Scotus secundum ultimum accipiendi modum sic: Praxis est actus alterius potentiae ab intellectu natura posterior intellectione natus conformiter elici rationi rectae. Ex quo sequuntur tres conclusiones: prima conclusio quod praxis est 11 actus alterius potentiae ab intellectu. Patet iam quia nos non loquimur denominatione intrinseca sed extrinseca. Secunda conclusio quod praxis est natura posterior ipsa intellectione. Patet, quia actus priores intellectione sunt actus potentiarum vegetativae et sensitivae quae sunt communes nobis et brutis. In brutis autem non est praxis. Ex istis duabus conclusionibus infertur unum correlarium; scilicet, quod praxis est actus voluntatis elicitus, non imperatus. Quod non imperatus probatur: nam dictum est in secunda conclusione quod potentiae tales, scilicet, vegetativa et sensitiva quae sunt communes nobis et brutis non habent praxim, et certum est quod sicut nec ut12 praecedunt sic nec ut sequuntur. Actus autem imperatus est talium potentiarum et ita ibi non est ratio praxis, nec etiam in voluntate divina. Ergo primo et principaliter est actus voluntatis elicitus. Ex isto correlario probato sequitur tertia conclusio: quod praxis est conformis rectae rationi. Omnis enim actus a voluntate elicitus est huiusmodi. Ex iam dictis patet ad istam secundam quaestionem.

Ad primam quaestionem dicendum quod tota theologia necessaria intellectui creato est simpliciter practica; cuius ratio est quia habitus habens naturalem propinquitatem et conformitatem ad veram praxim est simpliciter practicus. Patet ex prioribus. Sed tota theologia est huiusmodi. Obiectum enim theologiae, scilicet, ipse Deus, naturaliter determinat intellectum creatum ad notitiam sui ante omnem volitionem et ista intellectio virtualiter et habitualiter est conformis voluntati rectae quae est vera praxis et dicitur

dilectio. Ergo habitus theologiae in intellectu est practicus.

Ad argumentum principale dicendum; quod non oportet subiectum primum scientiae practicae esse contingens, sed sufficit quod praxis quae supra illud fit et transit sit contingens, et etiam obiectum operabile dicitur

contingens propter praxim contingentem.

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^{11.} prima . . .] marg. 12. interl.

COMMENTARY

Ioannis Duns Scoti Tractatus de Primo Principio *

Though very few copies of this work have reached America (and there is little likelihood that any more will arrive for some time, because it is feared that the publisher's stocks were destroyed in the closing phases of the European war) its being brought to the attention of American students of medieval philosophy should not be delayed. For it is the first *critical* edition of any of Scotus' works and as such is a landmark in Scotistic studies.

It is, perhaps, not altogether mere coincidence that the *De Primo Principio* should have been singled out for this honor. For it has long been acclaimed as Scotus' opusculum aureum and may well be considered the finest expression of his incomparable genius. It is undoubtedly the most magnificent treatise on natural theology that the middle ages ever produced. The precision of the strictness of its method, the simplicity and solidity of its starting point, and the breadth and depth of its conclusions, established by means of refined and inexorable logic, are its characterization.

Unfortunately this masterpiece of Christian philosophy has been forgotten, or deliberately ignored, even by Franciscans. No doubt, one of the main reasons for this neglect is the extreme difficulty everyone experiences in trying to understand the meaning of the text. Here, more than in any other work, the stylus nervosus of the Subtle Doctor expresses itself in a compactness which is at times almost unintelligible. This difficulty, serious enough in itself, has been increased by numerous textual errors in the faulty editions hitherto at our disposal. The student of Scotus has therefore looked forward to the completion of Fr. Müller's labors in the hope that a critical edition would eliminate many, if not all, of the textual difficulties, thus paying the way for an easier and more exact understanding of the work, which would greatly facilitate a more general recognition of its merits. To a great extent these hopes have been justified. Fr. Müller's edition is invaluable in so far as he has examined every known manuscript of the work and has given, in the footnotes, all of the variant readings in all of the MSS. In fact, the apparatus criticus takes up far more space than the text itself. This is fortunate in view of the fact that not everyone will agree with Fr. Müller's reconstruction of the text in every detail.

Fr. Müller lists and describes fifteen known MSS of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and decides that they can be broken down into three families. For reasons which, unfortunately, he does not make explicit enough in his evaluation of the MSS, he chooses the Madrid MS as the most reliable and, finding seven other MSS in the same family, is thus provided with a comfortable "working majority." Obviously, the value of his work as a whole depends very much on the validity of this choice and

^{*} Ioannis Duns Scoti Tractasus de Primo Principio. Critical edition by Marianus Müller, O.F.M. (Bücher augustinischer und franziskanischer Geistigkeit, I Reihe, Abt. A, I Bd. Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder & Co., 1941. Pp. xl-171).

Fr. Müller's description and evaluation of the MSS is not complete enough to satisfy the highest critical standards. Especially intriguing is his dismissal of the Munich MSS as "wholly inaccurate" without any further qualification or explanation.

As regards the reconstruction of the text, the very first line contains an insertion which is absolutely unjustifiable on the basis of the MSS evidence. It reads: Incipit primus tractatus de Primo Principio. The significant word "primus" is found in one MS (Madrid). Why, then, is it incorporated in the text? The answer is to be found in the author's introductory remarks (pp. x-xi). Fr. Müller believes that the De Primo Principio is intimately connected with the Theoremata. These two tracts, according to him, together constitute a very brief compendium of Scotus' philosophical and theological system. Fr. Balic is quoted in support of this theory. But I'r. Balic seems now changing his opinion (cf. "De Critica Textuali Scholasticorum scriptis accomodata," Antonianum [Miscellanea Historica P. Livario Oliger... oblata], 1945, pp. 267-308). He no longer considers the Tractatus de Primo Principio or the Theoremata as autonomous Scotistic writings, but believes that they are excerpts from the Oxoniense, outlined by Scotus himself and filled in or perfected by others. (Nevertheless, he says, Scotus must be considered their true author - a very broad sense of this word which runs through this whole study by Fr. Balic). In any case, by what stretch of the imagination can the De Primo Principio or the Theoremata (especially the latter) be considered as a summa or a synthesis of Scotus' philosophical and theological doctrine? The former is simply a philosophical argument for the existence of God and a discussion of what natural reason can know about His attributes. The Theoremata, far from being the "theological supplement" of the De Primo Principio is (a) of dubious authenticity, and (b) if authentic (even in Fr. Balic's generous acceptance of that term) probably no more than a "collection of notes and schemes and problems" in which it is almost impossible to distinguish what might be Scotus' own opinion and what might not. Furthermore, Fr. Müller admits that only three of the Theoremata can be considered as cognate with the De Primo Principio (i.e., Th. 14-16). How then can he consider the Theoremata as a whole to be the natural complement of the De Primo Principio? Fr. Müller bases his argument for this on a single text from the De Primo Principio. Towards the end of this work Scotus remarks that, besides the conclusions about God which philosophers have arrived at, there are many things which Catholics believe about Him. These he proposes to discuss "in the next tract" (ad tractatum proximum differentur). Fr. Müller here refers the reader, not to the Theoremata as might be expected, but to the Oxoniense AND the Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaph. Aristotelis (because the topics just mentioned by Scotus are not discussed in the Theoremata!). However, Scotus continues:

In hoc quippe tractatu primo tentavi videre, qualiter metaphysica de te dicta ratione naturali aliqualiter concludantur. In sequenti ponentur credibilia, in quibus ratio captivatur, quae tamen eo sunt Catholicis certiora, quo non intellectui nostro caecutienti et in pluribus vacillanti, sed tuae solidissimae veritati firmiter innituntur (ed. Müller, p. 129, lin. 15 - p. 130, lin. 5).

In his introduction (p. xi) Fr. Müller interprets this text as follows: primo is an adjective modifying tractatu; this "first tract" then refers to the De Primo Principio; the "following tract" (in sequenti) refers to the Theoremata. Why the sudden change in Fr. Müller's attribution? In the footnote to the text in question he refers the words tractatum proximum to the Oxoniense (cf. supra). Is it not likely that Scotus has the same reference in mind when, three lines later, he again refers to "the following tract"? Moreover, even granting the authenticity of the Theoremata, how can they possibly be regarded as an exposition of things more certain to Catholics than truths discovered by reason alone, of beliefs which are based, not on our blind intellects, but on the truth revealed by God Himself? That is how Scotus characterizes the content of this disputed "following tract." But the Theoremata, for the most part, deal precisely with subjects with which the "following tract" is professedly not concerned. Again, is it not more likely that Scotus is referring to the Oxoniense, which fulfills the conditions laid down by Scotus himself? In any case, Fr. Müller cannot have it both ways; if the "following tract" is the Oxoniense AND/OR the QQ. in Metaphysicam in one instance, it cannot be the Theoremata in another. Finally, the words in hoc tractatu primo tentavi videre... can just as well be translated: "In this tract I have first tried to see...", taking primo as an adverb instead of an adjective. And where does that leave the fine-spun theory of the "first tract" and the "second tract"?

This criticism may seem like a lot of fuss about a minor detail but it must be remembered that the theory under discussion led Fr. Müller to insert the word primus in the opening line of his reconstructed text an insertion which gains in significance when viewed in the light of his attempt to determine the date of composition of the De Primo Principio (pp. xiii-xvii). Admittedly the question of the chronological sequence in Scotus' writings is a difficult one, but it is certainly not going to be solved by the methods which Fr. Müller uses here. He concludes that the De Primo Principio was written before the De Anima (the authenticity of which is not yet established, by the way) and before the Theoremata and the QQ. in Metaphysicam. Let us review the evidence he adduces for each statement. A. He says that the De Primo Principio must have been written before the De Anima because the latter is mentioned in the former. Even if this were so, it would not prove a great deal by itself. For such a reference could easily have been inserted (a) either by a scribe, or (b) by Scotus himself at a later date. As a matter of fact, however, the supposed reference to the De Anima is not found in the text of the De Primo Principio at all. Scotus merely says: Omnis intellectus est totius entis communissime sumpti, ut alibi declaravi (ed. Müller, p. 88, lin. 7). Fr. Müller identifies this vague alibi as referring to De Anima qq. 19-21, but it might just as well refer to the Oxoniense (Balic, op. cit., p. 290, says that it definitely does refer to the Oxoniense). According to Fr. Müller's reasoning, this would mean that the Oxoniense was written before the De Primo Principio. But Fr. Müller would not admit this conclusion (cf. p. xiv), although Fr. Longpré thinks it probable that the De Primo Principio was written after the composition of at least the First Book of the Oxoniense, and Fr. Balic, by his contention that the Theoremata and the De Primo Principio are excerpts from the Oxoniense (cf. supra), must believe that

these two tracts post-date the Oxoniense (Fr. Müller himself quotes Longpré's opinion, p. xiv, n. 12, and gives, in addition, very good reasons from Wadding and Mauritius de Portu against using forward and backward references in Scotus as a means of determining the relative dates of composition of his different works). B. His reason for concluding that the De Primo Principio was written before the Theoremata is the supposed forward reference to the latter in the text we have discussed above in connection with the insertion of the controversial word primus in the first line of the tract. Since we have already shown that Fr. Müller's interpretation of this text is either false, contradictory, or not sufficiently warranted by the evidence at our disposal, this second conclusion with regard to the relative dates of composition of both works is worthless. C. As regards the relation between the De Primo Principio and QQ. in Metaphysicam, Fr. Müller again bases his conclusion on a single backward reference in the latter work. What we have already said about such evidence applies here again. Fr. Balic characterizes the arguments used by Fr. Müller as nullius ponderis (op. cit., p. 290) and furthermore uses Fr. Müller's argumentum ex stilo to prove, not the relative priority or posteriority of different Scotistic works, but his own thesis that the De Primo Principio is not an autonomous work of Scotus but the work of a collaborator based on an outline excerpt from the Oxoniense which Scotus delineavit et alii perfecerunt (Op. cit., 288-292).

For these reasons, Fr. Müller's general conclusion that the *De Primo Principio* must be considered one of Scotus' earliest works is of very doubtful value. Internal evidence, in fact, indicates that it is one of his latest works. Balic sums it up as follows:

... illi qui putant hoc opusculum ortum esse ante alia opera Duns Scoti, et potissimum ante eius summam seu Ordinationem, aut nullum locum designant cui allusio fieret, aut ad ipsum Opus Oxoniense mittunt, aut denique spurias omnes illas allegationes proclamant, quamvis in omnibus codicibus Tractatus reperiantur. Cum itaque oportet fateri in Tractatu de Primo Principio . . . sat evidenter varias allusiones Operi Oxoniensi reperiri, oportet etiam concedere talem Tractatum non inter priora sed certe inter ultima opera Doctoris Subtilis reponendum esse (op. cit., p. 291).

Those are the more serious shortcomings of Fr. Müller's edition. There are, of course, other points on which students might not agree. For instance, in Ch. III, end of Concl. 1, Fr. Müller reconstructs the text as follows:

Et ex natura illius quidditatis inferius ostendetur, de qua nunc ostenditur efficientia.

This does not make a great deal of sense. What will be "shown later"? According to four of the MSS which Fr. Müller considers the best (O2O3CO4) and according to two others (PV1) which belong to the Munich group, the text should read:

Et existentia illius quidditatis inferius ostendetur, de qua nunc ostenditur efficientia.

This is a far more reasonable reading and one more in conformity with the context and the whole plan of the work. These criticisms are not meant to detract from the value of Fr. Müller's work as a whole. Some shortcomings are inevitable in such a difficult work, and Fr. Müller deserves to be congratulated on the fact that they are so few. Students of Scotus and of Scholasticism in general are deeply indebted to him for a magnificent contribution to the history of philosophy and to systematic natural theology. It is to be hoped that his efforts will be rewarded by a better understanding of this gem of Scholastic thought. However, though critical (in so far as all the known MSS have been collated) this edition cannot and must not be considered definitive. It must be reworked by the Scotus Commission itself. Meanwhile, Fr. Müller's edition is a vast improvement on all others. Not the least important feature of the work is the fact that it gives students access to ALL the variants in ALL the known MSS. If Fr. Müller's text is read with constant reference to these variants it is an invaluable tool in the hands of medievalists.

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FRANCISCANA NOTES

BROAD CULTURE OF FRIARS MINOR DURING MIDDLE AGES

The narrow and exaggerated nationalism of our modern age has greatly impaired and is still retarding the catholicity of culture and science which formed such a characteristic mark of the Catholic Middle Ages. When the exchange of professors between Germany and the United States was first discussed, some forty years ago, the celebrated Protestant professor at the Berlin University Adolf Harnack published in February 1905 the following statement in the *Preussische Jahrbuecher*:

In order to find teaching uninfluenced by national prepossessions, one must turn to the educational system of the Middle Ages. The famous teacher of that time was not confined to any one country; he lectured at Naples, Bologna, Paris, Cologne or Oxford.

Likewise students roamed from school to school accordingly as the fame of great professors drew them. When later these students had graduated from the universities of various lands and had chosen a profession, they in turn did not keep fixed dwelling-places for any length of time but as professors, men of letters, clerks at ecclesiastical and civil courts, churchmen, artists and printers wandered from town to town to better living conditions. Thus there was kept up a constant intercommunication between the cultured classes; a man was not born for his native country but for the whole of Europe and the whole of Catholicity.

The Friars Minor, who were not bound to stability of place like the Benedictine Monks, followed this trend of the educated classes with greater freedom than the other mendicant and itinerant friars. In regard to the school established at Strasburg in Alsace we read that in 1309 the Provincial Peter, an Englishman, had raised the prestige of the school to such an extent that students of the provinces of the Friars Minor and of other Orders flocked to Strasburg from England, France, Burgundy, Milan, various parts of Germany and Austria to study there philosophy and theology. Fifty years later we are informed that the Strasburg Province of the Friars Minor was conducting seven schools of theology and more than fifteen schools of philosophy, each at a different place. At the theological schools studied more than six hundred SECULAR scholars, and at the philosophical schools, which were likewise open to all, there was a large concourse of students. Apparently poor students received some alms, for the Chapter held at Mayence in 1326 admonished the Custodes to see to it that the students do not spend all their money on drink.

In 1411 it was determined to which schools outside of the Strasburg Province Friars might be sent. We find mentioned among others the schools of Oxford and Cambridge in England, Erfurt and Cologne in Germany, Paris and Orleans in France, Vienna and Rome. On the other hand the following Provinces were given permission to send their students to Strasburg: Cologne, Saxony, England, Hungary, Ireland, Burgundy, Rome and Umbria.

Friars who were sent outside the Strasburg Province had to study at least for three years at those places. Thereupon they received the degree of Lector, and had to teach as such for five years, then two years' study at the university of Paris followed, when the student returned as Master of Theology.

A striking example of the great freedom of students in frequenting foreign schools is furnished at a later period by the celebrated Friar Minor of the Strasburg Province Thomas Murner. Born 1469 and entering the Order of Friars Minor at the age of fifteen years, he studied in succession at the following universities: Freiburg in Brisgovia, Paris, again at Freiburg, Cracow (here he received the degree of Bachelor of Theology), Cologne, Rostock, Prague, again Freiburg (where he was promoted to the licenciate of theology), Rome, Venice, again at Cracow, for the fourth time at Freiburg (where in 1505 he was promoted to Master of Theology) and Bern. His father defrayed the cost and spent six hundred ducats for his son who was a type of the itinerant scholars of his day. Murner opposed Luther and he was among all the antagonists of Luther the most witty, striking, and popular one. He died in 1530.

A FRIAR MINOR PATRONIZES A JEWISH PRINTER IN 1507

Marcus Vigerius of Savona, Franciscan, born at Savona in 1446 and entering the Franciscan Order while quite young, taught theology in the schools of his Order at Padua and Rome till the year 1476, when his granduncle Pope Sixtus IV nominated him bishop of Sinigaglia. On December 1, 1505, Pope Julius II made him cardinal. On July 18, 1516, Cardinal Marcus Vigerius died at Rome.

The revenues accruing to Cardinal Vigerius enabled him to prove himself a patron of printers. He was a very learned scholar and after his elevation to the cardinalate he had some of his work printed. The first book published was his *Decachordum christianum*, a treatise about the

ten mysteries of the life of Our Lord.

The Decachordum was issued in an edition de luxe at Fano in 1507. The book is a masterpiece of artistic make-up and it passes as one of the finest works printed in the Renaissance style. The text is adorned with ten full-page engravings and thirty-five smaller engravings, all representing scenes of the life of Our Lord. The frontispiece and the ten full-page illustrations are placed within a frame of beautiful and wide borders on a black background while the smaller engravings are placed on a "criblé" background i.e. on a black background spotted with white points. The frontispiece shows the arms of the cardinal.

The tenth and last full-page engraving bears the initials F and V which stand for the name of the engraver Florio Vavassore. This engraver apparently has also executed the nine other engravings of large size, viz. Annunciation, Adoration of Shepherds, Adoration of Magi, Circumcision,

^{1.} Knepper, Jos. D.15 Schul- und Unterrichtswesen im Elsass. Strasburg, 1905, pp. 62-67.

etc. to the last Descent of the Holy Ghost. The smaller engravings are signed with the initial of a small L and apparently were executed by another artist.

The book is printed with round Roman characters in folio size. The whole comprises 7 unnumbered preliminary leaves, one blank leaf, 246 numbered leaves and 16 unnumbered leaves containing the index of the work.

The printer of the book is the celebrated German Jew Gerson ben Moses Soncino who calls himself Hieronymus Soncinus in the Latin books he printed. This printer commenced his untiring activity with the production of Hebrew books at Soncino (1488), Brescia and Barco till the year 1503, when he established a printing office at Fano, a city then situated in the papal state. In 1507 the governor of this papal city was Urbanus Vigerius, apparently a relative of the cardinal, who paid the

printer in the name of the cardinal.

The printer was paid in advance in several instalments. On March 20, 1507, he received thirty-one ducats. By April 22, 1507, he had received in all 120 ducats in several instalments. On July 4, 1507, he received the last sixty-two ducats. On July 11, 1507, the paper-maker Antonio Mattioli of Fabriano was paid thirty ducats for the paper furnished to print the Decachordum. Finally on August 10, 1507, the printing of the work was finished. The engravers were paid by the printer. Accordingly the cost of paper and printing amounted to 212 ducats; the costs for paper and the printing of one leaf or two pages amounted to a little less than four fifths of a ducat. The monetary value of a ducat was ten dollars our money but the purchasing value was higher. The minimum cost of living was fifty ducats per annum; one hundred ducats placed a person into easy circumstances and 250 ducats afforded means of living in luxury. At this rate the cost of printing the Decachordum amounted to more than three thousands dollars.

The Conventuals Guido de Sancto Leone and Franciscus Armillino de Serra acted as proofreaders of the Decachordum and for their labor

received a few copies of the printed book but no money.

Apparently Cardinal Vigerio had his book issued in a limited number of copies, otherwise we could not explain why so few copies have come down to us. I do not know of any copy in the United States. I surmise that a copy may be traced in the Sulzberger Collection in the Library of the Jewish Theological Seminary at 531 W. 123rd Street, New York. Hieronymus Soncinus died in 1534 at Constantinople.

SUNDAY EPISTLES AND GOSPELS IN SERBO-CROATIAN LANGUAGE

Friar Bernardino da Spalatro, O.Min. in 1495 published at Venice the so-called *SKIAWET*, a translation of the Sunday Epistles and Sunday Gospels and the Prefaces and Benedictions contained in the Missal and

^{1.} Bibliofilia, IV, Firenze, 1902, 35-37; Olschki. Leo S. Monumenta Typographica, Firenze, 1903, pp. 46-47, n. 125; J. D. Passavant. Peintre-Graveur, I, Leipzig, 1860, 141-142.

other liturgical books in the Serbo-Croatian language. The book is printed with Latin letters and is the first book printed in that language. At the beginning Fra Bernardino calls the language DALMATIAN (Incipit vulgarizacio Dalmatica), and at the end ILLYRIAN (in lingua Yllirica expliciunt), but it was the common language of the Serbs and Croatians of those days. The printer was Damian de Gorgonzola, a native of Milan, who from 1493 to 1495 published at Venice classics mostly, and in 1500 issued a book of civil law from his press in Perugia. The Sunday Epistles and Gospels of Fra Bernardino is printed in quarto format and comprises two hundred and eight pages of print. The British and Foreign Bible Society in London treasures a copy of this rare book which was reprinted at Venice in 1543 and 1586.

THE ASTRONOMICAL ALMANAC OF COLUMBUS

The astronomical almanac which Christopher Columbus had used on his voyage of discovery was detected at Seville, Spain, in 1935. Among the books now preserved in the Columbus Library (Columbina) at Seville, Mr. Ernest Zimmer, professor of astronomy at the university of Erlangen in Bavaria, found a copy of an almanac which in 1471 had been published by the celebrated priest-astronomer John Mueller Regiomontanus at Nuremberg in Germany. It was printed on the private press of this the greater astronomer of the time. The copy of the Almanac has written annotations which apparently are the work of Columbus. The author was evidently the Jewish astronomer Abraham Zacut.

THE OLDEST BOOK OF THE WORLD DECIPHERED

The Capuchin Father Hilaire (Lahyre) de Barenton published in 1920 a philological study in which he proved that the Etruscan language was a dialect of the Old Egyptian language (La langue Etrusque, dialecte de l'ancien Egyptien. Paris, 1920, pp. 4-62). By this work the humble Capuchin became quite famous as a philologist and the Paris Academy responded by awarding him a prize. In 1922 Father Hilaire surprised Orientalists by publishing the text and translation of the so-called Goudea cylinders (Le temple de Goudéa et les premiers empires de Chaldée. Paris 1922). These cylinders which are preserved in the Louvre in Paris bear a pre-Assyrian or properly-called Sumerian text which was deciphered by Father Hilaire accurately and completely for the first time with translation. These cylinders are covered with inscriptions which had been imprinted into the soft substance before hardening with fire. They are called Goudea cylinders after the priest-king Goudea who ruled in Chaldea from about B.C. 2100 to 2080, a few years before Abraham was born. The text of those cylinders forms in truth the oldest book of the world. It relates in minute details the history of the erection of a temple and its organization. From this text it is evinced that many customs of the western people have their source in the customs of ancient Chaldea; it is also proved that at the time of Goudea the Oscans and Basques formed one empire which was independent of the Latins (Le temple de Goudéa et les origines Italiennes. Paris, 1922, pp. 134). The Sumerian texts furnished the key to Father

Hilaire to trace all living and dead languages to the Sumerian language (L'origine des langues, des religions et des peuples, I Part, Les radicaux primitifs ou lexique sumérien-français, Paris, 1932, pp. 116; II Part, Vol. I, Paris, 1933, pp. 568; II Part, Vol. II, Paris, 1936, pp. 798; and Supplément: Hiéroglyphes composés, Paris, 1937, pp. 24).

CAPUCHIN MISSIONARIES DEVOURED BY INDIANS IN ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

In 1940 two Capuchin missionaries of the mission of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, made an attempt to convert the cannibal tribe of Matakos in Argentina. They were murdered and their bodies devoured by the Indians. When the news spread that the missionaries were barbarously killed, the police of the Province of Salta in Argentina tracked the Indians in the forests of Tatargal in the northernmost part of the republic, and dispersed the Indians so badly that they cannot evermore unite as a tribe. One of the fugitive Indians, who was captured by the police of the Brazilian State of Rio Grande do Sul, later confessed that he had belonged to a tribe which practised cannibalism in the forests on the borders of Bolivia and Argentina; he stated that he often had taken part in the savage dances and murderous rites of that Indian tribe. The chief of the tribe had given command to kill all white people. This fugitive Indian described in detail how the bodies of the two missionaries were devoured by these cannibals. He carried with him some remnants of the things which had belonged to the missionaries so that there is no doubt about the truth of his story. Although the Brazilian government has tried to obtain information on the particulars of the death of these two Capuchins missionaries, no definitive news has reached this country up to the present.

JOHN M. LENHART, O.F.M. Cap.

BOOK REVIEWS

Jean Duns Scot: Un Docteur des Temps Nouveaux. By Béraud de Saint-Maurice. (Montréal: Thérien Frères, 1944. Pp. xiii+318.)

This book is written by a warm admirer of Duns Scotus. Its purpose is to introduce the general student of philosophy to the Subtle Doctor, with a view to spreading a better knowledge and deeper appreciation of Scotus, who admittedly receives scant and frequently unfair treatment in much of the current Catholic philosophical and theological literature, and in our Scholastic text-books.

Wisely the author begins by reconstructing the life and times of Scotus. He succeeds in doing this with such vivid detail of milieu and biographical data in their historical setting, that the Subtle Doctor emerges a living personality with boldly outlined pecularities. This reveals him as he lived, penetrating in mind and warm in heart, personally experiencing the ultimate problems, and giving his own characteristic solutions in an honest

endeavor to fathom and reach the truth.

Of these characteristic doctrines, the author singles out for special treatment four belonging to philosophy, and two to the domain of theology. The philosophical chapters embrace: a. Scotus' metaphysical demonstration of the existence of God as the Absolute Infinite, a proof preferred by the Subtle Doctor as more cogent than the traditional Prime Mover argument, and one which has been proclaimed one of the high points of medieval metaphysics. b. The "Univocity of Being," permitting us to transcend the abyss between the finite and the infinite by guaranteeing a positive knowledge of God, thus truly linking the creature to his Creator. This is one of the best expositions we have ever seen within similar brief compass. c. Equally adequate is the explanation of the much misunderstood and maligned "Formal Distinction." d. Finally, we have a discussion of the "Voluntarism" of Scotus and his "Primacy of the Will," showing how Scotus, though attributing the superior role in our psychic life to the will, does not make of the latter an arbitrary faculty. The will is a rational power, guided in its choice by deliberate judgment; but in every case it ultimately determines itself, even in the presence of an object presented as supremely desirable by the intellect.

Of the theological teaching of Scotus, the author selects his defense of the Immaculate Conception and his thesis on the Primacy of Christ. In a rapid sketch of the state of the controversy within the theological circles of Paris, he permits us to see why such saintly leaders of thought as Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas hesitated to subscribe to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, restrained by the difficulty of reconciling this privilege of Mary with the dogma of universal Redemption, and how Scotus daringly and brilliantly

met this difficulty by his praevisis meritis solution.

The doctrine of the "Primacy of Christ" asserts that Christ is the center of creation, and that consequently He would have become man even if Adam had not sinned. According to Scotus, in the eternal decrees

of God the Incarnation was willed absolutely as the supreme expression of God's love ad extra, and not merely, as it were, dependently upon and subsequently to the fall of man for the purpose of his Redemption. This

thesis is stated in detail and with clarity.

In a final chapter discussing the mission of Scotus in our day, the author states the belief that if the modern world, lost in agnosticism and neo-paganism, were to take Scotus with his sane philosophy and his conception of the divine plan of the universe with "Christ the King" for its center as its guide, it would of necessity find its way back to normalcy and salvation.

This book furnishes the general student of philosophy with much valuable information. It embodies the published results of the latest representative Scotistic scholarship, and in addition much that is new because the author was in the fortunate position of having access to hitherto unpublished material of the distinguished Scotistic scholar, Fr. Ephrem Longpré, O.F.M. Perhaps the inclusion of some admittedly legendary items and an occasional lyrical tone might better have been avoided.

As we mentioned above, the book was written by a warm admirer of Duns Scotus. This, no doubt, accounts also for an occasional overstatement. Thus on pages 304-306 it is affirmed that the plurality of the "formes de corporéité" is in accord with modern theories of biology and chemistry, e.g., the modern biological views which attribute secondary principles of life to the individual cells of the body. Now Scotus knew nothing of plural elementary vital forms in the sense of the modern cellular theory. For him the rational soul is the unique principle of all life in man, vegetative, sentient and rational. The forma corporietatis as he propounded it, is in no sense a biological principle, but purely a constituent principle of the concrete body:

Et ideo universaliter in quolibet animato necesse est ponere illam formam, qua corpus est corpus, aliam ab illa, qua est animatum. (Opus Oxoniense IV, d. 11, q. 3, n. 54; XVII, 436).

Concerning plural subordinate forms in the chemical compound, the older Franciscan School, along with St. Bonaventure, permitted the elements to retain their elemental forms, subsuming them under the forma mixti; Scotus, agreeing in this with St. Thomas, replaces the elemental forms in a material compound by the forma mixti uniting the latter directly to materia prima:

Non est ponenda pluralitas sine necessitate; nihil autem cogit ponere pluritatem elementorum vel formarum substantialium manere in mixto, quia non operatio, quae maxime concludit formam; non enim operatio mixti est ejusdem speciei cum aliqua operatione elementi" (Ox., II, d. 15, n. 5; XIII, 11).

The actuality and present-day value of the forma corporeitatis as propounded by Scotus, consists in this, that by his energetic and competent metaphysical defense in principle of the position of plurality, he brings able support to modern scientific views, by providing present-day scholastic

philosophers with a satisfactory metaphysical sub-structure and rational theory, enabling them to integrate new facts, e.g., modern views of chemistry and the problems presented by the electron theory, into the traditional matter and form theory in an acceptable interpretation other than the rigid unicity theory of St. Thomas.

Such minor slips do not effect the real worth of the book, which will

richly repay careful reading and re-reading.

BERARD VOGT, O.F.M.

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Augustine's Quest of Wisdom. Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo. By Vernon J. Bourke, Ph. D. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1945. Pp. xii+323. \$3.00.)

The need for a chronological-genetic approach to the study of great philosophers and teachers has become increasingly evident since Professor Werner Jaeger's monumental work on Aristotle. "In the treatment of intellectual progress, if we are to give full weight to the creative and underived element in great individuals, we must supplement the general tendency of the times with the organic development of the personality concerned" (Jaeger: Aristotle, p. 3). That Professor Jaeger set the pace by his study of the inner intellectual growth of the Stagirite, is common knowledge. A like approach to Saint Thomas is suggested in the Preface to the Ottawa edition of the Summa theologiae (tom. I, pp. xxi-xxii); and a study of the inner development of the thought of Saint Bonaventure would carry us to some interesting conclusions.

In contrast to these two princes of Scholasticism, Saint Augustine, the Doctor communis, has himself provided a broad outline of his own mental development in the two books of his Retractations, which thus supply the basis of more complete investigation. If only for this fact, that Doctor Bourke's study does attempt some such exposition, it is a welcome addition to the literature of the current Augustinian renaissance. He does not claim that the book is an adequate treatment, for he expressly declares that to be beyond his intentions (p. 202); yet the work does quite deftly forge into a fairly complete whole a study of the life and the more important works of the Saint. As such, it marks a contrast to the studies of Professor Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de S. Augustin, and of Professor Pegis, "The mind of Saint Augustine," Mediaeval Studies, VI (1944), 1-61, both of which are more directly doctrinal and technical in content. Professor Bourke, on the other hand, has woven together a biography and an analysis of the more important works in their chronological order. In this he has made good use of the Retractationes to indicate the value of the various works and the transitional state of Augustine's thought, particularly in the early years before his ordination. The last section of the book, in addition, is given over to a direct analysis of three major and mature works of Augustine the Bishop, the De Trinitate, the De Genesi ad litteram and the De Civitate Dei. The book contains two appendices, a

chronological list of St. Augustine's works and a chronology of his life,

plus an adequate index.

For the student of Franciscan philosophy the book is of special interest, because of the great dependence of Franciscan Scholastics on the Doctor of Hippo (Cf. E. Longpré, O.F.M., "S. Augustin et la pensée franciscaine," La France Franciscaine, XV (1932), 5-76). Professor Bourke points (p. 102, n. 82; p. 202, n. 4) to Saint Bonaventure's Itinerarium mentis in Deum as having best caught the spirit of the Augustinian quest of God. Though perhaps beyond his theme, the work would have been even more valuable had he indicated the many further instances of such dependence on the part of the Scholastics in general.

The book, then, is a most pleasing contribution to American scholarship, combining both scientific research and popular presentation. If we present a table of needed emendations, the latter will not detract from the substantial worth of the work as a whole nor indicate a lack of appreciation of the immense amount of labor that entered into its composition.

The reader is jarred at times by the numerous typographical errors, particularly in the Latin quotations in the footnotes. More than this, many such quotations are incomplete, the author taking only such words as will contain the point he wishes to confirm; the results at times are a bit ludicrous. As a minor example: "Hipponem . . . codicem prorsus invenire non possem" (p. 165, n. 24). This is intended to back up the remark that 'there was not a single copy of Cicero in the whole city of Hippo"; hence, as it stands, Hipponem would seem to be some kind of locative case, entirely at variance with the full passage (Saint Augustine jestingly remarks to Dioscoros that the latter had written a Carthagine ad Hipponem, ubi si vellem respondendi cura inspicere aliquid . . . codicem, etc.). A worse example (p. 226, n. 10): Augustine speaks of the human mind being informed by the contemplation of the 'incommutabili Dei Sapientia rationes,' which makes sense only if the whole phrase is read: intellectualiter sibimet impressas ab incommutabili Dei Sapientia rationes; nor does this text seem adequate to the doctrine for which it was chosen. See also p. 13, n. 6, which lacks the final verb oblectabamur; p. 194, n. 97, which makes absolutely no sense as quoted; p. 302, n. 68, for a bad translation from Possidius. The description of the table-manners of the monastery at Hippo (p. 127) seems inexact, or at least incomplete; "swearing" is a poor English synonym for ne quis juraret; and more emphasis should have been put on Augustine's horror of the common fault of detraction.

Some of the chapter-headings are not truly indicative of the contents. This holds especially for chapter VI, "Baptism in Milan," which includes also the succeeding events of the next eighteen months; and chapter VIII, "The making of a bishop." — There is no Old Testament passage that God is the Father of Lights (p. 77), the correct reference is S. James, i: 17; the text of note 12, p. 84, refers to the Empress Justina and not to the Arians in general, as Bourke would take it; the proper citation for Peter Lombard (p. 99, n. 66) is the critical edition of the Sentences (Quaracchi, 1916); and one might ask what might be the "textbooks of

thirteenth century theology" (ibid.); Lombard is the textbook!

From a doctrinal viewpoint I have no doubt that some will not agree completely with the statements made on the theory of illumination; nor with the general remark: "He learned first to think of the nature of spiritual substance, and this was practically all he learned from Neo-Platonism" (p. 67). While Professor Bourke does qualify this in a footnote, most authors would agree that Augustine received much more from Plotinus than is here conceded. Nor would I consider necessary the concern shown for the place of Angels between man and God in the hierarchy of being (pp. 93; 95; 112; 121). That there is nothing, other than God, above the human soul is plainly admitted by Saint Bonaventure as well as Saint Augustine because both consider the soul and the Angel on a par as images of God and therefore direct subjects of divine action (cf. S. Bonaventure, II Sent., d. 16, a. 2, q. 1, II, 401-402). — Finally, it does not seem accurate terminology to identify (p. 55) the mystical and the supernatural, so as to speak of the supernaturalism of Neo-Platonism, at least if one would use that theological term in its strict and proper sense.

IGNATIUS BRADY, O.F.M.

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Training in Christianity. By Sôren Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 275. \$3.00). For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves. By Sôren Kierkegaard. Translated by Walter Lowrie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. Pp. 243. \$2.50).

In recent years a dozen or more works of Sôren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) (rhymes with "gore") have been translated into English. This current interest in the Protestant theologian of Denmark may be explained by the fact that Kierkegaard sharply rebuked the decadent Christianity of his generation, and the remedy he indicated is thought to be the specific for the evils of our own time.

From 1536 to 1852 Lutheranism was the Established Church in Denmark. The initial strength of the Reformation in Denmark had greatly diminished before the middle of the nineteenth century. Although the majority of the people were Protestants, even the faith was being discarded

with the good works.

Kirkegaard was born at Copenhagen. He studied theology at the University and although he was never ordained a minister, he often preached sermons in church. He wrote a great many articles which appeared in the papers, and various discourses which were published in book form. In his writings Kierkegaard declares over and over again that he has one thesis: "Christianity no longer exists"; hence he has one task: "to reintroduce Christianity into Christendom" (Training in Christianity, p. 39). There is plenty of Sunday twaddle, he says, about Christianity's priceless truths, but it is only too evident that Christ, the Sign of Offence and the Object of Faith has become the most romantic of all fabulous figures. Christianity came into the world as the absolute, and to become a Christian, to become contemporary with the absolute, a man must endure sufferings in imitation of the Pattern (Training...p. 67).

In the spring of 1848 Kierkegaard experienced a profound realization of the forgiveness of sin which made him sure that his whole nature was changed (*Training*...p. v). Hence we find him insisting that man must learn by the torments of a contrite heart to enter by the narrow way through

the consciousness of sin into Christianity (Training ... p. 72).

Just as Christ opposed the established order and the Pharisees took offence, so today the established order takes offence at the individual, because the established order has deified itself and demands that all individuals shall be subject to it in their God-relationship. The established order insisting upon outwardness is devoid of inwardness (*Training*...p. 92-93). And it is by hidden inwardness that the true Christian is characterized — according to the established order (*Training*...210 sq.).

Kierkegaard acknowledges that although the errors of the Middle Ages (concerning good works, fasting, etc.) were great, its conception of Christianity (the monastic-ascetic type) was decisively superior to that of the nineteenth century, because the Middle Ages conceived of Christianity with a view to action, life, the transformation of personal existence (For Self-Examination...p. 201 sq.). Luther showed it was impossible to merit heaven by good works, and therefore he applied imitation in connection with witnessing for truth. A man is justified only by faith. The next generation transformed this Lutheran passion into a doctrine and diminished the vital power of faith. Christ demanded decisive action; but today the Christian's life is homogeneous with worldliness. People suppose they can become Christians by simply thinking about Christianity, and by advancing beyond faith in analysing the word of God. Hence the Christianity of the nineteenth century is the professor-scientific type (Self-Examination...p. 203).

All the interpretations of God's Word are introduced as though this were the right way to understand it but really in order to defend oneself against God's Word (Self-Examination... p. 59). Faith is against understanding (Kierkegaard admits a thing may be true in philosophy and false in theology, Training...p. 178). Strictly speaking, one can 'know' nothing about Christ, because He is the paradox, existing only for faith, and the miracles and so-called proofs cannot demonstrate Christ was God (Training...p. 27 sq.). The very attempt to argue from the consequences of

Christ's life to His divinity is blasphemy.

When all confidence in thyself, writes Kierkegaard, or in human support, and also in God as an immediate apprehension is excluded, then comes the life-giving Spirit and brings faith (Self-Examination...101). And faith in Christ, of course, brings remission of sins. "Jesus Christ covers with his holy body thy sin... Only by remaining in Him, only by living into Him, art thou in hiding, is there a cover over the multitude

of thy sins" (Self-Examination, p. 22, 24).

Christianity calls for sacrifices. Kierkegaard accused the established church of his day and its leaders of shunning these necessary sacrifices. People don't like the idea of sacrifices, so to make Christianity a saleable article the ministers of the church have made Christianity only a consolation (Self-Examination . . . 146). But Christianity cannot change. The obstacle between Christianity and men is that people have lost the conception of the absolute requirement; they cannot get through their heads

what use there is in having an absolute requirement, seeing that no one fulfils it, that the absolute has become the impractical, the foolish, hence they invert the situation, seek the fault in the requirement and become themselves the requirers, requiring that the requirement be changed (Self-

Examination ... 168).

To reintroduce Christianity into Christendom, Kierkegaard says that imitation (of Christ) must be introduced. The extreme form would not be readily accepted, so the mildest way to introduce it is so that it exerts pressure to bring doubt to silence and administer a little justice upon existences. Only he may advance doubts whose life bears the impress of imitation, or whose life has got so far out that there could be a question of his becoming a Christian (Self-Examination...205). Thus it seems blind faith is to stifle the doubts and disputes of interpretation, and some undetermined form of suffering and humiliation (not to be considered a good work!) is to bring about a contemporaneousness with the absolute, an imitation of the life of Christ.

All of this is fundamentally the appeal: "Zurück zu Luther!" In the doctrine of the absolute there is an echo of Hegel, although Kierkegaard disagreed with the Hegelian synthesis which subordinated faith to reason in the highest development of the absolute. Fr. Philotheus Bôhner classes Kierkegaard among the "wisdom philosophers" because his main interest is centered in man and his concrete relations to God, man, and the universe. His method is a reiterated pursuit of the same topic each time from a different angle; the method of digression and unceasing circulation around the one idea ("The Spirit of Franciscan Philosophy," in: Franciscan Studies, 1942, pp. 225-226).

Some passages of Kierkegaard are beautiful and inspiring. Much of his own life is reflected in his discourses which disclose a soul struggling to find God. In his effort to recall Christians to a deeper and a more sincere Christianity, Sören Kierkegaard gave expression to a message that Protestant theologians are trying to bring before their own church members, a generation of Christians in need of the challenging assertion of the Danish writer: "It is in likeness to Christ's life here upon earth that I along

with every Christian must strive to construct my life."

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Vladimir Solovyev's Lectures on Godmanhood. Translated with an Introduction by Peter P. Zouboff. (New York: International University Press, 1944. Pp. 233. \$3.75.)

Vladimir Solovyev, Russian philosopher, theologian, mystic and poet, was born January 16, 1853, in Moscow and died August 31, 1900. Until his conversion to the Roman Catholic Church, he worked enthusiastically for the reunion of the Western with the Eastern Church. He has been styled the Newman of Russian.

Solovyev's writings were collected by his friends and followers and

published in one complete edition: nine volumes of philosophic and theologic works, three volumes of correspondence, one volume of poetry. The twelve *Lectures on Godmanhood* were given in St. Petersburg. They were so popular that the large hall in the university was always crowded. He published them in 1878.

Mr. Zouboff has translated these lectures into English. He prefaced the text with three chapters of Introduction. In the first chapter he gives a short life of Solovyev. He still leans to the non-Catholic opinion that Solovyev died in communion with the Orthodox church, even though it is historically certain that he became a Catholic on Feb. 18, 1896 — just fifty years ago, by the way. That he received the last Sacraments from an Orthodox priest is due to the fact that a Roman priest could not be had. It is lawful in such circumstances to receive from a duly ordained Orthodox priest. Solovyev died four years after his conversion. That he did become a Catholic is important. In fairness to him, editions of his works should contain footnotes evaluating the doctrines incompatible with his later Catholic faith.

In the second chapter Mr. Zouboff treats the background of Solovyev's ideas, namely, Slavophilism. Solovyev, until his conversion, was a pronounced pan-Slav; however, he was always an opponent of degenerate Slavophilism. In the third chapter, Mr. Zouboff discusses the place of the idea of Godmanhood in the philosophy of Solovyev. The idea of union of God with man and of man with God (Godmanhood) is at the center of all of Solovyev's thought. One wonders whether it was proper to quote at such length in this introduction from Lectures on Godmanhood since they are given in their entirety later.

In these lectures Solovyev tried to show the insufficiency of historical systems of thought for explaining the world of God and creatures, and at the same time he gave his own explanation, based on the Greek Fathers and on the philosophers, both ancient and new. The answer lies essentially in the truth of Godmanhood.

In the first lecture socialism, positivism, and Western materialism are discussed and dismissed, although he sees a grain of truth in each of them. In the second lecture he reproaches Western Catholicism for having used force against its enemies and for having shown herself the archenemy of the Russian people and of the Orthodox Church. Still he thinks this is merely the earthly dust. The Roman Church possesses the essence of Catholicism, which is, that all secular powers and principles must be subjected to the religious principle. Even Protestantism was justified, though it was unable to offer the true solution. Of course, this information he got from the enemies of the Church. After his conversion he learned the truth from the Jesuit Fathers who became his friends.

In the third to the sixth lectures he treats in succession Buddhism, Platonism, Judaism, and Neoplatonism, as steps, but imperfect ones, toward the true solution. In the sixth lecture he philosophizes on the triunity of God as required by contemplative reason. He seems to stress too much the power of reason in regard to the Trinity, though he does say later that the triunity is logically necessary for the mind, but the mind by itself cannot certify to us the factual existence of that (divine) world (?). In

the seventh lecture he continues the discussion of the Trinity and introduces Sophia as the expressed idea of the Logos. In the eighth lecture he speaks of the Incarnation. The eternal Logos, the active principle, supposes humanity, namely man, as a mentally conceivable being. In the ninth lecture he justifies the freedom of God in view of the eternal Godmanhood. In the tenth lecture he discusses the tendency of all creatures to unity, and the tendency of the Logos to unify and bring all things into one

organism, which is actually realized in the Incarnation. The eleventh and twelfth lectures are printed together. Here he explains the possibility and the mode of the unity of Divinity with humanity, and its cause, namely, the return of all creatures to the Divinity through the spiritual center and head, Who is Christ. Mankind, that is, the Church, is His Body. Until now, however, neither the Western nor the Eastern Church has fully realized the truth of the Godmanhood. The Roman Church used force on her enemies. The result was the Protestant revolt. Protestantism inevitably led to pure nationalism. The Western world extricated itself from these errors only to fall into materialism and empiricism. The Eastern Church, too, only imperfectly realizes the truth of the Godmanhood. True, she did not fall into the errors of the Western world, but she is not externally actualized in all humanity. The union of the West with the East is necessary for the full realization of the truth of the Godmanhood. Though Solovyev does not use our terminology for the doctrine of the Mystical Body, he does express that doctrine here in the terms of the Greek Fathers. Solovyev's doctrine of the Godmanhood also involves the Franciscan doctrine of Christ's Absolute Primacy.

In regard to Solovyev's style it is worth noting that he is clever in the use of concrete illustrations for abstract truths and principles. His terminology is not that of the Western Church or of the Scholastics. For that reason he is difficult to read.

The translator frequently uses "cognate" incorrectly as a verb. He also uses "extant" very often for a Russian word which Solovyev himself interprets as expressing the thought that "being belongs to God" (p. 141). "Extant" does not have that meaning. Note also "existant" on pages 143 and 155. There are entirely too many spelling or typing mistakes in a work of this nature, seemingly due to careless proofreading. The translator's use of asterisks for references in the footnotes is rather clumsy and confusing. Some places the same number of asterisks occur on the same page for different notes. The Bibliography is not written according to modern standards. The titles of books as well as of articles are in quotation marks, instead of italics. Some titles have neither publisher nor city. References to articles in periodicals do not have the pages given.

It would have been very helpful to the reader if titles, and even subtitles, had been added to the lectures. A simple footnote could have informed the reader that these are not original. An index of important topics would be desirable too. And Catholics, since Solovyev died in union with the true Church, will want an edition of his works in which his teachings prior to his conversion are critically evaluated. And so, while admiring Mr. Zouboff's accomplishment in translating the representative work of the great Solovyev, I do hope that his other works will be trans-

lated and edited with greater care.

Would that Solovyev were a symbol of the entire Russian people! Would that they could find the truth of the Godmanhood, their salvation, in the Mystical Body of Christ, the Roman Catholic Church!

Rev. Dominic Unger, O.F.M. Cap.

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The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis. Vol. I, 1945. (New York: International Universities Press, Pp. 370.)

This yearbook is a collection of reprints of papers published in various psychoanalytical periodicals or held at symposia between the years 1942 and 1945. Proceeding from the premise that only roses are selected for such anthologies, we may surmise that *The Yearbook* contains the most representative and most valuable contributions which psychoanalysis has to offer.

The collection, according to the Introduction, seems to be born, at least partly, out of competition against those purveyors "who offer the public better, cheaper and quicker psychoanalyses." We must, therefore, conclude that the present contribution intends to advocate a less quick, less cheap, and evidentally a still better psychoanalysis. We for one would recommend also a little less fancy, less subjectivity, and considerably more logic and clarity. Do the editors really believe that they can sell to the American public what the European public has long since refused to swallow? There are more and more people who refuse to fall for every pompous new "ism" and who rightly believe that the dressing of thoughts in phrases which look more like Greek than English is no proof of their validity.

We are told usque ad nauseam that there does not exist, neither can there exist, a normal mind, from which assertion it follows that psychoanalysts have no normal mind either. In that case we pity the poor patients. We learn again that symbols are universal and ubiquitous; that to Australian primitive children all toys are sexual symbols; that "the roots of sublimation are always an erotic activity, either pregenital or genital." Some woman author wants us to believe that the well known women's tendency to lie about their age, is rooted in their hope that, as long as they are young, they may somehow develope into manhood. Another author assures us that "the highest achievement of the human mind — its conscience — arises out of the animalistic desire to devour our fellow creatures." Freud's sleep theory, viewing sleep "as a re-enacting of the period in utero" is repeated. And so it goes on and on: many other such passages, the very indelicacy of which prohibits quotation, excellently exploit their own folly.

When looking for evidence proving such statements we get little more than interjections like "undoubtedly," "surely," "I suggest," "I feel," "twenty years of clinical observation have taught me," etc. In other words we have to be satisfied with purely subjective interpretations. Robert Waelder frankly states that we cannot expect anything better when he says: "Experimental control in psychoanalysis is very difficult to achieve,

and is outright impossible for the interpretation of the individual case." However, the unprejudiced and critical mind, which, in science, prefers proofs to faith, will feel rather reluctant to admit statements which have no other basis but the subjective interpretation of a psychoanalyst.

Among the more objective and more interesting contributions we mention the articles on the history of psychoanalysis, as Siegfried Bernfeld's article on Freud's earliest theories and the School of Helmholtz, and the symposium on the present trends in psychoanalytical theory and practice, particularly that of Gregory Zilboorg. Zilboorg laments the confusion, dissensions, and schisms in the psychoanalytical world, even on fundamental issues. And indeed the present Yearbook itself gives abundant evidence of the chaotic condition of this little world. Zilboorg's remedy is a plea to go back to Freud. But we are not so sure about the efficiency of the medicine. For the 'master' is notoriously obscure, and who is there to give the real interpretation? As long as psychoanalysis fails to recognize an infallible teaching authority — and there is no reason why it should — the same chaotic state of affairs will continue and increase.

Another set of contributions with a somewhat more objective character are those on the war neuroses. But altogether out of place in a supposedly scientific book is the selection of a fragment of a novel which C. P. Oberndorf adorns with a few footnotes. Were the editors afraid that by omitting this contribution they would not reach a sufficient number of pages?

The book contains two articles on the Psychosomatic theory. With this we enter directly into the field of philosophy. Both contributions start with a quotation from a statement published in the Journal of Psychosomatic Medicine, which statement seems to contain the basic creed of the movement. It says that man is a psychosomatic unit — a statement which although as old as Aristotle -- could be welcomed as a happy return to a sound conception of man. But the manifesto goes on to say that not even a logical distinction exists between mind and body. However, seven lines further down the statement maintains that mind and body are probably two aspects of the same process. Seeing this, we wonder what the authors mean by a logical distinction. Kant, Leibnitz, Descartes, St. Thomas, St. Augustine, Aristotle, and Plato may have had different views on the relationship between mind and body, but they all attached practically the same meaning to the term "logical." We can hardly believe that Dr. Alexander and Dr. Dunbar consider themselves superior to the great thinkers we just mentioned, but even though they would consider themselves equal to them, a tradition of two thousand years or more stands against them. So if they use the term logical in a different sense, we may rightly ask for a definition.

This yearbook is the first of its kind in the United States. We would hope that it should be followed by many others, were it not for the damage they would do, because nothing better than such a selected anthology would show the confusing, chaotic and unscientific condition of psychoanalysis.

JAMES VAN DER VELDT, O.F.M.

Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.

Rufinus of Aquileia (345-411). His Life and Works. By Francis X. Murphy, C.SS.R., Ph.D. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1945. Pp. xviii+248.)

This doctoral dissertation represents Volume VI in the new series of *Studies in Mediaeval History*, under the able auspices of the Catholic University of America. Father Murphy evaluates the personal life and the literary works of Tyrannius Rufinus with that impartial objectivity which adorns forever the truthful brow of sincere scholarship.

Rufinus of Aquileia played a leading rôle in the development of early Christian monasticism, ecclesiastical history, Scriptural exegesis, and theological polemics. Besides, he deserves high credit for conserving the corpus of truths in the works of Origen, which he defended bona fide until his death in 410. But having run afoul of the acrid pen and temper of St. Jerome, Rufinus was unfairly devaluated, calumniated, and excoriated. Still, it was primarily the pressure of external events and outside interference that forced their personal differences into an open imbroglio, repeatedly fomented by the intrigues and the malevolence of preconfirmed partisans. Right there lurked the real crux. Consequently, Rufinus, the ascetical abbot and scholarly priest, was maliciously maligned, erroneously identified with another Rufinus, the precursor of Pelagianism, dubbed the very essence of a scoundrel in the piece, a prevaricator, and even a heretic.

Golden truth and sterling justice eventually demanded an unbiased critique of the man himself, his literary productions, and his theological orthodoxy. Father Murphy, guided by the completely objective analysis of other truth-loving scholars, prudently discredits the false charges against his worthy subject, and makes the following disclosures: Rufinus was no mean personage among the learned churchmen, whose works were consulted with comparative frequency by the author; his literary style evinces considerable competence in composition and argumentation; personally, he was gentle, modest, timid, humble, and sincere, than whom "a more learned man or a kinder one was not to be found among men" (Palladius); he edified all who visited him at the Melanian foundation in Jerusalem during twenty-seven years, conscientiously intent upon achieving Christian perfection, whereas his principal and implacable critic, though sincere, was periodically "puffed up with self-seeking, which hurt his character exceedingly," as Palladius remarks. Patently, in solid virtue, balanced mentality, and uniform living, Rufinus stood handsomely superior, being associated intimately with many distinguished churchmen and saintly ascetics of the latter fourth and early fifth centuries. It is delightfully significant that the dissertation is dated for the feast of Saint Jerome.

Granted that the Elder Melania — erudite, wealthy, saintly — was a key figure in the career of Rufinus, she definitely does not require such detailed comments regarding her travels and activities in this work. The author's English versions of his abundant Latin citations are sufficiently accurate and idiomatic. Among the twenty-five misprints in the copious footnotes, happily none are heretical, some are etymological, others are syntactical. In chapter I, note 47, the citation should be: *lbid.*, 30. In chapter I, note 53, and chapter II, note 14, we read *nolui*, whereas in chapter I, note 47, this same quotation is affirmative, *volui*, in harmony

with Migne. Then, too, it would be more practical to avoid duplication of identical passages, and more popular to reduce purely academic verbiage

to a suitable minimum, salva semper claritate.

Dr. Murphy merits our unstinted gratitude. His Regesta Rufiniana are admirable; his Bibliography, doctoral; his Index, practical. Starting eight years ago, he published his interest in the "Irascible Hermit," Saint Jerome, and "His Foil," Rufinus of Aquileia. It is obvious that the mills of God grind slowly; but in due time Truth will triumph, and Justice will win.

URBAN MUELLER, O.F.M. Cap.

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Lent. A Liturgical Commentary on the Lessons and Gospels. By Conrad Pepler, O.P. (St. Louis, Mo.: B. Herder Co., 1944. Pp. x+406. \$4.00.)

Fr. Pepler has rendered a notable service to the Catholic clergy and laity by his splendid liturgical commentaries on the Lessons and Gospels of Lent. It is a great contribution to the ever-increasing literature on Christian spirituality. Doubtlessly the present volume will be found useful in more than one way; the commentaries are not only liturgical, but also devotional and ascetical. They carry the full import of the Lenten spirit. For the primary purpose of the Lessons, as the author states, "is to lead every Christian to identify himself with Christ hanging on the Cross" (p. vi). That aim is well demonstrated in the course of this voluminous work.

It is the author's contention that the Church intended the Lessons for a set purpose, namely, as a course, or the basis of a course, of instructions to catechumens and Christians alike to prepare them for the Easter sacraments, baptism for the former, penance for the latter, and Eucharist for both (p. vi). The Lessons were meant "as a solid basis of instruction gradually revealing the mysteries of Christian religion to those who were finally to be brought into the Church by baptism" (p. vi); consequently the doctrine contained therein "is aptly chosen for the season of the year unfolding day by day, step by step, the way of Lent, of Christian asceticism, of Christian life" (p. iv).

It is towards this purpose, namely, "to unravel from these varied scriptural readings a consistent and orderly doctrine" (p. iii), that the author presented this present work. The entire Lenten season is divided

into two fairly equal parts, each having a definite scope in view.

In the course of his book Fr. Pepler emphasizes a sound principle of asceticism that the mere external observances of Lent do not carry much weight when they are not guided and motivated by the noble goal to which they should tend. The external observances, such as fasting, almsgiving and prayer, are but means which, if devoid of the end to which they are ordinated, become useless.

The book is well written and is an excellent help towards bringing the true Lenten spirit to Catholics at large. Priests, especially those engaged in pastoral work, will find in this volume a wealth of material for Lenten sermons, enriched by many interesting historical facts bearing on the

customs and rites of early Christians.

Aside from the fact that the author's pre-arranged plan of the whole scheme of the Lenten liturgy appears artificial, and is not shared by other liturgical writers, there are a few details which could stand correction. Thus on page 129, the author claims that Origen was the first to write a treatise on prayer. As far as we know it was Tertullian who has written the first treatise on prayer; his De Oratione, written between 198 and 200, preceded by some thirty years the work by Origen. Then, the author's statement that Aetheria "had listened, perhaps from the lips of the great master of Lenten instructions, S. Cyril of Jerusalem himself [the italics are those of the reviewer], to a veritable Sermo Domini" (p. 337), is highly improbable. Finally, the statement that pagans in the state of grace "necessarily belong to the Church, though unwittingly" (p. 141) ought to be revised in the light of the Encyclical of Pope Pius XII Mystici Corporis, or, at least, it should be followed by an explanation lest it be incorrectly interpreted.

GREGORY GRABKA, O.F.M. Conv.

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Smaointe Beatha Chriost i. Innsint Ghaelge a chuir Tomás Gruamdha O Bruacháin (fl. c. 1450) ar an Meditationes Vitae Christi. Cainneach O Maonaigh, O.F.M. a chuir i n-eagar. [A fifteenth century Gaelic translation of the Meditationes Vitae Christi, edited by Canice Mooney, O.F.M.] (Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 64-5 Merrion Square, Dublin, 1944. Pp. xlvii+400. Introduction, Text, Notes in Gaelic, Appendix in English, and Vocabulary in Irish and Latin. 10/6.)

The beginning of the fifteenth century marked the final stages of the Gaelicization of the Franciscan Order in Ireland. It also saw the establishment of the Strict Observance. The fusion of these two processes placed at the disposal of the Gaelic-speaking section of Ireland translations of some of the gems of Franciscan literature. One of the greatest of these translations was done by Thomas O Bruacháin (fl. c. 1450), choir canon in Killala. It was the celebrated Meditationes Vitae Christi. Of this translation, Fr. Canice Mooney, O.F.M., the editor of the first printed edition, writes: 'O Bruacháin's style is simple and direct, and often recaptures the pathos and naïveté of the original. Hyperbole, runs, and the other literary stock-in-trade of writers of his time are almost entirely absent from his pages. At times the adroitness with which he turns some abstract thought wins our whole-hearted admiration. The language, considering the translation dates from the middle or first half of the fifteenth century, is amazingly modern, and certainly far easier than contemporary ossianic texts' (pp. 364-5).

One would expect that the influence of this translation would have been as striking in Ireland as it had been elsewhere, but to judge from the surviving material, it was not so: principally because the two great forms of art, dramatic and pictorial, which were most affected by it, were almost non-existent in Gaelic Ireland. And its failure to influence contemporary poetry was none the less striking on account of the fact that there was in Ireland an organized and highly-trained body of poets whose sole care was the cultivation of literature. These men were, however, intransigent traditionalists, rabidly loyal to their own form of culture which had grown and developed beyond a youthful adaptability. And they as successfully withstood the benign influence of the Meditationes then, as they were to withstand that of the Renaissance at a later date. They were rigorously moulded into a fixed mentality from their youth in schools where they mastered a standard dialect for expressing poetic ideas in intricate metres of subtle music. Their poetry was, therefore, the faithful reflex of the cultural aristocracy which produced it. The Meditationes provided just those vital elements which were so conspicuously absent from their poetry. But they were far too culture-proud to realize that. And what they deigned to borrow was transformed in the Bardic mind, the metamorphosis stripping the material of all its distinctive appeal, which was to the heart. No one acquainted with early Medieval Gaelic lyrics will be surprised at this imperviousness. Long before the Franciscan spirit impinged on the Gaelic mind, these bards had turned their backs on a native "Franciscan" literature, produced by monks whose form of life so closely resembled that of Francis. Of this earlier literature Dr. Robin Flower writes:

... I think it may be claimed that the Irish were naturally Franciscan, Franciscan before St. Francis. For, when we read the records of the early church, the legends, the poems, the rules, we cannot escape the feeling that we are here in presence of a rehearsal of the Franciscan drama, centuries before it was first staged at Assisi. For where they are most characteristic and least dulled by later unimaginative repetition, these records have that very air of morning freshness which surrounds the early Franciscan traditions. In that young experience the world is born anew and the dews of that rebirth keep miraculously fresh every action and every utterance of the saints. In their poetry all natural things and creatures are seen as with an eye made magically clear and simple by some strange chastity of vision. And this faculty they had conquered for themselves, as the Franciscans were to do later, by extreme austerity. (Ireland and Medieval Europe, p. 16. "The Sir John Rhys memorial lecture," British Academy, 1937. From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Volume XIII).

If the cultivation of literature had been the exclusive privilege of the bardic cast, the Gaelic Meditationes would almost certainly have perished, but there were others, popular poets and scribes, some of them possibly from the fringes of this same coterie, to whom the original appeal was irresistable. And only those acquainted with the sorrowful history of Gaelic men of letters will realize the extent of the devotedness of those obscure scribes, who handed on this masterpiece, in MSS., from one generation to another, right down to the middle of the nineteenth century. The wide diffusion in time and space of the Gaelic version and its direct influence on fairly modern popular poetry are a tribute not only to its

original author, but also to the discrimination of those men who acquired their sense of the beautiful from a native tradition which so successfully withstood a policy of extermination directed against it for centuries.

The romantic story of the vicissitudes of this text is fully and ably told by Fr. Canice Mooney in his critical edition of this ancient text. He has based his edition on the oldest surviving copy made directly from the original translation. In his elaborate Stemma Codicum he traces the relation of all surviving MSS. This work must have involved immense labour; and it is regrettable that after all his pains he did not enter into greater detail as to how he established all these MS. relationships.

The greater part of this work, edited in Gaelic, will be a closed book for most American readers. But there is an English Appendix (pp. 323-366) containing a most up-to-date account of every aspect of the many problems connected with this text. The editor, not only treats of the diffusion and influence of the Gaelic translation, but also discusses the authorship, sources,

diffusion and influence of the Latin original.

No one interested in the world-wide influence of Franciscan literature can afford to neglect this scholarly work.

CUTHBERT MC GRATH, O.F.M.

Franciscan Friary, Dublin.

Heroes of the Cross: An American Martyrology. (Rev. ed.) By Marion A. Habig, O.F.M. Paterson, N.J.; St. Anthony Guild Press, 1945. Pp. 254. \$2.50.)

The new edition of Father Habig's delightful book is enlarged by seventy-nine pages. Essentially it is the story of the Franciscan Martyrs of North America, yet by including stories of non-Franciscan martyrs and by appending a complete list of all martyrs of the United States, it will have a still wider appeal to Catholic readers. Out of the one hundred and sixteen martyrs of the United States seventy-four belonged to the Order of Friars Minor. To these are to be added twelve missionaries who perished from hardships on their journeys and two who were wounded but recovered. In Canada two martyrs are listed, a Friar Minor and a Capuchin. In Mexico thirty-eight Friars Minor died the death of martyrs and in Central America eight Friars Minor. To these are added two Friars Minor of Canada who are not martyrs in the strict sense, one was tortured by the Iroquois but recovered, and the other died of exposure on his missionary trips. Friar Habig stresses the remarkable fact that the First martyrs of North America were Franciscans both in Mexico as in the United States and Canada. Yet they all were preceded by martyrs on the Antilles in 1516 and in Brazil in 1505; the two Franciscans murdered in Brazil on June 19, 1505, are the First or Proto-Martyrs of All America. Not all of these American martyrs were born in Europe. The Franciscan Augustine Ponze de Leon, killed in 1704 by the Apalaches, was born in Florida, and ten of the Franciscan missionaries killed by the Pueblos in 1680 were natives of Mexico.

Owing to dearth of material the story of the individual martyrs had to be very unequal. But all that could be gathered has conscientiously been worked up by the author as is attested by the reference notes and the Bibliography (pp. 135-166). He himself corrected errors made in the older edition. Certainly future researches may unearth new sources of information but for the time being Fr. Habig's work is the most authoritative history on the subject and his "American Martyrology" is the most complete record in print. The reviewer is happy to state that he cannot find any flaw in Fr. Habig's book and recommends it most heartily to all lovers of American history. On page 17, Father Habig states that the Franciscans in 1786 had twice as many men and three times as many colleges and missions in Spanish America as the Jesuit Fathers. This Franciscan preponderance will be still greater, if we count the work of the poor Capuchins in their missions stretching from Louisiana to Brazil. In one province, in Venezuela, these sons of St. Francis have eclipsed the work of Franciscans, Jesuits and Dominicans combined (237 out of 347 missions among Indians were founded by the Capuchins). The Capuchin missions in eastern Venezuela became internationally known, when the Venezuela Boundary dispute under President Cleveland (1895 sq.) was settled on the strength of maps of Capuchin missions.

JOHN M. LENHART, O.F.M. Cap.

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Eastern Catholic Worship. By Donald Attwater. (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1945. Pp. 224. \$2.50.)

The author, already well-known in this country, gives as the threefold object of his book: the encouragement of interest and understanding of Eastern worship, the furnishing of a handy reference book, and the increase of the private devotion of the readers. To reach these objectives he presents, after a general Introduction, a translation of the principal liturgies used at present by Catholics. Included are (what Latins call) the Common of the Mass of the Byzantine, Armenian, Coptic, Ethiopian, Syrian, Maronite, Chaldean, Malabar and (as an Appendix) Roman Liturgies. The treatment of the various rites is fairly complete and, although certain portions are omitted, a good general view is presented. However, for the understanding a comparative outline and interior connection between Eastern and Western Rites would offer a great help. It is exactly in this matter that confusion exists. Western Europeans and Americans often do not sufficiently realize that, with the exception of a few living in the larger cities, all Eastern Christians, including those of Russia, the Balkans and Near East, are very little educated especially in religious matters. This is the reason for the frequent repetitions and the long drawn-out instructional and prayer parts of the Liturgy. The text of the Byzantine Liturgy is translated from the original Greek. All others are retranslations of one or perhaps more translations. This is why the book is not quite suitable for deeper theological studies, but it is very well adapted to achieve the other ends which the author had in view. Notwithstanding a few minor shortcomings, Eastern Catholic Worship is recommendable to general readers.

KILIAN J. HENNRICH, O.F.M. Cap.

Our Lady of Sorrows Friary, New York, N.Y.

Catholics and the Civil War. By Rev. Benjamin J. Blied, Ph.D. (Milwaukee, Wis.: private publ., 1945. Pp. 162.)

The author prefaces these essays with the remark that "they are neither exhaustive, nor do they constitute an integrated narrative, but as a collection of fragments they may be helpful to others who wish to tell the story of the civil war in detail." They represent many hours of careful research in a field that has interested the Rev. Dr. Blied since he began to prepare his thesis for the degree of master of arts. They present the findings of the author regarding the bishops of the North and the South, the Catholic press in our country, the influencing of Europe, the Fenian Brotherhood, the charity in the armies, Wisconsin Catholics, and the mourning with the nation at the death of Lincoln. They will therefore be most useful to those who are interested in this phase of the history of the Church in the United States. A selected Bibliography and a good Index will help to supplement this usefulness.

THEODORE ROEMER, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Lawrence College, Mount Calvary, Wis.

The Practice of the Presence of God. By Brother Lawrence of the Resurrection. Translated by Sister Mary David, S.S.N.D. (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Book Shop, 1945. Pp. 127. \$2.25.)

This is one of those small books that may not be lightly put aside without the loss of profit it may occasion to spiritual guides of religious, or to those seeking self-perfection. The material was partly written, partly gathered and partly explained by Abbé Joseph de Beaufort some three centuries ago. It comprises (1) a spiritual biography of Brother Lawrence a Discalced Carmelite Brother, (2) an exposition of the way he practiced the remembrance of the presence of God, (3) some personal interviews (4) maxims, and (5) letters of the Brother, who, so far as the reviewer knows, is not yet on the way to the honors of the altar. Although the book is a translation, and a good one, of an old French treatise, it is by no means antiquated so far as doctrine and practice are concerned.

Its doctrines are independent of time and circumstances, although its practice may be somewhat easier at one particular time than another. The gradual opening of the world to religious and the opening of the monastery or convent to the world have brought about changes which do not contribute to spirituality and perfection, the main purposes of religious life in community. However, this should not lead us to the rash conclusion that

walking and living in the presence of God is no longer practiced among

religious as well as among seculars in various degrees.

The book abounds in good thoughts to increase the number of such religious as well as to increase their fervour. For personal use a careful and meditative reading will bring highly desirable results. It may at least recall the truth that the warmth of the love of God is entirely adequate to offset the coldness of the world, and while making concessions to the weakness of the flesh, we must not neglect to draw on the power of grace and the Spirit. Brother Lawrence's way leads a simpler path to the presence of God than many of those ways advanced by other spiritual writers and is, therefore, more commendable.

KILIAN J. HENNRICH, O.F.M. Cap.

Our Lady of Sorrow Friary, New York, N.Y.

Proceedings of the National Liturgical Week, 1944. (Chicago: The Liturgical Conference, Inc., 1945. Pp. ix+173. \$1.35.)

This fifth volume of the annual Liturgical Week reports carries the five papers read at the 1944 Liturgical Conference held at St. Meinrad's Abbey in October as well as the eighteen contributions offered at the December Liturgical Week held in New York City. Unlike the four previous Liturgical Week proceedings, the 1944 volume omits the floor discussion and comments, except in most concise statements of fact. The volume is indexed for practical use and runs a graded, well-planned bibliography for reading and study along lines of Liturgy.

The Conference contributions strike a decidedly scientific note and furnish excellent new material on these subjects: "The Liturgy and Orthodox Belief," "The Psalms in Catholic Life," "The Liturgy and the Word of God," "The Language of the Roman Liturgy," "Restoration of the

Parish High Mass and Vespers."

It would seem invaluable to anyone interested in the highly moot question of a modified vernacular liturgy that they carefully study Dom Rembert Sorg's convincing case against the vernacular. Monsignor Stedman's statistical and wholly practical review of the liturgical mind of seven hundred chaplains in the armed forces will confirm those who hold for changes in the liturgical language. Granted the present language barrier to full active participation of the laity in the Sacrifice, one readily agrees to the increasingly current practice of continuous explanation from the pulpit during the offering of Holy Mass. Dom Sorg's article along with Monsignor Stedman's would themselves make the *Proceedings* worthwhile reading.

Throughout the eighteen articles comprising the New York Liturgical Week sessions the accent is on practice. Agreeably absent to the mind of this reviewer is the not uncommon tendency among liturgical enthusiasts towards cultural cant. In this symposium of liturgical findings and suggestions the typical pastor is not made to feel himself a failure. (Perhaps this it not good!) In fact some five or more pastors recount their humble

progress towards alerting their flocks to the rich pastures of the liturgy. Honestly and without "fluff or flubdub" they tell of painstaking efforts

and moderate but solid advances in their city and rural parishes.

This Liturgical Week of 1944, so far as the printed matter is any index, seems to mark the liturgical movement in America as fully adult. No longer the demand for utopian and third-heavenly lyrics to propagandize the movement. By token of the volume under review, the pastors of the United States have begun to lead their flocks down to Bethlehem, to the "indispensable source of the true Christian spirit." Surely when the pastors move liturgically there can be no question of the momentum of the liturgical movement here in our country.

For pulpit and classroom and study the *Proceedings* cover a broad field of readily usable materials pertinent to almost every phase of liturgical life. Equipped with a good working index this little volume becomes

a needed addition to anyone's liturgical books.

ROBERT WILKEN, O.F.M.

Duns Scotus College, Detroit, Mich.

The Priest of the Fathers. By Edward L. Heston, C.S.C. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co. 1945. Pp. 171. \$2.50.)

This fine book, to which His Excellency the Apostolic Delegate contributes a Foreword, is as timely as it is practical. Dr. Heston, already favorably known through his articles in Catholic periodicals, considers the priest in his relations to God, to the people, and to himself. The result is thirteen interesting and useful chapters to which St. Gregory the Great furnishes the Conclusion. There is a topical Index but no bibliography. The footnotes, all religated to the end of the book, suggest that Migne's collection was the principal source of the quotations. The author speaks through the mouths of the Fathers and of some Doctors of the Church, not by merely quoting them, but by weaving them into fluent and readible chapters covering many phases of the priestly ministry and life.

The selection of topics and material is well done. The adopted tech-

nique was a happy choice, because it enabled him to bring before his readers some necessary things and thoughts that a Father of the Church could say, but which might be objected to if they came from the pen of a lesser authority. This does not mean that the book contains passages that might offend pious ears as the selections are presented prudently, wisely, and charitably. The topics dealt with are perennial and by no means antiquated. Conditions may change but the nature of things remains. Since this reviewer obviously has no intention to criticize the Fathers, he will, instead, recommend the book to clerics of all ranks, to seminarians, and especially

to retreat-masters for the clergy. It is not suitable for the "mothers of the Church."

KILIAN J. HENNRICH, O.F.M. Cap.

Our Lady of Sorrows Friary, New York City. Orientations. By Alcantara Dion, O.F.M. (Montreal: Editions Pax et Bonum, 1945. Pp. 266.)

Culture de la Liberté au foyer et à l'école. By Alcantara Dion, O.F.M. (Montreal: L'Ecole Sociale Populaire, 1945. Pp. 32.)

The generation born between the two wars owes a debt of gratitude to Father M. Alcantara for the illuminating directives he has given regarding education, and particularly regarding professional orientation. For many years a director of secondary education and professor at Laval University, he has ably made use of his pedagogical knowledge for the benefit of both educators and young people. In the course of the scholastic year 1943-1944, he gave a series of talks at Radio-Collège on the principal careers open to young men. Although he is very practical in these talks, he has intentionally refrained from a pragmatism too much in vogue in the United States and even Canada. Orientations is not a book of recipes for rapid or economical success as, for instance, How to Win Friends and Influence People. It is rather akin to two scholarly works of Mr. Esdras Minville, which it happily completes: Invitation à l'Etude and L'homme d'affaires. It strives to bring out the necessity of steady work and the great advantages of a solid culture as the key to success in whatsoever career may be chosen. At this particularly difficult hour, when our young men, anxious and bewildered, threaten chaos through difficulties in finding employment and through demoralizing inactivity, Orientations is most welcome, and should be for many the life-buoy that will save them. The concrete and precise knowledge of specific exigencies, of the advantages and difficulties inherent in each career, will perhaps be of more actual help than all the hypothetical allocations and subventions which were made to dazzle the eyes of our service men.

We now turn to the pamphlet of Father Alcantara, Liberty and liberties are on the lips of all since the start of the war just ended, and especially since the Atlantic Charter. We are told that we fought for liberty and for its triumph over the most inhuman tyranny. This theme seemed so important to the promoters of the Semaines Sociales that they chose it as the most fitting topic for the twenty-fifth Semaine Sociale of Canada, which was held last September in Montreal. R. P. M. Alcantara was entrusted with the paper Culture de la liberté au foyer et à l'école (the cultivation of liberty at home and in the school); and he treated it with the competency of an expert. He states that true liberty consists in the "capacity of doing good." In order that this capacity may be developed in the man of tomorrow, he must be trained to it progressively from his early childhood. The child's will must be trained to love, to want and to choose, what is good, just and honest, not because it is commanded, but because the intellect presents it as desirable. True liberty can result only from the union of intellect and will. Consequently the pedagogue must be an educator rather than a master; he must respect the child's personality, and he must develop in him the sense of personal responsibility, the spirit of initiative. All of this will increase in the child the capacity to act freely and reasonably for his own greater good and that of the community in which he lives. We are grateful to the author for his wise directives and

clear explanations. We hope that they may be brought to the attention of many educators, so that they may be helped "to prepare a finer race of men."

P. ALFRED DE SAINT-ALEXANDRE, O.F.M. Cap.

La Réparation, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Montréal.

German Education and Re-education. By Susanne Charlotte Engelmann, Ph.D. (New York: International Universities Press, 1945. Pp. 147. \$2.00.)

This book presents a brief summary of the history of education in Germany. The author groups her material under three convenient headings: education before the First World War; education under the Republic; education in Hitler's Reich. A single chapter is devoted to each period. The fourth, and final, chapter discusses the problems of re-education in

occupied Germany.

The presentation is largely factual, in the main unbiased, and quite objective. However, it is a generalization and suffers the defects of most generalizations, i.e. cursory and incomplete treatment. It is to the author's credit to have pointed out in several places that the problem of German education cannot be properly understood if studied apart from the country's civic and economic problems. Germany will not be re-educated in the midst of political unrest and economic insecurity. In the few places in which the author by necessity touches on fundamental philosophical issues her reasoning is vague and inconsistent.

The book has an Introduction by Lewis M. Terman, professor at

Stanford university, a short Bibliography, but no index.

MYLES PARSONS, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Lawrence College, Mount Calvary, Wis.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Blue Ribbon Books, Garden City, New York:

 Living Biographies of Great Philosophers, by Henry Thomas and Dana Lee
 Thomas (viii+335pp.).
- Newman Bookshop, Westminister, Maryland:

 Master and Model, by Rev. Simon Conrad, O.F.M. Cap. (123pp.; \$1.50).

 Meditation on the Passion, Compiled from various sources with an Introduction, by Rev. Reginald Walsh, O.P. (viii+305pp.).
- DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, NOTRE DAME, INDIANA:

 The Aristotelian-Thomistic Concept of Chance, by Sister M. Julienne Junkersfeld, S.S.M.D., M.A. (vii+86pp.).
- Polish Star Publishing Co., Inc., Philadelphia, Penn.:

 Ozdoba Padwy Czyli Ascetyczno-Biograficzne Rozprawy o Swietym Antonim z
 Padwy, Napisal Przew. O. Norbert Zonca, S.T.D., S.T.M., D.P. (xv+270pp.).
- SIMON AND SCHUSTER, INC., New YORK:

 A History of Western Philosophy, by Bertrand Russell (xxiii+896pp.; \$5.00).
- UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS, PHILADELPHIA, PA.:

 Studies and Documents, XIV The De Incarnatione of Athanasius; Part I The
 Long Recension Manuscripts, by George J. Ryan. (xi+125pp.; \$4.00).
- COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK:

 University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, by Lynn Thorndike
 (xvii+476pp.; \$5.50).
- CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, D.C.:

 Physics and Philosophy, A Study of Saint Thomas' Commentary on the Eight Books of Aristotle's Physics, by James A. McWilliams, S.J. (viii+143pp.; \$2.00).
- Franciscan Press, Jerusalem, Palestine:

 Fra Niccolo of Poggibonsi: A Voyage Beyond the Seas (1346-1350), Publications of the Studium Biblicum Franciscanum No. 2, translated by Fr. T. Bellorini, O.F.M. and Fr. E. Hoade, O.F.M. (xlviv+144pp.).
- F. A. DAVIS CO., PHILADELPHIA, PA.:

 Medical Ethics for Nurses, by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A., Ph.D. (xv+356pp.; \$3.00).
- The Newman Book Shop, Westminister, Md.:

 Kyrie Eleison:
 Two Hundred Litanies, by Benjamin Francis Musser, O.F.M. (xxxv+300pp.; \$2.50).
- PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, PRINCETON, N.J.: The Sikhs, by John Clark Archer (xi+353pp.; \$3.75).
- HENRY HOLT AND CO.:
 A Preface to Logic, by Morris R. Cohen (xi+209pp.; \$2.50).
- SHEED AND WARD, NEW YORK:

 John Henry Newman, by John Moody (ix+353pp.; \$3.75).
- DUBLIN, 2 CHAPEL ST.:

 The Capuchin Annual 1945-46, edited by Father Senan, O.F.M. Cap. (512pp.; \$2.50).

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Cum permissu superiorum.

OCKHAM'S THEORY OF SUPPOSITION AND THE NOTION OF TRUTH

UR discussion of Ockham's theory of signification, though limited to essentials, has prepared the way for an understanding of his theory of supposition and, consequently, of the notion of truth. This ingenious medieval theory of supposition, which unfortunately is much neglected by modern schoolmen and even misunderstood by historians of Medieval Philosophy, will finally answer the question: What is truth or falsity as applied to a proposition? For truth is given when and only when the subject and predicate of the same proposition stand or supposite for the same thing. To be sure, supposition is not truth, but supposition enters the definition of truth, at least if we are interested in a semantic definition of truth (sometimes called logical truth) and if we are not to indulge in vague circumlocutions about the relation of correspondance between a proposition and a state of affairs, which relation of correspondance in a general way characterizes every scholastic theory of truth. As we have shown in our first study on the notion of truth, a semantic elucidation of the notion of truth seems to have been attempted by almost all the scholastics. That Ockham did the same can hardly be called an innovation; that he made a more careful analysis than others before him, is his distinct contribution to scholastic philosophy. In order to show that, we must first acquaint ourselves with Ockham's theory of supposition, and then show its bearing on the notion of truth.

I. OCKHAM'S THEORY OF SUPPOSITION

The Venerabilis Inceptor neither invented nor introduced the theory of supposition into Medieval Logic, Philosophy, and Theology. It was already in use among logicians long before the time of Ockham, and had made, as we have shown before, its tentative appearance even in theological writings during the early part of

the thirteenth century.¹ Petrus Hispanus, who later became Pope John XXI, merely "codified" or gathered the teaching on supposition in his Summulae logicales, a work which later became the classical logical textbook for beginners.² However, though Petrus Hispanus professed a Terminism, as all good logicians will do, he still remained along with the other thirteenth century logicians a realist as regards the problem of universals. Ockham on the other hand adapted the same theory to his own conceptualism, simplified it, and gave it a classical form. With Ockham, at least, this theory penetrated the entire field of Philosophy and Theology, and its presence is everywhere felt. He applied it with a rigor and consistency hitherto unknown to the discussion of the relations between faith and reason and to an elucidation of philosophical and theological problems.

a. Supposition in General

In order to explain what supposition is we have to recall what signification means, and especially what signum in the sense of language-sign means. As we have seen, sign as language-sign must bring something into cognition, and may either stand for something in a proposition or be added to other signs in a proposition or is a composition of various such signs.³ Now the first part of the disjunction contains the idea of supposition, or, at least, the capability of supposition. Hence it would be awkward to define supposition by referring to sign, which was explained by reference to supposition.

2. This important work is now partly available in English translation (with Latin text); cf. Joseph P. Mullaly, *The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain*, "Publications in Mediaeval Studies" VIII; ed. Philip S. Moore, C.S.C. (Notre Dame, 1945).

3. S. Logicae I, c. 1.

^{1.} Cf. also the following studies on medieval semantics: Ernst Schlenker, "Die Lehre von den göttlichen Namen in der Summe Alexanders von Hales. Ihre Prinzipien und ihre Methode," Freiburger theologische Studien 46. Heft. (Freiburg Br.) 1938. And Franz Manthey, Die Sprachphilosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der Theologie (Paderborn) 1937. Valuable notes on the semantics of various scholastics are likewise found in Ernst Borchert, "Der Einflluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik. Nach dem Traktat De Communicatione Idiomatum des Nicolaus Oresme. Untersuchungen und Textausgabe," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters (Bäumker), Band XXXV, Heft 4-5, Münster 1940. This study contains an excellent bibliography.

2. This important work is now partly available in English translation (with

Our concern, however, is not a definition of supposition in a strict sense; we only intend to clarify the meaning of the term. For the same reason, Ockham himself seems to have abstained from a definition of supposition. He merely remarks that supposition is a property of terms, but only when they are actually used in propositions, and that supposition is *quasi pro alio positio*. However, he clarifies the meaning of supposition by using circumlocutions and examples.

We first start with examples and then proceed to a characterization of the notion of supposition. In the proposition, Homo est animal, both the terms homo and animal at least stand for the same thing as they signify, which is a man and which is an animal. However, we have already said a little too much. What we expressed is correct if the proposition is true, but we have also to take into account false propositions which are false exactly because subject and predicate do not stand for the same thing. For that reason Ockham is careful in his wording, and says that it is denoted that at least one proposition is true, for instance the proposition, Sortes est animal. In this proposition the subject is denoted as standing for an individual, so that by pointing at this individual we can form the proposition "This is an animal." And that is meant by the supposition of the subject. Another instance, "Homo est nomen." This proposition denotes that the spoken sign Homo is a noun. That which is signified by the spoken word Homo, viz. the individual man is, of course, not a noun. In this case, again, we can indicate the spoken word Homo and say, "This is a noun." But since Homo does not stand for its significates, it simply stands or supposits for the spoken word. This is another variety of the supposition of the subject. A third example given by Ockham is the proposition, "Album est animal." In this case it is denoted that at least one white thing, let us say this individual to which we can point, is an animal. Therefore, Album has supposition. Though up to now we have given only examples of the supposition of the subject, the same can be said about the predicate. For instance, the proposition, "Sortes est albus," denotes that Sortes is this particular thing

^{4.} Dicto de significatione terminorum, restat dicere de suppositione, quae est proprietas conveniens termino, sed numquam nisi in propositione. ...Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus stat in propositione pro aliquo, utimur illo termino pro aliquo... (S. Logicae I, c. 62.)

that has whiteness, and, therefore the term "white" has supposition 5

Now we will present Ockham's general characterization of supposition, of which the preceding were only exemplifications. Supposition is a property of terms only in propositions. Furthermore, it is a property which one term has in reference to another, viz., of the subject to the predicate and vice versa. When we say the subject supposites for something, then it is denoted that the predicate is predicated about the subject as such (Homo est nomen) or about the demonstrative pronoun pointing to it or to the individual signified by it. When we say that the predicate supposites for something, it is denoted that the subject functions as subject in regard to it or in regard to the demonstrative pronoun pointing to it.6 Thus we may say that supposition is the use of a languagesign either as subject or as predicate and in reference to each other within a proposition. However, we cannot say that applied signification is supposition because every signification applied in a proposition is supposition, but not vice versa. For supposition also covers cases where signification in the strict sense is not applied, for instance, in the proposition, Homo est nomen. This is the reason why supposition can enter the definition of signification, but not vice versa.

b. Division of Supposition

Ockham adopts a division of supposition which, as far as we could ascertain, first appears in the works of Raymundus Lullus.7

formetur.

7. We assert this on the authority of Carl Prantl, Die Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande. III (Leipzig) 1867, p. 133, note 596. The text quoted there uses almost exactly the divisions and terms which we encounter in Ockham's writings.

^{5.} Sicut per istam: Homo est animal, denotatur, quod Sortes vere est animal, ita quod haec sit vera, so formetur: Hoc est animal, demonstrando Sortem. Per istam ita quod haec sit vera, so formetur: Hoc est animal, demonstrando Sortem. Per istam autem: Homo est nomen, denotatur, quod haec vox 'homo' sit nomen, ideo in ista supponit 'homo' pro illa voce. Similiter per istam: Album est animal, denotatur, quod illa res, quae est alba, sit animal, ita quod haec sit vera: Hoc est animal, demonstrando illam rem, quae est alba, et propter hoc pro illa re subiectum supponit. Et sic proportionaliter dicendum est de praedicato; nam per istam: Sortes est albus, denotatur, quod Sortes est illa res, quae habet albedinem, et ideo praedicatum supponit pro ista re, quae habet albedinem (S. Logicae I, c. 62.).

6. Et sic universaliter terminus supponit pro illo, de quo vel de pronomine demonstrante ipsum per propositionem denotatur praedicatum praedicari, si terminus supponens sit subiectum; si autem terminus sit praedicatum, denotatur, quod subiectum subiicitur respectu illius vel respectu nominis demonstrantis ipsum, si propositio formetur.

This division is different from that offered by Petrus Hispanus and by the other older Logicians, as for instance, William of Shyrswood and Lambert of Auxerre, though it does seem to approach that of William of Shyrswood.8

Three main suppositions are to be distinguished: personal, simple, and material. It is true that a more general distinction could first be made, viz. that between a proper and metaphorical supposition. But the Logician is not greatly concerned with this improper supposition of which a few words will be said later.

Personal supposition is had when a term supposites for its significate, whether this significate be a thing outside the mind, or a word, or a concept, or something written, or anything else that could be imagined, as long as it is signified by this term. Hence in each of the following propositions the predicate has personal supposition: "Man is an animal," "Noun is a word," "Man is a concept," "Man is a written word," "Chimaera is an animal." As is evident from the instances, the predicate everywhere exercizes its significative function, that is, it signifies something different from itself in the strict meaning of language-sign. In other words it signifies that for which it was originally instituted. For this reason Ockham adds the requirement that in personal supposition the term must be taken in its significative function. Hence we can offer this definition: Personal supposition is had when the subject or predicate of a proposition supposites for its significate and has a significative function.9 It is obvious that personal supposition can apply only to categorematic terms, which have a definite meaning, while syncategorematic terms, taken alone, can not have personal supposition. 10

^{8.} Cf. Martin Grabmann, "Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood (+nach 1267)," in Sitzungsherichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Abteilung. Jahrgang 1937, Heft 10, (München)

^{9.} Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato, sive illud significatum sit res extra animam, sive sit vox sive intentio

suo significato, sive illud significatum sit res extra animam, sive sit vox sive intentio animae, sive sit scriptum sive quodcumque imaginabile; ita quod, quandocumque subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis supponit pro suo significato, ita quod significative tenetur, semper est suppositio personalis. (S. Logicae I, c. 63.)

10. Sciendum, quod solum, categorema, quod est extremum propositionis significative sumptum supponit personaliter. Per primum excluduntur omnia syncategoremata, sive sint nomina sive adverbia sive praepositiones, sive quaecumque alia sint. Per secundum excluditur omne verbum... Per secundam particulam 'extremum propositionis' excluditur pars extremi, quantumcumque sit nomen et categorema, sicut hic: Homo albus est animal, nec 'homo' supponit nec 'albus' supponit, sed totum extremum supponit (S. Logicae I, c. 67).

Without going into further details, let us merely state that personal supposition can be subdivided in line with the supposition of the terms of singular, particular, and universal propositions into (1) discrete, (2) determinate (subject and predicate in a particular proposition), (3) common and confused only (the predicate in an affirmative universal proposition), and (4) common, confused and distributive (subject in an affirmative universal proposition).11 We shall make use of these various suppositions later and at the same time give a few explanations. Let us simply affirm here that they contain the elements of a scholastic quantification-theory.

Simple supposition is had when a term supposites or stands for an intention of the mind, that is, for a concept or mental term when it has no significative function. 12 For instance, in the proposition Homo est species, the term Homo has simple supposition. For it is evident that the term does not signify in this proposition any one of its significates which are individual men. Since it does not signify any individual or significate, it cannot have, or rather it does not perform, its significative function either. Therefore, the only thing left for which it can stand meaningfully in this connection is the concept Homo. This is in complete accordance with Ockham's conceptualism and denial of any universality and any unity less than numerical unity outside the conceptual order. Of course, since according to Ockham the concept or the intention of the mind is a reality, being a quality of the mind, the concept conceptus can be truly and correctly predicated about any concept. But as soon as we take any one of the concepts and predicate something about this concept so that pointing to the concept we can say, "This is...," we mean or intend only this concept, and not what the concept signifies or may stand for. In this case the concept does not stand for anything else but itself. Hence in the proposition Homo est species, it is not said that this man or that man, Socrates or Plato etc. is a species, but only that the concept which is represented by itself or the word Homo is a species. Ockham, however, does not forget that there are mental, spoken, and written propositions.13

^{11.} Cf. the whole of Chapter 68 of the first part of the Summa Logicae.
12. Suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative (S. Logicae I, c. 63).
13. Sicut autem talis diversitas suppositionis potest competere termino vocali et scripto, ita etiam potest competere termino mentali, quia intentio potest supponere pro illo, quod significat, et pro seipsa et pro voce et scripto (S. Logicae, I, c. 63).


The case is simple if we have to deal with a mental proposition for then the subject mentioned stands only for itself. It is more complicated if we have to deal with a spoken or written proposition. For the spoken sign Homo is not an intention of the mind, and consequently we cannot say, "This (meaning the spoken word Homo) is a species." On the other hand, the spoken word and likewise the written word do not signify the concept with which they are connected. Nevertheless, they are connected, to use a modern expression, through association. As Ockham says, the spoken word is subordinated to the concept but does not signify it in the meaning of a strict language sign, that is to say, it cannot supposite for it in significative function. In spite of this, however, it can supposite for it without a significative function by simply representing it or calling it to mind. Briefly we may say that in a spoken proposition — and the same is true for a written proposition — the term with simple supposition stands for an intention of the mind without signifying it in the strict sense.14

Material supposition is had when a term does not supposite in its significative function, but supposites either for a spoken or written sign only. In the proposition Homo est nomen, or Homo scribitur, Homo certainly does not stand for its significates, nor for its corresponding concept; it stands only for itself, namely the material, written, or spoken sign. It is of course a sign that conveys meaning, but its meaning is disregarded and only the sign as artificial language-sign is considered.¹⁵

After these general descriptions of the three main suppositions Ockham reminds us that every term, be it mental, spoken, or written, can have this threefold supposition. It is important, therefore, to distinguish the various relations of strict and broad signification as regards the terms in mental, spoken, and written propositions. They follow a clear and consistently applied pattern. In order to show this, we shall now present these relations in a visual scheme, using a few simple examples.

^{14. ...}et tamen iste terminus 'homo' non significat proprie loquendo illam intentionem, sed illa vox et illa intentio animae sunt tantum signa subordinata in significando idem, secundum modum alibi expositum (S. Logicae I, c. 63). Cf. our preceding article.

^{15.} Suppositio materialis est, quando terminus non supponit significative, sed supponit pro voce vel pro scripto. Sicut patet hic: Homo est nomen; hic 'homo' supponit pro seipso, et tamen non significat seipsum. Similiter hic: Homo scribitur, potest esse suppositio materialis, quia terminus supponit pro illo, quod scribitur (S. Logicae I, c. 63).



A few remarks may explain the meaning of the schematic drawings. We distinguished two kinds of material supposition just as Ockham himself has distinguished them. ¹⁰ In every instance the subject alone has the various suppositions, the predicate retaining always personal supposition. The straight line always indicates that a relation of strict signification is had; the broken line indicates that there is no strict signification but only the relation of subordination, or rather broad signification in the sense of calling to mind or taking the place of the other. For a better understanding let us explain the third drawing: Here *Homo* has material supposition; it simply stands for itself in the spoken proposition and in this spoken proposition it is directly signified in the mental, spoken and written proposition by the predicate *Nomen vocale* and that in the strict sense of signification. The term *Homo*, exercises no

^{16.} Sed illa (scilicet suppositio materialis) potest subdistingui, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro voce vel pro scripto. Et si essent nomina imposita, ita posset distingui suppositio pro voce et scripto sicut suppositio pro significato et pro intentione animae, quarum unam vocamus personalem et aliam simplicem; sed talia nomina non habemus (S. Logicae I, c. 63).

signification in this case; it simply stands for itself. In the mental proposition the mental predicate directly and significatively supposites for the spoken word Homo. The mental term Homo, however, is merely a substitute for the spoken word Homo, it takes its place without signifying it in the strict sense; it calls it to mind, since it is connected with it by voluntary imposition. In the written proposition we have a similar relation.

c. The Primacy of Personal Supposition

The main division into personal, simple, and material supposition means that a term can stand for things or signs of a different order. It makes a great difference whether we use a term or whether we speak of a term. To be alive to this distinction is certainly not a prerogative of modern logicians alone, but of the Scholastics as well. The whole theory of supposition is proof of this.¹⁷ Ockham, therefore tells us that a term must not have a fixed supposition in various propositions, but may supposite pro alio et alio. 18 Those suppositions pro alio et alio viz. personal, simple and material supposition, are, however, not of equal right so to speak. For by natural right a term supposites for that which it signifies in the strict sense. By its original institution every term, and by its original imposition every artificial sign, is meant to signify its significate or at least to signify it in connection with other terms (cosignificare). It is obvious that we use concepts as cognitions of things, but not primarily as concepts in an absolute sense. It is likewise obvious that we use words as signs for their significates, but do not primarily use them as words, that is, as artificial signs without significative function. 10

^{17.} The distinction into the actus exercitus and the actus signatus belongs to the same category. Cf. S. Logicae I, c. 65. Ernest A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham, (London) 1935, p. 43 has assigned much importance to these and similar distinctions. We wholeheartely subscribe to this and recommend the reading of this book for further details about the theory of supposition.

18. Circa primum dico, quod suppositio termini variatur dupliciter: vel quia supponit pro alio et alio, vel quia aliter et aliter supponit. Primo modo dividitur suppositio in suppositionem personalem, simplicem et materialem... (Ordinatio d. 4, q. 1, E). At the beginning of this question Ockham critizes St. Thomas severely as regards the supposition of the term "Deus." Cf. St. Thomas S. Th. I, q. 39, a. 4.

19. Est etiam sciendum, quod terminus, quantum est ex vi suae institutionis sive impositionis, semper habet, quod supponar pro suis significatis. Cuius ratio est, quia cum utamur vocibus pro rebus, manifestum est, quod utimur vocibus pro suis significatis; igitur semper, quantum est ex vi impositionis vocum, (semper) sumuntur

significatis; igitur semper, quantum est ex vi impositionis vocum, (semper) sumuntur significative, et per consequens personaliter, si sint natae supponere personaliter (Expos. s.l. Elenchorum, not yet edited. MS Oxford, Bodl. 558, fol. 95 va).

From this it follows that personal supposition is the first and most basic supposition and consequently has primacy over simple and material supposition. Ockham does not hesitate from this to draw the conclusion that a term has to be taken in personal supposition as long as no other indication or qualification forces us to take the same term in another supposition. Hence if such an indication is given — Ockham merely says ratione adjuncti — the other suppositions may be admitted. Otherwise the term must be taken in personal supposition.20 Now, such an indication is present if the term, let us for the sake of simplicity say the subject, is compared to a predicate, which signifies intentions of the mind or spoken or written words.21

We will enlarge a little on this primacy of personal supposition since it seems it has been misunderstood. When Ockham says that a term in whatsoever proposition and in whatsoever connection it is used can have personal supposition provided it is not limited by the will of those using it to another supposition,22 then he does not by any means say that a term always has and must always have only personal supposition. He affirms rather that the term can also have another supposition. The fact, however, that the term actually has to be taken in another supposition cannot be known from the term alone, but must be ascertained from the other part of the proposition (ratione adiuncti) or from the will of those who use the term. For every categorematic term, since only terms of this kind are capable of personal supposition, means something and is instituted, if it is an artificial sign, to signify something. That is its natural right and the reason for its existence. This means that

(S. Logicae I, c. 64).

^{20.} Sed quod vox supponat aliter quam personaliter, hoc est ex ratione adiuncti, quod pertinet ad aliam suppositionem... (1.c.). Cf.: Hic tamen est advertendum, quod quandocumque terminus ex se, hoc est ex natura institutionis, habet supponere pro aliquo, et ratione adiuncti pro alio, ubicumque ponitur ille terminus, semper habet supponere pro primo, sed ratione adiuncti potest supponere pro secundo praecise (Ordinatio d. 4, q. 1, F).

21. Potest igitur ista regula dari, quod quando terminus potens habere praedictare describilista describilista.

triplicem suppositionem comparatur extremo communi incomplexis sive complexis, sive prolatis sive scriptis, semper terminus potest habere suppositionem materialem, et est talis propositio distinguenda. Quando vero comparatur extremo significanti intentionem animae, est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem. Quando autem comparatur extremo communi omnibus praedictis, tunc est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem simplicem, materialem et personalem... (S. Logicae I, c. 64).

22. Notandum, quod semper terminus, in quacumque propositione ponatur, potest habere suppositionem personalem, nisi ex voluntate utentium arcetur ad aliam

if such a term would not be capable of personal supposition it would not be able to have simple or material supposition for the simple reason that it would not exist at all. Ockham means this when he says that a term can always have personal supposition. For the same reason we have to call personal supposition basic.

However, man has not only the power of obtaining natural signs, that is, concepts of things and of instituting artificial signs of the same things, but he has also the even more amazing power of reflecting upon these first signs, whether natural or artificial, and of obtaining or instituting signs for them. By this fact there is opened to the human intellect a new world, the world of signs of signs. In this world, let us call it antonomastically the logical world, the signs of the former "real" world are individuals, so to speak. But while the individuals of the real world cannot themselves enter propositions but only through their names or signs, the "individuals" of the logical world can enter as such. They do exactly this in simple or material supposition. But as we can have universal propositions as regards the real world, so we can have universal propositions as regards the logical world, as, for instance, "Every concept is predicable," or, "Every proposition is either true or false." In this case personal supposition reappears for both the subject and predicate. This personal supposition is, however, not for things but for signs.

This naturally leads us to a distinction between different levels of language which were de facto clearly held apart by the scholastic theory of supposition and by Ockham's insisting on the primacy of supposition. The case where subject and predicate are denoted to supposite for things which are not signs, is the first level. Here we have what may be called primary personal supposition. The case where the subject or predicate, which is a sign of things and not of signs, does not exercize its significative function and consequently has simple or material supposition while the other extreme of the proposition signifies and supposites for it, is the second level. In such propositions or in such language we are speaking of concepts or names of things. The third level is the case where both subject and predicate signify concepts or names. The second and third levels (and even further levels, if we wish to produce them at will) constitute the proper realm of logic. But the first level is the proper

realm of a scientia realis of Physics, Mathematics and Metaphysics.23 This is the opinion of Ockham. The second and third levels break down, however, if they are not supported by the first level, or the language which speaks about things.

Since every term can appear and be used in two levels of language, it is necessary to make distinctions if the need arises. But the need never arises when the terms are on the same languagelevel. This explains why Ockham demands that certain distinctions be made in certain cases only, but denies the right to make distinctions in other cases. For as long as the two terms of a proposition are used on the same level both have their natural right to personal supposition. But if a term leaves its own level and joins with a term of a higher level, distinctions have to be introduced in order to prevent logical chaos.

Certain rules will serve as guides for the distinction of terms as regards supposition. No proposition need be distinguished as to the supposition of its terms if both terms are first intentions. In other words all propositions which belong to the first level of language are to be accepted without distinctions.24 We could enlarge this rule, as it seems, to a more general rule by saying that no distinction need be made, if both terms have personal supposition, whether both terms be of first intention, second intention, or first or second imposition. Ockham does not say this though he does not deny it either.

When a term capable of the threefold supposition is brought into relation with another term (subject or predicate) of a proposition which is common to spoken or written terms or propositions, then the proposition has to be distinguished; for the first term can

^{23.} Breviter ergo ad intentionem Philosophi est dicendum, quod scientia realis non per hoc distinguitur a rationali, quia scientia realis est de rebus, ita quod ipsae res sunt propositiones scitae vel partes illarum propositionum scitarum, et rationalis non est sic de rebus, sed per hoc, quod partes, scilicet termini, propositionum scitarum scientia reali stant et supponunt pro rebus; non sic autem termini propositionum scitarum scientia rationali, sed illi termini stant et supponunt pro aliis. Ordinatio d. 2, q. 4, O. This text is found in a long digression which Ockham added "propter aliquos inexercitatos in Logica" (M).

24. Item: Nulla propositio, in qua ponitur nomen primae intentionis est distinguenda primo modo (vel secundo), nisi reliquum extremum sit nomen intentionis secundae vel secundae impositionis (Expos. s.l. Elenchorum (cf. note 19)). Cf. S. Logicae I, c. 64: Sed terminus non in omni propositione potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel materialem, sed tunc tantum, quando terminus talis comparatur alteri extremo, quod respicit intentionem animae vel vocem vel scriptum.

have either personal or material supposition. It will be false in one sense and true in the other sense.25

When a term that is capable of the threefold supposition is brought into relation with the other extreme of a proposition which signifies an intention of the mind, then a distinction must be made as the term can have simple or personal supposition. It will be true in one sense and false in the other sense.26

When a term is brought into relation with another extreme of a proposition so that this other extreme is common to spoken or written words and to intentions of the mind, then the term can have all three suppositions and has to be distinguished accordingly. Such a term common to or predicable of mental, spoken, or written terms is, for instance, "to predicate." 27

We hope we made it sufficiently clear in the preceding part that at times we went beyond the littera Ockham. In order to create no misunderstanding let us state expressly that Ockham de facto distinguishes three levels of language: Propositions where subject and predicate are first intentions; propositions where the subject or predicate is a first intention without significative function and the other extreme is a second intention; and propositions where subject and predicate are second intentions each with significative function. We disregard here the case of first and second imposition which

^{25.} Cf. note 21 and Expos. s.l. Elenchorum (cf. note 19): "Item, quando nomen primae impositionis, cui non additur signum particulare nec universale, est unum extremum propositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae impositionis, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod nomen primae impositionis potest supponere personaliter vel materialiter." This rule is narrower and less correct, as it seems, than the formulation given in the Summa Logicae. It would exclude the following proposition: 'All men' is two words. The correctness of both formulations of the rule is guaranteed only if we either compare first intentions with second intentions or first impositions with second impositions, but not, necessarily, if both terms are second intentions or second impositions. In the proposition, "All words are spoken terms," we have personal supposition for both terms.

26. Quando vero comparatur extremo significanti intentionem animae, est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem (S. Logicae I, c. 64). Cf. Expos. s.l. Elenchorum (cf. note 19): "Item notandum est, quod quandocumque nomen primae intentionis est unum extremum propositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae intentionis, potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter, nisi illi nomini primae intentionis addatur aliquod signum particulare vel universale." This latter rule is narrower than the former. Both formulations do not take into account the case where a second intention is used in simple supposition, for instance, "'Concept' is an intention of the mind."

27. Quando autem comparatur extremo communi omnibus praedictis, tunc est extremum propositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae impositionis, illa

^{27.} Quando autem comparatur extremo communi omnibus praedictis, tunc est distinguenda, eo quod potest habere suppositionem simplicem, materialem vel personalem. Et sic est haec distinguenda: Homo praedicatur de pluribus... (S. Logicae I, c. 64). This rule, which seems to be redundand, has no equivalent in the Expositio super libr. Elenchorum.

could be treated similarly. Ockham is mainly interested in the case where a term of first intention enters into communication with a term of second intention and a term of first imposition with a term of second imposition.

In insisting on the fact that every term primarily has a personal supposition and only secondarily another supposition, and by demanding that an indication must be given if a term has not to be taken in personal supposition, Ockham removes from his logic an element of uncertainty and arbitrariness. According to his rules, we are able to check propositions as to the supposition of their terms. Hence the distinctions that he has introduced are not and cannot be made arbitrarily; they are demanded rather by the matter and by the terms that enter the propositions.²⁸ However these distinctions do not remove every possibility of equivocation. They and their corresponding rules will indicate whether a proposition can be true or not as far as the formal structure of propositions is concerned and as long as the terms are used in their proper meaning, and this whether they exercize their specific significative function or not. On the other hand they will not suffice if terms are not used in their proper meaning but in their improper meaning. Hence there is need of a more general distinction of supposition which is demanded by the loose manner of speech customary to all authors even in philosophy and theology. Hence, supposition must be divided into suppositio propria and suppositio impropria. Meanings of words in their improper sense vary according to the various figures of speech.29 It is obvious that we must know whether we have to take

^{28.} Ockham has made clear how he wants such distinctions to be understood in Ordinatio d. 4, q. 1, F: Ex istis patet, quomodo talia quae dixi et quae dicam, scilicet quod hoc potest accipi dupliciter vel tripliciter, vel quod potest accipi sic vel sic, et si accipitur sic, tunc est tale, et si accipitur aliter, tunc est tale, sunt intelligenda: quod non est intelligendum, quod aliquid idem propter acceptionem meam vel considerationem, vel si accipitur sic vel sic, quod sit tale vel tale, sicut alii dicunt, sed est intelligendum, sicut intelligit Aristoteles de ipso termino, quod de codem secundum quod pro diverso et diverso supponit, aliter et aliter verificatur, immo idem affirmatur et negatur. Sicut si in ista propositione: Homo est nomen, ly homo supponit materialiter, tunc est simpliciter vera, si vero supponit personaliter, est simpliciter falsa et suum oppositum verum: Homo non est nomen. Et ita non est concedendum, quod idem est nomen et non est nomen propter diversam considerationem vel acceptionem, sed quod de eodem termino pro uno vere affirmatur esse nomen et de eodem termino pro alio vere negatur esse nomen. Et ita non est idem, quod est nomen et quod non est nomen, sed de eodem termino propter variam suppositionem vere affirmatur et negatur idem.

29. Oportet autem cognoscere quod sigut est suppositio propria, quando scilicet

^{29.} Oportet autem cognoscere, quod sicut est suppositio propria, quando scilicet terminus supponit pro eo, quod significat proprie, ita est suppositio impropria, quando terminus accipitur improprie. Multiplex autem est suppositio impropria, scilicet

a term in the one or the other sense in order not to end in confusion. It is precisely to avoid such logical chaos that Ockham uses the ancient distinction between the proper and improper sense and the other old distinction between de virtute sermonis and de proprietate sermonis. It is true that Ockham has made more use of these distinctions than have any other scholastics before him.

DIGRESSION ON THE MEANING OF THE De Virtute Sermonis

From the preceding it should be sufficiently evident that Ockham did not consider a proposition simply false if it cannot be true in personal but only in another supposition, or even if it can be true only in an improper supposition. It was the doubtful privilege of certain smaller Ockhamists of Paris to call any proposition simply false which is false in personal supposition; it is regrettable that Michalski has dragged Ockham into their camp

by questionable means.

În his (probably) latest publication: "Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIVème siècle," in Studia Philosophica (Lemberg), II (1937), 255 ss (23 ss), this great pioneer in the field of fourteenth-century scholasticism, unfortunately has misrepresented Ockham's position as regards the use of de virtute sermonis. After a careful study of the pertinent documents and texts we could not convince ourselves that Michalski has correctly understood the document of condemnation of certain "Ockhamistic errors" issued by the Faculty of Arts in Paris in 1340 (Charturlarium Universitatis Parisiensis II, 505-507). Since the publications of the eminent Polish historian are quite often used in an uncritical manner (cf. Franciscan Studies 5 (1945) 315, where we promised a more detailed discussion of the point), we are forced once more to the ungrateful task of criticizing a scholar to whom we are very much indebted. However, our following redress of Michalski's misinterpretation is not made with the intention of whitewashing Ockham or even of proving that he was in no way meant by the condemnation of 1340. It is a fact that his name occurs in the document, however not in connection with the problem under consideration. Though we are personally convinced that Ockham's use of the term de virtute sermonis was not condemned, nevertheless, we are ready to admit that his frequent use of the term could easily induce a superficial reader to include him in this condemnation. Let us not forget that he had a famous adversary in the Faculty of Arts, Walter Burley, whom he had ridiculed and who had already in 1329 or before that date written a work against him (Cf. The Tractatus de Successivis... Franciscan Institute Publications I, (1944), 4). Since the document of condemnation does not state that Ockham's teaching is meant, we are at liberty to presuppose that the authors of it at least did not feel

antonomatica, quando terminus supponit praecise pro illo, cui maxime convenit, sicut in talibus: Apostolus dicit hoc, Philosophus negat hoc, et similibus. Alia est synecdochica, quando pars supponit pro toto. Alia est metaphorica, quando continens supponit pro contento, vel quando abstractum accidentis supponit pro subiecto, et sic de aliis (S. Logicae I, c. 76).

sure about him. We have, therefore, the right to ask whether Michalski's assumptions are correct. We shall do that by first presenting the content of the document of condemnation as regards the use of the expression de virtute sermonis, secondly Michalski's interpretation of and comment on it, and finally we shall add the necessary correction.

The decree of the faculty of arts demands the following: No professor is allowed to call a proposition of a "famous" author false in an unqualified sense or false by virtue of expression when he is convinced that the author understood it correctly. In such a case, he must either concede that proposition or separate the true sense from the false sense by making a distinction:

Nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel scolares in artium facultate legentes Parisius audeant aliquam propositionem famosam illius actoris cujus librum legunt, dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, si crediderint quod actor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed vel concedant eam, vel sensum verum dividant a sensu falso... (p. 506).

No one is allowed to call any proposition false in an unqualified sense or by virtue of expression, which would be false, if the terms were taken in personal supposition, since this error leads to the former; for authors often make use of other suppositions. No one is allowed to say that a proposition is to be distinguished, since this leads to the aforementioned errors... No one is allowed to say that no proposition is to be conceded if it is not true in its proper sense, since that leads to the aforementioned errors...

These are the condemned propositions concerning the expression de virtute sermonis. Amann in the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique (t. 11,

I, col. 897) gives a good and cautious summary of them.

Michalski (l.c. p. 257) however is convinced that the decree has condemned the doctrine of Ockham concerning the use of *De virtute sermonis*. Since copies of Michalski's article seem to be extremely scarce in this country — we were able to use it only through the courtesy of Prof. Weinberg of Cincinnati — we shall quote him literally:

La tendance d'Ockham dans la direction de l'actuelle sémantique n'aurait pas sans doute suscité une opposition retentissante dans l'histoire de la philosophie, si elle n'avait pas empiété sur le domaine de la théologie pour attaquer de façon inattendue certaines expressions de l'Ecriture Sainte et des théologiens. Le décret de Paris de l'année 1340 apparut comme une réaction contre cette tendance... Je dois immédiatement faire remarquer que le décret ne mentionne pas le nom d'Ockham (this is exact only in the sense that Ockham's name is not mentioned in "condemnations"; however it is mentioned at the end of the decree in another connection); mais, que ce soit bien de lui qu'il s'agissait, nous le savons par Denifle qui rapporte un passage du livre des procureurs de la nation anglaise où la secte des Ockhamistes est désignée expressément.

Michalski is furthermore convinced that the expression *de virtute sermonis* is connected with the old controversy as to whether words have meaning by nature or by institution:

Comme plus d'une fois elle (viz. the expression "de virtute sermonis") apparaît en opposition avec la formule "ad placitum", il pouvait sembler qu'il s'agit ici de l'ancienne controverse grecque, à savoir si les mots ont leur sens physei ou thései. Sans aucun doute l'expression ellemême se rattache à cette controverse; pourtant elle a chez Ockham une signification quelque peu différente.

Finally, the "unexpected attacks" made by Ockham against certain expressions of Holy Scripture and theologians, is substantiated by Michalski with a really shocking text of Ockham (note I, p. 257):

Je cite pour exemple la discussion suivante d'Ockham dans son Quodlibet, II, q. 19: Utrum haec propositio "hoc est corpus meum" de virtute sermonis sit vera. Et videtur, quod non est, quia quaero, quid demonstratur per hoc pronomen "hoc." Aut corpus Christi et tunc est falsa, quia quando profertur hoc pronomen "hoc," non est corpus Christi in Eucharistia... Aut demonstratur aliquid aliud a corpore Christi et tunc iterum est falsa, quia nihil aliud quam corpus Christi est corpus Christi.

Let us make it expressly clear that no other text and no explanation is added.

Now we are prepared to come to a sound judgment about the meaning of Ockham's de virtute sermonis and its alleged connection with the condemnation.

First, we must give credit to Michalski that he succeeded well in exonerating Buridan who added his seal and signature to this decree though he was a determined Nominalist in the medieval sense. Furthermore, Michalski understands de virtute sermonis correctly as the sense of a proposition in proper supposition in opposition to improper supposition. Ockham suggests this meaning when dealing with the suppositio impropria in chapter seventysix of the first part of his Summa Logicae. At another place he says that he understands under de virtute sermonis the meaning that must be assigned to terms secundum regulas generales, secundum quas tales iudicari debent (S. Logicae II, C. 19).

After these concessions we are forced to part company with Michalski. It is not true, and it is contradicted by exery text of Ockham concerning this matter — and they are very numerous — that the expression de virtute sermonis has anything to do with the controversy as to whether words have meaning by nature or by institution. Ockham has always maintained with Aristotle and other scholastics that words are instituted ad placitum, since they are artificial signs and are not given by nature. However, Michalski says that Ockham plus d'une fois opposes de virtute sermonis to ad placitum. Where? Michalski does not give any text. We do not know any text to that effect. If there should be in the writings of Ockham a passage where ad placitum is opposed to de virtute sermonis it can have only this meaning: Besides the commonly accepted meaning of terms, one may at will use the terms in improper meaning.

Furthermore it is not proved by Michalski that Ockham's use of the distinction between false in virtue of expression and true according to the

intention of the author is condemned. On the contrary it is this very distinction that is demanded by the decree. According to the decree — we again invite the reader carefully to read the text as quoted above — it is not right and allowable to call any famous proposition simply false which is false only in virtue of expression if it has a correct sense according to the intention of the author. If a right sense is intended, then such a proposition must be either conceded as such or it must be distinguished. This implies immediately that it is expressly conceded by this decree that a proposition may be called false in virtue of expression, but true according to the intention of the author. However, it is not allowed to call a famous proposition absolutely false, if and because it is false only in virtue of expression. This point has escaped the attention of Michalski completely. But let Ockham speak for himself:

One must carefully consider whether a term and a proposition are taken in virtue of expression, and whether they are taken according to the usage of those who are speaking and the authors' intention, because there is hardly any word which is not equivocally taken in some mode of equivocation in the various books of the Philosophers and the Saints and the Authors. Those, therefore, who are decided always to take a word univocally and in one mode, frequently err about the intention of the author and concerning the inquiry of truth, since almost all words are taken equivocally. Summa Logicae I, c. 76.

Again:

And so it is with many authorities from the philosophers which are false in virtue of expression though their intention is true. Therefore, as it is commonly said: Sentences of authorities are to be understood in the sense in which they are made, and not in the sense which they make (Expositio Aurea, Super 1. Porphyrii).

Many more passages from Ockham could be accumulated which are all to the same effect. Even Michalski's quotation on p. 256 proves the same. Moreover, the term *de virtute sermonis* and the use of the corresponding distinction was not introduced by Ockham into scholastic theology, but he found it already there, *cf.* for instance St. Bonaventure I S.d.4, a.u.q.2; t. I, p. 100 a. We have found it used elsewhere by scholastics of Paris long before Ockham.

However, the "example" of Ockham's radicalism in the use of the expression de virtute sermonis, is a little too much. If we allow such a "proof" to be considered seriously, we have to pronounce all the scholastics including St. Thomas the worst heretics. We have only to cut off from their quaestiones the pro or contra, as the case may be, present it without any connection with the rest of the question, and perfect heretics will be created. Let us show this as regards the words of consecration, for the Common Doctor could have really inspired these dangerous lines of Ockham. We read S. Th. IV, q. 78, a. 5:

Utrum praedictae locutiones sint verae. Ad quintum sic proceditur: Videtur quod praedictae locutiones non sint verae. Cum enim dicitur: Hoc est corpus meum, ly hoc est demonstrativum substantiae. Sed secundum praedicta, quando profertur hoc adhuc est ibi substantia panis, quia trans-substantiatio fit in ultimo instanti prolationis verborum. Sed haec est falsa: Panis est corpus Christi. Ergo haec est falsa: Hoc est corpus meum.

Michalski simply omitted that in the corpus quaestionis where Ockham expresses his own opinion he states that the proposition is true without

any distinction.

In summary, therefore, we can say that Ockham, too, could have subscribed to every demand of the decree mentioned above. He uses the expression de virtute sermonis only when a term is taken in an improper meaning. If a term is taken in an improper meaning, the Logician must know that he cannot simply apply his established rules, but must proceed carefully and have more regard to the intention of the author and the whole context than to the grammatical and logical structure of the sentences under consideration. What the decree requests from the students in the Faculty of Arts:

By affirming or denying sentences one must pay more attention to the subject matter than to the proper sense of the sentences; for a disputation which pays attention only to the proper sense of sentences and which does not accept any proposition unless in its proper sense, is only a sophistical disputation (p. 506).

Another use of logic is the ease which it gives in perceiving the virtue of expression and the proper manner of speaking. For by this science one may easily know what is uttered by an author in virtue of expression and what is not uttered by virtue of expression but according to the usual manner of speaking or according to the intention of a teacher — what is said in a proper way and what is said metaphorically. This is highly necessary for all who study the texts of authors. For he who always takes the words of an author in their proper sense and in virtue of expression falls into error and inexplicable difficulties.

II. TRUTH AND FALSITY OF PROPOSITIONS

After these explanations of signification and supposition we are now in a position to understand the concept of truth and falsity in Ockham. We have simply to apply and to elucidate a little further the previously expounded ideas of signification and supposition. Our aim will be to ascertain the concepts of logical truth and falsity in categorical propositions.

a. Truth and Falsity are Second Intentions

If we restrict the meaning of "true" and "false" or "truth" and "falsity" to the realm of propositions, that is, to logical truth and falsity, the terms are second intentions and not first intentions. For the terms "true" and "false" are predicated about other intentions, viz., propositions. Hence we are not here at all interested in so-called ontological or moral truth and falsity, nor in the so-called truth of simple apprehension or even of concepts. We are interested only in the meaning of the term "true" (or "false") when we say, for instance, "Socrates is white, is true."

The second intentions, 30 "true" and "false," or "truth" and "falsity," signify or stand for propositions. However, when used as predicates, their respective subjects do not necessarily have simple or material supposition. Ockham is well aware of the various ways in which "truth" and "falsity" can be predicated. They can be predicated about the common term "proposition" or complexum, etc., by saying for instance: "Every proposition is either true or false," or they can be predicated about the individual propositions as such. There can be no doubt, than in the aforementioned universal proposition "Every proposition" has personal supposition of the type of confused and distributed supposition. In the other case, however, it is quite different as when we say: "Socrates is white, is true." In the first case, it is obvious that the term "proposition" or "every proposition" is not true or false, but only that which is signified by it. In the second case it is likewise obvious that the proposition "Socrates is white" is denoted to be true. In the first case we speak about all the propositions which are signified by the term "proposition"; in the second case, the proposition as such is denoted to be true; and hence it stands for itself. Hence a dis-

^{30.} Though Ockham does not say expressly that truth or falsity are second intentions, they are nevertheless de facto always treated by him as second intentions. We know from S. Logicae I, c. 2, that propositions as a whole can be terms. Furthermore, he considers "verum" and "falsum" modalities either qualifying incomplex terms (sensus divisus) or propositions (sensus compositus), and as to the latter meaning he introduces our familiar distinctions. Cf. Quamvis ista distinctio communis possit sustineri, nec velim eam improbare, tamen potest aliter distingui et forte magis artificialiter (translate: logically), eo quod dictum propositionis potest sumi materialiter... et iste sensus est idem cum illo, qui ponitur sensus compositionis, vel potest sumi significative, et tunc est idem sensus cum sensu divisionis (S. Logicae III, 1, c. 20).

tinction must be made. The proposition: "Socrates is white, is true" would be false in personal supposition, for the proposition "Socrates is white" denotes a state of affairs, namely the whiteness in Socrates, and this fact or state of affairs is neither true nor false, being no proposition at all. Taken in simple or material supposition, it is only denoted that the proposition "Socrates is white" is true, though of course it is true because it signifies a state of affairs correctly.81

We are here not too far from a so-called modern approach to the problem of truth and falsity. Ockham is well aware that we have to distinguish the proposition from the name of the proposition. If we use the name of a proposition, the name has personal supposition — be it a singular or a common name; if we use the proposition as such, we have simple supposition and not personal supposition. In order to show this more definitely, let us briefly discuss an instance where Ockham brings symbolism into the debate. Let "A" stand for the whole proposition Homo est animal. In this case "A" is a name of a proposition; it is even a singular name and a sign in the strict sense. The term "A" signifies and is able to stand for the proposition Homo est animal. Therefore when we say "A" is true, we do not mean to say that this sign "A" is true, but that the proposition which is signified by "A" and for which "A" stands, is true. Hence "A" must have personal supposition; otherwise the proposition would be false.32

What we have said here may be illustrated by a drawing in which we distinguish the thing, its state, and three propositions indicating the various suppositions. The thing is the white Socrates;


^{31.} Sciendum, quod aliquod incomplexum supponens respectu veri vel falsi potest habere suppositionem simplicem vel personalem; si simplicem vel materialem, sic nullum incomplexum est verum vel falsum, et sic etiam hoc praedicatum verum vel falsum non praedicatur vere de aliquo incomplexo. Si habeat suppositionem personalem, sic de aliquo incomplexo vere praedicatur hoc praedicatum verum vel falsum, sicut de hoc termino 'propositio' verificatur, quod aliqua propositio est vera vel falsa. Si tamen subiectum istius propositionis: Propositio est vera vel falsa, supponat pro se, haec esset simpliciter falsa, quia tunc significaretur, quod haec dictio 'propositio' esset vera vel falsa, quod est manifeste falsum. Expos. s.l. Praedicamentorum ad: Videtur autem...

32. Similiter si A instituatur ad significandum hanc propositionem: Homo est animal, tunc haec est vera: A est verum, si A supponat personaliter, et falsa, si supponat pro se. Et isto modo frequenter in respondendo utimur una dictione pro propositione et pro uno complexo, et ita ista dictio neque est vera neque falsa; sed illa propositio, pro qua utimur illa dictione, est vera vel falsa. Sicut si quaeratur a te: Fuisti Romae? et dicas: Ita, tunc hac dictione 'ita' uteris pro tota ista propositione: Ego fui Romae, et ita est de aliis frequenter. l.c.

the three propositions are: "Socrates est albus," "Socrates est albus est verum," "A' (meaning Socrates est albus) est verum."

In all of the three the proposition "Socrates est albus" plays a role. In the first it is the proposition in its significative function, in the second we praedicate verum about the same proposition, in the third we predicate verum about the name of the proposition. The terms in the first and third proposition have personal supposition; in the second the subject has simple supposition.

This leads us immediately to a before-mentioned distinction between levels of predication. For the first proposition belongs to the language about things in reality, the second speaks immediately about a proposition of the first level, the third speaks about it mediately through a name of the proposition of the first level. The following drawing is a visual presentation:



Since the predicates verum and falsum, being second intentions, are predicated about propositions or names of propositions, it follows that they cannot be predicated about themselves or about any proposition in which they are contained without reference to other propositions. The famous Insolubile is solved by Ockham on the ground of this impossibility. The

treatment of the insolubile has been ridiculed and labeled as another case of scholastic subtlety and logical absurdity. Modern logicians are reduced to another opinion since in their own logic they must cope with these same difficulties of the scholastic insolubile. What they try to remedy by the theory of types or such similar devices is dealt with by Ockham in his theory of supposition and the character of the term true and false which are second intentions predicable about propositions of which they are not a part.33 The classical example commonly used in the Middle Ages is this: "Socrates says: Sortes dicit falsum." This sentence Sortes dicit falsum is his first and last sentence. About this single sentence the sophist now asks: Is it true or false? If it is true then Socrates says something true. But he says only this sentence: Sortes dicit falsum. Consequently Sortes dicit falsum is true; and consequently: Sortes dicit verum. Hence, if Socrates says something true he says something false. Under the supposition that the sentence is false, similar contradictions will show up. Then it follows that Sortes dicit falsum is true; but Socrates utters only this sentence; Sortes dicit falsum, consequently it is true, consequently Sortes says something true; hence if Socrates says something true, Socrates says something false. Ockham reminds us that such sophistical argumentation can be made only by using the terms "false" or "not true" or such similar ones.

In his answer Ockham justly remarks that the proposition Sortes non dicit falsum under the same condition, namely that no other sentence is uttered, is true, since the term falsum does not supposite for any sentence, and that is expressed by the denial. The same can be said about the critical form Sortes non dicit verum for if Socrates utters no other proposition, then he does not utter any true proposition for which verum could supposite. This is denoted by the negative proposition Sortes non dicit verum. However, the sophist will argue: if the proposition Sortes non dicit verum is true, and if Socrates does utter this proposition, he utters a true proposition; consequently, we could add, as understood by Ockham: Sortes dicit verum. We shall now give Ockham's answer in translation:

The answer is that this consequence is not valid: "Socrates utters this proposition," and: "This proposition is true," therefore, "Socrates utters a

^{33.} Moody, op. cit. 43, has first called attention to the relation of the theory of supposition with the "theory of types."

true proposition." The reason for this denial is as follows: In the proposition Sortes non dicit verum, the predicate cannot supposite for this entire proposition of which it is a part, yet not precisely because it is a part. Hence the proposition Sortes non dicit verum is equivalent to the following: "Socrates does not say something true other than this: Sortes non dicit verum." Therefore, as it does not follow: "This (proposition) is true," and: "Socrates utters this (proposition)," therefore "He utters a true proposition other than this," so it does not follow: "Socrates utters this proposition," and: "This is true," therefore "Socrates utters something true." Because as said before these two propositions are equivalent: "Socrates utters something true," and "Socrates utters something true other than the former."

A corresponding answer must be given to the preceding argument. When Socrates starts to say: Sortes dicit falsum, and someone asks: Does Socrates say something true or false? We must reply: Socrates says neither something true nor something false. For it must be conceded that he does not say either something true or false other than this. Then it does not follow: "This is false - Socrates dicit falsum;" and: "Socrates utters this (proposition);" therefore "Socrates utters something false." As it likewise does not follow: "Socrates utters this, and this is false," therefore, "Socrates says something false other than this." This is so because these two propositions are equivalent: Sortes dicit falsum and: "Sortes utters something false other than this," because in the proposition, Sortes dicit falsum, the predicate cannot supposite for this proposition. The objection arises: We argue here from the logically lower to the logically higher without denial and without distribution, therefore the consequence is valid. We say in answer: The consequence is not valid if that logically higher in that consequent cannot supposite for that logically lower; hence if in this proposition, "Man is an animal," "animal" cannot supposite for a man, this consequence would not be valid, "Socrates is a man," therefore "Socrates is an animal." In the proposition Sortes dicit falsum the predicate cannot supposite for that entire proposition; and for that reason it does not follow "Socrates says this something false," therefore "Socrates says something false." 84

Hence Ockham's solution of the Insolubile comes ultimately down to this: The predicate verum and the predicate falsum are

^{34.} This is a litteral translation from the Summa Logicae (revised text). A similar text of the still unedited Expositio s.l. Elenchorum (cf. note 19) fol. 135ra reads: "Sed ex hoc non sequitur, quod simpliciter dicat falsum. Et ita talis consequentia non valet: Sortes dicit hoc falsum, ergo Sortes dicit falsum, sed est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Et hoc, quia in ista: Sortes dicit falsum, ly falsum non potest supponere pro hoc falso, quod est: Sortem dicere falsum. Et per istum modum respondendum est ad omnia insolubilia, negando scilicet consequentiam ab aliquo termino sumpto cum pronomine demonstrativo determinante aliquod contentum ad ipsum terminum sumptum sine tali pronomine. Et non est alia ratio, nisi quia terminus communis non potest supponere in illa propositione pro illo inferiori, quamvis in aliis propositionibus possit pro eo supponere." Prantl's assumption that the chapter on the "Insolubile" in the Summa Logicae is non-authentic is without foundation. Cf. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., "Zur Echteit der Summa Logicae Ockhams," in Franziskanische Studien 26 (1939) 190-193.

terms signifying propositions. When used in a proposition in significative function, they require a significate. If no significate is given and the terms falsum and verum are denied, the propositions are false, since neither falsum nor verum stand for a significate which by hypothesis is not given. Furthermore, the predicates falsum and verum cannot be predicated about a proposition, of which they are a part, precisely because they require a significate which is a proposition. We know from our treatment of Ockham's theory of signification that sign and significate are different; for sign is something that makes something different from itself known. It is in fact Ockham's ingenious and carefully developed theory of signification and supposition which prevents the Insolubile from causing any trouble. For truth and falsity are second intentions predicable only of entire propositions which they signify and for which they can stand in a proposition. But by definition the proposition in which "truth" and "falsity" are predicates will be at least one level higher than the proposition of which or for which they are predicated.

b. Truth and Falsity are Connotative Terms

However, we are not yet at the end of our analysis of the terms "true" and "false." Though we know that "truth" and "falsity," being second intentions, are predicates about or properties of propositions, we wish to know what such properties are. A proposition is either true or false, but whether it is true or whether it is false does not simply depend on the proposition as such — at least if we speak of categorical propositions. Hence true and false are connotative terms. They signify propositions directly and connote something else.

What is it that the terms "true" and "false" connote? When we say about a proposition that it is true, we mean that the proposition signifies a thing or a state as it is; and when we say that a proposition is false, we mean to say that the proposition does not signify a thing or state as it is.³⁵ By saying this, we have reached

^{35.} Sed verum et falsum sunt quaedam praedicabilia de oratione connotantia aliquid a parte rei. Unde oratio dicitur vera, quia significat sic esse a parte rei, sicut est. Et ideo sine omni mutatione a parte orationis ex hoc ipso, quod primo significat, sicut est a parte rei, et postea propter mutationem rei significat, sicut non est a

Aristotle's notification of truth, which though sometimes it may appear trivial,³⁶ nevertheless remains on safe ground:

This is clear in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and what is not that it is not, is true.³⁷

It appears, however, that this definition is not so trivial after all. It has even found favorable comment in a recent study by one of the leading scholars in modern Logic.³⁸ Nevertheless, it does not say all that can and should be said in order to make the connotation of "true" and "false" explicit. Ockham leads us a step further when he says that a true proposition signifies a state of affairs as it is, and a false proposition signifies a state of affairs as it is not. When does a proposition signify or not signify a state of affairs as it is or as it is not? The answer constantly given by Ockham is: If subject and predicate supposite for the same or do not supposite for the same. If and only if there is the coincidence of supposition of subject and predicate will a proposition be true. Hence, the connotatum of the term "true" is the coincidence of the supposition of subject and predicate, and the connotatum of "false" is the lack of the coincidence of the supposition of subject and predicate. In accordance with his teachings, a definition of true would therefore be: "True" is a predicate predicable only of propositions connoting coincidence of supposition of subject and predicate. In similar fashion a definition of "false" would be: "False" is a predicate predicable only about propositions connoting lack of coincidence of subject and predicate. Or, and this comes closer to the wording of Ockham: "True" is a predicate predicable about propositions

parte rei, dicitur oratio primo vera et postea falsa. Sicut quando Sortes sedet, quia illa oratio: Sortes sedet, significat, sicut est a parte rei, ideo est illa oratio vera, et quia quando Sortes surgit, significat, sicut non est in re, sine omni sibi adveniente, est oratio falsa... (Expos. s.l. Praedicamentorum, cap. 9 ad: Sed si quis... Cf. Quodl. V, q. 24 (ed. Argentina).

^{36.} This may be the reason why it is usually overlooked by modern scholastics.

^{37.} Met. VI, 7, 1011b25 (Oxford translation). Cf. Categor. c. 5, and Periherm. c. 9.

^{38.} Cf. Alfred Tarski, "The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of Semantics," in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (1944) espec. 342ss.

and connoting that subject and predicate stand for the same. A similar definition could be given for "false." 39

Since truth is had if and only if subject and predicate supposite for the same, it is sufficient, but not required, that subject and predicate are the same term and have the same meaning, as in cases where we have propositions of identity. Yet, subject and predicate are usually not the same, not only in true negative propositions but also in true affirmative propositions. For they are two different words or two different concepts and hence two different entities. On several occasions Ockham has made it clear that the truth of a proposition does not imply the identity of subject and predicate; the truth of an affirmative proposition only implies that subject and predicate signify or at least stand for the same.⁴⁰

If however, we want to retain the equivocal expression "In a true proposition subject and predicate are the same," we have to distinguish two possible meanings of it. In one sense it could say that in every true proposition subject and predicate are truly identical. It is obvious that, taken in this sense, the expression is false. Ockham even takes pains to prove that.⁴¹ In another sense the expression is true. Then it means: Every affirmative, true proposition requires for its truth that subject and predicate signify the same and supposite for the same. This refers, of course, to propositions

^{39.} Ockham has never given an explicit definition of "true" or "false"; however, the definition (quid nominis) here presented is in perfect accordance with his explanation. The first part is based on what has been said in footnote 35. The second is amply substantiated by many texts, of which a few will be quoted later. For the time being the following text may suffice: Dicendum, quod per istam propositionem: Sortes est albus, non denotatur, quod Sortes sit vox, quantumcumque vox praedicetur hic. Cuius ratio est, quia per propositionem non denotatur, quod subjectum sit praedicatum, sed denotatur in tali propositione, quod illud, pro quo subjectum supponit, sit illud, pro quo praedicatum supponit. Et propter hoc in tali propositione, ubi praedicatur concretum tale, quale est hoc concretum 'albus', denotatur, quod aliqua talis res, sicut albedo, competit illi, pro quo subjectum supponit. Et ideo quia in illa: Sortes est albus, subjectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem, et Sortes est illud, pro quo supponit praedicatum, quamvis non sit ipsum praedicatum, ideo haec et vera. Expos. s.l. Porphyrii (De genere) ad: Eorum quae praedicantur...

^{40.} Sed quando subiectum et praedicatum habent suppositionem personalem et supponunt non pro seipsis sed pro suis significatis, tunc non requiritur, quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem, sed oportet, quod supponunt pro eodem, et hoc in propositione simpliciter de recto et simpliciter de inesse, quamvis non semper hoc sufficit. Unde in illa propositione prolata: Homo est animal, subiectum et praedicatum non sunt idem, quia si essent idem, praedicaretur idem de se, quod nullus concedit; et tamen haec est vera, quia subiectum et praedicatum supponunt pro eodem. *I.c.*

^{41.} Cf. various proofs in *Quodl*. III, q. 5 ed. Argentina (ed. Paris III, 12). May we recall here that this is also the teaching of St. Thomas. Cf. S. Theol. I, 13, 12.

where both subject and predicate are taken each in personal supposition though it could as easily be enlarged to cover propositions with different suppositions for the terms. Taken in this sense, there is an identity given, not the identity of subject and predicate but only the identity of the thing which is signified with terms which are different. In other words, in such propositions subject and predicate are identified in the thing that they signify.42

c. Application of Truth and Falsity to Various Propositions

By way of application let us now exemplify what has been said about the notions of truth and falsity. We cannot take into consideration all possible cases. A few may suffice to show the usefulness of Ockham's theory. We are here following Ockham through the second part of the Summa Logicae where he treats of various propositions and also always adds the requirements for their truth or falsity.

Singular propositions in the strict sense are propositions in which the subject is a proper name or a demonstrative pronoun (in the singular case) with or without a common term. For instance: Sortes currit, Iste currit, Iste homo currit. 43 According to our definition, these are true if subject and predicate stand for the same thing. This needs no further explanation, since we have used similar examples to clarify the meaning of supposition and of truth and falsity.44 The supposition of the subject in such singular propositions is called "discrete" supposition, since the subject stands precisely for one thing.45 Falsehood of such a proposition would of course be had if the subject were not to stand for anything for which the predicate stands.

Particular propositions, that is, propositions in which the subject

^{42.} Alius intellectus praedictae propositionis est, scilicet quod omnis propositio affirmativa vera requirit ad veritatem suam, quod subjectum et praedicatum significant idem vel (so Ms. Vat. 3075; the editions et) supponant pro eodem. Et iste intellectus est verus, quia omnis propositio affirmativa vera est vera propter identitatem rei significatae per subiectum et praedicatum, et quia per talem propositionem non deno-tatur, quod subiectum sit praedicatum, sed denotatur, quod res importata per subiectum sit res importata per praedicatum, quia utimur vocibus pro rebus et terminis non pro se sed pro re, quam significant (Quodl. III, 5; Ms. Vat. and ed. Paris III, 12).

43. S. Logicae II, c, 1. Cf. also and for the following, Moody, op. cit. p. 192 ss.
44. Cf. its explicit treatment in S. Logicae II, c. 2.

^{45.} Suppositio autem discreta est, in qua supponit nomen proprium alicuius vel pronomen demonstrativum significative sumptum; et talis suppositio reddit propositionem singularem (S. Logicae I, c. 68).

is determined by a particular sign as aliquis, etc., and indefinite propositions in which the subject is a common term without a particular or universal sign or a demonstrative pronoun but suppositing personally, demand a more detailed treatment. We first consider the case of such an affirmative true proposition as Aliquis homo est albus. Now, this proposition is true, if there is at least one individual for which subject and predicate stand, that is, if there is at least one white man. As regards at least one white man the subject and predicate are identified, not, however, as regards them-

Since such a particular proposition requires for its truth at least one instance in which it is true, the supposition of the subject is called determinate supposition. It is a common supposition, since the term that supposites is common, but it is determinate supposition since there must be at least one individual for which it is verified.47 Though the common term by its very nature is able to stand for all the individuals it can signify, nevertheless, the syncategorematic term aliquis causes the subject aliquis homo in the proposition aliquis homo est albus to stand for at least one white man. Or, in other words, it is denoted that subject and predicate meet in at least one individual in which individual they are identified, since each one signifies it and stands for it. Whether subject and predicate meet also in other individuals does not matter.

A negative particular proposition to be true, requires that subject and predicate do not stand for at least one individual. The lack of supposition can be on the part of the subject or of the predicate.48

Indefinite propositions are propositions in which the subject is a common term without a particular or universal sign, as for instance: Homo est animal, Homo est species. If the subject is taken in personal supposition, Ockham treats them as particular propositions. If, however, the subject is taken in another supposition, then

^{46.} S. Logicae II, c. 3.

^{46.} S. Logicae II, C. 3.

47. S. Logicae I, C. 68.

48. Sic igitur patet, quomodo indefinita vel particularis est vera, si subiectum supponat pro aliquo, pro quo non supponit praedicatum. Hoc tamen non semper requiritur, sed quandoque sufficit, quod subiectum indefinitae et particularis negativae pro nullo supponat; sicut si nullus homo sit albus, haec particularis negativa est vera: Aliquis albus homo non est homo, et tamen subiectum pro nullo supponit, quia nec pro substantia nec pro accidente (S. Logicae II, c. 3).

he suggests that they be treated as singular propositions. In the latter case the truth of such propositions is guaranteed if the subject stands for itself and the predicate signifies and stands for the subject.⁴⁰

Universal propositions, that is, propositions in which the subject as such is qualified by a universal sign, as omnis, etc. are true if the subject stands for every individual that is signified by it and the predicate stands for every individual that is signified by the subject. Such a universal proposition is, of course, false if subject and predicate are not identified in every individual of the subject, unless such an exception is made explicit. The supposition of the subject of unqualified universal propositions is called Suppositio confusa et distributiva mobilis; if at least one of its supposites is excepted or immobilized, as, for instance, in the proposition Omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, it is called Suppositio... immobilis.⁵⁰

We have briefly explained only a few examples of the application of Ockham's theory of supposition to categorical propositions. Ockham makes application to many other types of propositions, to propositions of the past and future (S.L. II, c. 7), and to modal propositions (S.L. II, 9). It would lead too far afield to present his discussions here, since the nature of such propositions—highly complicated and equivocal—requires lengthy explanations.

^{49.} Sed quid sufficit ad veritatem talis indefinitae, si sit indefinita? Dicendum, quod ad veritatem talis sufficit, quod pro eodem supponat subiectum et praedicatum, si sit affirmativa, vel quod non supponat pro eodem, si sit negativa, sicut hoc sufficit ad veritatem propositionis singularis, quia idem est iudicium de tali propositione et de propositione singulari. Et ideo communiter ponitur, quod talis propositio est singularis, et potest poni satis rationabiliter (S. Logicae II, c. 3).

^{50.} Est igitur primo sciendum, quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis non requiritur, quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, sed requiritur, quod praedicatum supponat pro omnibus illis, pro quibus supponit subiectum, ita quod de illis verificetur. Et si ita sit, nisi aliqua causa specialis impediat, propositio universalis est vera. Et hoc est, quod communiter dicitur, quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis sufficit, quod quaelibet singularis sit vera (S. Logicae II, c. 4). As to the various names and distinctions of supposition cf. S. Logicae II, c. 68, and Moody, op. cit. p. 189-192. Ockham uses consequentiae in order to make the various personal suppositions clear. From discrete supposition we can go down to singulars (as to subject or predicate) in a disjunction, for instance: Aliquis homo est albus, ergo vel iste homo est albus, vel iste homo est albus vel... From a universal we can go down to all the singulars (of the subject) in a conjunction, for instance: Omnis homo est albus, ergo Iste homo est albus, et iste homo est albus et... As to the predicate we can go down only to the disjunct predicate, for instance: Omnis homo est albus, ergo Omnis homo est istud album vel istud album vel...

There remains, however, one difficulty which we have no intention to pass over in silence. All the scholastic theories of truth and falsity can be more or less easily applied to categorical propositions de inesse or de modo. All, however, face new problems when they have to deal with hypothetical propositions, that is with conditional, conjunctive or copulative, disjunctive, causal, temporal, and local propositions. It is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to see how the theory of supposition could immediately be applied to the so-called truth and falsity of such composed propositions in so far as they are composed propositions. For even in a certain case where every elementary proposition is false, it can happen that the compound is nevertheless true.⁵¹ As it appears to us, salvo meliori iudicio, this problem has been neglected by the scholastics. They seem to have felt this problem since oftentimes for the consequences at least they use the expressions bona consequentia or consequentia valet or consequentia tenet. Hence it seems that they felt at least that the terms "true" and "false" are equivocal. For this reason it would appear that Ockham and the other scholastics do not advocate their theory of signification and supposition in order to ascertain whether such propositions are true or false; rather, they advocate rules of which the compound propositions are instances. These rules are established by the scholastics on purely logical grounds in accordance with the definitions of statement-connectives. They were not considered as "postulates" or "axioms" in the modern sense of these words, but as being evident from an insight into the relations of such propositions. They were, therefore, called Axiomata, or propositions of high dignity because of their universal validity. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to enlarge on this viewpoint. We intended by our remarks only to make clear that we have not dealt with a certain meaning of "truth" and "falsity" which is encountered in scholastic writings.

We hope that one point has, however, been made clear, viz., that the theory of supposition is a considerable help in clarifying

^{51.} Est etiam sciendum, quod ad veritatem conditionalis nec requiritur veritas antecedentis nec consequentis, immo est aliquando conditionalis necessaria et quaelibet pars eius est impossibilis, sicut hic: Si Sortes est asinus, Sortes est rudibilis (S. Logicae II, c. 31).

the sometimes obscured notions of "truth" and "falsity." As regards non-hypothetical propositions, which are neither explicitly nor implicitly hypothetical, the theory of supposition is of great value.

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ST. BONAVENTURE AND THE POWER OF THE KEYS

PART I

Introduction

FTER the Council of Trent had defined the judicial character of sacerdotal absolution and had threatened with anathema anyone daring to say that it is a bare ministry of declaring sins forgiven,1 scholars began to probe the writings of older theologians regarding the efficacy they attribute to the power of the keys. St. Bonaventure drew more than a modicum of attention, not only because he was a Doctor of the Church and a luminary of the Franciscan Order, but also because seemingly contradictory statements, scattered throughout his works, presented a perplexing problem and germinated the seeds of controversy.

All agree that St. Bonaventure did not attain the perfection of Scotus in determining the true function of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance. But opinions vary as to whether he assigned sufficient efficacy to sacramental absolution to escape the condemnation of the Council of Trent. Investigation revealed that the Seraphic Doctor, on the one hand, unmistakably spurned those opinions which ascribed too much to the absolution of the priest, while, on the other, he plainly strove to depart from the "ostensive" theory of Peter Lombard which would have the priest merely confirm the forgiveness of sins. Obviously, he took his stand somewhere between these extremes. But just where, scholars do not agree.

In a long scholion in the Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,2 the illustrious editors seek to interpret his writings in a favorable light. While they admit that the Saint undoubtedly erred in his manner of presenting the subject, they nevertheless contend that, in essence,

Brisgoviae 1937).

2. S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, Ad Claras Aquas, 1889, tom. IV. p. 475. (Hereafter cited only by volume and page).

^{1.} Enchiridion Symbolorum, n. 919 (Denziger-Umberg, ed. 21-23 Freiburgi

his doctrine does not differ from that of St. Thomas and the Tridentine Council. The critical acumen of these giants of Ouaracchi has been universally acclaimed by students of Scholastic lore,³ and they are generally to be considered as the best exponents of things Bonaventurean; yet they have been accused of giving a more benign explanation to the Seraphic Doctor's exposition of the operation and efficacy of the power of the keys than is warranted by his actual words. But, inasmuch as these devoted admirers wished to preserve the name of their beloved author from the faintest taint of heresy, even that of a purely material nature, it is not surprising that they marshal such a formidable array of arguments in defense of his orthodoxy. These, though manifesting a superb grasp of the matter, fall short of persuading notwithstanding.

Estius, along with other older theologians, does not take such a benevolent view.4 He holds that the doctrine of St. Bonaventure is essentially the same as that of Peter Lombard, who taught that in the Sacrament of Penance the priest merely declares the sinner to have been bound or loosed by God,5 thereby reducing the rôle of the confessor to the nudum ministerium expressly condemned by the Council. Recent scholars who have dedicated special attention to the penitential doctrine of the Scholastics, 8 while not so final in their conclusion as Estius, are nevertheless inclined to think that St. Bonaventure does not ascribe to the absolution of the priest sufficient power over sin and eternal punishment to comply with the Tridentine definition.

The aim of this paper is more to reawaken interest in St. Bonaventure as a theologian than to provide a new setting for an old controversy. The reader is asked to bear in mind that in the Thirteenth Century sacramentary doctrine was still in an evolutionary stage, especially in regard to Penance, and that St. Bonaventure, rather than be an innovator, preferred to adopt the opinions of his

^{3.} Grabmann, M., Die Geschichte der kath. Theologie seit dem Ausgang der

^{3.} Grabmann, M., Die Geschichte der kalb. I heologie seit dem Ausgang der Vaeterzeit, Freiburg in Br., 1935, pp. 224 et seq.
4. Estius, In IV. Sent. Comment., tom. III, p. 236, ed. 1680 (Parisiis).
5. Lombardus, P. in Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, IV, 467.
6. Confer among others: Schmoll, P., O.F.M., Die Busslehre der Fruehscholastik, Muenchen, 1882, p. 150 ff.; Vacandard, "Absolution des Péchés (Sentiments des anc. Scholastiques), Dictionnaire de la théologie catholique, tom. I, col. 782 et seq.; Reutten, W., Studien zur mittelalterlichen Busslehre mit besonderer Beruecksichtigung der aelteren Franziskanerschule, Muenster 1902, pp. 59-79.

times.⁷ This will contribute much to a better understanding of the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on the efficacy of the keys. Furthermore, honest consideration must be given to his basic penitential doctrines. This study, then, will comprise a thorough inquiry into his conception of the nature and properties of the keys, a summary reviewal of the traditional and contemporary factors which influenced his theological speculation on sin and its forgiveness, and a piece by piece unveiling of the particular operation and effectiveness which he assigns to contrition, confession, and satisfaction respectively in the sacramental process of removing sin. And so, by elimination, the peculiar function and efficacy which he attributes to the keys should become manifest. This, then, will be weighed in the balance with the demands of the Council of Trent, and a final judgment, we hope, safely formulated.

I. THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF THE KEYS

The Scholastics, in general, restricted the term potestas clavium to that inherent power by which priests bind and loose in the Sacrament of Penance. They were familiar with a broader connotation of the keys, extending to that full, legislative, judicial, and coercive authority which the Pope exercises over the universal Church, and which, in turn, is shared in a lesser degree by the various prelates in their respective spheres of activity. But this they considered an amplification of the potestas clavium; its more proper ambit lay in the capacity to bind and loose in the penitential tribunal.

St. Bonaventure was partisan to this limited view of the keys. He recognized their origin in the promise made by Our Lord to St. Peter at Caesarea Philippi: "I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven." This promise had its realization after the Resurrection, when Christ breathed on His Apostles and said: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are for-

^{7. &}quot;Communi sententiae pro viribus meis in omnibus praecedentibus libris adhaesi, tanquam viae securiori, mihi et aliis consimilibus, parum intelligentibus, persuadeo adhaerendum" (*Op. Om.*, III, 896), Cf. Smeets, *D.T.C.* "S. Bonaventure," Vol. I, col. 976.

^{8.} Lombard, P., Op. Om. Bon., IV, 465. S. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, IV, 74. 9. Op. Om. IV, 470; Mt. 16, 19.

given them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained." 10 Although aware of the fact that by the conferring of the keys Christ had made St. Peter steward over His entire household. 11 with complete authority to govern and direct everything that pertained to the spiritual and temporal welfare of this new kingdom on earth, the Seraphic Doctor envisaged the real operation of the potestas clavium in the internal forum alone.

In the external forum the power of the keys signifies jurisdiction to mediate between man and man, and pertains to prelatic authority; its purpose is to coerce through the imposition of censures. In this capacity, says St. Bonaventure, the power were better designated by the name "sword." 12 In the internal forum the "keys" import the right to arbitrate between God and man; they derive from Sacred Orders, and operate in a manner characteristic of keys. Just as keys are used in mundane affairs to remove obstacles and impediments barring ingress to places and things, so the term "keys," transferred to the spiritual order, aptly expresses that power by which obstacles and impediments to the entrance of heaven are removed. And such is the nature of the potestas clavium, for it is a spiritual power, primarily ordained for opening the portals of heaven.13

Although to open is the primal purpose of the "keys," heaven is not to be opened immediately and indiscriminately to all. Hence, they also have the power of exclusion and can bar admission to heaven until certain conditions or dispositions obtain, ne culpa sine poena remaneret comments the learned Franciscan. This second virtue, however, is had only by way of accident, for the "keys"

^{10. &}quot;Ad illud quod quaeritur quando data est haec potestas Petro? dici potest. quod... potestas clavium promissa fuit Matthae decimo sexto et data Joannis vigesimo" (Op. Om. IV, 489; Jn. 20, 23).

11. "Quod enim in Ecclesia aliquis habeat potestatem, hoc est ab ipso Christo, qui potestatem contulit Apostolis et praecipue ipsi Petro. Dominus autem ipsi Petro utramque contulit potestatem, et ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali, et ligandi et solvendi in foro iudiciali" (Lk. 12, 41 sq.; Op. Om., IV, 488 b).

12. "Prima potestas ligandi et solvendi in foro poenitentiali aditum caeli aperit; et ideo recte dicitur clavis. Secunda per censuram iudicii subditos coercet; et ideo dicitur gladius" (Op. Om., IV, 470).

13. "Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen clavis translatum est ad spiritualia ab

^{13. &}quot;Respondeo: Dicendum, quod nomen clavis translatum est ad spiritualia ab ipsis corporalibus. In his autem corporalibus clavis est instrumentum ad removendum aliquod obstaculum. Quoniam igitur in spiritualibus invenimus obstaculum ad ingrediendum in regnum caeleste; necesse est illud removere. Ideo ad spiritualia nomen clavis transferimus, vocantes clavem illam virtutem, per quam obstaculum removetur, sive per quam excluditur, vel includitur" (Op. Om., IV, 470 a).

exclude with a view to opening.14 Just as a doctor applies a bandage to hasten the healing of a wound, so the priest binds the sinner in order to insure the convalescence of the soul. This binding is a curative medium, and is not to be construed in a punitive sense. Obviously then it is not opposed to loosing but conducive to it.15 And so St. Bonaventure succinctly describes the potestas clavium as illa virtus, per quam obstaculum removetur, sive per quam excluditur, vel includitur,16

To St. Peter it was first said: "I will give thee the keys"; hence, St. Bonaventure argues, the potestas clavium is a prerogative of the New Dispensation. Under the Old Law priests could declare lepers clean; they could impose penance upon those who sinned out of ignorance; they could expiate for sins by offering sacrifices. But these ministrations of the Mosaic priesthood were carnal in nature and only figurative of the spiritual ministry of the priesthood of Christ. Furthermore, the keys could not possibly have existed under the Old Law for they take origin from the clavis auctoritatis (God) through the clavis excellentiae (Christ) and are, therefore, posterior in origin to the dissolution of the Jewish priesthood. An added argument is developed from the purpose of the keys, which is to open heaven by effecting complete reconciliation between God and the sinner. Now, such a reconciliation was impossible before Christ opened heaven through His Passion and Death.¹⁷

^{14. &}quot;Dicendum, quod potestas sacerdotibus communiter concessa super subditos non est ad omnino solvendum debitum, quia non debebat hoc cuilibet communicari, non est ad omnino solvendum debitum, quia non debebat hoc cuilibet communicari, ne culpa sine poena remaneret; ideo data est eis potestas, ut ligando solverent... sed non est data potestas ligandi nisi propter solutionem... Clavis spiritualis principalius est ordinata ad aperiendum, nec est ordinata ad claudendum nisi propter apertionem" (Op. Om., IV, 471b).

15. "...sicut in corporalibus quaedam est ligatio simpliciter nocens et impediens, sicut ligatur homo propter paralysim; quaedam simpliciter expediens, sicut homo medicamento emplastri: sic in spiritualibus ligatio peccati impedit, sed ligatio sacerdotalis melius facit ad velociorem et expeditiorem solutionem" (Op. Om., IV, 472).

dotalis melius facit ad velociorem et expeditiorem solutionem" (Op. Om., IV, 472).

16. Cf. Supra note 13.

17. Cf. Lk. 17; Lev. 5, 18. "...potestas clavium propria est sacerdotis evangelici; nec in lege veteri fuit inchoata, sed magis figurata; et illud apparet clarius, si respiciatur ipsius essentia, origo et finis. — Clavis enim postesas spiritualis est... lex illa non spiritualis, sed carnalis dicitur. — Similiter patet hoc, si respiciatur clavis origo... Clavis ministerii descendit a clave auctoritatis, mediante clave excellentiae: quoniam, et si Deus per se delet culpam, et sacerdos aliquam poenae particulam, Christus tamen fuit, qui solvit debitum in passione sua, solvit, inquam, debitum Adae, et tantum superabundavit, quod, ministris communicavit virtutem solvendi a poena. — Similiter patet, si respiciatur finis; quoniam clavis ad aperiendum est per reconciliationem; et quoniam in reconciliatione illa mediator est homo, qui tenet locum Dei, ex tunc potuit et debuit dari clavis, ex quo Deus factus est homo... et ex quo pretium reconciliationis fusum est; et hoc debuit esse in nova lege: et ideo

The Seraphic Doctor does not attempt to prove directly from Scripture that the potestas clavium is peculiar to the priesthood. But he does see an intimate connection between the use of the keys and the other functions proper to the sacred ministry. And so, with the words of St. Paul to the Hebrews in mind "For every high priest taken from among men is appointed for men in the things pertaining to God, that he may offer gifts and sacrifices for sins," he infers that they who have the power to offer sacrifices for sins should also have power to loose from sin. 18 The possessor of the keys, he writes, holds the office of mediator and reconciler. He mediates between God and man; he reconciles by readmitting the sinner to the bond of charity existing within the Church. In order to be a competent mediator between God and man, he should have the power to offer sacrifices for sin; and if he is to reunite sinners to the Mystical Body of Christ, that is, effect a reconciliation with the Church, it is only fitting that he be able to confect the Most Sacred Body of Christ.19

According to St. Bonaventure, the potestas clavium is a spiritual power, and is conferred in the Sacrament of Holy Orders.20 Not unlike the sacerdotal character, from which it differs only "secundum quamdam relationem," it is essentially rooted in the soul and partakes of the indelibility of Orders.21 Being inseparable from

primo dictum est Petro: Tibi dabo claves, quasi ante datae non fuissent" (Op. Om.,

In regard to the manner in which the people of the Old Testament were saved, St. Bonaventure has the following: "Christus per passionem suam omnibus impetravit gratiam poenitentialem, et Deus praecedentibus Patribus dedit gratiam propter satisfactionem passionis promissam, sequentibus vero propter solutam" (Op. Om., III, 425).

^{18.} Heb. 5, 1. "...in ordine sacerdotali clavium potestas confertur... Huius autem ratio est divina institutio. Institutionis autem congruitatem videre possumus, quoniam harum clavium conservator habet officium mediatoris et officium reconciliatoris. Mediator autem est inter Deum et homines; reconciliator vero reducendo ad Ecclesiam et reconciliando Ecclesiae. Ad hoc autem, ut possit esse mediator perfectus et competens inter Deum et hominem, oportet, quod posse habeat offerendi dona et sacrificia pro peccalis... Ad hoc, quod possit reducere ad Corpus Christi mysticum... ut recta christi... Ad noc, quod possit reducere ad Corpus Christi mysteum... ut recta sit et ordinata potestas, oportet, quod habeat posse conficiendi sanctissimum corpus Christi... Et ideo mirabilis Dei sapientia... hanc potestatem ligandi et solvendi solis sacerdotibus commisit" (Op. Om., IV, 504).

19. Op. Om., ibid.
20. Op. Om., ibid.
21. "Dicendum, quod sicut de potentia visiva est loqui dupliciter; vel quantum ad essentiam, vel quantum ad usum; et quantum ad essentiam fundatur hace potentia

ad essentiam, vei quantum ad usum; et quantum ad essentiam rundatur naec potentia in anima nec animam deserit unquam... si loquamur de potentia solvendi quantum ad essentiam, sic radicaliter est in ipsa anima, sicut et character, nec videtur ab illo diferre nisi secundum relationem quandam; et hoc modo inseparabiliter se tenet cum sacerdotali ordine" (Op. Om., IV, 506 a).

Orders, the keys are to be found in the possession of both good and bad priests. The gift of the Holy Spirit "secundum gratiam gratis datam" is sufficient to warrant the presence of this power in all priests, writes the Seraphic Doctor, for, were the power to absolve given only to the worthy, the greatest confusion would exist in the Church, and no one could be certain whether he were bound or loosed.²² The priest, however, should be pure and holy, for no one can be a good judge in a matter in which he himself is guilty. Still, a priest who absolves while in the state of sin truly and effectively absolves, yet, unless he be penitent, he administers the Sacrament unworthily and sins grievously.²³

In priest and prelate the *potestas clavium* is essentially one and the same. For, inasmuch as the prelate does not receive a new Order, neither does he receive a new key.²⁴ Still, there is a difference in the extension and use of this power. In the priest it is a simple power, restricted to the internal forum, and dependent in its exercise upon the will of ecclesiastical superiors. In prelates it takes on a plenitude of power, embracing jurisdiction and the power to excommunicate. But out of a consideration of the diverse acts which come into play in the use of the keys, namely, discernere de culpa and solvere de poena St. Bonaventure distinguishes two keys invested in the priesthood. Wherefore, Christ

^{22. &}quot;Bonum illud gratiae gratis datae ordinatum est ad utilitatem communem, et quamvis non valeat accipienti, tamen valet aliis: ideo Dominus, qui in distributione Sacramentorum utilitatem communem considerat et suam institutionem non retractat, malis confert istam potentiam, qui ordinati sunt secundum Ecclesiae catholicae forma. Si ergo quantum ad id quod est de necessitate clavis, sive quantum ad esse, sive quantum ad executionem; cum nihil exigatur ad hoc nisi ordo et jurisdictio, et hoc dicit donum gratiae datae; tum in bonis, quam in malis est" (Op. Om., IV, 502).

23. "Si autem loquamur quantum ad ea quae spectant ad idoneitatem; cum ad debitum usum officii concurrat meritum, et auctoritas praelationis debeat esse cum

^{23. &}quot;Si autem loquamur quantum ad ea quae spectant ad idoneitatem; cum ad debitum usum officii concurrat meritum, et auctoritas praelationis debeat esse cum sanctitate, maxime tale officium et talis auctoritas; competit, quod habeat caritatem... Et hoc patet: quia officium illud est officium mediatoris et reconciliatoris; et cum auctoritas ista sit iudiciariae potestatis, et nullus sit bonus mediator, qui est inimicus; nullus sit bonus iudex in ea causa, in qua est reus: oportet, ipsum esse mundum et sanctum; alioquin, etsi sit minister, non tamen est idoneus vel dignus" (Op. Om., IV, 502). "...ideo dico, quod sacerdos, quando absolvit poenitentem, tenetur de culpa sua poenitere, alioquin indigne Sacramentum administrat; ideo graviter peccat, quia in quo alterum iudicat, se ipsum condemnat" (Op. Om., IV, 512, dub. 2).

24. "Et quoniam episcopatus non dicit novum ordinem, sed quamdam ordinis

^{24. &}quot;Et quoniam episcopatus non dicit novum ordinem, sed quamdam ordinis eminentiam, recte dicendum est in eo non dare novam clavem, sed potestatem hujusmodi extendi et ampliari" (Op. Om., IV, 504). "Et quia in Pontifice summo et etiam in episcopis est huiusmodi iurisdictio non tantum ad iudicandum inter Deum et hominem in occulto, verum etiam ad judicandum inter hominem in aperto, ...hinc est quod gladium habent praelati, quo possunt percutere ad iuris defensionem in excommunicatione, et potestatem largiendi de thesauris meritorum Ecclesiae..." (Op. Om., V, Breviloquium 276).

was not speaking figuratively when He said: "To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." The Seraphic Doctor designates the one as the anticlavis, while the other he calls the clavis principalis. The function of the anticlavis is to examine the penitent so as to direct the subsequent judgment of binding or loosing, which is rendered by the clavis principalis.25 The former is better known as the clavis scientiae, and the latter as the clavis potentiae. Despite their diverse operations these two keys coalesce into one complete authority; they are given simultaneously in Orders; they are directed towards the same end, namely, the opening of heaven.²⁶

The Master of the Sentences departs from the common doctrine regarding the clavis scientiae.27 To him it is a spiritualization of the habit of knowledge. He seems to demand that the candidate for the priesthood be in possession of the habit of knowledge at the time of ordination. By virtue of Holy Orders this habit is converted into the clavis scientiae. But since many priests manifest a woeful lack of knowledge, knowing neither what to bind nor what to loose, Peter Lombard concludes that such priests do not have the clavis scientiae, nor do they ever obtain it, for, as the Master puts it, semper scientia carent. This opinion leads to disturbing

25. "...in corporalibus videmus duplicem clavem; unam, quae aperit viam et dicitur anticlavis, et aliam, quae directe aperit, et haec dicitur principalis clavis. Sic in spiritualibus scientia est sicut anticlavis, quae dirigit iudicium, et potestas solvendi principalis clavis" (Op. Om., IV, 481, n. 3).

26. "In foro poenitentiali duo sunt, quemadmodum in foro iudiciali. In illo

Opinio 3. Cf. Breviloquium Op. Om. V, 6, c. 10).

27. "Sane dici potest, quod alteram clavium istarum, id est scientiam discernendi, non omnes habent sacerdotes; unde dolendum est atque lugendum. Multi enim, nendi, non omnes habent sacerdotes; unde dolendum est atque lugendum. Multi enim, licet indiscreti atque scientiae, qua eminere debent, exsortes, sacerdotii gradum recipere praesummunt, vita et scientia eo indigni, qui nec ante sacerdotium nec post scientiam habent discernendi, qui ligandi sint vel solvendi. Ideoque illam clavem consecratione non recipiunt, quia semper scientia carent. Qui vero ante sacerdotium scientia discernendi praediti sunt, licet habeant discretionem, non tamen in eis clavis est, quia non valent ea claudere vel aperire; ideoque, cum promovetur in sacerdotem, clavem discretionis dicitur accipere, quia et ante habita discretio augetur et fit in eo clavis..." Lombard, P. (Op. Om., IV, 497).

enim sunt isti duo actus, scilicet discernere causam, et postmodum sententiare; et isti sunt actus diversi, et ad hoc, quod plene committatur alicui auctoritas, necesse est, utrumque committi, alioquin plenam non habet auctoritatem; est tamen duplex auctoritas concurrens in unam plenam, quod patet, quia eam contingit dividi. Committit enim aliquando Dominus Papa aliquibus, ut causam discutiant et instructam ante prolationem sententiae ad ipsum remittant; et hi habent auctoritatem discernendi, non sententiandi. Per hunc modum in auctoritate commissa est sentiendum, quod cum sufficiens sit eis collata potestas arbitrandi inter peccatorem et Deum, quod utramque habent auctoritatem; et cum utraque harum sit ordinata ad aperiendum caelum, utraque dicitur clavis, et sunt duae claves; tamen, quia ex his constat una plena auctoritas, ideo in uno ordine dantur et unum respiciunt" (Op. Om., IV, 481,

difficulties, for it might be asked whether the clavis principalis can validly function if the anticlavis is wanting.28 The Lombard simply bewails the fact that many priests are in want of this key, but does not say that the absolution of such priests lacks all efficacy.

St. Bonaventure takes a different view of the clavis scientiae. In accord with the common opinion, he holds that the essence of the key of knowledge rests upon the authority invested in the priest by his appointment as mediator between God and man. This authority arises out of Holy Orders and is, therefore, common to all priests. It is not a habit, but a quality accompanying the sacerdotal character.20 The habit of knowledge is not essential to the potestas clavium, still it is a dispositio faciens ad bene esse, vel etiam sicut dispositio materialis sine qua altera clavis exire non potest in actum. 30 And whether or not knowledge actually be a key, so much knowledge is required in the priest, the Saint asserts, as to enable him to discriminate between mortal and venial sin: otherwise he hears confessions to the detriment of his own soul and the souls of his penitents.31

In the Breviloquium³² St. Bonaventure writes that the justice of Christ, the Judge, should be made manifest in the cure of the sinner. But, since Christ will not judge in His own person until the last judgment, He commissioned priests to serve as judges until the end of the world. And so, by virtue of the keys, priests are constituted judges in the place of God, with power to bind and loose. Therefore, in the exercise of the potestas clavium the priest conducts himself in accordance with the norms of law and the deserts of the penitent before him. His procedure embraces inquiry,

^{28.} Cf. infra note 30.
29. "Et ideo est secunda opinio, quod scientia non est clavis, secundum quod dicit habitum, sed in quantum dicit auctoritatem sive officium discernendi... et haec clavis est essentialiter" (Op. Om., IV, 479).
30. "...scientia-habitus est sicut dispositio materialis, sine qua altera clavis exire non potest in actum... et quanto melius habetur scientia, tanto meliori modo habetur clavis" (Op. Om. 479 b).
31. "Dicendum, quod sive scientia sit clavis, sive non, tamen necessaria est sacerdoti tanta scientia, quod sciat discernere in peccatis communibus, et quod sit veniale, et quod mortale; et quod sciat semper, ad quae peccata potestas sua potest se extendere... alioquin in periculum animae suae et confitentium audit confessiones" (Op. Om. 463 dub. 3).
32. "Postremo, quia in curatione nostra manifestari debet ipsius Christi iudicis recta iustitia; et ipsius in propria persona non est iudicare ante iudicium ultimum et finale; ideo ad particularia iudicia ante finem iudices debuit constituere... ideo omnibus in sacerdotali ordine constitutis et solis datur potestas duplicis clavis..." (Op. Om., V. Breviloquium, 276, a).

judgment, and the imposition of sentence. The inquiry entails a thorough investigation of the cause;33 the judgment must follow the dictates of wisdom and jurisprudence,34 and such a penance must be imposed as to meet the demands of justice and to insure the greatest benefit to the penitent.35 From this it is evident that St. Bonaventure attributes real judicial character to the power of the keys.

II. THE USE OF THE KEYS

We have seen that the potestas clavium is a spiritual power, permanently residing in the soul of the priest. It is therefore irremovable by its essence. The same, however, cannot be said in respect to its use, which is dependent upon life and jurisdiction. Sacramental absolution, being an integral part of the Sacrament of Penance, can be administered only in the bosom of the Church militant.36 This follows not only from the fact that the Sacraments are the exclusive property of the visible Church, but also from the Bonaventurean notion that it is a special function of the keys to effect reconciliation between the sinner and the Church.³⁷ Such a reconciliation is possible only in this life; hence, the mediator, through whose agency it is brought about, must himself be a sojourner on life's way.

dub. 5).

34. "Si autem ille qui solvit et ligat, secundum voluntatem non secundum scientiae vel iuris regulam procedat; sic clavis non habet efficaciam... Unde sicut Sacramenta privantur efficacia, aut quia non recte administrantur, aut quia non recte suscipiuntur sic de clavibus oportet intelligi" (Op. Om., IV, 483, dub. 4).

35. "...sacerdos, servato recto ordine et quantitate, punit, et sententia sacerdotis est sententia Dei hic hominem absolventis; et tunc non praevenitur, quia ipse iudex

^{33. &}quot;Dicendum, quod absque dubio oportet, ipsum confessorem diligentem esse in investigando. Et ratio huius est, quoniam ipse iudex est, et iudex debet diligenter inquirere causae veritatem, maxime quando dubia apparet" (Op. Om., IV, 513,

est sententia Dei hic hominem absolventis; et tunc non praevenitur, quia ipse iudex iudicat per ministrum suum, cui commisit ministerium; quod tamen cassum est, nisi praecedat auctoritas Dei absolventis" (Op. Om., IV, 360, dub. 5). "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod tanta potest esse contritio, quod totum remittitur; dicendum, quod verum est; sed quia Ecclesiae non constat, ideo debet (sc. satisfactio) a sacerdote imponi" (Op. Om., IV, 363, 3).

36. "Quod status viatoris requiratur, patet, quia, sicut ratio merendi non competit caritati extra statum viae, sic nec potestas reconciliandi et Sacramenta exhibendi sive administrandi nisi in statu Ecclesiae militantis" (Op. Om., IV, 506).

37. "Sed quoniam peccator ipsum offenderat et etiam damnificaverat eius Ecclesiam: commisit Dominus judiciariam potestatem super peccatore rectoribus Ecclesiae.

siam; commisit Dominus iudiciariam potestatem super peccatores rectoribus Ecclesiae et in eos compromisit tanquam in arbitros, ut sic innotescat voluntas Dei poenitentibus per sacerdotes, et per illos imponatur poena peccatoribus, et Domino satisfiat principaliter et Ecclesiae per consequens" (Op. Om., IV, 364, a).

According to St. Bonaventure, a twofold reconciliation is brought about by the Sacrament of Penance. The first, between the sinner and God; the second, between the sinner and the Church.38 When, through the reception of Orders, the priest is made mediator between God and man, he does not thereby become a mediator between man and the Church. The Church, being a perfect society, has the right to designate its own mediators. 39 Through the collation of the keys St. Peter was given supreme authority over the universal Church. All men seeking membership with the Mystical Body of Christ had to subject themselves to this one, plenipotentiary authority. Christ's visible kingdom, however, quickly spread throughout the world, embracing so much territory and so many people that it soon became expedient to establish subsidiary ecclesiastical offices, each enjoying ordinary territorial authority, dependent upon the Holy See. This authority, in turn, was subdelegated to priests, whose jurisdiction, however, was limited ad portiunculam determinatam. 40 Consequently, even though the priest be equipped with everything necessary for the proper administration of his office, insofar as Orders, knowledge, and moral integrity are concerned, all use of the keys is null and void until the Church assigns him subjects. Whereas this multiplication and curtailment of authority was introduced to procure efficiency and to prevent confusion in the Church, de jure it is not totally ecclesiastical, for it is in con-

^{38. &}quot;...poenitens, quamdiu est in hac vita subiectus est foro Ecclesiae, ita quod ab ipso non potest appellare. Praeterea, fecit iniuriam Ecclesiae, et ideo, si potest comparere (sc. ad confessionem), tenetur, nisi per impossibilitatem excusetur"

quod ab ipso non potest appellare. Praeterea, fecit iniuriam Ecclesiae, et ideo, si potest comparere (sc. ad confessionem), tenetur, nisi per impossibilitatem excusetur" (Op. Om., IV, 432, 3).

39. "Sacerdos enim est mediator, et in quantum mediator inferior est Deo et superior poenitente et arbiter et iudex homini constitutus loco Dei ad parcendum sive solvendum et ad puniendum; talis autem iudicatio non est sine aliqua iurisdictione in eum qui iudicatur, quia nemo potest aliquem iudicare, nisi qui iudex eius constituitur ab eo qui potest" (Op. Om., p. 506a).

40. "Quia vero propter confusionem vitandam non quilibet cuilibet est praelatus in Ecclesia militante, cum ipsa hierarchia ecclesiastica debeat esse secundum potestatem iudiciariam ordinata; ideo haec potestas ligandi et solvendi concessa est primo uni primo et summo sacerdoti, cui collata est tamquam summo capiti potestas universalis; et deinde secundum particulares Ecclesias dividitur in partes, ita quod primo in episcopos et deinde in presbyteros descendit a capite uno. Ideo, licet unusquisque sacerdos habeat ordinem et clavem, ad eos tamen usus clavis tantum se extendit, qui ordinarie sunt subjecti, nisi sibi ad eo qui habet iurisdictionem ordinariam, committatur" (Op. Om., IV, 508 b, 509 a; Breviloquium, Op. Om., V, 276). "...quoniam per recessum ab uno fit multiplicatio, et per hoc virtutis diminutio; ideo, quanto praelati alii inferiores sunt, tanto plures sunt et tanto minorem habent potestatem, ita quod status est in sacerdotibus parochialibus, qui immediate gerunt populi curam; et istorum iurisdictio arctata est ad portiunculam determinatam..." (Op. Om., 509 a).

formity with the will of Christ and under the direction of the Holy Spirit.41

The Seraphic Doctor distinguishes various powers embodied in the ministers of the Church. Some are based principally upon Holy Orders as, for instance, the power to consecrate bread and wine; others, again, are founded solely on canonical jurisdiction, as the power to excommunicate; finally, there is a third kind which rests both on ordination and ecclesiastical authority, and such is the power to bind and loose in the penitential tribunal.42 All priestly functions should be executed under ecclesiastical authority. But there are some which do not depend upon it secundum rem de facto, and accordingly, though illicit, are nevertheless valid when performed without ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Not so, however, the operation of the keys. Unlike the other powers which derive from Orders, the potestas clavium is primarily directed towards others and consequently jurisdiction, which consists in the assignment of definite subjects by competent authority, must be supplied before the keys can act. This St. Bonaventure calls the vis motiva clavium. 43 As an illustration, he uses the analogy of a blind person, who, while possessing the potentiality of vision, cannot see because the visual organ is impaired. In further elucidation, he says that just as light, which is necessary for sight, does not pertain to the essence of the eye and is not given with the visual faculty, so jurisdiction, which is necessary for the operation of the keys, is not concomitant with the reception of Orders but is dependent upon an external will.44 Still, in those priests who for one reason or another have no

^{41. &}quot;Quando ergo Dominus dedit clavem et hanc potestatem, ipse praesupposuit

^{41. &}quot;Quando ergo Dominus dedit clavem et hanc potestatem, ipse praesupposuit eius executionem secundum regulam potestatis collatae Petro et eius successoribus" (Op. Om., IV, 509, 2): "...talis arctatio facta est in minoribus sacerdotibus, regulante iure divino, immo ipso Spiritu Sancto, per Patres et Apostolos, qui Ecclesiam fundaverunt et ordinaverunt"— (ibid. p. 509, 6).

42. "...potestas quadruplex reperitur in ministris Ecclesiae. Quaedam namque est fundata super ordinem principaliter, ut potestas conficiendi; quaedam super iurisdictionem canonicam principaliter, ut potestas excommunicandi; quaedam super ordinem et eminentiam, ut potestas ordinandi; quaedam super ordinem et iurisdictionem, ut potestas absolvendi et ligandi in foro poenitentiali. Et quoniam character auferri non potest, ideo potestas, quae consequitur characterem, de facto auferri non potest. Sed quoniam iurisdictio descendit ordinate a superiori ad inferius, ita quod plenitudo est in Summo Pontifice; ideo potest auferre eam et potestatem, quae consequitur ipsam" (Op. Om., IV, 645 b).

43. "Et ideo iurisdictio est tamquam vis motiva ipsius clavis, sive manus; haec autem deficiente, quae clavem moveat, etsi adsit clavis, numquam aperiet; et si amittitur haec iurisdictio, cessat clavis executio" (Op. Om., IV, 506, 6—ibid. p. 506a).

44. Op. Om., IV, 506 a, 506 b.

jurisdiction, the potestas clavium is not to be looked upon as a vain and meaningless power, for, even though it accomplishes nothing externally, it can contribute to the adornment of the soul of the good, or to the confusion of the wicked. 45

Can any sin whatsoever be submitted to the power of the keys? In his treatise on the potestas clavium the learned Franciscan says nothing in this regard. However, from his doctrine on the necessity of an integral confession46 and on the complete removal of all sins in the Sacrament of Penance, of which the power of the keys is an essential part, 47 it can be safely assumed that he excludes no sin from the benefits of the keys. Omnis agens poenitentiam super culpam quamvis gravissimam inveniat veniam a Deo, he writes. 18 Now, poenitentiam agere in the mind of the saint always implied submission of sins to the judgment of the priest. Moreover, he teaches that there are no sins actually irremissible. Impenitence and despair are said to be irremissible simply because the disposition to penance is wanting in such sinners. 49 Furthermore, he flays as a cruel and pernicious error the opinion of those who say that penance cannot be repeated.⁵⁰ The possessor of the keys, therefore, has the power to absolve all his subjects from all their sins, except those which have been reserved to a higher tribunal. In the danger of death, however, there are no circumscriptive limits to the power whatsoever. 51 As to the absolving of an accomplice, the holy doctor

^{45. &}quot;...non oportet, quod potentia exeat in omnes, sufficit tamen, quod aliquid faciat, ita quod non sit otiosum in natura. Et... etsi nihil per illam potentiam fiat exterius, tamen illa potest esse in animae ornatum quantum ad bonos, vel in confusionem quantum ad malos" (Op. Om., IV, 506, 5).

46. Op. Om., IV, Dist. XVII, p. iii, Art. II Qq. 1, 2, 3. 457 et seq.

47. "Summa clementia Pontificis superexcedit omnia peccata humana, qualiacumque et quantacumque et quotiescumque fuerint perpetrata; hinc est, quod peccantes suscipere ad veniam est ipsius Pontificis clementissimi, non semel nec bis, sed quotiescumque peccator peccaverit, et poenitentiae Sacramentum potest habere refugium, per quod sibi fiat remissio peccatorum" (Op. Om., V, Breviloquium 275).

48. "Alia est poenitentia, qua quis poenitet propter Dei offensam, paratus ei facere emendam. Et haec non est sine divina gratia gratum faciente, vel gratis data; et haec adeo disponit ad gratiam, quod nullus est sic poenitens, quin inveniat gratiam et veniam; et ideo Deus nulli eam dat, nisi cum quo proponit facere misericordiam... Concedendum igitur, quod omnis agens poenitentiam super culpam secundum assignationem praedictam, quantumcumque peccaverit, invenit veniam" (Op. Om., IV, 355 a).

49. Op. Om., II, 983 a; IV, 335 a.

50. "Dicendum, quod pessimus error est et crudelissimus, quod poenitentia non possit iterari, quia claudit viscera divinae misericordiae; et tunc omnes peccatores, vel fere omnes cogeret desperare" (Op. Om., IV, 333).

51. "Haec autem intelligenda sunt secundum legem communem, quia in articulo necessitatis indulget rectitudo iuris cuilibet sacerdoti quemlibet absolvere, si sit in

necessitatis indulget rectitudo iuris cuilibet sacerdoti quemlibet absolvere, si sit in Ecclesia unitate" (Op. Om. IV, 509).

believes that a priest could do so validly. He protests, however, that such a procedure would not be safe, for it appears to be vitiated by presumption on the part of the confessor, and by lack of contrition on the part of the penitent. 52

St. Bonaventure enumerates four instances wherein the action of the keys is frustrated.53 Two arise from deficiency on the part of the confessor, unus, si non sciat; alter, si non possit; the others occur by default of the penitent, viz., if he simulates confession, or if, after having confessed, he contemptuously spurns the penance imposed and neglects to perform it. In the first case deficiency lies in the key of knowledge, namely, that material disposition is lacking without which the clavis principalis is helpless to act. 54 The second case of frustration is due to deficiency in the key of power. The Seraphic Doctor assigns two causes, to wit, lack of jurisdiction and the enormity of the crime. By the latter he means sins reserved to a higher tribunal. The penitent frustrates the absolution of the priest by simulating confession, this he does aut discredendo, aut malum appetendo, aut Sacramentum contemnendo. 55 Simulation is more opposed to grace than is sin itself, for the former is opposed secundum oppositionem formae, while the latter is opposed secundum oppositionem resistentiae. 56 Again, the operation of the potestas clavium is rendered null and void through deliberate failure on the part of the penitent to complete the materia Sacramenti. Such contemptuous neglect precludes any sacramental effect being derived from the potestas clavium.

St. Bonaventure speaks of a twofold manner in which the potestas clavium can err. The first occurs when the priest absolves a person whom God has not vivified with grace; the second, when he binds to less satisfaction than is demanded by divine justice. In such cases the priest judges with the judgment of man, and not in accordance with the Supreme Judge; consequently his decision is not valid and the penitent still remains accountable to the divine forum.⁵⁷ In other words, the judgment of the priest must be in conformity with the judgment of God, otherwise it is not

^{52.} Op. Om., IV, 512, dub. 3. 53. Op. Om., IV, 561 b; ibid 464 b. 54. Op. Om., IV, 479 b. 55. Op. Om., IV, 103 a. 56. Op. Om., IV, 103 b. 57. Op. Om., VII Comm. in Joan; c. 20, n. 49.

effective. All this is in keeping with the Bonaventurean principle absolutio praesupponit gratiam.58

III. TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY DOCTRINE ON THE EFFICACY OF THE KEYS AT THE TIME OF ST. BONAVENTURE

If contrition, which entails the presence of sanctifying grace in the soul, is a prerequisite to sacerdotal absolution, just what is effected by the power of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance? This is the question which vexed theologians at the beginning of the twelfth century. 59 Surely, the words of Christ, "whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," 60 were not meaningless phrases! And surely the precept to submit sins to the judgment of a priest suggested something more than an onerous, but useless, formality!61 Still, how could the potestas clavium possibly exercise any causality towards the remission of sins after they had already been removed by the infusion of grace coincident with supernatural sorrow?

In order to attribute some efficacy to the keys, various theories were proposed by theologians. Some, discarding the subjective factors of the Sacrament of Penance entirely, ascribed too much to the absolution of the priest, claiming that he could absolve whomsoever he pleased. 62 Others, embracing the opposite extreme, assigned the remission of sins solely to the acts of the penitent.63 A third, more moderate group, hesitant and vague, hinted that sins were removed by the combined action of the subjective and objective elements of the Sacrament, but failed to clarify their posi-

^{58.} Op. Om., IV, 360, dub. 5.

59. Hugh of St. Victor places the question thus: "Solet quaeri utrum solvatur homo a peccato, ut primum habet verum cordis contritionem... Sed si per contritionem cordis solutus est a peccato, in confessione oris non solvitur: ad quid ergo confessio oris est?" P.L. 176, col. 147, Peter Lombard poses a similar question: "Hic quaeri solet, si peccatum omnino dimissum est a Deo per cordis contritionem, ex quo poenitens votum habuit confitendi, quid postea dimittatur ei a sacerdote?" Dist. 18, cap. 1 in Op. Om. Bon., IV Sent., 465.

60. In. 20, 23.

61. Denzinger 146: "...indulgentia Dei nisi supplicationibus sacerdotum nequeat obtineri... 'homo Christus Jesus' hanc praepositis Ecclesiae tradidit potestatem, ut et confitentibus actionem poenitentiae darent, et... per ianuam reconciliationis admitterent" (Ex epistola (108) S. Leo M. an. 452); Denziger 437: The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) prescribes annual confession.

62. St. Thomas, Comm. in Matt. c. 16.

63. Abelard and his school. Cf. p. 310 infra.

tion.64 In short, the problem remained bewilderingly enigmatic until the way to the true solution was pointed out by St. Thomas⁶⁵ and later stabilized by Scotus.66

The Fathers did not occupy themselves precisely with the question of the efficacy of the keys. Isolated statements, scattered throughout patristic literature, express belief in a power inherent in priests to bind and loose, and make frequent mention of an obligation to confess sins committed after Baptism, but they do not indicate whether sacerdotal absolution has a causal influence upon the remission of sins, or whether it is only a conditio sine qua non. Indeed, there is reason for asserting that, in the matter of the keys, the Fathers contributed more to the confusion than to the enlightenment of medieval scholars. The reverential awe in which certain ancient doctors were held made their opinions sacrosanct. In the Middle Ages, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great were names to conjure with. Their writings moulded and fixed the thought of the early Schoolmen. It is no wonder, then, that the allegorical interpretation they gave to the raising of Lazarus became the traditional manner of explaining the remission of sin. This proved a major obstacle to the discovery of the real function of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance.

In the Gospel of St. John, 67 we read that Jesus cried out with a loud voice, "Lazarus, come forth!" And when he had come forth, Jesus said to His disciples: "Unbind him, and let him go!" St. Augustine, in allegorizing this account, gives the impression that Our Lord retained the power to remit sin for Himself. He points out that it was Christ alone who called Lazarus back to life; and that it was only after Lazarus had stepped from the tomb revivified

64. Cf. Buchberger, M; Die Wirkungen des Buss-Sakramentes nach der Lehre

^{64.} Cf. Buchberger, M; Die Wirkungen des Buss-Sakramentes nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas, Freiburg (1901) p. 29.
65. Galtier, P., S.J., De Poenitentia, Tractatus dogmatico-historicus, Parisiis (1923) p. 127, n. 187. St. Thomas, Sum. Theol. III. Suppl. q. 18, art. 1; Sum. Theol. III, q. 84 ad 5.; IV Sent. D. xviii, q. 1 a. 3 ad primam. Goetler, J., Der hl. Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentinischen Thomisten ueber die Wirkungen des Buss-Sakramentes, Freiburg in Br., (1904).
66. "Exercet actum qui est signum prognosticum, efficax mundationis sequentis" (Scotus, Vives, XVIII, 649, 650; cf. ibid 420, 421; Ruetten, op. cit., p. 4; Teetaert, A. La confession aux laïques dans l'église latine depuis le VIIe jusqu'au XIVe siècle, Paris (1922) p. 93; Cf. Stufler, J., S.J.: Die Suendenvergebung bei Origenes ZfKT, 1907, Innsbruck, p. 193 ff; also the same author, Die Bussdisziplin der abendlaen-dischen Kirche bis Kallistus, ZfKT (1907) p. 433 ff). 67. In. 11, 43-44.

that Jesus told the disciples to loose him and let him go.68 St. Gregory the Great, in commenting on the dignity and gravity of the divine commission to loose and retain sin, also appeals to the evangelical incident of the raising of Lazarus. He says that the absolution of the priest, in order to be effective, must follow the judgment of God, for only after Lazarus had been vivified by the Lord did the disciples loose him. We, too, St. Gregory adds, must unbind by pastoral authority those whom we know to have been vivified by the resuscitating grace of the Creator. This vivification is recognizable in the confession of sin. 69

The authority of St. Anselm of Canterbury (d. 1109) was also held in great esteem by the Schoolmen. He left no ex professo treatise on the Sacrament of Penance, but the principal elements of penitential doctrine, as conceived at his time, are found interspersed here and there in his works. Apropos to the efficacy of the keys, St. Anselm, in a homily on the lepers who had been cleansed by Our Lord, lays stress on the words dum irent mundati sunt. 70 The sinner, by acknowledging his guilt and resolving to confess and perform satisfaction, is immediately freed of his sins, but he must carry out his proposal to confess to a priest,

ut qui jam coram Deo sunt mundati, sacerdotium judicio etiam hominibus ostendantur mundi.71

Influenced by such misleading illustrations, the early Scholastics were unquestionably nonplussed to assign a decisive rôle to sacramental absolution in the remission of sin. With guilt removed, and grace restored to the soul even before the keys come into

^{68. &}quot;Quis eum suscitabit, nisi qui remoto lapide clamavit, dicens: Lazare, prodi foras? Quid est autem foras prodire, nisi quod occultum erat foras prodere? Qui

foras? Quid est autem foras prodire, nisi quod occultum erat foras prodere? Qui confitetur, foras prodit. Foras prodire non posset, nisi viveret: vivere non posset, nisi resuscitatus esset. Ergo in confessione sui accusatio, Dei laudatio est" (St. Augustine: Enarratio II in Ps. Cl. Sermo II, iii; Sermo LXVII).

69. "Tunc enim vera est absolutio praesidentis, cum aeterni arbitrium sequitur judicis. Quod bene quatriduani mortui resuscitatio illa significat, quae videlicet demonstrat quia prius mortuum Dominus vocavit et vivificavit... ecce illum discipuli jam viventem solvunt... illos nos debemus per pastoralem auctoritatem solvere quos auctorem nostrum cognoscimus per suscitantem gratiam vivificare. Quae nimirum vivificatio ante operationem rectitudinis in ipsa jam cognoscitur confessione peccati" (Gre. M., Hom. 26, P.L. 86, p. 1200; in the East Origen also taught that Lazarus was vivified by his contrition and the voice of Jesus, cf. Origenes Werke, IV. (ed. Preuschen) bk 28, E. p. 396-398).

70. Anselm, Hom. 13, P.L. 158, 660; Lk. 17, 14.

71. 1bid., 662.

action, it is not surprising that they sought to establish a causal relation between the keys and the removal of punishment due

A further deterrent to the discovery of the peculiar efficacy of the keys were the prevalent lax notions concerning the nature and number of the Sacraments.72 Some went so far as to deny the sacramental character of private Penance, and consequently paid little heed to any efficacy which might lie in sacerdotal absolution.73 Others considered the keys as completely detached from the Sacrament of Penance;74 for them absolution had no more value than any other blessing given by a priest. But the most vexing difficulty was the medieval persuasion that contrition, endowed with charity, was a prerequisite disposition to submitting one's sins to the potestas clavium. Abelard (d. 1192) made supernatural sorrow the basis for his penitential doctrine. Taking the text, "Quacumque hora peccator ingemuerit salvus erit," he argued that when God inspires sorrow, He no longer tolerates guilt, and sin is immediately removed. Confession, however, is necessary for obtaining other relaxations. 75 It also has an ethical value, inasmuch as it has a curative effect upon the will, wherein lies the constitutive element of sin. 76 In this system, there is no question of sacerdotal absolution having the deletion of sin for its objective; in fact, the rôle of the priest is analogous to that of a physician prescribing remedies

^{72.} Ruetten, Op. cit. p. 7; Cf. Schaetzler, Die Lebre von der Wirksamkeit der Sakramente ex opere operato in ibrer Entwicklung innerhalb der Scholastik, Muenchen

^{(1860) 258} ff.

73. Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments (authorized translation from the 3rd French edition) 153, 257 1q.

74. "Tria itaque sunt in reconciliatione peccatoris ad Deum, poenitentia scilicet, confessio, satisfactio" (Abelard, eth. 17, P.L. 178, 661 A; Roland (Alexander III) Bandinelli, while he assigns sacramental character to the Sacrament of Penance, considers the potestas clavium as separate from the Sacrament. Cf. Schmoll, op. cir. 36, 37; cf. also 11 1q.

75. "Cum hoc autem gemitu et contritione cordis, quam veram poenitentiam dicimus, peccatum non permanet... quia caritas Dei hunc gemitum inspirans, non patitur culpam. In hoc statim gemitu Deo reconciliamur, et praecedentis peccati veniam assequimur, juxta illud prophetae: Quaecumque hora peccator ingemuerit, salvus erit (Ezech. 33, 14)... Etsi enim articuli necessitatis praeventus non habeat locum veniendi ad confessionem, vel peragendi satisfactionem, nequaquam in hoc gemitu de hac vita recedans gehennam incurrit... Non enim Deus cum peccatum poenitentibus condonat, omnem poenam eis ignoscit, sed solummodo aeternam" (Abelard: eth. 19, P.L. 178, 664-665 B). "Multis de causis fideles invicem peccata confitentur... ut orationibus eorum magis adjuvemur, quibus confitemur, tum etiam quia in humilitate confessionis magna pars agitur satisfactionis, et in relaxatione poenitentiae magnam assequimur indulgentiam" (Idem, eth. 24, P.L. 178, p. 669 C).

76. Idem, eth. 25, 672 1q. 76. Idem, eth. 25, 672 sq.

for the convalescence of a patient; his chief function being the imposition of satisfaction upon the penitent for the remission of temporal punishment.77

Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141) did much to dispel the obscurity veiling the true nature of a Sacrament by working out a stable definition.78 He also listed Penance among the Sacraments and attributed sacramental efficacy to the absolution of the priest. Furthermore, Hugh was reluctant to accept the implication of the Abelardian theory that the potestas clavium had no direct bearing whatsoever on the removal of sin. But he was at a loss to explain how gratia gratum faciens could be the effect of an external operation.79 The priest, he said, could forgive sin, but only through the special cooperation of God. 80 However, any desire on the part of the reader to see in this concession even an indirect extension of the keys to the guilt of sin is frustrated when he adds that man can thus absolve from the vinculum poenae (i.e. eternal punishment), but only after God has removed the vinculum culpae (guilt). This is truly a remarkable opinion. In the eyes of Hugh, the sinner, though justified by God, may still remain subject to eternal punishment.81

^{77. &}quot;Ipse quippe Dominus Jesus se spiritualem medicum appellans, ait: Non est opus valentibus medico, sed male habentibus (Mt. 9, 12). Hujus locus sacerdotes in Ecclesia tenent, quibus tamquam animarum medicis peccata confiteri debemus, ut ab eis satisfactionis catasplasma sumamus" (Idem, Sermo VIII, P.L. 178, 442 B).

^{78. &}quot;Sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum, ex similitudine repraesentans et ex institutione significans et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem gratiam" (Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis I, 9, c. 2., P.L. 176).

^{79. &}quot;...necesse est, ut Deus gratiam suam, quam peccantibus nobis subtraxerat, quando ad poenitentiam vivificandi sumus, sola misericordia nullis nostris meritis quando ad poenitentiam vivificandi sumus, sola misericordia nullis nostris meritis praecedentibus reddat, quatenus ipsa gratia adveniens cor nostrum a torpore infidetatis et a peccati morte exsuscitet, ut sc. dum primum ipsa sola operante ad poenitentiam compuncti a vinculis torporis absolvimur, etiam ipsa deinde cooperante poenitentes a debito damnationis absolvi mereamur" (Idem, De Sacramentis II, 14, 8., P.L. 176, p. 565 C). (Cf. Bon. IV. Seni., 474 ad 4): "Potestas clavis dicit potestatem creaturae rationalis nec concernit gratiam, sed quod exterius est."

80. "Deus per semetipsum, quando vult, sine humana cooperatione peccata dimittere potest, hi vero (sacerdotes)... nisi eo, a quo sunt hoc quod sunt, in eis et per eos operante et eis cooperante peccata dimittere non possunt" (Hugh, ibid. 566 A).

^{81. &}quot;...quamvis iste, de quo loquimur, jam justus sit, quia non habet voluntatem peccandi et de praeteritis dolet, tamen nondum justificatus est, cum adhuc debito peccati teneatur. Cum enim vulnus per confessionem cordis jam ostensum sit medico, restat ejus recipere medicinam. Sed quis nesciat sacramenta esse medicamenta" (Hugh, ibid. 2, 7, 133 B; — Cf. Schmoll, op. cit. 47 sq.; Vacandard D.T.C. "Absolution," Vol. I, 1, col. 170 sq.).

Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) in his De Potestate Solvendi et Ligandi⁸² upholds the theory of Hugh. He attempts to circumvent the Hugonian dilemma of the coexistence of grace and liability to eternal damnation by alleging that the patriarchs and prophets of old, despite their charity, were under sentence of the poena damni until released through the Redemption of Christ.83 It is possible, he argues, that a man, though free of guilt, may still need the intervention of another power to liberate him from the consequences of sin. And so, whereas God remits the poena damni conditionally, it is the priest who removes it effectively.84

Peter Lombard (writing between 1145 and 1150) teaches that God not only cleanses the soul of the sinner from interior guilt (culpa), but also remits eternal punishment. This He does by illuminating the soul with grace and inciting true contrition. True contrition, he argues, is informed with charity; and he who has charity is worthy of life; but no one can be deserving of life and death at the same time. Ergo. 85 In order to assign some sort of effectiveness to the potestas clavium he has recourse to the "ostensive" theory whereby the power to bind and loose is reduced to the fruitless service of displaying the sinner as bound or loosed by God. According to the Master of Sentences, the penitent, though loosed by God, is not to be considered as such in the eyes of the Church until the priest has passed a confirmatory judgment.86 He cites the case of the lepers who had been cleansed by Christ and vet had to obtain legal corroboration before being readmitted to community life. And to the priests of the New Law he applies the words of St. Jerome speaking of the priests of the Mosaic Law:

^{82. &}quot;De potestate Solvendi et Ligand?" (Richard of St. Victor; P.L. 196, col. 1159-1178. — Cf. Schmoll, 57 sq. op. cir.).

83. "...absque dubitatione patriarchae et prophetae caritatem habuere et tamen tenebantur debito damnationis aeternae" (Richard; ibid. col. 1171).

84. Idem., ibid. col. 1174. — Cf. Vacandard loc. cir.

85. "Deus ipse poenitentem solvit a debito poenae, et tunc solvit, quando intus illuminat, inspirando veram cordis contritionem. Cui sententia ratio suffragatur, et auctoritates attestantur. Nemo enim de peccato vere compungitur, habens cor contritum et humiliatum, nisi in caritate; qui autem caritatem habet dignus est vita; nemo autem simul dignus est vita et morte: non est igitur tunc ligatus debito aeternae mortis" (Peter Lombard: In Op. Om., IV, Sent., 466, cap. 4).

86. "...etsi aliquis apud Deum sit solutus, non tamen in facie Ecclesiae habetur

^{86. &}quot;...etsi aliquis apud Deum sit solutus, non tamen in facie Ecclesiae habetur solutus nisi per iudicium sacerdotis. In solvendis igitur culpa vel retinendis ita operatur sacerdos evangelicus et iudicat, sicut olim legalis in illis qui contaminati erant lepra, quae peccatum significat" (Peter Lombard, *ibid.* 467, cap. 6).

non faciunt leprosos vel mundos, sed discernunt qui mundi vel immundi sunt.87

According to this theory, confession serves only as a norm for gauging the internal sanctity of the members of the visible Church. Absolution is, so to speak, a certificate of spiritual health issued by the priest which permits the penitent to partake of the Sacraments and associate with the other members of the community. There seems to be no essential distinction between binding and loosing in the internal forum and in the external forum. In both, the priest represents solely the authority of the Church. From the manifestation of sins the confessor judges whether or not the penitent has found mercy with God; then, in the name of the Church, he proclaims his status in the eyes of the Church.

Some authors cite Alexander of Hales (d. 1245) as an adherent of the above theory. In all fairness to Hales, however, it must be said that he did not teach the aforementioned doctrine; at least, not in the form proposed by Peter Lombard. To the contrary, he expressly ridicules this opinion: *Haec sententia tam frivola est quam ridenda*.⁸⁹ According to Hales, the priest, cooperating with the authority conceded to him by God, absolves from sin. It must be noted, however, that the word "sin" often takes on the extended connotation of punishment due to sin, when used by the Irrefragable Doctor.⁹⁰ But we shall refrain from saying more con-

^{87.} St. Jerome, In Mt. lib. 3, c. 16, v. 19.

^{88. &}quot;Et in remittendis vel in retinendis culpis id iuris et officii habent evangelici sacerdotes, quod olim sub Lege habebant legales in curandis leprosis. Hi ergo peccata dimittunt vel retinent, dum dimissa a Deo vel retenta iudicant et ostendunt. Ponunt enim sacerdotes nomen Domini super filios Israel, sed ipse benedicit, ut legitur in Numeris" (Lombard, *loc. cit.* 467, cap. 6).

^{89.} Alex. of Hales: Summa Theologica, pars IV, q. 20, m. 3, a. 2.

^{90. &}quot;Man darf nur nicht uebersehen, dass die Suende in zweifacher Weise erlassen werden kann, naemlich der Schuld nach und der Strafe nach. Dies haben schon namhafte Vertreter der Fruehscholastik betont... Namentlich seitdem die eigentuemliche Ansicht des Petrus Lombardus ueber die Bedeutung der sakramentalen Absolution in die Schulen Eingang gefunden, wurde oefters von den Theologen darauf aufmerksam gemacht, dass die Suende auf mehrfache Weise nachlassen werden koenne. Der Priester, sagten sie, laesst im Bussakrament die Suenden nach, indem er etwas von der ihnen gebuehrenden Strafe nachlaesst" (Paulus, Nikolaus, Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter, Paderborn (1922), I, 256 ff).

cerning his opinion, for only in slight details does it differ from that of St. Bonaventure.91

Before taking up the doctrine of the Seraphic Doctor on the efficacy of the potestas clavium, it may prove of interest to single out the strange theory of St. Albert the Great (d. 1280). According to him, the keys, not unlike the Passion of Christ, have an anticipatory effectiveness.92 Supernatural sorrow being a prerequisite to sacramental absolution, by the actual imparting of absolution the priest remits only part of temporal punishment and contributes nothing to the removal of guilt and eternal punishment. But since the votum clavium was already present in the contrition of the penitent, the keys may be said to have part in the remission of guilt and eternal punishment.93 This remarkable opinion was contested by Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure. The latter pointedly observes that, did the mere proposal to submit sins to the potestas clavium actively contribute to their total remission, then the keys would be more effective in voto than in actu, which is ridiculous.94

Many other variations and vagaries of opinion anent the effectiveness of the power of the keys are to be found the old commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. For a profuse and more explicit account of these, confer, among others, Schmoll and Teetaert.95 But from the foregoing it is sufficiently evident that a determined stand on the exact relationship between the potestas clavium and the forgiveness of sin had not been reached at the

^{91.} In fact, the texts of Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure on the treatise of the power of the keys are so remarkably alike that some writers have concluded that the Seraphic Doctor simply copied the doctrine of his Master; others think that the text as found in the Summa is not authentic, but an interpolation by another hand; others, again, see in this tract a youthful work of St. Bonaventure, written at a time when he was still greatly swayed by the authority of his teacher. This peculiar phenomenon should be cleared by the recent discovery of the Commentary on the Sentences of Hales. Cf. Schmoll, op. cit. p. 150; Vacant, D.T.C., "Alex. d'Hales".

on the Sentences of Traics.

d'Hales."

92. "Nihil prohibet operari clavem ante actum sacerdotis extra; sicut et gratia
Mediatoris operata est antequam esset mediator in natura vera medietate" (Albertus
Magnus, IV. Sent. d. 18, a. 1, vol. 19, 764). Ed. Borgnet, Paris (1894).

93. "Dicendum quod sacerdos non potest absolvere a culpa et poena aeterna,

absolver relaxando partem poenae nisi illo modo, quo supra dictum est, quod votum clavium est in contritione habendo vim quamdam ad remissionem totius

peccati" (ibid. 775).

94. Bon. Op. Om., IV, 473, opin. 1.

95. Schmoll, op. cit.; Teetaert, A. (De Zedelchen, A). Doctrine d'Alexander d'Ales au sujet du Sacrement de Pénitence; idem, La confession aux laïques dans l'Eglise latine depuis le VIIe jusqu'au XIVe siècle, Paris (1922).

time of St. Bonaventure. In fact, the problem was practically in the same position as it had been a hundred years earlier (1150) when Gratian, after examining the opinions rife in his day, curtly remarked:

Cui autem harum adhaerendum sit, lectoris judicio reservatur.98

Progress had been made, it is true, in sacramentary doctrine, due to the impetus given by Hugh of St. Victor and to the development and stabilization contributed by the Sentences of Peter Lombard and by the Summa Theologicae of Alexander of Hales;⁹⁷ still, the question of the precise function of the keys in the Sacrament of Penance was to remain officially unsettled and open to controversy until the Council of Trent.

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^{96.} Gratiani Decretum, ed. Friedberg 1879, c. 89 (1189). 97. Schwane: Dogmengeschichte der mittleren Zeiten, Freiburg in Br. (1822) 661-664.

FRANCISCAN AUTHORS KNOWN TO ST. TERESA OF AVILA*

Among the many mystical writers the Church has produced, few, if any, have surpassed, or even equalled, St. Teresa of Avila. It is, therefore, understandable that those religious orders, whose members in former days contributed towards the formation of her great personality, have considered this a great honour, and that controversies have originated as to whose influence has been preponderant. Thus for instance, when Mir in his book on St. Teresa¹ claimed that the influence of the Dominicans had been greater than that of the Jesuits, Zugasti 2 immediately came forward with a denial.

Although there is sufficient evidence to warrant an investigation and perhaps, as a third party, run away with the spoils and claim them for St. Francis, (Hoornaert says: "L'empreinte de la mentalité franciscaine dans les idées de Thérèse n'est plus à découvrir;" 3 and Etchegoyen writes: "Parmi les multiples influences du milieu, celle des lectures et des directions franciscaines nous parut prépondérante") 4 still we refrain from making an attempt, not only because it is so difficult and dangerous to weigh off imponderabilia, but also because in this essay we have restricted ourselves to tracing the influence of Franciscan authors only.

The investigation as to the sources Teresa may have utilized, or the books she may have read, is of relatively recent date. In 1907

^{*} Editor's Note: The present article is a partly abbreviated translation of "Franciscaansche Lectuur van de H. Theresa" (Collectanea Franciscana Neerlandica, I (1927) 219-239) by Marius Lamers, O.F.M. The abbreviated translation is rendered by Achilles Meersman, O.F.M. of Karachi, India. While it is our policy not to republish already published researches, the relative inaccessibility of the original due to the devastation of so many European libraries coupled with the current interest in the Spanish

Mystical School warrants our departure.

1. Mibuel Mir, Santa Teresa de Jesús, su vida, su espíritu, sus fundaciones, Madrid, 1912.

P. Zugasti, Santa Teresa y la Compañía de Jesús, Madrid, 1914.
 R. Hootnaert, Sainte Thérèse, écrivain, Tournai, 1922, p. 156.
 G. Etchegoyen, L'Amour Divin, Essai sur les sources de Sainte Thérèse, Bordeaux, 1923, p. 9.

the Carmelite Sisters of Paris could still write in the Introduction to their critical edition of St. Teresa's works:

Sainte Thérèse est l'écrivain le plus personnel qu'ait produit le génie espagnol et peut-être le génie chrétien; chez elle nul emprunt d'aucune sorte, point d'études préalables, point de laborieuses recherches, mais des facultés brillantes, une sensibilité exquise, des intuitions philosophiques remarquables.⁵

But, after the studies of Hoornaert, Etchegoyen and Morel-Fatio,⁶ this assertion cannot be maintained, or else only with the necessary restrictions and reservations. The above writers have definitely shown that contemporary authors and others have exercised their influence on St. Teresa. This however does not mean that any have detracted from her genius and originality.

The first question we must now put is: Which authors did St. Teresa read?

Very seldom does St. Teresa mention the source upon which she has — consciously or unconsciously — drawn and when she does, only in a general way, as e.g. "I have once read in a book...," or, "As, I think, St. Augustine says..." A few times she names a book in which she had found an important instruction, e.g. Bernardino de Laredo, Subida del Monte Sion. Further in her Constitutions she lists a number of books which should be kept in all libraries of her convents. It may be presumed that she had read all of them. Finally, in the process of canonization, Mother Mary of St. Francis gives the names of a number of books which St. Teresa especialmente read.

Which books could they have been? In the first place they must have been in Spanish, since Teresa did not understand Latin, much less other languages. Further they must be writings which appear on the Index of the Grand-inquisitor Don Fernando de Valdés, for in the *Book of Her Life* she writes: "When many books, written in the vernacular, had been proscribed and therefore were not allowed to be read, I found this very hard. It had been a diversion to me to read some of these and I was no longer able to do so." ⁷

^{5.} Oeuvres complètes de Sainte Thérèse de Jésus, Paris, Beauchesne, 1907-10 I Introd., xxiii.

^{6.} Bulletin Hispanique, 1908, pp. 87-94.
7. Works of St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Translation, p. 210.

With the help of these data, it has been possible to compile a list of works — besides a few lives of Saints — i.e. those of St. Francis and St. Clare — which St. Teresa knew. They are: the Letters of St. Jerome; the Confessions of St. Augustine; the Moralia of St. Gregory on Job; the Life of Christ by Ludolph of Saxony, translated into Spanish by Ambrosio de Montesino, O.F.M.; The Imitation of Christ; El arte de servir a Dios by Fr. Alonso de Madrid, O.F.M.; Tercer Abecedario of Fr. Francisco de Osuna, O.F.M.; Subida del Monte Sion of Fr. Bernardino de Laredo, O.F.M.; Oratoria de religiosos of Fr. Antonio Guevara, O.F.M.; the works and opuscules of Louis of Granada, O.P. and of St. Peter of Alcantara, O.F.M.

From this enumeration, it is indubitable that Hoornaert could write:

La majeure partie des livres d'ascétisme et de dévotion dont elle se nourrit de 1530 à 1560 ont pour auteurs des Franciscains.8

It is of little importance for our investigation that Teresa read a book which happened to have been translated into Spanish by a Franciscan. Still we insert that Fr. Ambrosio de Montesino has been mentioned as translator of the Latin Life of Christ by Ludolph of Saxony, since we wish to point to the fact that Ludolph has greatly and extensively undergone Franciscan influence, something both Hoornaert and Etchesgoyen have failed to remark. Ludolph namely took as basis for his work the Meditationes of John de Caulibus, O.F.M. The Meditationes for many years ascribed to St. Bonaventure can often be found literally in Ludolph's work, who then added to them numerous texts from the Fathers, theological explanations and moral applications.⁹

When St. Teresa writes: 10 "He (Christ) certainly permits us, when we meditate on the Passion, to imagine more sufferings and

^{8.} Hoornaert, l.c., p. 156.

9. This has been proved by Livario Oliger, O.F.M. in Studi Francescani, Ott.-Dec., 1921, p. 143 and Gennaio—Marzo, 1922, p. 24. Miss Margaret Deanesly in Vol. X of the British Society of Franciscan Studies wrote an article entitled: "The Gospel Harmony of John de Caulibus or Bonaventure," in which she questions the authorship of the former. Fr. Cuthbert, O.F.M., "A Medieval Gospel-Story," Eccl. Rev., LXVII (1922), 1-11 concludes his study by saying that the original text is the work of a Franciscan, but not of Bonaventure. Cf. "De Pelgrimagie van bet Kindeken Jesus door Pater Franciscus Caurve, O.F.M.," bewerkt door P. Ladislas Kerkhove, O.F.M., II, 28, Vlaamsche Boekenhalle, 1925.

10. Oeuvres, l.c., V, Pensées I, 398.

tortures than the Evangelists narrate," she is giving one of the basic principles of John de Caulibus, so that we may conclude in this instance to dependence on John through Ludolph of Saxony.

But let us lay translations aside and ask ourselves what Franciscan authors have influenced St. Teresa and our answer will enumerate the following.

FR. FRANCISCO DE OSUNA

This Franciscan from Andalusia had occupied very high posts in the Order. At one time he was Commissary General for the Indies. Notwithstanding his manifold duties and the frequent journeys he had to undertake through the whole of Spain and into France and Belgium, he still found time to write many important works both in Latin and in Spanish. He died about the year 1540.

In this article, however, we will only speak about one of his writings, which is also considered his most important one, viz. the Tercer Abecedario: Don Miguel Mir, who prepared a new edition of it in 1911 11 describes it as one of the chief mystical writings of Spanish literature. It was in many ways a pioneer work. As Walsh says: "Although the various stages of mental prayer had been recognized by many saints, no methodical attempt had been made to analyze and classify them until Osuna wrote this book." Osuna himself refers to it as a brief outline or study of how one must prepare for contemplative life. He calls it an "Abecedario" or A B C Book because each one of the twenty-two Chapters of which it consists commences with a text, the first letter of each being a different one of the alphabet, and he terms it "Tercer" or third because he had already composed two other "Abecedarios" or A B C Books for beginners in spiritual life.

This book influenced St. Teresa greatly. Very early, already in 1536, she acquired it, when, only twenty-one years old, sick and over-wrought she had been obliged to leave The Incarnation. Journeying to Becidas to be treated by the famous (!) doctor there, she paid a visit to her uncle Pedro Sánchez de Cepeda, who gave her the Tercer Abecedario to read, and on her departure presented it to her. St. Teresa herself narrates in the Book of Her Life:

^{11.} Osuna, O.F.M., Tercer Abecedario, published by Mir in: Escritores Místicos Españoles, Tomo I, 319-587.

On my way I received from my uncle, whose house, as I have already said, was located on the road thither, a book entitled: Tercer Abecedario, which treated of interior prayer. I had, indeed, read good books that first year and knowing the pernicious influence of the other (books) I had resolved not to touch wrong books any more; still I did not know how to cope with the problem of interior prayer, or how to concentrate within myself. I was, therefore, highly pleased with the book and decided to follow with all my strength the way pointed out to me. The Lord had already granted me the gift of tears, and I found delight in reading good books. Now I also began to set aside certain times for interior recollection, to go frequently to confession, and to follow the indicated road. This book was my guide.¹²

From the above it is clear that St. Teresa had difficulties about that form of prayer which both she and Osuna¹³ term oración de recogimiento, the form of prayer transcending words, without well-distinguished logical sequence (or clear conceptions). In other words regarding this "prayer of recollection" St. Teresa had scruples. She practised it, at least at times, but she was unable to give an adequate explanation of the phenomenon, neither did she know whether it was good or evil. The Tercer Abecedario of Osuna gave her the desired explanation and peace of mind.

Therefore we cannot easily over-estimate the influence of this book on St. Teresa. There she discovered what she was sorely in need of and that in a transition-period of her life. Years she studied the volume for she was unable to comprehend and realize all it contained at once. In St. Joseph's Convent at Avila the copy she used is still preserved as a precious relic. Many verses are underlined; other passages are marked with a cross, a heart, a hand. When, in later years, she herself began teaching her daughters, she always followed Ossuna in dubious questions, e.g. in the question of contemplating Christ's humanity, the silence of the mind, seeking God in one's own heart, the value of spiritual consolations.¹⁴

Not only did Osuna influence her life and doctrine; he even seems to have influenced her style. "It is a gift of God to receive Grace, another gift to be able to understand it. He who has received only the first knows that it is befitting to rejoice and remain

^{12.} St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Translation, pp. 18-19.
13. Osuna explains this manner of prayer in the XIIIth Chapter of his Abecedario; Cf. Osuna, l.c., p. 466.
14. Hoornaert, l.c., p. 333.

silent, but he who has received both must be watchful over his words." These words of Osuna 15 St. Teresa underlined. Undoubtedly she had received both gifts in overflowing measure, but a third had also been added to it, viz. to be capable of expressing with precision what she herself had internally experienced. Like other mystical writers she felt urged to make use of images and comparisons. Now in various places St. Teresa complains that she lacks a vivid imagination. This has often been interpreted as an expression of modesty on her part. But since the publishing of recent studies on St. Teresa's sources, one is more inclined to give credit to her complaint, since it became apparent that she had greatly been inspired by the symbolism of traditional and contemporary authors — therefore also by Osuna. Both Teresa and Osuna call a distracted mind a wind-mill, both compare the soul to a diamond, a crystal, or a garden pleasing to God, or to a dove, a phoenix, a silk-worm, a strong fort, etc.

When in the Chapter XI of the Book of Her Life she wishes to give an explanation of the four degrees of interior prayer, she excuses herself for using a comparison: "I must here make use of a comparison. As woman I would rather not do this and simply write what they have told me to do, but it is so difficult for illiterate persons like myself to express myself clearly, that I must do something about it." She then continues and compares the soul to a garden that has to be furnished with water: "That garden, I think, can be supplied with water in four different ways: in the first place water can be drawn from the well by means of a bucket, which will cost a great deal of effort on our part; then water may be brought up by a water-wheel; further a river or creek can be made to provide it with water... finally it may rain copiously and the Lord may Himself finally sprinkle it, which last will not cost us any labour at all." 16 Regarding this comparison St. Teresa herself says: "I believe I have read or heard this comparison used in one place or another, but do not recall where, neither for what

Etchegoyen is of the opinion that in this passage St. Teresa remembers what Osuna writes in Chapter XVIII regarding interior

^{15.} Osuna, l.c., p. 351. Regarding Osuna's influence on St. Teresa cf. W. T. Walsh, St. Teresa of Avila, IVth Edition, Milwaukee, 1944, p. 52.

16. St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Translation, pp. 72-73.

prayer being a seeking for God in our own heart to which he applies the text: "Bring water out of thy own cistern (Prov. V: 15)." He then continues: "In these few words the wise man mentions a cistern, a well and a fountain. The one is better than the other for a well is more than a cistern and a stream more than a well. In this manner does he refer to three classes of people: the beginners possess a cistern, the more advanced a well, the perfect a stream, which they share with others.¹⁷ A few lines further down he speaks about grace which pours down like rain, but he does not use this idea to introduce a fourth group of persons.

It may be that St. Teresa indeed remembered this passage vaguely when she used her comparison, but even then she surpasses the original. As a matter of fact with all dependence - if we may term it such — she maintains her own originality. We can, therefore, whole-heartedly subscribe to Hoornaert's final conclusion

Enfin, où elle surpasse son maître de toute la hauteur dont le génie surpasse le talent, c'est dans l'analyse psychologique. L'œuvre d'Osuna est après tout dogmatique et l'analyse psychologique se borne à quelques traits généreux et souvent conventionnels. L'œuvre de Thérèse est une œuvre vécue, vibrante, pétrie avec toute la chair, tout le sang et toutes les fibres du cœur humain.18

Fr. Bernardino de Laredo

In 1535 there appeared at Juan Cronberger's Press at Seville a book entitled Subida del Monte Sion. It appeared anonymously and as such it remained up to the edition of Alcalá in 1617 when the following was added to the title page:

Compuesto por Bernardino de Laredo, Frayle Lezo de la Provincia de los Angeles de la Orden del S.P.S. Francisco, como se colige de la quarta parte de las corónicas 19 de la Misma Orden, aunque el autor par su humildad no quiso manifestar su nombre.

Having been born at Seville in 1482, he entered the monastery of San Francisco del Monte in 1520 (according to others in 1510). Before his entrance into the Order he had studied medicine for a

^{17.} Osuna, l.c., p. 527.
18. Hoornaert, l.c., p. 338.
19. Refers to the chronicle of Mark of Lisbon, O.F.M.

number of years and had been court-physician to King John II of Portugal. He remained a lay brother up to the time of his death in 1542 (according to others in 1555).

In 1521 or -22 Bernardino published a number of treatises on medicine. Ten years later his *Subida del Monte Sion* appeared. This work, described by Etchegoyen as "I'un des chefs-d'œuvre de l'Espagne religieuse," treats in three subdivisions on self-knowledge and detachment from the things of this world, on the imitation of Christ and on mystical contemplation. Undoubtedly St. Teresa must at times have smiled at some of Bernardino's medical considerations which he sometimes gives with a certain ostentation and with references to the "Doctores médicos." The third part especially, in which Bernardino treats on the "contemplación pura y perfecta," was of great value and help to St. Teresa.

She discovered the book about the year 1556, therefore at the beginning of her — in the strict sense — mystical life, at a time when she herself did not understand what was going on within her, when her sisters in religion and she herself suspected it might be from the devil, although she interiorly and instinctively felt it must be God Who was working so prodigiously in her soul. The Saint herself writes:

While I was consulting various books to see whether it was possible to describe the degree of prayer to which I had been lifted, I discovered in a book called Subida del Monte Sion, at the place where it treats on the union of the soul with God, all the signs I had observed in myself when I was in this state of prayer transcending thought. Thus I generally termed this state, because when I found myself lifted up to this form of prayer, I was unable to think. I marked in the book the places where these phenomena were described and gave them the book, in order that he and the other saintly Reverends, the servant of God of whom I have spoken, could peruse it and tell me what I should do, whether they considered it necessary for me to give up interior prayer altogether, or whether there was reason for me to expose myself to these dangers.²⁰

This first and strange account which St. Teresa gave of herself to Francisco Salcedo and Master Gaspar Daza has not been preserved, or at least has not been traced up to now. After reading this report both Salcedo and Daza were of the opinion that she had been deceived by the devil. She herself had been fearful and

^{20.} St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Transl. p. 186.

uneasy about it all, though in her heart she was convinced it was genuine and not from the devil. Perhaps while hearing the sentence of the two eminent theologians, she remembered these lines from Bernardino: "It is necessary to remark here something that is possible, even certain, namely that a good number of readers, for lack of experience, will not understand some of the points we have explained, which for the more advanced are clear. But the mere fact of their not understanding is not sufficient reason to question the undoubted excellence of this divine practice." But Teresa had promised to accept the decisions of her councillors. And they forbade her this suspicious reading-matter, and suggested frequent Holy Communion and solitude.

Fortunately she had other councillors too, who understood God's work and allowed her more liberty. She must have resumed her study of the Subida for otherwise it would be impossible to explain the literary relationship which exists between the two authors, something difficult to deny especially after the investigations of Hoornaert and Etchegoven. Most probably St. Teresa drew from this source her knowledge of such terms as soul, mind, faculties, substance, etc., terms which confused her at one time and which Laredo so lucidly defines in his treatise. As proof for this literary relationship they point to the similarity which exists between Chapter XLVI of the Subida del Monte Sion and the fundamental plan of St. Teresa's Castle of the Soul. Bernardino de Laredo places the soul on a vast field, where it erects a castle of transparent crystal, with twelve towers of precious gems, to each of which are attached four shields. In the middle of the castle there is a beautifullywrought Paschal Candle of which the wax represents Christ's immaculate flesh, the wick His soul, while the flame by the essence of its light signifies the Person of the Father, by its brilliance the Son, and by its clarity the Holy Ghost. The pure light of the candle shines forth through the crystal, and due to this light all the walls and towers and shields gleam with indescribable brilliance. Everything, therefore, comes from the one candle "from Christ, who dwells in the centre of this celestial city erected in the soul, which in this manner receives the knowledge of things divine.

With her natural good taste St. Teresa lays aside all details and retains the essence: the castle of transparent crystal and in the centre Christ glorified. No candle with its strained symbolism. For her own purpose St. Teresa adds to the imagery of the castle various "moradas" or apartments.

Well-known is St. Teresa's devotion to St. Joseph. Laredo in an appendix to his Subida del Monte Sion gives a brief treatise on the mysteries of St. Joseph. We do not possess sufficient data to prove Teresa's dependence on Laredo in this matter. At any rate she must have read these pages with more than ordinary devotion and interest.

It is noteworthy and may serve as a proof of her independence that she neither enumerated this book nor the one by Francisco de Osuna among those she prescribed for all her convents. The reason must be this that from experience gained while founding her houses she had become frightened lest these treatises on mystical prayer be misunderstood or lead to errors and exaggeration.

FR. ALONSO DE MADRID

Totally different in character from the works of Osuna and Laredo is the El Arte de servir a Dios of Fr. Alonso de Madrid. If for clarity's sake the distinction is permitted we would say that it belongs not to mystical, but to ascetical literature.

It was at one time a very popular book. In the sixteenth century alone it was reprinted no less than nine times. In 1903 it was reedited by James Salá, O.F.M. according to the edition of 1570 and Miguel Mir republished it according to the Alcalá-print of 1526.21 It was also translated into other languages.²² The eminent Spanish critic Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo called it "una verdadera joya literaria."

Sr. Mary of St. Francis enumerates this book among the works St. Teresa "especialmente" read. The Saint herself says about it in the Book of Her Life:

^{21.} Fr. Alonso de Madrid, O.F.M. "El Arte de servir a Dios" in: Escritores Misticos Españoles, Tomo I, 588-634.
22. For instance it was translated into Latin by the secular priest Jan Hentenius and into Flemish or Dutch, by a Franciscan from Brussels. In Dutch or Flemish it had five editions, the last being Antwerp, 1682. Cf. Servais Dirks, O.F.M., Hist. litt. et bibliogr. des Frères Mineurs en Belgique et dans les Pays-Bas, Anvers (1885) p. 174.

It is good for a soul, which as yet has not attained a high degree of sanctity, not to endeavour to go higher and let such a soul take this into account, for nothing would lead her more quickly into perdition. Having attained this height, she is able to perform many acts of virtue, can do much for God, can inflame her heart with love for God, can endeavour to strengthen her virtues. A book entitled El Arte de servir a Dios describes all this extensively. For those who have arrived at this first stage, it is good to be recommended to read this book as the intellect has still to exert itself.28

St. Teresa must have read this book at an early date, certainly while still at The Incarnation. Miguel Mir is of the opinion that she owed to the El Arte the habit she acquired of observing the movement of her soul, of analyzing her actions and discovering the motives, in one word, that she learnt there introspection of which she became the great mistress.

Are there any traces in her works where this influence is discernible? Hoornaert is of the opinion that especially in her Way of Perfection this influence can be traced.24

It is regrettable that we possess so little knowledge regarding Fr. Alonso's life. The only other particular we know about him is that he is also the author of two other volumes, Espejo de ilustres personas25 and Siete Meditaciones de Semana Santa.

Fr. Antonio de Guevara

Among the books St. Teresa prescribes for all her convents we find Oratorio de religiosos y exercicio de virtuosos. The author of this treatise is the Franciscan, Antonio de Guevara, a most remarkable personage. Born of noble parentage, he was educated at the Court of Isabelle of Castile; after the death of this sovereign he joined the Order of Friars Minor where he applied himself most diligently to his spiritual life. Though he sought obscurity, he became so famous as a preacher that Charles V appointed him Court-preacher and later chronologer. After having been Grand-Inquisitor at Valencia, he was chosen the Bishop of Guadix in 1528 and nine years later of Mondognetto. He died in 1544 or -45.

Opinions regarding his person and achievements differ. Rene

St. Teresa, *Book of Her Life*, Dutch Transl., p. 80.
 Hoornaert, *l.c.*, p. 356.
 Mir. *l.c.*, 635-648.

Costes criticizes both his character and his works rather severely.²⁶ The Franciscan Martyrology of Arthur a Monasterio, O.F.M. calls him Beatus, a sign that within the Order he was considered a virtuous and exemplary religious. And in the chapel where he lies buried a plaque with the following inscription was placed:

> En sacer antistes, clarissimus orbe Guevara Artibus insignis, religione pius. Inclytus orator, coelestis preco sophiae, Caesaris interpres hystoricusque fuit Stemmata qui tegit sacco saccumque tiara Ornavit, niveo marmore nunc tegitur. Obiit anno MDXLV

Regarding his literary productions, opinions again differ. His contemporary Vives disagreed with Guevara's new trend in writing, which consisted of an abundant use of paradoxes and parallelisms. A man with wit may make use of these, but it is dangerous for others who lack this talent to imitate this style.27

However it may be, it is certain that he was the most widelyread author of the sixteenth century. For those days it is remarkable the number of editions and translations one meets. Of his Marco Aurelio ó Relox de Principes. Sbaralea enumerates four Spanish, five Italian, five German, one French and six Latin editions.28 His Epistolas Familiares were edited six times in Spanish, twice in French, and once each in Italian, German and Latin. It was also translated into Dutch as were also his Aviso de Privados y Doctrina de Cortesanos and his Menosprecio de Corte y Alabanza de Aldea.29

His spiritual books, like his profane works, were assiduously read. His Monte Calvario on the Passion of Our Lord and the Last Words was reprinted five times in Spanish and was translated into both French and Italian. René Costes, who cannot be accused of being over-sympathetic towards Guevara says the following of this work:

^{26.} Bulletin Hispanique, 1923, p. 305-360.
27. Regarding his influence on John Lily and English prose cf. Eduard Norden, Die antike Kunstproza, II, Leipzig (1898) 786.
28. Wadding, Scriptores (Romae, 1906) p. 26; Sbaralea, Supplementum (1st.,

Romae, 1908) p. 81.
29. W. Davids, Verslag van een onderzoek betrefende de betrekkingen tusschen de Nederlandsche en Spaansche Letterkunde in de 16e-18e eeuw, 's Gravenhage, 1918, p. 104 ss.

En même temps que l'Oratiore des Religieux, où se résume toute l'expérience conventuelle de l'ancien moine, paraissait à Salamanque la première partie de son Mont-Calvaire, et cet ouvrage, que l'auteur dédiait, non plus à Charles-Quint ou Franco de Cobos, mais à la majesté divine, est tout imprégné de tendresse chrétienne, presque mystique.30

It is reasonable to believe that St. Teresa read several of Guevara's books. Positive proof we have only of this Oratorio de religiosos y exercicio de virtuosos (Valladolid, 1542). This treatise, like his other works ran through several editions and was translated into Italian, French, and Dutch.

Hoornaert 31 is of the opinion that St. Teresa recommended this book to her prioresses moved more by the author's fame, than by its contents. In itself this assertion does not seem to have any grounds. St. Teresa was not a person likely to be impressed by a name. Moreover when one scans the contents, we do not find Hoornaert's supposition supported. Even though among the fiftyfive chapters there are a few which are not applicable to her Carmelite Nuns, e.g. the twenty-eighth on partaking of meals outside the convent and the fifty-first regarding changing of residence and going out, still the book contains a treasure of wise counsels regarding life in a religious house which were bound to please St. Teresa and prompt her to recommend the book.

Etchegoven claims to have found traces of Guevara's influence on St. Teresa in her Modo de visitar los Conventos, Fundaciones and Constituciones. This may be true, but there is no clear proof, since in the meantime St. Teresa had gained sufficient experience to formulate practical regulations. Still it is not excluded that consciously or unconsciously she was influenced by what she had formerly read.

St. Peter of Alcantara

In the course of her life St. Teresa enjoyed the friendship of having many and wise counsellors. But none of them was so highly esteemed and praised as St. Peter of Alcantara. Let us hear what she herself says about him:

^{30.} Bull. Hisp., l.c., p. 358. 31. Hoomaert, l.c., p. 339.

He was already quite old when I made his acquaintance. He was so emaciated that he seemed to consist of roots of trees. With all his sanctity he was very friendly. Still he did not talk much unless he was addressed. Then it was a delight to hear him, for he possessed a very clear mind.³²

It was he who, like his friend St. Francis Borgia, consoled her and assured her that those mystical phenomena she observed in her soul were indeed of God. It was he who together with St. Francis Borgia and St. Louis Bertrand certified that it was God's will she should reform the Carmel. Finally it was this same St. Peter who wrote her that beautiful letter, dated 14 April, 1562, telling her not to accept any fixed income for her convents. Even after his death he influenced her.

The same night St. Peter of Alcántara also appeared to me... He showed himself very angry and only said that in no circumstances was I to accept any fixed income and asked why I had not followed his counsel. With that he disappeared. I was entirely cast down.33

However we do not wish to elaborate on St. Peter's personal influence, as this really lies beyond the scope of this article. Those who desire to be more informed about this matter may refer to St. Teresa's works themselves.34

On St. Peter as writer St. Teresa notes the following:

He wrote in Castilian a number of small volumes which are being used a good deal nowadays. For since he himself had practised it in the right manner, those writings are of great value for those who dedicated themselves to his manner of prayer.35

That was of course the reason why she prescribes his booklets in her Constitutions. But which booklets — "libros pequeños de oración" - does St. Teresa refer to? Between 1556 and 1560 there appeared at Lisbon (J. Blavio de Colonio) a book which, besides a treatise by Savonarola on the three vows, contained the following writings by St. Peter of Alcántara: Tratado de la Oración y Meditación; Breve Introducción para los que comienzan a servir a Dios; Tres cosas que debe hacer el que desea salvarse; Oración devotisima; Petición especial de amor a Dios. The last four writings

^{32.} St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Transl., p. 222.
33. St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Transl., p. 325-26.
34. St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Chapters XXX, XXXII, XXXVII, XXXVIII, XXXVIII, XX. 35. St. Teresa, Book of Her Life, Dutch Translation, p. 244.

occupy together only a few pages. The Tratado de la Oración y Meditación, countless times re-edited and translated into almost every European language, 36 is really a compilation of Louis of Granada's larger work, but in his method of compiling his own personality has had an influence.

The above is the result of our investigation regarding the Franciscan authors St. Teresa read and which most probably influenced her at least in some measure. Even though the study regarding probable sources St. Teresa drew from in composing her works, has as yet not been completed, still we doubt whether anything much will be added to the above list. There is of course always a possibility of new discoveries especially since many spiritual books were edited in Spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century. Did St. Teresa read many of them? Occupied as she was with founding her many convents and in writing her own treatises, we doubt whether she had much time to read.

Still we dare ask the question whether she ever read the Libro de la Vanidad del Mundo and the Meditaciones del Amor de Dios of the once famous Fr. Diego de Estella, O.F.M., a cousin of St. Francis Xavier.37 This great preacher was also one of the best writers of his day, something that says a great deal as it was the heyday of Spanish literature. His Meditaciones were praised and utilized by St. Francis de Sales, and Fénelon depends on him for his Traité de l'existence de Dieu.

St. Teresa knew him personally during her second sojourn at Salamanca. When she moved from her first damp and half-ruined convent to the second one in the house of Pedro de la Banda, this was done with great solemnity. The sermon was held, as Ana de Jesús writes, by one "de los más famosos predicadores que aquí había que era el P. Estella, por lo qual entendíamos se juntaría la mayor parte de la ciudad a nuestra solemnidad." 38

From the above it is clear that if we were to put the question as to which school of writers influenced St. Teresa the most, the

^{36.} Cf. A Golden Treatise on Mental Prayer by St. Peter of Alcantara, by G. S. Hollings (London; Mowbray, 1940).

37. Diego de Estella (1524-1578), Meditations on the Love of God from Meditationes Devotisimas del Amor de Dios, sel. and trans. by Julia Pember (Sheed and Ward, 1939). 38. Archivo Ibero-Americano, Anno XI, No. LXIV, 14.

answer would be the Franciscan school to which belonged such great lovers of God as St. Francis of Assisi and St. Bonaventure, St. Clare and St. Peter of Alcantara and a host of others.

Abbreviated translation by ACHILLES MEERSMAN, O.F.M.

Karachi, India.

CAPUCHIN-FRANCISCAN RESPONSE TO THE REVIVAL OF SCHOLASTIC STUDIES

THOUGH Scholastic Philosophy has undergone periods of decadence and decline, it has nevertheless lived on. History is witness to this. At stated periods its smouldering embers have been fanned by leading minds into living flames. The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a Scholastic revival. Since then, it has grown steadily even to the present day, and gives promise of greater achievements in the future.

In 1863 Canon Gaetano Sanseverino (died 1865) admirably attracted the attention of the scholastic world with his appreciative work on the Summa of the Angelic Doctor, entitled Philosophia Christiana cum Antiqua Comparata. The powerful influence exercised by this work on philosophical minds of those years, can be gauged from the many and various discussions to which it gave rise, particularly in the universities of Italy.

About this time (1863), Cardinal Joachim Pecci, Archbishop of Perugia, had been intensely interested in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas. Sanseverino gave him the opportunity to confirm his appreciation for the theology and philosophy of the Angelic Doctor. He, however, was not alone in this endeavor. Other highly enlightened ecclesiastics, like Joseph Pecci (brother of the Cardinal Archbishop), Matthew Liberatore, Aloysius Taparelli D'Azeglio, John Cornoldi, were working at the same time with scholarly tact and zeal on the Thomistic Synthesis.² These men may be said to have constituted the fundamental strata for the Neo-Scholastic revival.

After the election of Cardinal Pecci to the See of Peter, as Leo XIII, the revival assumed greater proportions. The newlyelected Roman Pontiff did not forget his Scholastic interests. As

Cf. Fredericus Klimke, S.J., Institutiones Historiae Philosophiae (Rome, 1923), II, 290.
 Mercier, A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy (London, 1926), II, 486.

Vica. of Christ, to whom par excellence belongs "the right and office of teaching and confirming the brethren in the faith,"3 Leo XIII made manifest to the Christian world that Scholastic philosophy is the Philosophia Perennis.

Intent upon achieving his purpose, he launched forth his renowned Encyclical, Aeterni Patris (August 4, 1879), in which he called for the study of Scholasticism. Quoting from the Bull of the learned Pope, Sixtus V,4 he did not neglect to point to the Scholastic doctors of the golden, thirteenth century; and particularly, to the importance of the Seraphic Doctor St. Bonaventure and of the Angelic Doctor St. Thomas.⁵

St. Thomas is called by the same Pontiff "the chief and master of all Scholastic Doctors." 6 And because philosophy has no part which this same doctor did not touch with masterly thoroughness, he exhorted all to follow Thomas in the difficult field of philosophy especially in our modern times. Thus he wrote in part:

We exhort you, Venerable Brethren, in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic Faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all science...

Let carefully selected teachers endeavor to implant the doctrine of Thomas in the minds of students, and set forth clearly his solidity and excellence over others. Let the academies already founded or to be founded by you illustrate and defend this doctrine, and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors.7

To assure the application of his Encyclical, the Pontiff established, in July, 1882, a chair of Thomistic philosophy at the University of Louvain. Canon Mercier, later created cardinal, was appointed its expositor.8 In November, 1889, the Thomistic Ins-

^{3.} The Great Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII (Benziger Bros., New York,

^{3.} The Great Encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII (Benziger Bros., New York, 1903), p. 34.

4. Triumphantis, 1588.

5. "Divino Illius munere, ait Sixtus V, qui solus dat spiritum scientiae et sapientiae et intellectus, quique Ecclesiam suam per saeculorum aetates, prout opus est, novis beneficiis auget, novis praesidiis instruit, inventa est a majoribus nostris, sapientissimis viris, theologia scholastica, quam duo potissimum gloriosi Doctores, angelicus sanctus Thomas, et seraphicus sanctus Bonaventura, clarissimis huius facultatis professores, et primi inter eos, qui in sanctorum numerum relati sunt, excellenti ingenio, assiduo studio, magnis laboribus et vigiliis excoluerunt atque ornarunt, eamque optimam dispositam multisque modis praeclare explicatam posteris tradiderunt" (ex Bulla, Aeterni Patris, in Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, iussu impensaque Leonis XIII, P.M., Roma, 1882, I, x).

6. Ibid., p. 48.

^{6.} Ibid., p. 48. 7. Ibid., p. 56. 8. Cf. Klimke, op. cit., II, 300.

titute of Philosophy was founded at the same university for the purpose of disputing with unbelieving scientists the ground of the experimental sciences.⁹ In the Universities of Freiburg, Lille and Washington, and in the great seminaries, chairs of Thomistic philosophy came into existence at the Pontiff's call.

But, whereas Pope Leo XIII exhorted to the study of Scholastic philosophy and pointed to the Angelic Doctor as the master and guide to be preferred, Pope Pius X made the study of Thomas imperative. In order to make his meaning unmistakably clear, he explained that the Scholastic philosophy to be followed was that of Aquinas.¹⁰ Thus it was that the study of Thomas became obligatory, as a safe foundation for the study of theology in all seminaries both secular and regular.¹¹

Benedict XV continued to stress the importance of the Neo-Scholastic revival. He also pointed to St. Thomas, as to the leading exponent to be followed in this age of rationalism and heretical modernism.¹² And finally, Pope Pius XI, deeply interested in scholastic pursuits, advised professors of philosophy, when giving their lectures to clerical students, not only to follow the Thomistic method, but also the doctrine and the principles of the Angelic Doctor.

This recommendation of Pius XI is a more explicit expression and a more detailed instruction on the teaching of thomistic philosophy. Where only the method of St. Thomas was followed, the Pontiff exhorted that also the doctrines and the principles of the Angelic Doctor be employed more studiously; since no other Doctor of the Church strikes such terror and fear in modernists and in other enemies of the faith as Aquinas.¹⁸

The Exhortations of the Roman Pontiffs, from Leo XIII to Pius XI, have found a ready response from all Superiors of Religious Orders within the Church. The Capuchin-Franciscan

^{9.} Francis T. Furey, Life of Leo XIII (New York, 1903), p. 111. 10. Pascendi, September 8, 1907, Analecta Ordinis Fratrum Minorum Capuccinorum, XXIII (1907), 313-314.

^{12.} Cf. Motu Proprio, December 31, 1914, Analecta, XXXI (1915), 33.

13. "Itaque in primis sibi curae habeant magistri Philosophiae in hac disciplina clericis tradenda non solum rationem seu methodum, verum etiam doctrinam et principia sequi sancti Thomae: idque eo faciant vel studiosius, quod sciunt nullum Ecclesiae Doctorem modernistis ceterisque fidei catholicae hostibus ita esse terrori ac formidini, ut Aquinatem" (De Sacra Clericorum Institutione, Typis Ployglottis Vaticanis, Romae, 1922, p. 14).

higher superiors, far from being an exception to the rule, have cooperated most faithfully with the promotion of Neo-Scholastic endeavors according to the desires of the Roman Pontiffs.

They well understood however that those Pontiffs, who recommended the intellectual leadership of Aquinas, did not intend to abrogate the study of the Franciscan Masters and particularly of the Seraphic Doctor St. Bonaventure. And, indeed, it was Pope Leo XIII who wrote to the Most Rev. Bernardine of Portogruaro, Minister General of the Friars Minor, in a letter dated December 13, 1885, encouraging the study of Bonaventure together with Aquinas:

Quaproper nullo modo dubitandum quin catholici praesertim juvenes in spem Ecclesiae succrescentes qui ad philosophica ac theologica studia secundum Aquinatis doctrinam sectanda se conferunt, perlegendis S. Bonaventurae operibus plurimam utilitatem sint hausturi... (Analecta, II, 38).

Likewise Pius X, writing to the Most Rev. Dionysius Schuler, Minister General of the Friars Minor, on April 11, 1904, pointed to the usefulness of Bonaventure by saying:

Etenim Bonaventuram, utpote non suo dumtaxat saeculo, sed omni posteritati, quemadmodum caeteros summos Ecclesiae Doctores, datum divinitus, egregie prodesse huic etiam aetati posse arbitramur, si, quod sperare post vestros labores licet, multo plures invenerit studiosos sui (Analecta, II, 161).

On the centenary of the birth of the Seraphic Doctor, Pope Benedict XV wrote to Dom. L. Antomelli, Bishop of Bagnorea, a letter dated June 25, 1921. Among other things, the Pontiff places Bonaventure next to Aquinas, not only as a luminary of wisdom but also as an exemplar of Christian virtue:

Vix attinet plura hic dicere de tanti viri excellentia, qui cum alter renuntiatus sit cum Aquinate princeps Scholasticorum et Seraphicus Doctor non solum mirificae sapientiae lumine sed etiam virtutum omnium christianarum laude in exemplum eluxit (S. Bonaventurae Opera Theologica Selecta, Ad Claras Aquas, 1934, p. xix).

Not less clear is the recommendation of Pius XI. Writing to the Superiors of Religious Orders on March 19, 1924, he praised the works of St. Bonaventure and together with St. Thomas proposed him as a model of priestly virtue and learning:

Itaque sacerdotis tam saecularis, quam regularis, est, catholicam doctrinam cum pervulgare latius tum uberius inlustrare ac tueri... Quod ipsum cum Doctores illos mediae, quam vocant, aetatis neutiquam fugisset, iidem, Thoma Aquinate et Bonaventura, ducibus, toti in eo fuere, ut divinarum rerum cognitionem perciperent amplissimam cum aliisque communicarent (Analecta, XL, 120).

Previous to the Neo-Scholastic Revival, the Capuchins had followed other laws on sacred studies, prescribed by diverse General Chapters. The Most Reverend Father General, Seraphin of Capricollo, had issued a decree, approved by Pope Benedict XIV, wherein Lectors were exhorted to follow St. Bonaventure; and, if books could not be had containing the doctrines of the Seraphic Doctor, the doctrine of Scotus was to be followed.14

This decree was the first official prescription in the Capuchin Order with regard to the teaching of philosophy and theology according to the mind of the Seraphic Doctor, St. Bonaventure. Thus Bonaventure became the established master and guide of Capuchin-Franciscans. And because "preference" has been correctly understood as "choice without exclusion," Capuchin devotion for their Franciscan Master has not ceased; though preference has been given by the Roman Pontiffs to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor.

For this reason the General Chapter held in Rome on May 9, 1884, included in its Ordinationes both Bonaventure and Thomas, as true guides in philosophical studies according to the mind of Leo XIII. 15 And the official commentaries on the Ordinationes of this same Chapter (LXV) confirm the standard of both the Seraphic and Angelic Doctor; and admonish lectors to instruct the students always according to the mind of both Scholastic Masters. 16

Later on the Most Reverend Venantius a Lisle-en-Rigault (Minister General, O.F.M. Cap., 1914-1920), quoting Leo XIII, encouraged the friars in the study of St. Bonaventure; for, as the

^{14. &}quot;In tradendo philosophiam, non sequatur quilibet P. Lector genium suum neque sensum recentiorum philosophorum, sed uti nostrae Constitutiones hortantur, sententiam S. Bonaventurae, aut dificientibus libris de illa tractantibus, sententiam Scoti in toto Ordine acceptatam, vel huic magis conformem doceat" October 6, 1757, Bullarium Ordinis Capuccinorum, VIII, 272.

15. "In philosophicis atque theologicis facultatibus exponatur optima et tutissima doctrina Seraphici Doctoris S. Bonaventurae et Angelici Doctoris S. Thomae, ad mentem Leonis XIII" Cf. Analecta, II (1885), 230.

16. "Sedulo ergo curent Lectores, ut Philosophiae tyrones magni faciant doctrinam S. Bonaventurae et S. Thomae ceu verae scholasticae, cuius duces et genia et magistri praecipui sunt ipsimet Angelicus et Seraphicus" Ibid. III (1886), 105.

Dominicans followed and promoted the doctrines of Thomas, so the Franciscans should devote themselves to and follow the Seraphic Doctor.17

Moreover, in his letter to all the brethren, dated January 6, 1920, he gave a detailed analysis of all branches of knowledge. At the end of his masterly instruction on the teaching of philosophy, he reminded the friars of their Franciscan heritage and of the suitableness in giving a worthy place to the Franciscan School.¹⁸

One after the other the Ministers General of the Capuchin-Franciscan Order from the time of Leo XIII have stimulated the interest of the friars subject to them with their timely decrees in favor of the Neo-Scholastic Revival. Thus the Most Reverend Bernard Christen of Andermatt (Minister General, O.F.M. Cap., 1884-1908), responded most faithfully to the instructions of the reigning Pontiff. In his letter to the whole Order (February 2, 1901), he exhorted all the friars to greater fervor and love of study. 19 Within precise terms he explained the essence of science. He defined scientific knowledge as a simple, uniform, and systematic cognition of things from their ultimate reasons and proceeding from principles which have been established with certainty.20 He appropriately pointed out the difference between the intelligent man informed and learned in many things, and the one whose learning is guided by scientific knowledge and wisdom. The latter, he explained, is the one who possesses both theory and experience in the field of scientific knowledge.21

The learned Minister General compares science to the sun. He most beautifully points out that, like the sun, all knowledge should not only give light but also warmth; it should not only animate, but should also function as a guiding beacon, leading to the

^{17. &}quot;Vos autem Franciscales viri, Theologiae Magistrum habetis cuius volumina nocturna diurnaque manu catholicae doctrinae explanandae, versetis. Quemadmodum Patres Dominicani Angelicum Doctorem S. Thomam sibi vindicant, ita vos, Franciscales, Doctorem Seraphicum S. Bonaventuram vobis jure quidem optimo vindicatis" Ibid. VII (1891), 60 Cf. also Vanantius a Lisle-en-Rigault, O.F.M. Cap. Monumenta ad Constitutiones Fratrum Minorum Cappuchinorum (Rome) 1916, p. 483.

18. "Incongruum ergo non erit in scholis nostris dignum Franciscanae Scholae locum dare, cum sit nobis patrimonium quod repudiare non licet" Analecta, XXXVI

^{(1920), 20.}

^{19.} Ibid., XVII (1901), 73.

^{20.} Ibid. 21. Ibid.

Creator.²² Exactly in this lies the difference between a Bonaventure and a Zeno, an Augustine and a Plato, a Thomas Aquinas and an Aristotle, an Anselm and a Pythagoras. The pagan philosophers enlightened the mind but fell short to touch the heart and the will; this is characteristic only of Christian philosophers.²³

Subsequently the Most Reverend Father General gives the reasons why scientific studies should ever thrive within Capuchin monasteries. Scientific studies should be pursued by the friars not only because of their inherent value, but also because of the Franciscan tradition.

Moreover, the Capuchin-Franciscan, both as priest and as religious, should love study. As a priest of the Most High, he is required particularly in our modern time to surpass those endowed with wordly learning; because from the lips of the priest should proceed science and wisdom, which are strong bulwarks against the waves of modern errors and corruption.24 As a religious, the Capuchin priest is ipso facto a missionary; and from him, whether at home or abroad, whether in the confessional or in the pulpit, a full knowledge of the philosophical and theological sciences is expected.25

Furthermore, speaking of those studies which are of great importance, he points out in the first place the study of the humanities. They are necessary as a preparation for higher studies. Next in order, he recommends the study of philosophy, and calls this science "a branch of study that is a foundation of, a road to, and a handmaid of theology." 26 The goal, however, of all Capuchin studies is sacred theology, the knowledge of which must be solid, profound, and complete. Complete theological knowledge embraces not only dogmatic and moral theology, but also the

^{22. &}quot;Sed scientia non unice illuminare debet, spiritus humanus non est tantum oculus; ipsa ad solis instar in interiora cordis et animae penetrare debet, calefacere habet, roborare, animae voluntatem... Ipsa suis radiis spiritualibus hominis spiritum cognoscentem, amore in Deum fecundare atque animare debet" *Ibid.* 74.
23. "Ex dictis patet quantum intercedat discrimen inter S. Bernardum, S. Bonaventuram et Zenonem, Magistrum Stoae; inter S. Augustinum, S. Thomam Aquinatem et Platonem et Aristotelem; inter S. Anselmum et Pythagoram..." *Ibid.*24. *Ibid.*, 76.

^{26.} Ibid., 78. "Absolute necessaria autem nobis est solida philosophia... Philosophia est fundamentum theologiae, via ad theologiam, ancilla (sensu nobilissimo) theologiae..."

allied theological sciences, chief among these is ecclesiastical history.27

In order to assure the teaching of solid philosophy in the Capuchin Order, the same Minister General reminded directors of education in the Order to work along the lines, traced out by Pope Leo XIII. He exhorted them particularly to follow the leadership of the Angelic and the Seraphic Doctors.²⁸ And because special emphasis had been laid on the philosophy of Saint Thomas, he did not neglect to remind the lectors and students of philosophy and theology of devotion to the teachings of the Angelic Doctor.29 The exhortation closes with words of encouragement. Three ways will assure progress in study, namely, love of study, humble prayer and regular observance.30

This letter clearly reveals the close cooperation between this eminent Capuchin prelate and the Roman Pontiff in the Neo-Scholastic Revival. His fatherly instructions show forth earnest solicitude and interest. By making sure the fulfillment of the scholarly designs of Leo XIII, he proved himself to be a leader in the Scholastic movement.

The next Minister General, the Most Reverend Pacifico Carletti of Seggiano, O.F.M. Cap. (1908-1914), followed his predecessor in furthering Neo-Scholastic activities in the Order. Well-known for his deep learning and governing ability in his mother-province of Tuscany, he continued with the same ability to govern the Capuchin Order after his election as Minister General. At the request of the Roman Pontiff,31 he founded the International College of St. Lawrence of Brindisi in Rome.³² The purpose of this undertaking was to give students of the Order an opportunity

^{27.} Ibid., 76.
28. "Horum praecipui duces tam in philosophicis quam in theologicis semper sint et maneant duo illi Doctores principes, Angelicus Thomas et Seraphicus Bonaventura, tantopere iteratisque vicibus a S. P. Leone XIII, glorioso regnante, commendati" Ibid. 77.
29. Ibid., 79-80.
30. "Inculcata et perspecta studiorum necessitate, quaedam adhuc indigitare velimus media, quae ad ea fovenda et perficienda conducere, ac nostris praesertim studiis adjumento incrementoque esse possunt. Primum est amor studiorum in Ordine... Alterum medium in studiis proficiendi est humilis oratio... Qua tertium et ultimum studii scientifici promovendi medium, observantiam regularem nominabimus..." Ibid.
31. Ibid., XXIV (1908), 171.

^{31.} Ibid., XXIV (1908), 171. 32. Ibid., 346, 363; XXV (1909), 27; XXVI (1910), 110; XXVII (1911),

to pursue their studies of theology and philosophy, as well as of other important branches of scholarship under the direct influence of Rome. Moreover, it was foreseen that such a center of Capuchin learning would supply many provinces with able friars who, imbued with a love for study and ecclesiastical traditions, would encourage and develop the Neo-Scholastic movement. The same Minister General added a valuable library to the College, affording students numerous volumes in their work of reference and research.33

In one of his letters to the brethren of the Order, Pacifico exhorted the friars to love study; and, at the same time, not to forget the duty to pray and to strive after Franciscan holiness. Study, indeed, is necessary; but it must never become the gateway to pride. He admonished them to have ever before their eyes the example and leadership of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, and thus carry out with all simplicity of heart the decrees of Leo XIII and of Pius X 34

Pacifico of Seggiano was followed as Minister General of the Order by Venantius a Lisle-En-Rigault (1914-1920). In his learned and instructive letter to the friars, he re-echoed the willing response of his predecessors to the enlightening and disciplinary exhortations given by the Pontiffs of the Neo-Scholastic era.

By way of introduction, the brethren were reminded of the pernicious errors that threatened society. He spoke of the place occupied by philosophy in the clerical curriculum, and pointed to the rôle it plays as a rational foundation for the study of theology.³⁵ And because the Philosophia Perennis had been attacked and supplemented by the false trends of a Descartes and a Malebranche, of a Kant and a Hume, of a Rosmini and of a Bergson, as well as of the Modernists, the Church in the person of the Roman Pontiffs has seen fit to obstruct these channels of modern errors by pointing to the authority of the great Scholastic Doctors and particularly to that of the Angelic Doctor.36

^{33.} Cf. Felice da Porretta, O.F.M. Cap., Memorie dei FF. Minori Cappuccini della Toscana (Florence, 1931), p. 81. Cf. also Analecta XXVI, 38-40, 110-111; XXVII, 249-253, 356-373; XXVIII, 18, 44-47, 358; XXIX, 334, 359; XXX, 171, 178, 179, 181, 275, 369, 370; XXXI, 48-54.

34. Analecta XXIV, 339; XXVI, 13.

35. Ibid., XXXVI, 12.

36. Ibid., 15-20.

Furthermore, the distinguished Capuchin General explained in precise terms the reciprocal relation between theology and philosophy. He emphasized the great service of philosophy to theology, for it furnishes to theology reasonable explanations of fundamental problems. Philosophy investigates and expounds the nature of a contingent being and of a necessary being, the meaning of nature and of the laws of nature, the nature of miracles and the laws of nature consequently suspended by them, etc. 37

Apart from the study of logic and philosophy, other sciences are necessary. Lest some sciences might be overlooked or omitted, the Most Reverend Prelate enumerates those to which special attention be given, namely: algebra, geometry, and trigonometry; physics, chemistry, and natural history; biology, physiology and zoology; botany, crystallography, and minerology; geology, cosmography and astronomy.88

The exhortation continues reminding the friars to be solicitous in the acquisition of ancient and modern languages, because with the knowledge of a new language a new soul is acquired.³⁹ Subsequently the importance of theology is stressed, and with it. church history and sacred oratory.

It may be seen that this Circular Letter gave to the Capuchin-Franciscan Friars not only a fervent message to study, but also guidance in what to study according to the spirit of the Neo-Scholastic movement as promoted by the Roman Pontiffs. Moreover, it called the attention of the superiors to the duty of being conscientious in the appointment of lectors, on whom is incumbent the higher education of clerics in philosophy and theology.

Alluding to the decree of Pacifico of Seggiano, 40 the Most Reverend Father Venantius did not neglect to remind provincial superiors that they must have lectors trained for the doctorate in philosophy, theology, and canon law at the Gregorian University, or at some university in their own province, provided that said university be approved by the Holy See. And in order to shorten the years of study in Rome for students in sacred Scripture, attendance

^{37.} *Ibid.*, 20. 38. *Ibid.*, 24-28. 39. *Ibid.*, 28. 40. *Ibid.*, XXIV, 346.

at a university in the mother-province is recommended, as long as it is a center of learning approved by the Roman authorities. 41

Pope Pius XI, in his Apostolic Letter De Seminariis et De Studiis Clericorum (August 1, 1922), enjoins superiors of seminaries to have Scholastic philosophy taught according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor. The vigilant eye of this Pontiff, however, did not overlook the possibility of drawing wisdom also from other scholastic masters.42

The Capuchin-Franciscan response to this appeal of the Roman Pontiff was as immediate as it was forthcoming. The Most Reverend Joseph Anthony of San Giovanni in Persiceto, Capuchin Minister General (1920-1926), readily seconded the injunctions of Pope Pius XI. In his Letter to all the friars of the Order, he says:

There is nothing which Mother Church has emphasized and more urgently advocated than that the doctrine of Aquinas, should be followed in philosophical and theological studies... Let no one dare to refuse to give ear to these frequent appeals...

The doctrine of Saint Thomas should, therefore, be the foundation and rule of our ecclesiastical instruction... Science based on such a foundation will be made admirably complete and perfect with the doctrines of

our Seraphic Doctor, Bonaventure. 43

These words are, indeed, indicative of the responsive attitude of the Order towards the Neo-Scholastic revival. And in the harmonious application of these pontifical decrees, the strengthening process of Neo-Scholasticism may be readily seen. Neo-Scholastic activity, thus promoted and encouraged by the highest superiors of the Capuchin-Franciscan Brotherhood, has proceeded with steady step and is giving promise of more substantial progress. Every Capuchin Province today has its own Seraphic colleges and sem-

^{41.} Ibid., XXXVI, 85.
42. "Confecto igitur litterarum curriculo, nostri alumni, ut sacrae theologiae aptam preparationem adhibeant, minimum biennio diligentissime in Philosophiae studio versentur. Scholasticam intelligimus Philosophiam, a sanctis Patribus Scholaeque Doctoribus quadam laborum continuatione naviter expolitam, ac denique opera et ingenia Thomae Aquinatis ad summum perfectionis gradum adductam..." De Sacra Clericorum Institutione (Rome, 1922), p. 13.
43. "...Nihil scilicet Ecclesiae Matri antiquius fuit quam, ut in studiis philosophicis ac theologis, quidquid de doctrina Aquinatis sequenda semel atque iterum saprivit fideliter servetur, totanue vocibus nemo sit qui aures claudere praesumat

Sophicis at theologis, quiquid de doctrina Aquinaus sequenda sener aque herum sancivit fideliter servetur; totque vocibus nemo sit qui aures claudere praesumat... Doctrina itaque Divi Thomae debet esse nostrae Ecclesiasticae institutionis fundamentum ac regula... Scientia autem tali fundamento innixa mirabiliter complebitur atque perficietur doctrinis laudatissimis nostri Seraphici Doctoris Bonaventurae'' Litterae Encyclicae, August 15, 1922, p. 42.

inaries. And these seminaries are given lectors most of whom have been educated within the shadow of the Gregorian University.

With the administration of the Most Reverend Melchior of Benisa (1926-1932), the establishment of the long-planned College of Saint Lawrence of Brindisi was realized at Assisi on November 4, 1930.⁴⁴ For a long time it had been the aim of the Order to have a Capuchin-Franciscan house in the town where the Seraphic Founder, Saint Francis, was born. The need for such an establishment grew more urgent as the number of Capuchin friars venerating the relics of Saint Francis and visiting the Franciscan shrines increased.⁴⁵

The foremost purpose of the College at Assisi was, however, to correspond with and cooperate in the Neo-Scholastic revival. In this Capuchin center of studies, a select group of Fathers was placed in order to continue the Franciscan, intellectual activities traditional in the Franciscan Order. They specialized in Capuchin-Franciscan research and have brought to light many theological and philosophical contributions made by the Capuchin friars in the four centuries of the Order's existence.⁴⁶

The first president of the College, appointed by the Minister General himself, was the Very Reverend Cuthbert of Brighton, ex-Provincial of the English Capuchin Province and an eminent author. Other Fathers from diverse Capuchin Provinces were selected to help in the work. These friars, standing high in the intellectual sphere, have divided among themselves the scientific work.

The Collectanea Franciscana, the official, scientific periodical of the Order and a very symposium of Capuchin scientific research, is published by them.⁴⁷ Through this periodical, the Fathers at the College have been constantly working to unearth many eminent writers of the Order and to make their precious contributions better known and appreciated. This work at Assisi's Capuchin College again manifests the deep interest of our Capuchin-Franciscan Friars in the present-day Scholastic restoration.

^{44.} Analecta, XXVI, 307.

^{45.} *Ibid.*, 46. *Ibid.*, XLVI, 307. 47. *Ibid.*, XLVII, 115.

From the first quarterly installment (January, 1931), the Collectanea Franciscana has put forth a wealth of scientific monographs, which have, indeed, revived Franciscan interest in the theological and philosophical contributions of the almost forgotten, vet eminent, thinkers of the Order.

Of great interest is the series of monographs of Fr. Augustine de Cornero, O.F.M. Cap., wherein he brings to light some of the greatest luminaries of the Order. In easy and flowing Spanish, he recounts the Capuchin precursors of Fr. Bartholomew de Barberis in the study of St. Bonaventure. 48 Later he gave us a critical exposition of Fr. Valeriano Magni, O.F.M. Cap., and of his philosophical activity. In four lengthy treatises, Valeriano's philosophical career and work was published in the Collectanea.49

Fr. Hubert of Maguntia, O.F.M. Cap., published a profound study of Scotus entitled De Convenientia Doctrinae B. Ioannis Scoti circa Essentiam Sacrificii Eucharistici cum Definitionibus Concilii Tridentini. 50 And Fr. Romualdo Bizzarri, O.F.M. Cap., has written a learned and interesting treatise, De Aesthetices Rudimentis.51 Fr. Humilis of Genoa, O.F.M. Cap., with sure, philosophical touch, extols the Seraphic Doctor in his Doctrina Sancti Bonaventurae de Distinctione Attributionis; 52 while Fr. Paolino of Cassacalenda, O.F.M. Cap., affords an intellectual treat with his historical monograph, I Cappuccini nel Concilio di Trento.53

Worthy of mention are the two monographs of Fr. Melchior of Pobladura, O.F.M. Cap. on Fr. Pedro Trigoso, O.F.M. Cap., who was an eminent exponent of Bonaventurean studies;54 and the Scotistic contribution of Fr. Aniceto of Mondanedo with his Abstraccion y Realismo segun el Beato Juan Duns Escoto.55

These are but a few of the learned writers in the Collectanea. Their work, however, gives satisfactory evidence of the interest taken by the Capuchin friars in the Neo-Scholastic movement. Moreover, apart from the Collectanea, other works have been undertaken

^{48.} Collectanea Franciscana, I (1931), 184 et seq.
49. Ibid., III (1933), 67 et seq. 209 et seq., 347 et seq. 518 et seq.
50. Ibid., I, 215 et seq.
51. Ibid., 492 et seq.
52. Ibid., III, 321 et seq.
53. Ibid., 571 et seq.
54. Ibid., V (1935), 45 et seq.; 370 et seq.
55. Ibid., VI (1936), 529 et seq.; VII (1937), 5 et seq.

by the Order. It was also during Melchior of Benisa's administration as Minister General of the Order that the gigantic work of editing several quarto-volumes of the scholarly works of St. Lawrence of Brindisi has taken place. 56 Since this saint was an alumnus of the Venetian Capuchin Province, the work was confided to a select group of the province under the able guidance of Edward of Alençon, O.F.M. Cap., and Hilarin Felder, O.F.M. Cap.⁵⁷

The first volume of the multiple work of St. Lawrence of Brindisi, i.e., the Mariale, was published at Padua, 1928; the second volume, in three tomes, also at Padua, in 1930 Tomus I, in 1931 Tomus II, in 1933 Tomus III. The title of this threefold volume is Lutheranismi Hypotyposis. The third volume, Explanatio in Genesim, was published in 1935 at Padua. The fourth volume, Ouadragesimale Primum followed in 1936; and the fifth volume, Quadragesimale Secundum, divided into two distinct tomes, in 1938 and 1939, at Padua.58

The works completed thus far have not only helped but also brought the cause of St. Lawrence of Brindisi for the Doctorate more closely to the pontifical decision. This was the report of the Most Rev. Vigilius of Valstagna, ex-Minister General, who after the publication of the seventh tome of the Opera Omnia, declared: Causa Doctoratus S. Laurentii a Brundusio in optima via est ut concludatur (cf. Analecta, LIV, p. 136). Since then the eighth tome of the Opera Omnia has been published.

It is not without reason that Capuchin higher superiors have urged the publication of the Opera Omnia. This great and saintly Capuchin friar was perhaps the greatest mind, and certainly ranked among the first intellectual giants, of his period. In the course of his eminent, religious life, he was appointed provincial not only in his mother-province but also in Tuscany, Switzerland, and Genoa.50 His election to the supreme post of authority in the Order (May 2, 1602) was followed by an unusual constructive activity with regard to studies and apostolic preaching. As Visitator and Commissary General of Cologne and Bohemia, Lawrence came into close contact with Profestant strongholds: and with his eloquence

^{56.} Analecta, XLVII, 197. 57. Cf. S. Laurentii a Brundusio Opera Omnia (Padua, 1930), I, xv. 58. Cf. ibid.

^{59.} Ibid., I, viii.

and unction, brought back many to the fold of the Catholic Church.60

His learning was admirable. The facility, with which he acquired knowledge of foreign languages seemed almost miraculous. His memory was prodigious. Because of his comprehensive knowledge of political philosophy and diplomacy, he was entrusted time and time again with delicate, diplomatic missions to King Philip IV of Spain, to the kings of Germany and to other princes particularly in Italy. His extensive works are classified as apologetico-homiletical, exegetical and polemical. He died at Lisbon in 1619.

Neo-Scholastic work was also done by the Capuchin friars of Barcelona, Spain. Theirs is a Miscellanea Lulliana, consisting of twenty-four well written treatises on the thought and times of Raymond Lull., the renowned philosopher and mystic of Majorca, Spain. Among these treatises, the one which attracts attention is that of Fr. Andreu de Palma, Majorca. The author gives a detailed analysis of the relation had and the interest taken by the Capuchin friars in the works of Lull. ⁶² These same friars also published a Miscellanea Thomista in commemoration of the sixth centenary of the canonization of the Angelic Doctor. ⁶³ Elsewhere in the Order, there has been a growing literary activity, and authors in all branches of knowledge have multiplied considerably in the last fifty years.

The Most Reverend Vigilius a Valstagna (Minister General, O.F.M. Cap., 1932-1938), in a circular letter to the brethren (Rome, November 1, 1932), exhorted all the students and Fathers of the Order to devote themselves to scientific studies. He expressed, moreover, his desire that the friars should particularly give themselves to those studies which have some relation to the Capuchin Order.

He praised very highly the work accomplished thus far by the College at Assisi, and exhorted the students of the International Capuchin College in Rome to take a lively interest in and make known the seraphic beauty of Capuchin spirituality.⁶⁴ It was also

^{60.} Father Cuthbert, O.F.M. Cap., The Capuchins (London, 1928), II, pp. 286-297.

^{61.} S. Laurentii a Brundusio Opera Omnia, I, viii. 62. Estudis Franciscans, XLVII (1935), 5-24; cf. also Analecta, LI, 149. 63. Cf. Estudis Franciscans XXXVI (1924). 64. Analecta, LXVIII, 234.

his most earnest wish that study extend not only to the historical development of the Order but that it should include also the intellectual, scientific, literary and artistic activities. 65

At the seventy-second General Chapter of the Capuchin-Franciscan Order (June 6-11, 1938), the Most Rev. Donatus of Welle, O.F.M. Cap., was elected Minister General. In his first allocution to the assembled Capitulars, he pledged to continue the program of his predecessors with regard to studies.66

For many years Rector of the Ethiopian College within the Vatican City, the newly-elected General fittingly recommended scientific studies in the Order. And, indeed, in his first letter to all the brethren he advised lectors and professors to assemble under the direction of the Provincial of each Province at stated times and discuss methods and progressive means in the education of youth. 67

Moreover, in order that the instruction of future educators in the Order be thoroughly Franciscan, he advised that a Chair of Franciscan Studies be inaugurated at the Capuchin International College of Rome. 68 And in order to promote the spirit of study. which goes hand in hand with regular observance, the same Minister General pointed out the places which should be closest to the heart of every Religious, namely, the cell, the choir and the library. The cell is a place of quiet and retirement, of prayer and study; the choir is a place of Divine Office, of prayer and of meditation; the library is the place where we may converse with books and acquire knowledge in conformity with our state of life.69

During the present administration of the Donatus of Welle, O.F.M. Cap., the Direction of the Collectanea Franciscana has been transferred from Assisi to Rome. 70 It is now known as the Historical Institute of the Friars Minor Capuchins and occupies a

^{65.} Ibid., XLIX, 3.
66. Cf. Analecta, LIV, p. 150.
67. Ibid., p. 233.
68. "Quo facilius instructio magis franciscana eorum qui futuri sunt nostrae iuventutis Educatores obtineatur, statuimus, de consensu Rev. mi Definitorii Generalis, Cathedram de rebus franciscanis cognoscendis in nostro Collegio internationali de Urbe instituere, cuius praelectiones initio huius ipsius anni scholaris incipi iussimus" Ibid.
69. "In cella quies, oratio solitaria, studium; in choro officium, oratio communis, meditatio; in bibliotheca libens conversatio cum libris et acquisitio scientiae statui nostro conformis" Analecta, LIV, 234.
70. Cf. "Monitus" in Collectanea Franciscana, October, 1940.

section of the International College in Rome, directly under the supervision of the Minister General.⁷¹ The purpose of this Institute is to seek and bring to light, to comment upon and clarify hidden literary works of those Capuchins who have excelled in learning, in holiness of life, and in the apostolic ministry.72

To carry on this work, the Friars assigned thereto by the Minister General in Rome must do research-work. They are to seek and collect whatever is noteworthy in the lives and works of the writers of the Order. The fruit of such literary endeavors is published in the Collectanea Franciscana. This quarterly publication includes monographs on theology, philosophy, jurisprudence, hagiography, missionary enterprises, literature, the arts, disciplinary and doctrinal documents.73 In general, the Collectanea Franciscana is a Capuchin-Franciscan organ containing whatever is of historical interest to the Order.

When the news of the election of the Most Rev. Donatus of Welle, O.F.M. Cap., reached Vatican circles, His Eminence Eugene Cardinal Tisserant without hesitation wrote a letter to the newlyelected General. His Eminence, among other things, expressed his gratitude for the splendid work accomplished at the Ethiopian College. For, "The Congregation (for the Oriental Church) bears witness to the fact that this Institute has risen to a new life; and has been admired and praised by all, including the honored expression of satisfaction of the Pontiff himself..." 74

Despite the tragic handicaps of a world at war, the present Minister General has done his heroic part in keeping the flame of scientific studies, particularly in Rome, still burning. With the return of peace, more is expected; so that, under his leadership and encouragement, scientific studies in the Order will continue their march onward and upward with greater strength. Perhaps at the end of his administration, some eminent Prince of the Church will

^{71.} Analecta, LVII, 28.

^{72.} Ibid.

^{73.} Ibid., p. 31.
74. "L'opera svolta dalla P. V. nel Pontificio Collegio Etiopico sara recordata con sensi di viva riconoscenza da questa S. Congregazione, che ha visto l'Instituto risorgere a nuova vita, ammirato e Iodato da tutti, ed onorato dallo stesso augusto compiacimento del Santo Padre" Analecta, LIV, p. 178.

rise and say to him, as did Cardinal Tisserant: "The Capuchin Order bears witness that through your vigilance, scientific studies in the Order have risen to a new life; and have been admired and praised by all."

MARCELLUS MANZO, O.F.M. Cap.

Friary of Our Lady of Sorrows, New York City.

FATHER ANTHONY MENZANI OF CUNA (1650-1729)

INVENTOR OF "THE BALM OF JERUSALEM"

In 1686 a Franciscan Father arrived at Jerusalem from Tuscany to serve the Holy Land, and was appointed infirmarian, chemist and physician by the custos. For some forty-three years he fulfilled these duties assiduously, and served in the meantime many of the other duties of his fellow friars at the Holy Places. After prolonged experimentation this friar discovered the famous balm, and although this balm was sought after for two centuries and became a famous specialty of the Franciscan monastery at Jerusalem, little is known of its inventor. The following few pages are devoted, then, to a first attempt to place the life of this friar in print.¹

Father Anthony Menzani was born on March 3, 1650, and entered the Order of Friars Minor at La Verna, the holy mountain of the Stigmata of St. Francis. Under the well-known Father Thomas of Cetica he studied the sacred sciences from 1674 to 1677, and was then promoted to the priesthood and ordained by the Cardinal of Florence, F. Nerly. After his ordination he graduated as lector and preacher and studied to proficiency the medical sciences outside the convent — in all probability, as was the custom of the Italian friars of those days.²

Upon assuming his position as infirmarian and doctor at Jerusalem, his task required that he minister to the illnesses of the friars, and of the laity irrespective of religion, sex, or age, which meant always to be at the behest of the public. Not the least discomforting sequels of such ministration were the angry complaints and the occasional persecutions which followed should his skill

(Quaracchi, 1918), p. 319. 2. B. Innocenti, O.F.M., Operette e lettere inedite di S. Leonardo da Porto-

maurizio (Arezzo, 1925), p. xi.

^{1.} A short necrology written by his friend Fr. Bonaventure of Danzic is published in the Diarium Terrae Sanctae (Jerusalem, 1910), p. 98. This is imperfect in some respects. See also Catalogo dei Religiosi della Prov. delle SS. Stimmate in Toscana quoted by Mencherini in the Annali di Terra Santa of P. A. Cirelli, O.F.M. (Ouaracchi, 1918), p. 319.

be deficient or erring. Oriental peoples, as Father Roger remarks, believed that their cure depended greatly on the goodwill of the doctor.3 Alongside the persecutions, though, and greatly more consolingly ran the many spiritual delights which came with the alleviation of suffering and the bringing of living faith through baptism to the dying infant,4 as well as to the dying aged.5 And not the least of Father Anthony's joys were those occasions which permitted him to enter into some onetime religious house now a mosque prevented to the entrance of the Christian under pain of death. The Venetian priest, Bartholomew Angeli, a pilgrim in Jerusalem in 1700,6 speaking of the Cenacle says: "Entrance here is absolutely prohibited to the Christians. Some time before my arrival in Jerusalem entrance to it was acceded to the infirmarian of the Franciscans as a singular favor for having cured the dying Pasha. The Santons did not dare to object to the order of the Pasha who had given him permission to enter every Sanctuary freely; nay, they begged him to cure one of their colleagues who had been abed for a long time. The prudent infirmarian tried his best to avoid the engagement because he knew how difficult it was to cure that disease, and also because he foresaw that his life hung in the balance. In fact, if the sick man die under his treatment, they could accuse him of his death. However, by no means could he avoid their request and had to attend on the invalid. Fortunately he was successful in restoring his health. The result, however, was not so propitious to the poor Fathers, because, when the Santon recovered, the Chief of the Santons went to the convent of Saint Saviour to accuse, with fictitious zeal, the infirmarian for having profaned the mosque. For such a profanation the penalty was death to himself and the other friars. The Superior to avoid further vexations abated this zeal and fury with a purse."

Of further present pertinent interest is the ruling made by the Minister General of the Franciscan Order in 1650 forbidding all friars practising the medical profession to cater to the illness of

^{3.} La Terre Sainte, (Paris, 1664), p. 312.
4. P. Morone da Maleo, O.F.M. Terra santa nuovamente illustrata, I (Piacenza, 1669), p. 52; II (Piacenza, 1670), p. 235.
5. E. Boger, O.F.M., La Terre Saincte, p. 453.
6. Viaggio in Terra Santa nuova edizione (Venezia, 1737), p. 80. R. Röhricht (Bibliographia geographica Palestinae, Berlin, 1890, p. 306) puts the voyage in 1730, but cf. Fr. Francis of Politio, Navis peregrinorum (MS in the Archives of St. Saviour) for June 3. The "purse" amounted to 500 piastres.

women. This ruling was answered by the friars of the Holy Places with the following: "Many times the Pasha or another of power among the Turks commands the guardian to send his infirmarian to their houses, and in these cases it is impossible to refuse. To attend Turkish women, then, and not the Christian could be the occasion of scandal." The difficulty later reached the attention of the Pope, Clement X, who allowed priests the practice of the medical profession in such cases. The Bull granting permission is dated July 7, 1670 and entitled Cum sicut dilectus.

Contemporary evidence of the activities of Father Anthony is available from Cardinal Cozza's Diary of the Holy Land. Cardinal Cozza was Custos of the Holy Land from 1709 to 1715, and in his Diary for 1710 he acknowledges the activity of the friar infirmarian. He states that he behaved always as becomes a friar, giving good example both to the faithful and the infidel, and that practicing his medical art day and night he brings health to the souls and bodies of men even in the midst of the danger of the plague.8 The great charity of Father Anthony and his excellent knowledge of medicine and surgery find an accord of praise from Brother Eugene of Saint Francis, an Augustinian brother who fell sick while on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.9 Records of his being assisted in his work by others of the community at Jerusalem attest that Brother Nicholas of Lucca helped him for some sixteen years until he died of plague, while Brother Bernard of Serzio assisted for about three years, and Brother Gaudens of Padua "able apothecary and surgeon" died attending the plague-ridden victims of Acre in 1702.10

Since there were about one hundred Franciscans in Palestine¹¹ and oftentimes sick pilgrims the convent of St. Saviour maintained a large infirmary. Father Anthony being discrete in 1696 had sixteen more rooms added and in 1721 erected an altar with a wooden

Da Maleo, Terra Santa, II, 330.
 Diarium Terrae Sanctae (1910) p. 99.
 Itinerario a Jerusalén published by P. A. Arce, O.F.M., (Jerusalem,

^{1940),} p. 41. 10. L. Lemmens, O.F.M., Acta S. Congregationis de Propaganda Fide pro Terra Sancta (Quaracchi, 1921), I, 343 re. Nicholas; II (Quaracchi, 1922), 17 for Bernardine; Cirelli, Annali, p. 219 for Gaudentius.

11. Lemmens, Acta, I, 394; II, 139, and Cozza, O.F.M. Atti published by E. Castellani, O.F.M. (Quaracchi, 1924) p. 21.

statue dedicated to St. Didicus — the Patron of the Infirmary. 12 The statue still remains in situ.

Though the Pharmacy at Jerusalem finds mention early as 1620 and then as "beautiful" and although in that same year there was a brother surgeon¹³ attendant on it, the real development nevertheless must be ascribed to Father Anthony. An interesting description given by Elzearius Horn, O.F.M. living in Palestine during the lifetime of the inventor of the balm introduces us to a detailed summary of its support and content. "The Pharmacy is sufficiently provided with medicaments and tonics for the sick bought by the benefactions of charity — especially those of the "serenissima" Republic of Venice. As you enter on the right and left sides you may see minerals within wooden boxes; fruit and fruit stones, mixtures, pills, poultices, cerates, wrapped in paper; salts, waters, resins, juniper berries, marrows and ointments kept in glazed pots; vinegars, distilled waters, wines and all other juices and essences of alcohol; also balms, preserves, electuaries, hock, oils kept in glass vases or glazed containers with large or small mouths so that they could be poured more commodiously; aromatic spices, flowers, barks, roots, dried-up herbs, precious stones, balms in pots, tin pyxes or glasses, etc. Outside the pharmacy, besides a cistern off the corridor we notice two laboratories screened from the sunshine but not dark, in which there are several kinds of pharmaceutical implements, ovens and furnaces for testing, or supplying heat as the operation demands." 14 The same Father Horn describes a number of pharmaceutical objects and many signs used in the pharmacy to save time. Sometimes these are letters, e.g. B for bath, QE for essence, sometimes a variously shaped cross for — dependently glass, vinegar, or talc; a triangle with the vertex up to denote fire or down to denote water; a square for urine, a crescent for silver, etc. Sometimes a round line or lines indicate an action to be per-

^{12.} Castellani, O.F.M., Catalogo dei firmani di Terra Santa (Jerusalem, 1922) nos. 701-2, 830-2; Horn, O.F.M. Ichnographiae locorum Terrae Sanctae published by G. Golubocich, O.F.M. (Rome, 1902) p. 213 Libro nuebo donde se escriben las conductas (MS in St. Savior) for the 15th of December 1721.

13. Golubovich in Collectanea Terrae Sanctae of P. L. Lemmens (Quaracchi, 1933), p. 310; Legrenzi cited by Tobler, Beitrag zur medizinischen Topographie von Jerusalem (Berlin, 1855), p. 13: from pages 12 to 15 he speaks about the pharmacy of St. Saviour. Cf. also Da Maleo quoted by Acre, O.F.M. Medicos franciscanos in Tierra Santa (1938), p. 292.

14. Horn, Ichnographiae, p. 209 14. Horn, Ichnographiae, p. 209.

formed as to precipitate, to distil; or to indicate a state of the medicine as distilled water, or precipitated medicine, etc. All this tells us of a steady and assiduous work done in the silence of these rooms. Father Anthony loved his pharmacy and consequently he was always busy there, busy with the manipulation of substances, or sending for raw materials or implements. In response to one such request we have the record of his having received three boxes of "fonderia" from the Grand Duke of Florence in answer to his request for one. 15 In The Book of Conductas 16 we find mention of many commodities brought from Europe at this time, e.g. a retort from Venice, chlorine and cinnamon from Portugal, groceries from Venice, "panna purgativa" from Naples and not seldom spectacles. To form some idea of the plenty and the variety of the medicines of the time we need but take a glance at the beautiful glazed vases preserved in the Flagellation Museum.¹⁷ These bear the names of over one hundred and ninety different components. Although they are certainly posterior to Father Anthony we may reasonably presume that a great number substituted for the old ones used by him.

Twenty-two years after Father Anthony's death Frederic Hasselquist, the Protestant Danish doctor and member of the Royal Society of Upsala and Stockholm relates in his diary of his voyage to Palestine: "April 16 (1751) I visited something which I consider one of the rarities of Jerusalem. It is the Pharmacy of the Latins which may be accounted the most precious in the world from the great number of drugs and medicines we find there." 18

And this brings us to the description of the balm itself. The same doctor writes: "There they (the Franciscans) prepare the famous Balm of Jerusalem, which is a mixture of different balms and aromas dissolved in alcohol. You can find 150 ducats' worth of them every year at the summer solstice. It is excellent for the healing of recent wounds, but I do not think it can be safely swallowed as it is too hot. They administer it to those who spit blood and for contusions in doses of ten to twelve drops."

^{15.} Fr. Anthony of Cuna Relazione sincera del viaggio fatto nel procacciare il riscatto delli schiavi turchi published almost in its entirety in Cirelli, Annali, pp. 319-331.

^{16.} Libro nuebo cited above, from 1720 to 1725. 17. B. Bagatti, O.F.M., Il Museo della Flagellazione (Jerusalem, 1939), nos. 1, 27, 66. 18. Voyages dans le Levant (Paris, 1769), p. 199.

For twenty-four years Father Anthony used his best exertions to find an effective balm, and when after many experiments he emerged successfully, he made his discovery known in Milan in 1719 through Joseph Pandolfo Malatesta. 19 In his papers he enumerates first the forty ingredients of which the balm is composed, and then the relative dose to be administered. We find among the ingredients four kinds of roots, as those of carlina and gentian, incense, myrrh, rose leaves, citron, viol and various other ingredients in some cases still unknown to modern pharmacists. The Balm itself was of four kinds. With great exactness Joseph Pandolfo speaks of its preparation, composition, use, and finally some of the recoveries occurring from its use. These were of such various ailments as wounds, colic, fistula, and preservation from plague, and took place at such various places as Jerusalem, Ain Karem, Acre, Beirut, Constantinople, Palermo. We may quote one such case. "Here in the Holy City of Jerusalem a Swiss pilgrim, a lieutenant of the Guards of His Holiness (probably Nicholas Raumann or Joseph Accarmann, pilgrims in 1702),20 suffering for many years from heart trouble and having been unsuccessfully treated in Rome, came in search of a cure. I made him take our balm for two full months, and he was cured and set out again comforted." "In Constantinople Our Father of the Holy Land was angling together with the Bailiff of Venice and the Ambassador to the Ottoman Porte. Pulling out an anthrax, which has a poisonous thorn in its head, he suffered a wound in the hand which caused a severe pain. After such a wound nothing but amputation can save the life of the victim, but being anointed with our balm he recovered in two days."

The Pharmacy of the Holy Land has been closed since the beginning of the current century and the Balm is no longer avail-

20. Fr. Francis of Politio Navis Peregrinorum for 12th April, 1702; Cirelli

Annali, p. 219.

^{19.} Four pages of the account are kept in the Archives of St. Savior. The réclame was printed in Valenza (Imprenta de Francisco Brusola, 1815) Muravillos as virtutes del Balsamo que se compone en la Botica de los Padres de San Francisco del Convento de San Salvador de Jerusalem; in Italy, Le mirabili virtù del Balsamo composto nella Speziaria dei PP. Minori Osservanti del P. S. Francesco nel Convento del SS. Salvatore di Gerusalemme, and afterwards in Diarium Terrae Sanctae (1910) pp. 99-111. A short recipe of the balm is given in P. Cesaris Nuovo dizionario di chimica (Lodi, 1904) p. 98; S. Plebani Dizionario poliglotta di farmacia (Milan, 1895), p. 84ff.

able. Any judgment regarding the truthfulness of the assertions of its inventor - however unseemly or extravagant they may at times appear - cannot therefore be made with certainty. Some healing power may without hesitancy be given it, and the fact that until the close of the last century requests for it came from Europe and Asia is not entirely a negative recommendation.

The series of plagues which so devastated Europe time and again were not without their significance in the life of our infirmarian and doctor. Presenting his balm to the public Father Anthony affirmed its usefulness for preservation from the Plague then spreading. He writes: "In Acre the Dutch Consul delivered the whole family of a great Dignitary of the Church by having them take our balm three times a day. In Beirut the Capuchin missionary saved the dving son of a Catholic through giving him twelve drops of it in cordial water."

We may easily gauge the speedy renown which any medicine even purporting to alleviate the distresses of the Plague might acquire, seeing what destruction it spread and what little efficacy any of the older medicines had as an antidote. Francis of Flora, Custos of the Holy Land, notified the Pope in 1693 that thirty-two of his friars had died that year attending the sick.21 Himself indisposed Father Anthony returned to Europe this same year, but returned inside eleven months. On the 22nd of April, 1711, Custos Lawrence Cozza put the convent of St. Saviour under quarantine²² commanding its absolute segregation under pain of excommunication, and upon the death of Brother Francis of Carniola still more stringent precautions were taken. It is interesting to note the inscription posted on the refectory door: "Notice that the main precaution is to pray to God for preservation." In this Plague as in the former one, the balm of Father Francis acquired a further medicamental renown.

Plague, however, scarcely constituted the main hardship of the friars of this day; wars productive of booty and ransom served the preoccupation of the Arabs.28 Every pretext advantageous to this

Lemmens Collectanea, p. 97.
 Cozza Atti, pp. 122, 123, 125, 139-40, 212.
 Lemmens Collectanea, p. 39-45, Acta I, pp. 385-87, 293-4; Cirelli, Annali,

end served as an incentive, e.g. the conversion of someone to the Catholic Church as was the case at Beit Jala, the greediness of the Pasha, the repair of the dome of the Holy Sepulchre. The latter enters prominently into the closing years of our account. In 1691 the Franciscans noticed that the cone-shaped dome was in need of repair and expended considerable money obtaining the requisite permission. Having overcome many difficulties and having the material ready, the machinations of the Greeks and the Turks interposed revoking the permission. The following year upon the payment of a large sum of money to the Turks the permission to transport the requisite materials from Europe was granted. June 22, 1698 a cargo of beams in transit from Jaffa to Jerusalem suffered attack near Ramle by 300 men from Hebron. One friar was seriously wounded and in successfully robbing the caravan some of the Turks were likewise wounded and killed. These tidings reaching Jerusalem provoked a riot in which the convent was besieged and the death of the friars demanded. The besiegers, however, were bought off and the riot subsided. But, still not an end. In retaliation for an attack on Jaffa by the Knights of Malta in which stores of booty and some captives were taken²⁴ an enraged mob assailed the convent at Jerusalem crying "Death to the Franciscans." The dismayed custos summoned his religious to the convent chapel and imparting general absolution exhorted them to prepare for death. The convents at Ain Karem and Bethany were likewise subjected to attack about this time. The friends of the friars again came to their assistance and release. Some twenty-one years later the convent again came in for assault. "The Mograbins," writes Father Ladoire²⁵ the Vicar of the Holy Land at the time, "unsuccessfully attempted to break down the door, and then climbed onto the nearby terrace, which was higher than ours, to fire on the friars. Our Father the surgeon, who went up there to defend the convent. was wounded in the head losing consciousness. In the meantime some others of the Turks had broken down the door and had penetrated into one of our gardens as far as the door of the mill and the cellar. As the friars were in the chapel recommending

^{24.} On the act of piracy of the Knights of Malta which caused great mischief to the Cutody see Scerri, O.F.M. Malta e i Luoghi Santi della Palestina (Malta, 1933) pp. 32-44; Lemmens Acta I, 278.
25. Voyage, p. 120. See also Lemmens Acta I, p. 356; Horn, p. 260.

themselves to God, at last, thanks to Heaven, the Pasha arrived on the scene with his army and intercepted the imminent massacre of the Franciscans." Reminiscent of these attacks are the lines written by Father Anthony: "...in a foreign country where hatred triumphs over love, the many uprisings cause a loss of life and the pillage of property."

The reiterated difficulties fell short however in preventing the friars from restoring the somewhat dilapidated cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, and after prolonged negotiations the French Ambassador, John Louis D'Usson, Marquis of Bonnac, obtained permission for this work in 1719. The conditions laid down by the Sultan required the returning of one hundred and fifty Turkish slaves from Europe inside two years. In default of the fulfillment of this condition he was decided to enslave all the Franciscans. The Custos of the Holy Land sent fathers in quest of slaves to the courts of Europe. To France went Father Marcellus Ladoire who availed himself of the opportunity to publish his Voyage fait à Terre Sainte en l'année MDCCXIX (Paris, 1720); to Spain Father Francis of Puerto author of Patrimonio Seraphico; to the Empire Father Agapitus Haikler who wrote an interesting Relazione sincera about his voyage. Its first editor Fr. A. Cirelli26 draws attention to the elegant phraseology reminiscent of Benvenuto Cellini. At the age of sixty-nine Father Anthony set out for Jaffa on November 15. We will note but a few of the incidents credited to this enterprise.

Upon arriving at Leghorn Father Anthony proceeded to Genoa where he presented the Commissar with the dilemma of his confreres in the Holy Land. He then proceeded to Florence and interviewed the Grand-Duke Cosimus III. "We will console you," answered the Grand-Duke, and he ordered his Secretary of State Marquis Rinucinni to donate sixteen slaves, and placed an open carriage at the disposal of the friar on his way to Rome.

News of the transaction having reached Pope Clement XI, he showed his displeasure for any return of slaves to the Turks, saying that throughout the future different dealings would have to take place between the Pasha and the Christians of the Holy Land, and this present trafficing might afford a very undesirable precedent.

^{26.} Annali, p. 319, 355 and 337. Cf. also Scerri, p. 51; Lemmens Acta I, 353. Cirelli, p. 329 transcribes from the archives of St. Saviour papers of release for slaves of Genoa, namely Abdalla of Smyrna, Said and Cinora.

In explanation Father Anthony showed how the Franciscans were not primarily implicated as the transaction took place between the French Ambassador and the Turks, while the Franciscans merely availed themselves of the opportunity to repair the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre. This repair demanded all urgency for extrinsic reasons, viz. to deter the Greeks from usurping any rights neglected by the friars. The Holy Father understood the difficulties. Toward the completion of his mission and as Father Anthony was about to set forth he tells us that "a slave called Mohammed sent me a memorial in which he begged me to have mercy on him, because he had been serving in the convent at the time of Fr. Raphael (Ventayol, 1709) and he had a sister in Jerusalem. Hearing a "sister" I remembered how a fidgety Turkish woman used to instigate the Turks against us, as if we were responsible for her brother's captivity. Then I wrote to H. R. H., the Secretary of War through the Marquis Rinucinni begging him to obtain from H. R. H. in the name of the Holy Land that that slave be set free and an end be put to the trouble. The Grand-Duke with his usual clemency at once sent the papers of his liberation." Embarking on the 22nd of June, 1720 on the "S. Giovanni Battista" owned by Captain John Cantelmi and taking along six slaves donated by Genoa and sixteen from Tuscany, he reached Civitavecchia on the twenty-sixth to take eight slaves donated by the Pope and on the 11th of July he was in Malta. Here the Grand-Duke D. Mark Anthony Zondonari of Siena released forty slaves. The banter that took place at their release and the ensuing incident have a certain quaint humor. "Are these not stalwart knights I give you, my countrymen?" queries the Grand Master. Father Anthony replied with familiarity, "They will prove very excellent pages since there is a hundred years' old youth in their midst who has been a writer in these jails some fifty years." The dry humor of the friar provoked the laughter of the potentate and he gave him another slave instead of the centenarian.

On August 27 he landed at St. Stephen where he found the eighty slaves sent from France. All were shaven, washed and dressed in new garments and then presented to the Sultan by the first dragoman of the Embassy, Farsetti. When the Sultan saw them he said, "Thank the Ambassador for these fine and clean shaves,"

and went on, "but are not these slaves you present to the Great Sultan mostly old and decrepit?" With this he abruptly dismissed the page. The Ambassador was indignant at the trick played on him in presenting such nondescript and depleted beings toward the fulfillment of his promise. Again, however, a substantial donation to the Sultan's friends stayed any further trouble and retaliations. In Father Anthony's absence five hundred workmen and fifty-three master builders were busy with the repair work on the cupola while some five hundred camels carried building material to the Holy City.

As the Pope had foreseen the Sultan considered the transfer of the slaves a precedent, and in 1722 a Turkish ship drew into Malta in search of a further cargo.27 The preparedness of the Grand Master Manoel De Vilheema soon persuaded Captain Abdu Agha to withdraw. A letter left with the Grand Master advised the latter to release what Moslem slaves he held, "otherwise he would rue it." The Grand Master fully aware of his strength notified the Sultan that the condition for the return of the Moslems was the setting free of the Christians.

In 1707 a strange and in the history of the Holy Land unique event took place in Jerusalem. The Discretorium or Council of the Holy Land elected a new Custos in place of the one appointed. Fr. Cajetan of Palermo, the one chosen by the Discretorium, certainly was not unworthy as he died with a reputation for sanctity, nor was he unlearned as his Mistica Teologia attests, but he was rather victim to the intrigue of an interested European government. The first to receive illicit appointment in this election was Father Joseph of Sternaia. Following upon his refusal "Father Anthony of Cuna was tumultously elected and likewise did not accept." 28 To some extent his being chosen and his refusal of the appointment in this act of insubordination bring out alike his natural eminence in the affairs of the Custody as well as his admirable integrity. This is further substantiated by the fact of his having been a member of the Custody Council for the Italian nation at different times as

^{27.} E. Rossi, "Una intimazione di una squadra turca a Malta nel 1722" in Rivista degli Studi Orientali (Roma, 1928), pp. 306-311.
28. Lemmens Acta, I, 310; on Fr. Gayetan see Acta Ordinis Minorum (Quaracchi, 1921), pp. 40-41. From 1622 to 1709, as Lemmens remarks (Acta, II, xiii) custodes were chosen from Spanish countries and perhaps the strange insubordination of the Discretorium may be attributed to opposition to this policy.

in 1697 and 1722-1724.29 His self-sacrificing piety and charity as physician, his assiduous devotion to work, and his full knowledge of Custody affairs acquired during his prolonged stay in Palestine gained him great esteem. This sense of responsibility evidenced itself in his corresponding with the Propaganda on the imprudent management of the Procurator Brother Luke of Poveda who caused great mischief to the Holy Land. Contemporary witness substantiate his information in this regard.³⁰

In 1724³¹ he made his last visit to Italy to take some gifts or "sanctuaries" to the Grand-Duke John Gastone who succeeded Cosmos III and to solicit help for the Custody. On April 11 of the succeeding year he returned to his infirmary and pharmacy. His long labors for the relief of suffering finally draw to a close when in 1727 he was no longer able to participate in the services in the church, and on November 11, 1729 he fell ill. "Provided with the Holy Sacraments and amidst the grief of his brothers," as we read in the Registro dei Religiosi32 he gave his soul back to God in the seat of his labors.

Every year the necrology of the Holy Land perpetuates his memory as physician and apothecary and wishes him eternal rest.33

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^{29.} Registrum ordinationum Discretorii, MS in the Archives of St. Saviour for the 2nd of Oct. and the 18th of March, 1697; Registro Superiorum MS in the Archives of St. Saviour for the 2nd of April, 1722; Libro nuebo from 20th Sept., 1722 to the 7th Feb., 1724.

^{30.} Lemmens Acta II, 9; Cirelli Annali, pp. 338-9.
31. Lemmens Acta II, 139.
32. Registro dei religiosi morti in questa S. Custodia dal 1641 al 1767, MS in the Archives of St. Saviour on the date of the death.
33. Castellani Necrologium Terrae Sanctae (Jerusalem, 1923) for Dec. 2nd.

MISCELLANEA

SCOTUS' TEACHING ACCORDING TO OCKHAM

II. ON THE NATURA COMMUNIS

Serious students of the history of Medieval Philosophy have reached the conclusion that Scotus does not teach an "ultra-realistic" theory as regards the problem of universals. A real universal nature in things outside the mind is entirely foreign to the philosophy professed by Duns Scotus. This definite result is the fruit of painstaking research done by both Fr. Parthenius Minges, O.F.M.1 and Johannes Kraus.2 Their excellent work has closed another chapter of serious misunderstandings of Scotistic doctrines.

However, the encouraging agreement of these two scholars concerns only the main point, viz. the denial of a Platonic realism in Duns Scotus. It does not concern every detail. The interpretation of the common nature would appear to be the main point of difference. While Fr. Parthenius Minges maintains that the natura communis is something of the metaphysical order, Kraus holds that it is something of the physical order. Fr. Parthenius Minges, on the basis of his interpretation, thinks that substantially the same solution of the problem is to be found in the teachings of Duns Scotus and St. Thomas. Kraus strongly objects to this:

Nach Skotus gibt es also in der physischen Ordnung eine aktuell indifferente Natur; aktuell in dem Sinne, dass die Natur in der Existenz mit der individuellen Entität ihre innere Indifferenz und Kommunität an sich beibehält. Das bedeutet einen tiefgreifenden Unterschied zu der Lehre des Doctor angelicus, nach der die in den Einzeldingen existierende Natur weder positiv noch negativ gemeinsam ist.³

It has been said4 that Kraus' opinion or interpretation of Scotus' doctrine on the natura communis confirms a certain view of Ockham in regard to the same problem. Before dealing with Kraus' interpretation, therefore,

(Münster, 1908).

2. "Die Lehre des Johannes Duns Skotus, O.F.M. von der Natura Communis.

Ein Beitrag zum Universalienproblem in der Scholastik," in Studia Friburgensia,
(Paderborn 1927).

Cf. also: "Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay

^{1. &}quot;Der angebliche exzessive Realismus des Duns Skotus," in Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, herausgegeben von Cl. Bäumker, VIII, 1,

Cf. also: "Die Universalienlehre des Oxforder Kanzlers Heinrich von Harclay in ihrer Mittelstellung zwischen skotistischem Realismus und ockhamistischem Nominalismus," in Divus Thomas (Fribourg), X (1932) 36-58, 475-508; XI (1933) 79-95, 288-314. — "Die Lehre von der realen specifischen Einheit in der älteren Skotistenschule," in Divus Thomas (Fribourg), XIV (1936) 353-378.

3. "Der angebliche..." p. 139.
4. Cf. A. C. Pegis, "The Dilemma of Being and Unity. A Platonic Incident in Christian Thought," in Essays in Thomism, ed. by R. Brennan, O.P., Sheed and Ward (1942), p. 381, note 33: "In locating Scotus after Platonic realism, in his sequence of questions on the universals, Ockham finds confirmation in the interpretation of Scotus proposed by Johannes Kraus..." We have no intention to engage in a debate over the views presented by A. C. Pegis in this article; we disagree

It seems advisable to go back to this the greatest adversary of the Doctor Subtilis, William Ockham, and to ask him to explain to us what he considered the genuine teaching of Duns Scotus as regards our problem. We certainly cannot expect from him a defense of the Doctor Subtilis. For on this point as on many others he was most decidedly opposed to Scotus. But we can rely on him as to fairness and correct presentation. Ockham admired Scotus, and in addition, he did not believe in constructing a fake position and then destroying it, thereby making others and perhaps himself believe that he had really conquered something.

Ockham deals with the problem of universals in the second distinction of the *Ordinatio*. Before explaining his own solution, step by step he eliminates contrary opinions admitting any kind of universality in things

outside the mind.

We first find the ultra-realistic theory in its pure form. Ockham presents it as follows: Every univocal universal is a thing that exists in each corresponding individual outside the mind. It is of the essence of every individual, though really distinct from every individual and from any other universal. Thus a universal man is one, true thing that really exists in every man outside the mind. This universal man is really distinct from each individual man, and it is also distinct from the universal animal as well as from the universal substance. This holds for all genera and for all species, be they subordinated or not. Hence according to this opinion, in any individual which as such is in a genus there are as many things really distinct, as there are universals which can be predicated about such an individual in the manner of an essence (not in the manner of a quality) and so that they are parts of the definition of the subject. These universal things are really distinct from each other and from the individual in which they exist. Each of these real universal things, being itself in no way multiplied, exists in every individual of the same species, no matter how much the individuals are multiplied.6

That this opinion holds the existence of real universals in extramental things and the existence of one and the same universal thing in many

individuals is its distinctive character.

on too many points. However we cannot resist the temptation to correct one minor detail for which the author is not responsible. We came across one line that struck us as very unusual in Ockham. We read on p. 167: "In the Summa Logicae... Ockham says flatly that haec opinio videtur esse irrationabilis." This severe censure against Scotus is indeed found in the edition quoted by the author. According to the oldest manuscripts we have to read: Sed ista opinio omnino improbabilis mihi videtur. Summa Logicae I, 16.

^{5.} Ordinatio, d. 2, q. 4, B: "Ad istam quaestionem est una opinio, quod quodlibet universale univocum est quaedam res existens extra animam realiter in quolibet singulari et de essentia cuiuslibet singularis distincta realiter a quolibet singulari et a quolibet alio universali; ita quod homo universalis est una vera res extra animam existens realiter in quolibet homine, et distinguitur realiter a quolibet homine, et ab animali universali, et a substantia universali, et sic de omnibus generibus et speciebus sive subalternis sive non subalternis. Et ita secundum istam opinionem, quot sunt universalia praedicabilia in quid et per se primo modo de aliquo singulari per se in genere, tot sunt in eo res realiter distinctae: quarum quaelibet realiter distinguitur ab alia et ab illo singulari. Et omnes illae res in se nullo modo multiplicatae, quantumcumque singularia multiplicentur, sunt in quolibet individuo eiusdem speciei." Cf. Pegis, art. cit. p. 161. Our text is revised.

The second opinion is very briefly outlined by Ockham. A universal is a true thing that exists outside the mind. It is really distinct from a difference which contracts the really universal nature to an individual. Consequently the present opinion differs essentially from the preceding: the universal is multiplied and not one and the same in every individual.6

Of these two opinions, Ockham says, that they were attributed by some scholastics to Duns Scotus. However, Ockham himself is not convinced that such an attribution is correct. As he expressly states at the beginning of the text edited below, he is convinced that an opinion different from the two explained above represents the genuine doctrine of the Doctor Subtilis. Since he is aware of possible misinterpretation, he takes pains to explain this theory very extensively. Furthermore, he substantiates his own exposition with literal quotations from Scotus. We shall now present, therefore, the summary of the Scotistic opinion made by Ockham disregarding his quotations from Scotus.

According to Ockham, Scotus holds the following doctrine as regards the universals: In extramental things there is a nature of which the following can be said: It is really one with the difference that contracts it to one definite individual. Though this nature is really one with the difference, it is nevertheless formally distinct from it. The nature insofar as it itself is concerned, is neither universal nor particular: in the thing it is incompletely universal, but it is completely universal in the mind

The crucial point in the interpretation is the expression: natura de se... est incomplete universalis in re. In order to ascertain the meaning of this incomplete universality which belongs to the nature in the thing insofar as the nature is concerned, Ockham studies this nature which can be contracted in relation to the singular itself, with numerical unity, with the being of a universal, and with a unity less than numerical unity. Let us point out here that Ockham uses the correct expression, natura contrahibilis, not natura contracta. The natura contrahibilis and the natura de se are the same. It seems to us that this distinction has not found the attention that it deserves. Of this natura contrahibilis Ockham says: It is the intention of this Doctor that besides numerical unity there is a unity less than numerical unity which belongs to this very nature which is somehow universal. Hence, according to Ockham, the "very nature" is not the individualized nature, but the natura contrahibilis, or the natura de se.

We now study this nature in relation to the individual in which it exists. According to Scotus, a nature by itself (de se) is not this individual nature (baec, that is, natura). It is this nature by something which is added to it. What is this addition? This addition is neither a negation, nor some accident, nor actual existence, nor matter. It is rather in the line

^{6. &}quot;Et est opinio, quod universale est res vera extra animam distincta realiter ab una differentia contrahente, realiter tamen multiplicata et variata per talem differentiam contrahentem." Ordinatio d. 2, q. 5, B.

7. "Ad quaestionem est una opinio, quae imponitur Doctori Subtili a quibusdam, sicut et ab aliis opinio recitata et improbata in praecedenti quaestione sibi

imponitur." l.c.

of substance and intrinsic to the individual. Now in the order of nature (and not in the order of time or things) the nature is prior to that which

contracts it to the individual nature (Text B).

On the basis of texts quoted carefully from the Oxoniense, Ockham summarizes Scotus' teachings as regards the individual difference that contracts the nature, as follows: Firstly, it is not a quidditative difference. We explain: this individual difference lies beyond the ultimate specific difference and does not add anything to the quiddity of the essence of an individual. Secondly, the nature is naturally prior to the individual difference (as explained before). Thirdly, the opposite, that is, another individual difference, is not repugnant to the nature as far as the nature is concerned, and therefore the nature as such could be individualized by another difference; there is nothing in the nature as such by which it would be determined to this one individual. Fourthly, this holds not only for the whole nature, but also for the parts of the nature. Furthermore, the individual difference and the nature are not distinct as res and res, that means, they are not really distinct. Fifthly, they are only formally distinct. Sixthly, every nature in its individual difference is really different from another nature with its individual difference.

Again, we study this nature considered in itself in reference to numerical unity. According to Scotus the nature has no numerical unity from itself (since it has it only from an individual difference). Nor is the nature as such immediately denominated by any kind of real unity. Nevertheless, the nature is really numerically one. The nature is also not really one in two individuals, but only in one individual. (l.c.). This explanation calls for an interpretation since it is couched in highly technical terms. A denominative term qualifies a subject by a property which is not identical (in creatures) with the subject. For instance, "just" is a denominative term; likewise, "numerically one." Now nature insofar as itself is concerned (de se) is not immediately denominated by any kind of real unity, since as such it does not have numerical unity, it is only mediately denominated by the term "numerical unity," namely when it is individualized and insofar as it is individualized by the individual difference. When, therefore, the nature is called or mediately denominated numerically one, it does not mean, that it is still in a state of indifference.

Thirdly, let us study this nature in itself in reference to universality. According to Scotus, the nature, thus understood is not completely universal; it is completely universal only in the intellect. The nature as such, has

no singularity nor universality but only commonness. (l.c.)

Finally, let us study this nature in reference to a unity less than numerical unity. According to Scotus the nature has a unity less than numerical unity. However, this lesser unity does not belong to the definition of the nature as such, but is an essential predicate of it, viz. a passio. That is what is meant by the expression "second mode of predication per se" (l.c.).

This constitutes the opinion of Scotus on the natura communis as proposed and understood by Ockham. If we compare this careful analysis with the texts quoted by Ockham and others scattered throughout the works of Scotus, we can say that it is a fair presentation of the teachings of Duns Scotus. One thing is already clear. Though Ockham knows that Scotus develops his teachings on the natura communis in connection with the

principle of individuation, nevertheless, he also knows perfectly well that it has likewise an essential bearing on the problem of universals. Scotus' proofs for his theory, as presented by Ockham (cf. text D) are ample evidence of it. And by this Ockham confirms the view rather of Fr. Parthenius Minges than that of Kraus who especially criticizes Minges on

However, the main difference of opinion between Fr. Minges and Kraus is the understanding of the indifference or community of the natura communis. In order to offset the too close rapprochement of Scotus' opinion to that of St. Thomas, Kraus maintains that the nature retains its inner indifference, even when individualized by a Haeceitas. As far as we can say, Kraus goes too far. Ockham, certainly does not lend him a hand in this. For Ockham always maintains that Scotus or the Scotists do not believe in an actually existing indifferent nature, but only in a nature which is actually individualized and hence a nature that is numerically one. Let us gather a few texts from Ockham's own criticism and then on this particular point present again the teaching of Scotus according to Ockham:

Sed per te omnis res extra animam est realiter singularis et una numero, quamvis aliqua de se sit singularis et aliqua tantum per aliquid additum (q. 6, F).

Sed ista est vera per te: A est unum unitate maiori, quia tu dicis, quod natura est una numero. (l.c.)

Secundum eos omnis res extra animam est realiter singularis. (l.c.)

Si dicatur, quod illa natura non est communis ex hoc ipso, quod est appropriata Sorti per differentiam contrahentem. — Contra... ergo est aliqua res extra animam, quae non est realiter singularis, quod tamen negant, quia dicunt, quod natura est realiter una numero et singularis. (*l.c.* H).

...per consequens est aliquid indistinctum realiter in Sorte et Platone, quod isti negant, quia ponunt, quod nihil idem realiter indistinctum est in Sorte et Pla-

Tertio non videtur bene dictum, quod natura sit indifference de se, et tamen quod realiter sit differentia contrahens. (I.c. N)

Quarto non videtur bene dictum, quod natura est realiter una numero, quamvis sit de se communis et sit una tantum denominative. (l.c.)

What can be gathered from these and the preceding remarks, is this, that Ockham knows well that Scotus and the Scotists of his time made a distinction between the nature considered in itself, that is abstractly speaking, and the nature considered in its concrete existence in an individual. The communitas or indifference is referred to the nature considered in itself, not, however, as it exists in an individual. In an individual the nature is an individualized nature, which considered apart from this individualization is neither universal nor singular. But as common nature it cannot exist and therefore, does not exist. However, individualization is brought about by means of some addition, namely the Haecceitas, which is not something, a res, but only a realitas. Both, nature and Haecceitas are really indistinct, but in the order of formalities, they still show the fine and faint contours of their composition, not by reason of our intellect which projects them into the thing, but objectively, a parte rei. Where therefore does Scotus say, that in this individualization the nature is still common and indifferent? Ockham, certainly did not discover that in Scotus. In his

^{8.} l.c. p. 47 s.

criticism he attempts to force Scotus to that admission by way of inferences, but not by way of texts. The principal means used by Ockham is a rejection of the distinctio formalis, with which, indeed, the theory of Scotus will stand and fall. Ockham rejects this distinction in creatures, though he admits it in God. But such a procedure is not anymore that of an historical investigation. We are here interested only in the historical question, viz. what Scotus really taught.

In our opinion, Kraus makes Scotus say something, that he really did not say. However, Kraus does not do it, as Ockham does, by way of criticism and by drawing consequences, which are understood to be contradicted by Scotus, but by maintaining that such consequences belong to the body of the Scotistic theory on universals. In the text quoted from Kraus at the beginning, the author certainly goes further than the texts of Scotus. And, what is worse, he introduces a terminology which far from clarifying the issue, rather obscures it. He speaks of an indifference of the natura communis in the physical order, he calls the natura communis an actually indifferent nature and maintains that this nature in existence with the individual entity, viz. the Haecceitas, does not lose its inner indifference and community, but retains it "an sich." All this appears to us as confusing the issue. If we use precise medieval language, there can be no doubt that we have to say with Fr. Parthenius Minges that the distinction between natura and haecceitas is of the metaphysical order and not of the physical order, that it is of the order of realities and formalities and not of res. Hence the crucial point of the Scotistic doctrine on the problem of universals is the distinctio formalis. Unfortunately the rôle of the formal distinction is grossly neglected by Kraus, whilst the Doctor plus quam subtilis correctly senses the vital spot and therefore directs his criticism mainly against the distinctio formalis. In this, most certainly, Ockham does not find confirmation from Kraus.

In fact, Kraus has somewhat to retract what he has said about the inner indifference of the nature which remains even in the singular. He writes:

Nach der positiven Seite bedeutet die Kontraktion eine Hinordnung zu dieser oder jener Haecceitas, sodass die Natur tatsächlich ihre Indifferenz wenigstens extrinsece einbüsst. Unter diesem Gesichtspunkt spricht Skotus von einer Determination, durch die eine Natur einem bestimmten Subjekte zugeeignet wird.

Inasmuch as we are able to understand the expression "die Natur büsst wenigstens extrinsece ein," it means in plain English that the nature has lost its indifference not by an inner determination, that is not de se, but by an extrinsic determination. Yet, and this matters, it has lost its indifference, and hence it is not an indifferent nature any more.

However, if this is the case, then we do not exactly see anymore, how on the basis of this *de se* indifference and yet, at the same time, really "not-indifference" of the nature, the teaching of the *Doctor Angelicus* and the *Doctor Subtilis* differ. For according to Saint Thomas, too, the nature or essence or form or even common nature, as he sometimes says,

^{9.} l.c. p. 115; here as in footnote 5 reference is made to the text C: Omnis substantia... of the following edition.

considered in itself and by itself, is not individual, but indifferent to this or that individual. The interested student may convince himself of that by reading the third chapter of the De Ente et essentia in the edition of Roland Gosselin, O.P.10 But we urge him also not to omit reading the lengthy quotations from Avicenna that accompany the text edition, since they show that as to this particular doctrine both doctors have absorbed much of this greatest genius of Arabian philosophy, and, by the same token, have drawn freely from the same source. On page 25 we read for instance:

Haec autem natura habet duplex esse: unum in singularibus et aliud in anima; et secundum utrumque consequitur dictam naturam accidens, et in singularibus habet etiam multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem. Et tamen ipsi nature secundum primam considerationem suam, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur. Falsum enim est dicere quod essentia hominis, in quantum homo, habeat esse in hoc singulari, quia si esse in hoc singulari conveniret homini in quantum est homo, et numquam esset extra singulare...

However, we have no intention of saying that there are no differences between the teachings of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus as regards their respective understanding of the natura. There is in fact a definite difference, which was certainly noticed by Ockham, but not by Kraus, or which was at least neglected by him. The Doctor Subtilis introduces a formal distinction into the individual between haecceitas and natura, the Doctor Angelicus only a distinctio rationis. Furthermore, the former has the de se common nature individualized by matter, the latter by the haecceitas.

To appreciate these differences — and other minor ones — seems to be rather a matter of taste. Maybe certain Thomists will continue to call Scotus' theory more realistic than that of St. Thomas. There are, however, others who in spite of their great admiration of St. Thomas call St. Thomas' theory more realistic than that of Scotus. Thus, Hans Meyer, speaks even of an Aristotelean Platonism in St. Thomas.¹¹ We are personally convinced that all depends on the point of view from which the respective theories are seen. From one point of view St. Thomas' theory may appear more Platonic, from another that of Duns Scotus. However, the positive value of the individual as such is certainly more emphasized by the Doctor Subtilis.

^{10.} Bibliothèque Thomiste, VIII (1926).
11. Thomas von Aquin, (Bonn, 1938), p. 90 s. Since the English translation (by Frederic Eckhoff, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Herder Book Co. (1944), p. 85s.) is incorrect, we submit here the German original: "Eine Reihe von Faktoren, ein gewisser Parallelismus der Erkenntnis und der Seinsordnung, der Ausgang vom Allgemeinen, die Materie als Individuationsprinzip, drängten zu einem universale formale, zu einem aristotelischen Platonismus, der dann in der Tat deutlich aus der thomistischen Gedankenwelt hervorlugt... Skotus gelangt mit seinem Formalismus in der Ueberwindung des Begriffsrealismus einen Schritt weiter. Die gemeinsame Natur in den Dingen ist mit der Individualform unzertrennlich verbunden, die letztere bestimmt und vervollkommnet die Allgemeinform und prägt sie zu einem bestimmten Individuum aus. Sokrates entsteht, indem die Humanitas durch die Sokratitas bestimmt wird, beide unterscheiden sich nicht wie res et res, ihr Unterschied ist kein realer, gehört vielmehr der metaphysischen und der logischen Ordnung an und ist ein formaler."

[Guilelmus Ockham, Ordinatio, d. 2, q. 6 in ordine]

[Opinio Scoti de natura communi]

Ad istam quaestionem dicitur, quod in re extra animam est natura eadem realiter cum differentia contrahente ad determinatum individuum distincta tamen formaliter, quae de se nec est universalis nec particularis, sed incomplete est universalis in re et complete secundum esse in intellectu. Et quia ista opinio est, ut credo, opinio Subtilis Doctoris, qui alios in subtilitate iudicii excellebat, ideo volo totam istam opinionem, quam sparsim ipse ponit in diversis locis, hic recitare distincte, verba sua quae ponit in diversis locis non mutando.

Et est de intentione istius Doctoris, quod praeter unitatem numeralem est unitas realis minor unitate numerali, quae convenit ipsi naturae quae est aliquo modo universalis. Et ideo potest natura contrahibilis primo comparari ad ipsum singulare, secundo potest comprarari ad unitatem nume-

ralem, tertio potest comparari ad esse universale.

Si comparetur ad ipsum singulare, sic ponit ista opinio, quod natura non est de se haec sed per aliquid additum; et secundo ponit, quod illud additum non est negatio, quaestione secunda, nec aliquod accidens, quaestione tertia, nec actualis existentia, quaestione quarta, nec materia, quaestione quinta; tertio quod illud additum est in genere substantiae et intrinsecum individuo; quarto quod natura est prior naturaliter illo contrahente. Unde dicit:1 "Omnis entitas² sive totalis sive partialis alicuius generis est de se indifferens3 ad hanc entitatem vel4 illam, ita quod, ut est entitats quidditativa, est prior naturaliter ista entitate ut haec est; et ut prior est naturaliter, sicut non convenit sibi ex5 se quod sit haec, ita non repugnat sibi ex ratione sua suum oppositum. Et sicut compositum non includit illame entitatem, qua est compositum, ita materia inquantum materia non includit illam entitatem, qua est haec materia. Eodem⁸ modo de forma. Non est ergo ista entitas materia vel forma velo compositum, inquantum quodlibet istorum est natura, sed est ultima realitas entis, quod est materia, et entis, 10 quod est forma, et entis,10 quod est compositum; ita quod quodcumque commune et tamen determinabile adhuç potest distingui, quantumcumque sit una res, in plures realitates formaliter distinctas, quarum haec formaliter non est illa, et 11 haec formaliter est entitas singularis et illa formaliter est entitas naturae communis.12 Nec possunt istae entitates13 esse res et res,

Oxon. II, d. 3, q. 6, n. 15; ed. V, t. 12, p. 144.
 quidditative add. ed. V

^{3.} ut entitas quidditativa add. ed. V

^{4.} et ed. V

 ^{...}haec/ esse hanc ed. V
 suam ed. V

^{7. ...}includit illam/ inquantum natura, ita nec materia inquantum natura includit suam ed. V

^{8. ...} forma/ nec forma inquantum natura includit suam ed. V

^{10.} et entis/ vel ed. V

^{11.} sed ed. V 12. om. ed. V

^{13.} duae realitates ed. V

sicut possunt esse realitates,14 realitas unde accipitur genus et realitas unde accipitur differentia, ex quibus realitas specifica accipitur quandoque; 15 sed semper in eodem sive parte sive toto sunt realitates einsdem rei formaliter distinctae."

Ex isto patet, quod circa istam differentiam contrahentem ponit ista: Primo quod differentia individualis non est quidditativa; secundo quod natura est prior naturaliter ista differentia contrahente, tertio quod naturae de se non repugnat oppositum istius differentiae individualis, scilicet alia differentia individualis, sicut nec sibi convenit ex se ista differentia individualis; quarto quod hoc est verum universaliter tam in toto quam in partibus suis, et similiter quod differentia individualis et natura non distinguuntur sicut res et res; quinto quod tantum distinguuntur formaliter. Sexto ponit alibi, quod natura est realiter alia et alia cum alio et alio contrahente. Unde dicit sic: "Omnis substantia per se existens est propria illi cuius est, hoc est, vel ex se ipsa propria vel per aliquid contrahens facta propria, quo contrabente posito non potest inesse alteri, licet non repugnet sibi ex se inesse alteri." Unde propter hoc dicit ipse, quod idea, quae imponitur Platoni, non est substantia Sortis. Unde sequitur ibidem:17 "Idea non erit substantia Sortis, quia nec natura Sortis, quia nec ex se propria nec appropriata Sorti, ut tantum sit in eo, sed est etiam in alio secundum ipsum, scilicet in Platone." 18

Consimiles sententias ponit alibi in diversis locis.

Si autem ista natura comparetur ad unitatem numeralem, similiter ponit, quod natura non habet ex se unitatem numeralem nec est illud quod immediate denominatur quacumque unitate reali; est tamen realiter una numero; nec est realiter aliquid unum quacumque unitate reali in duobus individuis sed in uno tantum. Unde dicit sic:19 ,, Concedo, quod unitas realis non est alicuius20 existentis in duobus individuis sed in uno. Et cum obiicis: quidquid est in eodem21 numero est idem numero. — Respondeo primo in alio simili manifestiori: Quidquid est in una specie est unum specie; color ergo in albedine est unum specie, ergo non habet unitatem minorem unitate speciei --- non sequitur. Nam sicut alias dictum est... aliquid potest dici animatum denominative, sicut corpus, vel per se primo modo ut homo; et ita superficies dicitur alba denominative, et superficies alba dicitur alba per se primo modo, quia subiectum includit praedicatum. Ita dico quod potentiale, quod contrabitur per actuale, informatur ab illo actuali, et per hoc informatur ab illa unitate (consequente)22 illam actualitatem sive illum actum. Et ita est unum unitate propria illius actualis; sed denominative est sic unum, non autem est de se sic unum neque primo neque per partem essentialem. Color ergo in albedine est unus specie, sed23

^{14.} om. ed. V 15. om. ed. V

^{16.} Oxon. II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 10; ed. V, t. 12, p. 55.

scilicet.../ om. ed. V
 Oxon. II, d.3, q. 6, n. 10; ed. V, t. 12, p. 133.
 entitatis add. ed. V

^{21.} individuo add. ed. V

^{22.} ommittitur in pluribus manuscriptis Ockham 23. licet ed. V

non de se nec per se nec primo sed denominative tantum. Differentia autem specifica est una primo,24 quia sibi primo repugnat dividi in plura specie. Albedo autem est una specie per se, sed non primo, quia per aliquid intrinsecum sibi, ut per illam differentiam. Ita concedo, quod quidquid est in hoc lapide est unum numero vel primo vel per se vel denominative. Primo forte, ut illud per quod unitas talis huic convenit composito. Per se, ut hic lapis cuius illud, quod est primo unum hac unitate, est25 pars. Denominative tantum (ut)26 illud potentiale quod perficitur isto actuali, quod quasi denominative respicit actualitatem eius et unitatem." 27

Si autem tertio modo natura comparetur ad esse universale, sic ponit, quod de se non est complete universalis, sed secundum quod habet esse in intellectu; secundo quod de se convenit sibi communitas, non singularitas. Unde dicit sic:28 , Universale in actu est illud, quod habet aliquam unitatem indifferentem, secundum quam ipsum29 est in potentia proxima, ut dicatur de quolibet supposito, quia secundum Philosophum 1º Posteriorum, universale est quod est unum in multis et de multis; nibil autem30 secundum quamcumque unitatem in re est tale, quod secundum illam unitatem praecise31 sit in potentia proxima ad quodlibet suppositum32 praedicatione dicente: boc est boc, quia licet alicui existenti in re non repugnat ex se83 esse in alia singularitate ab illa, in qua est, non tamen illud vere potest dici de quolibet inferiori, videlicet34 quod quodlibet est ipsum. Hoc enim solum est possibile de eodem obiecto numero35 considerato actu ab intellectu; quod quidem ut intellectum habet unitatem etiam numeralem obiecti, secundum quam ipsum36 est praedicabile de omni singulari, dicendo quod hoc est boc."

Et subdit, quod37 "Est in re commune, quod non est de se hoc, et per consequens de se ei non repugnat38 non hoc; sed tale commune non est universale in actu, quia deficit illa indifferentia, secundum quam universale completive est universale, secundum quam scilicet ipsum idem aliqua indentitate est praedicabile de quolibet individuo, ita quod quodlibet sit

Item ibidem subdit, quod³⁹ "Non ita se habent communitas et singularitas ad naturam sicut esse in intellectu et esse verum extra animam; quia communitas convenit naturae extra intellectum et similiter singularitas, et

25. per se add. ed. V

26. omittitur in pluribus manuscriptis Ockham 27. similiter add. ed. V

29. idem add. ed. V 30. enim ed. V

31. praecisam ed. V 32. ut dicitur de quolibet supposito add. ed. V

33. ex se/ om. ed. V 34. om. ed. V

35. indifferenti add. ed. V

36. idem add. ed. V 37. l.c. (nota 28) 38. esse add. ed. V 39. l.c. p. 55.

^{24.} specie. Primo ed. V

^{28.} Oxon. II, d. 3, q. 1, n. 8; ed. V, t. 12, p. 54. Hic invenitur nota marginalis in uno manuscripto Ockham: Quaestione 1º in Rep. ad 1m ojectionem contra so(lutionem?).

communitas convenit ex se naturae, singularitas autem convenit naturae per aliquid in re contrahens ipsam. Sed universalitas non convenit rei ex se. Et ideo concedo, quod quaerenda est causa universalitatis, non tamen quarenda est causa communitatis alia ab ipsa natura. Et posita communitate in ipsa natura secundum propriam entitatem et unitatem necessario oportet quaerere causam singularitatis, quae superaddit aliquid ipsi naturae cuius est."

Si quarto comparetur natura ad unitatem minorem unitate numerali, sic ponit quod ista unitas non est infra rationem quidditativam naturae, sed praedicatur de ea secundo modo dicendi per se. Unde dicit sic:40 "Hoc modo intelligo naturam habere unitatem realem minorem unitate numerali, licet non habeat eam de se, ita quod sit intra rationem naturae; quia equinitas est tantum equinitas secundum Avicennam 5° Metaphysicae; tamen illa unitas est propria passio naturae secundum entitatem suam primam."

Pro conclusione principali istius opinionis arguitur multipliciter. Primo sic: 41, Quidquid inest alicui ex sua ratione, per se inest ei in quocumque; ergo si natura hominis 42 de se esset 43 haec, in quocumque esset 43 natura hominis, 44 illud esset hic homo." 45

Secundo: 46 ,, Cui de se convenit unum oppositum, eidem de se repugnat aliud oppositum; ergo si natura de se est una numero, ex se sibi repugnat multitudo numeralis."

Tertio sic:⁴⁷ "Obiectum inquantum obiectum est prius naturaliter actu, et in illo priori⁴⁸ est de se singulare, quia hoc semper convenit naturae non acceptae secundum quid sive secundum esse quod habet in anima; ergo⁴⁹ intelligens illud obiectum sub ratione universalis intelligit ipsum sub ratione opposita suae rationi inquantum⁵⁰ scilicet universale, quia ut praecedit actum determinatur⁵¹ ad oppositum illius rationis, scilicet universalis." ⁵²

Quarto sic:53, Cuiuscumque unitas realis propria et sufficiens est minor unitate numerali, illud non est de se unum unitate numerali sive non est de se hoc; sed naturae existentis in isto lapide est unitas propria realis sive sufficiens54 unitas minor unitate numerali; ergo etc. Maior de se patet: quia nihil est de se unum unitate maiori unitate sibi sufficiente; nam si propria unitas, quae debetur alicui de se, sit minor unitate numerali, unitas numeralis non convenit sibi ex natura sua55 et secundum se, aliter praecise

^{40.} l.c. n. 7; p. 49. 41. l.c. n. 1; p. 6 (contra) 42. lapidis ed. V.

^{42.} lapidis ed. V. 43. est ed. V

^{44.} om. ed. V 45. lapis ed. V

^{46.} l.c. 47. l.c. n. 2; p. 7.

^{48.} per te, obiectum add. ed. V

^{49.} intellectus add. ed. V 50. ...quia/ nam ed. V 51. ex se add. ed. V

^{52.} scilicet.../ om. ed. V

^{53.} *l.c.*

^{54.} hic transponit praecedens 'est' ed. V 55. om. ed. V

ex natura sua haberet maiorem et minorem unitatem, quae circa idem et secundum idem sunt opposita, quia cum unitate minori potest stare multitudo opposita sine contradictione unitati maiori, quae multitudo non potest stare cum maiori unitate, quia sibi repugnat; ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quia si nulla est unitas naturae realis minor singularitate, et omnis unitas alia ab unitate singularitatis56 etiam naturae specificae est minor unitate reali, ergo nulla erit unitas realis minor unitate minor unitate numerali; consequens falsum, sicut probabo quinque vel sex viis, ergo etc.

Prima via est talis: Secundum Philosophum 10° Metaphysicae: In omni genere est unum primum, quod est metrum et mensura omnium, quae sunt illius generis. Ista unitas primi mensurantis57 est realis, quia Philosophus probat, quod uni convenit prima ratio mensurandis8 et declarat per ordinem, quomodo illud est unum, cui convenit ratio mensurandi in omni genere. Ista etiam59 unitas est alicuius inquantum est primum in genere, 60 quia mensurata sunt realia et realiter mensurata; ens autem reale non potest realiter mensurari ab ente rationis; ergo ista61 realis unitas non est singularitatis, quia nullum est singulare in genere, quod sit mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in62 genere.63 Nam secundum Philosophum 3° Metaphysicae: În individuis eiusdem speciei non est hoc prius et illud posterius, quod prius, licet Commentator aliter exponat de priori constituente posterius, tamen nihil ad. b. [= minorem?],64... quia intentio Philosophi est ibi concordare cum Platone, quod in individuis eiusdem speciei non est ordo essentialis, etc.65 Nullum ergo individuum est per se mensura eorum, quae sunt in specie sua, ergo nec unitas numeralis sive66 individualis.

Praeterea secundo probo, quod idem consequens falsum sit, quia secundum Philosophum 7° Physicorum: in specie atoma sit comparatio, quia est una natura, non autem in genere, quia genus non habet talem unitatem. Ista differentiaer non est unitatis secundum rationem, quia conceptus generis est numero68 unus apud intellectum sicut conceptus speciei, alioquin nullus conceptus diceretur in quid de multis speciebus, et ita nullus conceptus esset genus, sed69 tot essent conceptus dicti de speciebus, quot sunt

^{56. ...}reali/ singularis, est unitas rationis tantum ed. V
57. primi.../ om. ed. V
58. mensurae ed. V
59. autem ed. V
60. ergo est realis add. ed. V

^{61. ...}singularitatis/ unitas illius primi est realis. Ista autem unitas non est unitas singularis vel numeralis ed. V

^{62.} illo add. ed. V

^{63.} sequentia usque ad finem deficient in Ms. Firenze A. 3.801 cum nota in textu: quaere alias vias in Joanne libro secundo et in metaphysica. In nota marginali legitur. Hic dimisit spatium pro aliis viis. MS Troyes 718, continuat in textu: quaere,

^{64.} ed. V addit circa 15 lineas et continuat: Est ergo intentio Philosophi (in quo concordat cum Platone), quod...

^{65.} om. ed. V; vide praecedentem notam.

^{66.} nec ed. V

^{67. ...}rationem/ vero unitas non est unitas rationis ed. V 68. ita ed. V

^{69.,} si ed. V

conceptus specierum, et 10 tunc in singularibus praedicationibus idem praedicaretur de se.

Similiter: Unitas conceptus vel non conceptus nibil ad intentionem Philosophi ibi, scilicet ad comparationem vel non; ergo intendit ibi naturam specificam esse unam unitate naturae specificae, non autem intendit ipsam esse sic unam unitate numerali, quia in illa non fit comparatio, ergo etc.

Praeterea tertio: Secundum Philosophum 5° Metaphysicae capitulo de Ad aliquid: Idem, simile et aequale fundatur super unum, sedii relatio non est realis, nisi habeat fundamentum reale et rationem12 fundandi realem; ergo unitas, quae requiritur in fundamento relationis similitudinis est realis et non numeralis, quia nibil unum et idem est simile vel13 aequale sibiipsi.

Praeterea quarto: Unius oppositionis realis sunt duo prima extrema realia; sed contrarietas est oppositio realis. Quod patet: quia unum realiter corrumpit alterum circumscripto omni opere intellectus, et non nisi quia sunt contraria; ergo utrumque primum extremum buius oppositionis est?+ reale; ut autem est extremum est unum aliqua unitate reali et non numerali, quia tunc praecise hoc album vel praecise illud album esset primum contrarium's nigro, quod est inconveniens; tunc enim essent tot contrarietates primae quot individua.70

Praeterea quinto: Unius actionis sensus est obiectum unum secundum aliquam unitatem realem sed non numeralem, ergo est aliqua alia unitas realis.77 Probatio maioris:78 quia potentia cognoscens obiectum sic, inquantum videlicet hac unitate unum, cognoscit ipsum inquantum distinctum79 a quolibet quod non est unum illa unitate, sed sensus non cognoscit obiectum, inquantum est distinctum a quolibet, quod non est unum illa unitate numerali,80 quia nullus sensus distinguit hunc radium solis differre numeraliter ab alio radio, cum tamen sint diversi propter motum solis; sede1 circumscribantur omnia sensibilia communia, puta diversitas loci vel situs, et si ponerentur duo quanta simul esse82 per potentiam divinam, quae etiam essent omnino similia et aequalia in albedine,83 visus non distingueret ibi esse duo alba. Si tamen cognosceret alterum eorum, inquantum est unum unitate numerali, cognosceret ipsum inquantum est84 unum distinctum unitate numerali. Posset etiam iuxta hoc argui de primo obiecto sensus, quod est unum in se aliqua unitate reali saltem85 de obiecto unius actus sentiendi, quia sicut obiectum huius potentiae inquantum obiectum praecedit intellec-

^{70.} quia ed. V 71. ita quod licet similitudo habeat pro fundamento rem de genere Qualitatis, tamen ed. V

^{72.} proximum add. ed. V
73. et ed. V
74. ...extremum/ realis (ut est extremum) ed. V
75. huic add. ed. V

^{76.} contraria, ergo etc. add. ed. V 77. quam unitas numeralis add. ed. V

^{78.} minoris ed. V

^{79.} Sequentia partim sunt transposita, partim in nota marginali in MS Troyes 718. 80. quod patet add. ed. V

^{81.} si ed. V

^{82.} omnino ed. V

^{83.} et quantitate add. ed. V

^{84. ...} numerali/ distinctum numeraliter a quolibet alio ed. V

^{85. ...} sentiendi om. ed. V

tum, ita etiam secundum unitatem suam realem praecedit omnem actum intellectus.86

Praeterea sexto: Quia si omnis unitas realis est numeralis, ergo omnis diversitas realis est numeralis; consequens falsum: quia omnis diversitas numeralis inquantum numeralis est aequalis, et ita omnia essent aeque distincta, et tunc non plus posset87 intellectus abstrahere a Sorte et Platone aliquid commune quam a Sorte et linea, et esset quodlibet universale purum figmentum intellectus.88 Prima consequentia probatur dupliciter: Primo, quia unum et multa, idem et diversum, sunt opposita ex 10° Metaphysicae capitulo 5°; quotiens autem dicitur unum oppositorum, totiens dicitur et reliquum, ex 1º Topicorum; ergo cuilibet unitati correspondebit sua propria diversitas. Probatur secundo: quia cuiuslibet diversitatis utrumque extremum est in se unum, et eo modo, quo est unum in se, videtur esse diversum a reliquo extremo, ita quod unitas extremi unius videtur⁸⁰ esse per se ratio diversitatis alterius extremi.

Consirmatur etiam aliter: quia si tantum est in hac re unitas realis numeralis, quaecumque unitasoo est in re, illa est ex se una numero; ergo istud et illud secundum omnem entitatem in eis sunt primo diversa, quia91 in nullo uno92 aliquo modo convenientia.

Confirmatur etiam per hoc, quod diversitas numeralis est hoc singulare non esse illud singulare, supposita tamen entitate utriusque extremi; sed

talis unitas est necessario alterius extremi.

Praeterea:03 Nullo existente intellectu ignis generaret04 ignem et corrumperet aquam, et aliqua unitas esset realis generantis ad generatum se-cundum formam, propter quam esset generatio univoca: intellectus vero⁹⁵ considerans non facit generationem esse univocam.

Praeterea:90 Avicenna 5° Metaphysicae dicit, quod equinitas est tantum

equinitas, et quod nec est de se una nec plures nec universalis nec particu-

Praeterea:97 Impossibile est idem omnino a parte rei realiter differre ab aliquo et realiter convenire cum eodem; sed Sortes realiter differt a Platone et realiter convenit cum eodem; ergo etc."

PHILOTHEUS BOEHNER, O.F.M.

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^{86.} ed. V l.c. n. 15, add. 13 lineas.

^{87.} non.../ sequitur quod non pluspotest ed. V 88. om. ed. V

^{89.} videtur ed. V 90. entitas ed. V

^{91.} et ed. V

^{92.} om. ed. V 93. septimo add. ed. V

^{94.} causaret ed. V 95. vero ed. V

^{96.} cf. l.c. n. 7; p. 48.

^{97.} Non invenimus istum textum ad litteram, sed ad sensum in Quaestiones subtilissimae super libros Metaphysicorum l. 7, q. 13, n. 1; ed. V, t. 7, p. 403.

Franciscana Notes

HOLY NAME OF JESUS DEVOTION SPREAD BY COINAGE

The current coin for many centuries constituted a very popular means of spreading devotion to the Most Holy Name of Jesus. While we oftentimes read of the great preachers who encouraged and spread devotion to the Most Holy Name, in particular, St. Bernard, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Bernardine of Siena very notably, and St. John Capistran, seldom do we hear of that very efficacious preacher which reached the rich and the poor,

the religious and the irreligious alike, the current coin.

Pursuant to an ordinance of Saint Louis IX, King of France, the following legend on August 15, 1266 was placed around the rim of the "Gros Tournois": Benedictum sit nomen Domini Dei Nostri Jesus Christi. The coin was of billon, a base metal alloy of silver and copper valued at four pennies, or twenty-eight cents American money. This legend of the Most Holy Name later appeared on French coins time and again while outside of France it became very popular. The English Kings Edward III and Henry V and VI placed it on their coinage, and the coins of Savoy, of several states of Northern Italy, of Switzerland, Naples and of many other civil and ecclesiastical realms both prior to the Reformation and after it employed a legend laudatory of the Holy Name on their coinage. The Tertiary King Louis IX of France initiated this custom and thereby surely exerted a powerful influence on the propagation of the devotion. (Cf. William Allan, The Christian Teaching on Coin Mottoes (London, 1911), pp. 24, 107-108; Ad. Dieudonné, Manuel de Numismatique Française II (Paris, 1916), 228). The monogram of the Most Holy Name of Jesus (IHS) was placed on Byzantine coins from 690 to 1071 and on Venetian coins at a very early date.

FRAS GIULIO DA BRESCIA AND ANTONIO DA BRESCIA, FRANCISCAN MEDALLISTS

Fra Giulio da Brescia, an Italian medallist and Friar Minor, deserves historical significance from the realistic trend of his art. A medal and a wax-model, both representing Matteo Avogadro, were made by him in 1534 as is attested by the inscription Frater Julius Brix. Minorit. me f(ecit) MDXXXIIII. This friar followed the style of the elder Friar Minor Antonio da Brescia. Although we are not expressly told that Antonio was a Friar Minor we may reasonably conclude from the close resemblance of styles to their being passed down in the Order. Fra Giulio shows the same excellence and the same defects in his work as Fra Antonio. George Hill writes about his work as a medallist: "It is a point worth mentioning that a later medallist of Brescia, evidently by his style a follower of Fra An-

tonio da Brescia, was also a Friar and signs himself beyond all possibility of error Frater Julius Brixiensis Minorita... The works of the two friars are both in their way very remarkable by a certain form of realism the analogue of which in painting we find in the portraits by Giambattista Moroni of Bergamo" (Medals of the Renaissance (Oxford, 1920), p. 61). The medal and the model of Friar Giulio are preserved in the museum of the city of Brescia (P. Rizzini, Illustrazioni del Civico Museo di Brescia, II (1892), 28). Fra Giulio worked in Venice. It is, perhaps, worth mentioning that the two friars and the canon of Prato, Andrea Guazzalotti, are the only ecclesiastics among the large number of Italian medallists of the Renaissance.

Fra Antonio da Brescia, O.Min. is known only from his works. He signs his medals A, or F.A.B. or in the fullest form Fra. An. Brix. That he belonged to the Order can be concluded from the style of his works which was copied by another medallist in 1534 who entitles himself a Friar Minor. On one of his finest medals he signs himself simply A, which is conclusive enough in indicating that his name was Antonio. "But," says George Francis Hill, "the man's name is less important than his work. Now there are portraits of half a dozen people, some of them signed by our artist, others undoubtedly by the same hand as the signed ones. One of these represents a man who died in 1487, another commemorates an historic event of 1513. We may, therefore, date the activity of this artist from shortly before 1487 to shortly after 1513. Friar Antonio is a most pleasing artist of the Venetian school of medallists. In a medal made by the friar about 1500 representing on the obverse the portrait of Nicolo Michiel and his wife Dea Contarini we reach the high water mark of a certain form of realism. Unflinching fidelity, not without dignity, but inspired by no high intellectual ideal: this is the characteristic of the good friar's work. The transparent honesty of the artist never fails to reconcile us to the lack of imagination which he shows in his composition." (Medals of the Renaissance (Oxford, 1920), pp. 60-61). Another connoisseur, Cornelius von Fabriczy, characterizes the medals of Friar Antonio thus: "Our first impression on looking at his medals is: precisely so must the nobles, procurators and canons here depicted have looked during life. So convincingly does the absolute photographic fidelity of the portraits force itself on the beholder. The master, it is true, was obliged to pay a heavy penalty for his keen grasp of the actual in the scenes on his reverses (the backsurface of the medals), so awkwardly composed, so hard, occasionally so ill-modelled, are his allegorical figures" engraved there (Italian Medals, translated by Mrs. Gustavus W. Hamilton from the German, (London, 1904, p. 78). One unsigned medal attributed to Fra Antonio depicts a winged dragon holding a balance in its jaw, on its reverse. The meaning of this as of many of the reverses is obscure. From the portraits on the obverse it is evident that Friar Antonio worked successively at Padua. Treviso, Verona, and Venice (George Hill, The Gustave Dreyfus Collection of Renaissance Medals, (Oxford, 1931), p. 82, n. 157). In conclusion we mention that Fra Antonio is credited with the production of six or more signed plaquettes representing mythological scenes.

Franciscana Items

TWENTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE FRANCISCAN EDUCATIONAL CONFERENCE

On June 17, 18, and 19 past the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the Franciscan Educational Conference was held at Our Lady of Carey Seminary, Carey, Ohio. The meeting which was well attended by the delegates from the different provinces, commissariats and custodies constitutive of the Conference representative of the various families of the Franciscan Order in North America, was held under the chairmanship of Father Basil Heiser, O.F.M. Conv. in the absence of Father Thomas

Plassmann, O.F.M.

Franciscans and the Missions, the topic chosen for the year, constituted a subject provocative of papers most informative and interesting in their survey of the mission field. As might be expected in papers contributed largely by men specialized by seasoned experience in the heart of the home and foreign mission territories as also by those dedicated to the education of the missionary apostolate, an intimate and very real discussion of the spiritual, sociological, psychological and methodological problems encountered in mission work always evidenced itself. This may further be gleaned from the wide variety of missions discussed, viz. those of Latin-America, China, the native missions both Southern and Indian, and the topics directly bearing on the mission fields, as Missiology, American Service Men and Our Missions, The Home Front, Training Our Seraphic Youth for the Missions, and Franciscan Missions in the Past, Present and Future — a Challenge. All of the papers led to enlightening and clarifying discussions among the delegates.

This, the twenty-seventh annual meeting of the Conference, was dedicated in a special way to SS. Fidelis of Sigmaringen and Joseph of Leonissa the second centenary of whose canonization is celebrated this year, as also to the pioneering missionary itinerary of John Pian di Carpine to the vast

Tartar Empire seven centuries ago.

The Franciscan Brothers of the Diocese of Brooklyn were admitted to

membership in the Conference.

The closing conference was devoted to the reports of the committees, the reading of the resolutions, the election of officers, and the discussion of possible topics for the coming year's Conference. The following officers were elected: President, Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M.; Vice-President, Basil Heiser, O.F.M. Conv.; Secretary, Sebastian Miklas, O.F.M. Cap.; Treasurer, Marion Habig, O.F.M. The topic of next year's Conference is to be chosen from the following: Libraries, or The Christian Family with its Associated Problems.

Change in the Direction of FRANCISCAN STUDIES

The Executive Board of the Conference unanimously approved in session the permanent transfer of the publication and direction of Franciscan Studies to the Franciscan Institute located at St. Bonaventure, N.Y. Franciscan Studies as a quarterly had emerged from the Old Series of "Franciscan Studies" then published at irregular intervals, and until 1945 it carried the annual Franciscan Educational Conference Report as its December number. Henceforth, the Report appears separately under the editor-

ship of the Secretary of the Conference, while *Franciscan Studies* appears under the editorship indicated on the editorial page of this number. The continued planning and the stability required by a quarterly publication necessitated this change approved unanimously. The outlined decision does not alter the content and scope of *Franciscan Studies Quarterly* which shall continue to serve advanced scholarship in the Franciscan vein.

The Franciscan Educational Conference Report of the present year appears in December under the editorship of Rev. Sebastian Miklas, O.F.M. Cap. of Washington, D.C., Secretary of the Conference. This volume in content both informative and provocative will substantially augment the available literature on American missiology.

HOUSE OF HIGHER STUDIES AND RESEARCH OPENED BY IRISH FRANCISCANS

On May 6, 1945 the Irish Province of Friars Minor opened a House of Higher Studies and Research for the collection, codification and editing of the vast number of hitherto uninaccessible manuscripts of great significance to Irish and Franciscan history and scholarship. Members of the Irish Government including the President attended the opening ceremony and the blessing of the new house of studies by the Archbishop of Dublin. The site of the studium at Killiney, Co. Dublin, dedicated to the re-creation of scholarship in the spirit of the ancient Christian learning while devoid of any historical association of its own, stands nearby the ruins of one of Eire's earliest Christian churches, and is named in honor of Our Lady, Dun Mhuire — Mhuire being the Gaelic form of the name Mary uniquely given to the Blessed Virgin.

The studium has as director Canice Mooney, O.F.M., who recently accompanied Dr. Joseph Healy to Spain on the invitation of the National University of Ireland to discover, note, examine, and report on the MSS of Irish interest in the general archives of Simancas. Among the manuscripts in the large Franciscan manuscript library at Killiney are several from the hand of Luke Wadding, Scotist and Founder of St. Isidore's at Rome, and of Michael O'Cleary, co-editor of the Annals of the Four Masters.

The body of young friars assigned to the studium have been trained for their present researches throughout Europe, and though presently due to its urgency historical studies are stressed, later studies and publications of other than historical interest are to be edited in Latin, English, French, Spanish and Gaelic.

SPAIN HONORS FATHER FRANCIS BORGIA STECK, O.F.M., Ph.D.

The Spanish Embassy has announced the election of the Rev. Dr. Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M. to the Spanish Royal Academy of History in unanimous recognition of well-known attainments in Hispanic-American historical scholarship. With the announcement of his reception of this honor comes the further announcement of his retirement from the Catholic University where he has been a member of the history department since 1933.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Mystical Body of Christ. By Rev. Friedrich Jüergensmeier, D.D. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., no publication date given. Pp. 309. \$3.00.)

Theological treatises aiming at developing more explicitly the doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ constitute a most praiseworthy contribution to Catholic scholarship at the present day. For there are undoubtedly phases of this sublime doctrine which have not yet been adequately discussed by theologians; and those who investigate these phases and present their findings in a clear and precise fashion are engaged in a most commendable task, conducive to the progress of Catholic theology, both speculative and practical. Consequently, the work of Dr. Jürgensmeier, a theological treatment of the doctrine of the Mystical Body as the basis of Christian asceticism, is calculated to arouse widespread interest among Catholic scholars.

The book is divided into two sections: first, the biblical-dogmatic presentation of the doctrine of the Mystical Body; second, the detailed treatment of this doctrine as the fundamental principle of Christian asceticism. In the first section the author begins by propounding the concept of the Mystical Body as found in the Pauline epistles and in other passages of the New Testament, particularly in Our Lord's parable of the vine and the branches (John, 15: 1-6). He then goes on to explain the dogmatic implications of this doctrine, especially the part taken by the Mystical Body in God's plan of human salvation, which involves the necessity of incorporation into Christ. Dr. Jürgensmeier emphasizes the idea that the union of Christ's humanity with the godhead is a prototype of our union with God through sanctifying grace, effected by our union with Christ: "As in Christ's case sanctifying grace was propter unionem ad Verbum Dei, so analogically, the justified believer is endowed with this grace by virtue of his inner union with Christ." (p. 77). In this connection Dr. Jürgensmeier uses some ambiguous expressions, which might be taken to imply that the sanctifying grace we receive is physically a participation of the grace of Christ: "Since Christ is the universale principium in genere habentium gratiam, his grace becomes ours, transmitted to us through our union with Him, and our souls are sanctified by the same grace which hallows his." (p. 78). In reading such expressions one must always bear in mind that ontologically the grace which adorns the justified soul is distinct from the sanctifying grace which resides in plenitude in the soul of the Word Incarnate.

The second section begins with a discussion of the general idea of Christian asceticism in its relation to the Mystical Body. Then Dr. Jürgensmeier develops from his principal theme, namely, that perfection is growth in fellowship with Christ, certain particular conclusions referring to the practice of the virtues (especially charity) and the reception of the sacraments. A Supplement presents a further development of the doctrine of the Mystical Body in relation to the devotion of the Sacred Heart and

to the veneration of the saints and of the Blessed Virgin. A very adequate Index is a useful feature of the volume.

Certain portions of Dr. Jürgensmeier's book deserve special praise, such as the treatment of the Holy Eucharist as the sacrament of life and growth in Christ (pp. 200-216) and the section on the fellowship with Christ and with one another conferred on the members of the Church by the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass (pp. 243-249). The author's exposition of the place assigned to the Mother of God in the economy of salvation, in which he states that Mary's position as the Mediatrix omnium gratiarum is a thoroughly established doctrine of theology (p. 295), is an excellent presentation of this aspect of Mariology. His study of the manifestation of "life in Christ" through the practice of prudence, humility and chastity (pp. 174-180) is inspiring, though exception could be taken to the assertion: "Fornication is a sacrilege." (p. 180).

However, it is deeply regrettable that, despite the commendable features of Dr. Jürgensmeier's book, it contains statements which would seem to be irreconcilable with the teachings of Pope Pius XII in his Encyclical

Mystici Corporis. Thus, Dr. Jürgensmeier asserts:

Neither can one say that the mystical body is limited, in an actual sense, to those who belong visibly to the Church. As Christ is "the Lamb which was slain from the beginning of the world" and our fathers before Him "drank the same spiritual drink,... Christ," His members may be called those who live in inner, vital union with Him. This body of Christ extends beyond the boundaries of the visible Church, which is universal and includes an incalculable multitude from all nations and ages and religions, "baptized and unbaptized, circumcised and uncircumcised, all those whose intentions are good and who maintain an inner communion with God and Christ." (p. 49).

In striking contrast to these views is the teaching of Pope Pius XII:

Only those are really to be included as members of the Church who have been baptized and profess the true faith and who have not unhappily withdrawn from Body-unity or for grave faults been excluded by legitimate authority... It follows that those who are divided in faith or government cannot be living in one Body such as this, and cannot be living the life of its one Divine Spirit... It is clear, We think, how grievously they err who arbitrarily picture the Church as something hidden and invisible... No, the Mystical Body of Christ is like Christ the Head and Exemplar of the Church, "who is not complete if only His visible human nature is considered, or if only His divine, invisible nature... but He is one through the union of both and one in both." (AAS, XXXV (1943), 202f, 223f; tr. America Press, pp. 12, 29).

Again, Dr. Jürgensmeier asserts:

The Church offers all her prayers to the Father "through Christ." Primarily, Christ is not the God Who receives the prayers of the faithful, but the man Who, being simultaneously God, is appointed

and qualified to be the "permanent" mediator through Whom we pray to the Father... St. Paul usually prays to the Father "through Christ" and "in Christ"... He only prays twice to Jesus, while his prayer to God through or in Christ takes place forty-five times... This form of prayer, not as a rule to Christ, but through and in Him, is a reflection of the fundamental principle from which all prayer proceeded. (pp. 182, 186).

In discussing this point, Pope Pius XII says:

Some would have it that our prayers should not be directed to the person of Jesus Christ, but rather to God, or to the Eternal Father through Christ... But that, too, not only is opposed to the mind of the Church and to Christian usage but is false... Though it is true, especially in the Eucharistic Sacrifice — in which Christ, at once priest and victim, exercises in an extraordinary way the office of conciliator — that prayers are very often directed to the Eternal Father through the only-begotten Son; nevertheless it occurs not seldom even in this sacrifice that prayers to the Divine Redeemer also are used. (AAS, loc. cit., 236f; tr. America Press, p. 39).

Dr. Jürgensmeier does not say that prayer directly addressed to Christ is wrong or ineffective. On the contrary He states that prayer to God through Christ "nowise depreciates the value of the prayer to Jesus." (p. 187). However, in referring to prayer to Jesus he seems to be speaking of Our Lord only in His divine nature; whereas the Pope asserts in this connection: "Christ is Head of the universal Church as He exists at once in both His natures" (loc. cit.). In any event, one can say that the doctrine of prayer as explained by Dr. Jürgensmeier is not fully in accord with the doctrine expounded in Mystici Corporis.

In defence of these divergencies between Dr. Jürgensmeier's book and the papal pronouncements, it might be urged that the only date given in the book relevant to publication is 1939, the date of the *imprimatur* and the copyright (in Germany), and that the Encyclical Mystici Corporis was issued in 1943. But it is hard to see how the fact that the writing and the ecclesiastical approval of a book antedate an official statement of the Sovereign Pontiff justifies the continued printing or sale of such a book if it contains views opposed to the statement in question. In such an event Catholic publishers and booksellers should discontinue the distribution of the book, at least until a suitable correction has been made in the text or in the appended notes.

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The Incarnation of the Word of God, Being the Treatise of St. Athanasius, De Incarnatione Verbi Dei. Newly translated into English by a Religious of C.S.M.V. S.Th. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1946. Pp. 57. \$1.50.)

Any work that tries to make the great classics of the Fathers of the Church more readable is welcome. The work under review is a translation

of a masterpiece of ancient Christian literature which has stood the test of time.

The translation was made by a woman religious of the Anglican Church. She wanted to bring this classic within the reach of ordinary Christians of the present day. She has broken down long Greek sentences and simplified them in many cases; occasionally she tries to bring out the meaning better by paraphrase rather than by direct translation; at times when the Greek is rather wordy, she has condensed it slightly. These three principles seem to have been applied too generously in places. We do not agree in using the first principle as a razor to cut out connectives and destroy all vestige of the original sequence of thought; for instance, a relation of finality, as is the case at times. In paragraph 20, skipping the word autum made the translation easier, but we thereby miss a very fine contrast. Some readers will miss captions and short analyses of the paragraphs, which are always very helpful if well done.

The translator has prefaced her work with a short life of Athanasius and an appreciation of him. C. S. Lewis wrote the Introduction in which he has some well-chosen remarks about the value of reading the ancient Christian writers. However, he leaves the reader under the impression that the true Christianity is a combination of all that is good in the various branches of Christianity.

This translation should help to make the great, though short, classic of St. Athanasius' youthful days appreciated more in our day.

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- St. Dominic and His Work. By Pierre Mandonnet, O.P. Translated by Sister M. Benedicta Larkin, O.P. (St. Louis: Herder, 1945. Pp. xviii+487. \$5.00.)
- St. Dominic and His Work is a translation of Saint Dominique, l'idée, l'homme et l'œuvre, a posthumous work of Pierre Mandonnet, O.P., a master historian. It was compiled by M. H. Vicaire, O.P., who had worked with P. Mandonnet some years before the latter's death. He added some sections of his own and completed others from the notes of P. Mandonnet. Reginald Ladner, O.P. contributed the study on the plight of preaching in the twelfth century, chapter 16. On p. xi we are told that at the beginning of each new study the name of the author is given. I fail to see that verified in the book. The work is substantially that of P. Mandonnet.
- P. Mandonnet gives not only a mine of information on the conditions of clerical and religious life in the Middle Ages, and also on the original Rule of St. Augustine; but he shows himself a keen philosopher of history, always seeking the causes of movements in their historical background; an honest historian, giving due credit to the findings and solutions of other historians.

The book is divided into two main parts, with some appendices at the end. The first part is entitled: "St. Dominic and the Order of Preachers." In the first four chapters he treats in order the conditions in the Church in the thirteenth century, the coming of St. Dominic, with Bishop Diego de Acebes, to Rome and his formation of the Order of Preachers until 1204; the years of experimental activity from 1215 till 1219; the constitutional organization from 1220 till 1221. In the fifth chapter he gives a summary of the character of Dominic, saint, scholar, legislator, organizer, preacher.

Chapters six till fifteen form a unit; namely, the nature and work of the Preachers, in which are discussed their essential character as a clerical order of educated preachers, their academic activity, their doctrinal life and the Thomistic school; their literary productivity, their apostolic work, their influence on ecclesiastical and civil society, their foreign missions,

their sanctity and mystical life, their liturgy and art.

Chapters sixteen till nineteen form another unit, in which is given the historic setting and origin of the Friars Preachers; namely, the lack of an educated clergy for preaching and the unsuccessful attempts of the Popes to get the secular clergy interested in educating priests for preaching. The times were ripe for an order of preachers. St. Dominic was the man to call it into being. This entire section of some seventy pages is scholarly and scientific.

The matter of the second part of the book is coherent in itself, treating the question of the original Rule of St. Augustine and the relation of St. Dominic's Rule to it. This part is done well. The author proves rather conclusively that the Rule of St. Augustine is not the letter which he wrote to a monastery of women. This was merely the second rule transcribed for the women. And the second rule proper, better called a commentary on the most ancient rule, was the Rule of St. Augustine. See the author's summary of his view on pp. 195-197. The Dominican Rule is the Commentary of St. Augustine plus the constitutions of St. Dominic. This part of the book is valuable for the study of all the Rules that depend on St. Augustine's or on St. Dominic's. It was not meant for the ordinary reader, but for the scientific historian.

At the end of the book there are six rather lengthy appendices of special topics concerning St. Dominic and the Dominican Order. The translator tells us that she omitted five other special studies which are still more erudite and technical, and that the studies given are treated in a comprehensive manner, since, she says, the historical specialists can consult the original. The entire book was never meant for anyone but the specialists: hence all the studies should have been translated, or none at all.

St. Dominic and His Work is a scholarly work written by a scholar for scholars. It is not a continuous biography of St. Dominic. His life before his journey to Rome is not treated at all. The book is properly a group of select historical essays dealing with St. Dominic and his Order. I think it would have been fair to the ordinary reader to indicate this in the title. I am inclined to think that many non-specialists will buy the book with the hope of getting a popular life of St. Dominic, but will be dismayed by the array of scientific information and argumentation.

Sister M. Benedicta Larkin is to be congratulated on her very readable translation. Both she and the publisher deserve a special vote of thanks

for not having spoiled this scientific work by the too frequent phobia of

American publishers against footnotes.

To divide the chapters into smaller sections with frequent titles is very helpful to the reader; however, in some places there are too many titles, without any indication in the print as to whether these are coordinate or subordinate divisions.

On page 340 the translator has an anachronism based on a faulty translation of the original. She writes: "In 1239, after the serious difficulties in the government of Brother Elias, Aymon of Faversham borrowed a major part of the text of the Preachers for the writing of the first constitutional rule of the Friars Minor, based on the Narbonne Constitutions." Now the Narbonne Constitutions of the Minors were drawn up in 1260. What the original has is that the work of Aymon of Faversham, who drew heavily from the Preachers, was the basis for the Narbonne Constitutions.

And incidentally, as much as I appreciate the eminent position of St. Thomas in philosophy and theology, it is hardly historically accurate to call him the "creator" of Christian philosophy and theology (p. 1).

P. Mandonnet forcefully inculcates time and again that St. Dominic desired an order which would train educated preachers. His friars were to be not merely educated, nor merely preachers; they were to be educated preachers; their study must flower into the fruit of preaching. Even the doctors of the universities must be preachers. It goes without saying, that their lives should be modelled on Christ's. This ideal of the Preachers of St. Dominic might well be the ideal of all the clergy, diocesan and religious. It is the ideal which the Church has always wanted for her priests. It is the ideal of the Eternal High Priest who was Wisdom Incarnate. If the Order of Preachers had never done anything else but present this ideal to priests, it would deserve immortality. And an Order which has retained this ideal, we can but congratulate: Crescat floreatque!

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Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy. By Harold Cherniss. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. Vol. I. Pp. xxvi+610. \$5.00)

There are several points we must never forget when dealing with the relationship between Aristotle and scholastic philosophy. First of all, Aristotle was never really "baptized," nor has his teaching ever been "canonized" by the Church. Aristotle was and forever will be a pagan. Yet Aristotle has his rightful place in the history of Christian philosophy — in so far as he exerted a tremendous influence (not always for the best) on the formation of scholastic philosophy. This influence was most manifest in the thirteenth century. But Aristotle was known to the thirteenth-century scholastics in a manner which precluded a genetic study (on sound historical principles) of the real Aristotle and his intellectual development. Consequently, Aristotle was never systematically assimilated by the early scholastics who valiantly tried to cope with the intellectual revolution which the sudden propagation of his writings precipitated. We cannot blame the scholastics of the thirteenth century too much for their failure in this re-

gard. In the first place, the task of assimilation was, by force of circumstances, a hurried affair. In the second place, Aristotle's philosophy itself was not systematic enough. Though Aristotle had outlined the principles of such a systematization (in the Posterior Analytics), he had never applied these principles to his own work as a whole. Finally, and most important of all, the scholastics failed to apply to its originator one of the most important conceptions in the history of philosophy, namely, the idea of genetic development in the different stages of a philosopher's thought. The scholastics are not alone in this. In fact, this method of studying Aristotle was not applied until the beginning of this twentieth century when Werner Jaeger began to publish the results of investigations concerning Aristotle's intellectual development and showed that what had hitherto been considered "a static system of conceptions" was really the result of an organic development during periods when Aristotle was a devoted pupil of Plato, then an independent Platonist among Platonists, and finally a leader of his own school. This was conceived, not as a rectifier of fundamental Platonic errors but as the logical continuator and refinery of the best in the Academy (cf. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development. Transl. by Richard Robinson, Oxford, 1932). Hence many of the dicta of Aristotle are now seen not so much as difficulties which must be reconciled in order to preserve the illusional notion of static coherence, but as evidences of a change of mind, of a dynamic development. Consequently, many of the Aristotelian "axioms" which suddenly found themselves firmly entrenched in thirteenth-century scholasticism and subjected to conflicting interpretations which did credit neither to the original Aristotelian meaning nor to the Christian tradition, have now to be re-examined in the light of Professor Jaeger's discoveries. The concept of nous and of the intellectus agens is a case in point. The point of these fragmentary remarks is to remind neo-scholastics that their thirteenth-century counterparts cannot be considered as Aristotelian commentators par excellence, and a just appreciation of the real Aristotle is necessary for the sake of scholasticism itself.

In the two volumes which will constitute Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy when completed, Professor Cherniss proposes to give "a complete account and analysis of all that Aristotle says about Plato and Plato's pupils and associates in the Academy" (p. ix). Much has been written on this subject, but no substantial agreement has been reached by ancient or modern scholars. Alexander of Aphrodisias, for example, accepted Aristotle's criticism of the Academy at its face value. Neoplatonists either rejected it as biassed and unhistorical, or chose to believe that it was not a criticism of Plato at all. Some modern historians have claimed that Aristotle completely misunderstood Plato (e.g., Natorp, Ast, Teichmüller, Ritter, Kluge). Others have maintained that, even if Aristotle's interpretations of Plato are false, at least his reports of what Plato said are reliable (e.g., Burnet, Taylor). Particularly significant in this regard is the fact that "Aristotle ascribes to Plato a form of the theory of Ideas which does not appear in Plato's Dialogues" (p. xii). Did Plato really teach the theory of "idea-numbers" which Aristotle ascribes to him? Teichmüller and Shorey say no; but in general scholars have accepted Aristotle's testimony on this point and consequently are faced with the problem of reconciling this (Aristotelian) version of the theory of Ideas with the teaching of the Dialogues themselves. Dr. Cherniss reviews the many theories which have been proposed as solutions of this problem (pp. xii-xx) and concludes that the confusion they have engendered stems chiefly from the fact that none of them took all the evidence into consideration (p. xxi). He therefore proposes to "outline and analyse all of Aristotle's testimony and criticism bearing upon Plato and the pupils and associates of Plato... to compare wherever possible his testimony and interpretation with relevant passages in Plato's writings, with the fragments which remain from the writings of Plato's pupils and with the other ancient evidence concerning their doctrines, to estimate the validity of his (Aristotle's) criticism" (p. xxii).

This prodigious undertaking will round out the project which Dr. Cherniss began in his Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935). The two volumes of Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy will be complimentary to this earlier work, and the whole series, when completed, should be the most extensive and critical survey of the historical value of the so-called "first historian of philosophy," for the second volume of the present book will bring to a close Dr. Cherniss' complete analysis of all the "historical" references in

Aristotle — and that in their widest philosophical significance.

The second volume of *Plato and the Academy* will contain the indices, a resolution of the "number-theories" of the Ideas, and an integration of the results of the specific investigations carried on throughout the first and second volumes of this book. A complete evaluation of it is therefore impossible before the publication of the second volume. However, some indication of the conclusions we can expect to find in Vol. II can be de-

rived from the study of Vol. I.

There seems to be no doubt that Aristotle's reliability as a historian will be disproved finally and convincingly -- on the basis of all the evidence. Dr. Cherniss is painstaking in research and an acute analyst of the facts which he digs up. He finds that Aristotle's criticism of the logic and method of the Academy is similar to his criticism of the Pre-Socratics that Aristotle was capable of setting down something other than the objective truth when he had occasion to write about his predecessors, and that he was inspired to do so because of his "belief that all previous theories were stammering attempts to express his own" (Presocratics, p. xii). Thus Aristotle's treatment of diaeresis presupposes his own theory of the relation of genus to differentia as that of matter to form (p. 41). His position depends ultimately on whether or not the universal can have substantial existence; for the Platonists, according to his account, treat the universal as a genus. These factors constitute the basis of his attack on Platonic Ideas (p. 43) — an attack which concludes with a denial of the Ideas, because of the incompatibility of substantial ideas and Aristotle's logical analysis of the concept into genus and differentia - an incompatibility which is apparent only because the results of diacresis have come to be regarded as not merely analytical but identical with existential relations. In other words, Aristotle remolded diaercsis to bring it into conformity with his own theory of matter and form. He also remolded the method of logical dichotomy in order to account for the unity of essence and definition, but

in so doing became involved in an ineradicable inconsistency (see p. 52-3). Furthermore, Aristotle tries to reduce the Platonic theory of reminiscence to his own doctrine of the recognition of the universal in the particular (p. 71), but this "substitution of abstracted universals for the ideas" is not such a radical break with Platonism as some Aristotelians like to believe.

An analysis of Aristotle's concepts of material substrate and form and its relation to matter fill the body of this book, and Cherniss' comments on the origin and development of these fundamental Aristotelian ideas are always enlightening. It is impossible to do justice to his commentary in a report like this. One can only repeat emphatically that a new Aristotle emerges from the pages of this book — an Aristotle who, if properly understood, will serve as a healthy purge of some of the ills of neo-scholasticism. But Cherniss must be read and studied seriously and sympathetically if this medicine is to take effect. He is not a rhetorician; he has not given us a popular exposition. As far as can be seen, he has no axe to grind. He has simply given us, in a work of solid scholarship, a new picture of the real Aristotle. We may say in conclusion that his books, then, should be on the desk of every Neo-Scholastic.

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The Dream of Descartes. By Jacques Maritain. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944. Pp. 220. \$3.00.)

It is hardly possible for the present reviewer to add anything to the general volume of praise which greeted the publication of this book. Its obvious virtues have been extolled enthusiastically, and often with more zeal than sober judgment. But the interests of truth are usually better served if criticism be allowed to temper enthusiasm. This review will therefore limit itself to a few observations which may serve as a guide for a more

discriminating appraisal of M. Maritain's contribution.

The first problem which confronts the reader of *The Dream of Descartes* is the work's significance and direction. Is it a contribution to the history of philosophy? to systematic philosophy? to theology? to some ill-defined conglomeration of all three? or to what? M. Maritain tells us in the Preface that he has attempted "to try to determine the value and significance of the Cartesian reform with regard to *metaphysical* and *theological* wisdom." But despite many poetic praises of metaphysics, we are left in the dark regarding the nature of the discipline that Descartes is supposed to have "degraded" and which M. Maritain defends so rhetorically. As regards theology, M. Maritain does not make use of the theological sources, but confines himself to the opinions of certain theologians. So despite what he has attempted to do, his contribution is likely to be judged as a contribution to the history of philosophy and his observations about systematic philosophy and theology are likely to be regarded as clouding the issue.

But The Dream of Descartes can hardly claim to be pure "history of philosophy." In the first place, M. Maritain does not simply expound

Descartes' teaching; he interprets it — and always in the light of M. Maritain's own convictions. On the basis of this interpretation, Descartes is then fitted into a preconceived scheme of the history of philosophy in general. In a recent issue of Franciscan Studies (Sept., 1945, pp. 301-308) Professor Ernest A. Moody did students of philosophy and of the history of philosophy a great service in his acute analysis of "a highly rhetorical discourse on the philosophical meaning of the history of philosophy." He drew attention to a curious method of writing the history of philosophy as exemplified in Professor Pegis' introduction to The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas — a method which he characterized as a "game of diagnosing the history of philosophy in terms of 'isms' and errors' (loc. cit., p. 306). This "philosophical" treatment of the history of philosophy is further characterized by Prof. Moody as "Hegel's procedure of reconstructing intellectual history in such a manner as to illustrate (one's) own philosophy" (ibid.). This characterization fits M. Maritain's treatment of Descartes perfectly. For example, Descartes' system is variously diagnosed as rationalism (p. 26), dogmatism and scepticism (ibid.), idealism, intuitionism, Angelism (pp. 26, 28, 169), mechanism, intellectualist nominalism, ontologism (p. 55), naturalism (p. 98), dualism (p. 169), anthropomorphic in theodicy (p. 151), anti-theological fideism (p. 79, 175), etc. As regards the scheme of philosophy into which Descartes is fitted, M. Maritain seems anxious to link up even eminent scholastics with the Descartes he thinks he has discredited by these uncomplimentary "tags". Scotus is made out to be a precursor of Leibnitz, and St. Bonaventure and Scotus are designated as the source of the Cartesian notion of ideas (notes 141 and 196). The ironical part about this attribution is that no text of Scotus himself is quoted, but only Cajetan's report of what Scotus said! Are the texts of Scotus so inaccessible that an historian must rely on what a confessed adversary has to say about him? Suarez, Vasquez, and of course St. Anselm, are likewise linked up with Descartes — on the basis of similar unhistorical speculation. The whole of Chapter Four, indeed, is a pitiful misunderstanding of the ratio anselmi (which M. Maritain prejudicially persists in referring to as the "Ontological argument") and the scholastic (and Aristotelian) ideal of strict demonstration.

In looking for an explanation of M. Maritain's opposition to Descartes, several of the footnotes seem to provide the best answers. Notes 33 and 108 show that M. Maritain, while decrying Descartes' conception of Physics, is intent on preserving the notions developed in the Physics of Aristotle. Could it be because the Physics of Aristotle are so fundamental to the Metaphysics which Maritain is so anxious to preserve? If so, he might well give more sympathetic consideration to the following passage from Descartes (which is quoted in note 108):

It seems to me we must be careful to distinguish the opinions decided upon by the Church from those commonly accepted by Doctors and which are founded upon an uncertain Physics.

In general, lack of sympathy for the intellectual efforts of all but one man is the outstanding weakness of this book; or perhaps we should rather say "two men," since Maritain confesses that he is a "simple and ingenuous

follower of Cajetan and of John of St. Thomas" — a very illuminating confession and an important point for the student of Maritain to bear in mind. This lack of sympathy leads him to blandly identify scholasticism with one school and to be content to accept unjustifiable criticisms of other schools on the basis of unreliable secondary sources only. This prejudice has its amusing side. Maritain dismisses Descartes because, he says, he claims the impossible for his system, namely, that it knows all the answers. But when M. Maritain points out that Descartes cannot know all the answers because Descartes' solutions do not conform with Maritain's own, does not this criticism contain, by implication, a condemnation of the system which Maritain uses as a touchstone of Descartes' system?

By far the most unfortunate feature of the whole book is the fact that M. Maritain seems intent to discredit Descartes rather than argue his case dispassionately. For instance, he makes much of the speculation that Descartes might have been influenced by Rosicrucianism, on the basis of the simple fact that Descartes was in close scientific relationship with a mathematician, Faulhaber, who was a Rosicrucian. After two pages of speculation on this point M. Maritain admits, of course, that "all this is pure conjecture," but the damage is done - suspicion has been aroused and Descartes is discredited. In the same way, the "higher criticism" which Knox satirized so brilliantly in Essays in Satire is applied to the incident of the Dream in such a way that Descartes' whole scientific endeavor is made to appear as the outcome of a "cerebral episode" or a fit of "mental depression." This spirit of disparagement, as we have pointed out, also manifests itself in Maritain's treatment of St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Ockham, Vasquez, Suarez, St. Anselm, and others. It merely embarrasses the reader and certainly does not forward the cause of which M. Maritain is so ardent a champion. The general impression that a reading of The Dream of Descartes leaves is this: what a pity that such an extensive knowledge of the Cartesian sources is not put to better purpose. This might have been a great book.

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John Henry Newman. By Charles Frederick Harrold. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1945. Pp. xi+472. \$3.50.)

John Henry Newman. By John Moody. (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1945. ix+353. \$3.75.)

"Persons influence us, voices melt us, looks subdue us, deeds inflame us." So wrote John Henry Newman more than a hundred years ago. Saintly and learned as he was, "a gentleman and a scholar," he would never know nor even imagine his influence on the literary and religious world of his day — and all succeeding ages. Loved and appreciated alike by those who share his religious convictions as well as those who disagree with them, he may be likened in many ways to the "Little Poor Man of Assisi" — The impact of Francis' personality on the world of his day and succeeding ages, is tremendous. The greatness of Francis' human stature attracted many to him — his love for the birds, "Brother Wolf" and all created things — and the heroic heights of his saintliness impelled many to follow in his path.

Yet there were always those who followed him in his love for nature yet left him in his love for God. This parallelism is clear, I think. There were and are many who admire Newman as an artist and a litterateur — his terse, clear, vigorous and colorful language; his precise logic; the orderly and reasonable nature of his ideas flow as smoothly as a bird in flight — and as direct! But these same people leave him when he bids good-bye to his beloved St. Mary's and embraces Catholicism. For his embracing Catholicism in 1845 was, they say, the result of an emotional crisis more than intellectual conviction.

Newman's Apologia pro Vita Sua which appeared in 1864, is not only an answer to Charles Kingsley's article which appeared in Macmillan's Magazine stating that Newman did not consider truth a necessary virtue—but an exposition, written with the utmost simplicity and sincerity and in a style of limpid clearness, of his spiritual history, — and has obtained recognition at a literary masterpiece.

Professor Harrold of Ohio State University has joined the list of scholars in presenting Newman to the world. It is both academic and scientific and yet it is by no means a formidable tome. It is presented in an objective manner "with an eye single to the truth" in all things.

John Moody, a man of the world, has joined the great numbers of writers who popularize Newman — to make him better known and more

sincerely appreciated.

Professor Harrold's work is undoubtedly the most authoritative and comprehensive study of Newman yet to appear since Ward's two-volume study published over thirty years ago. It is the result (and the Professor need not tell us that he spent thirteen years collecting his data!) of years of profound, sympathetic and impartial study. There is evidence of the mature scholar and of the specialist of the Victorian era in English Literature. As Dr. Harrold says in his Preface:

That Newman's theory of doctrinal development and his account of religious assent have been attacked on very strong grounds I am perfectly aware. But as a non-Catholic — I am, to use a word Newman very much disliked, an Episcopalian — seeking to understand him as a man and as a writer and religious thinker. I have tried to observe an intelligent neutrality on controversial issues, and have played the critic only where I thought I knew whereof I spoke — in dealing with his literary method, with his achievement as a poet, novelist, critic, rhetorician. Hence the greater part of the book is expository and historical rather than critical.

Dr. Harrold's book is divided into five sections following a logical as well as chronological pattern. He traces briefly the salient points in his career — his entrance at Oxford, the Oxford Movement, the Crisis and his embracing the Roman Catholic Church, and finally from Anglican Minister to Roman Cardinal.

Mr. Moody, on the contrary, is more concerned with Newman as a man. As he says in his foreword:

...American Catholics hold Cardinal Newman in high esteem, loving his meditations and prayers and frequently quoting from his writings;

but all too few are familiar with his background and life-story. Still fewer have a clear understanding of the famous Oxford Movement in the Anglican Church of a century ago, through which Newman, after a tragic struggle, reached the Catholic Church of the Ages.

Mr. Moody feels that there is a dire need of a clear understanding of Newman:

...No Anglican writer has fully and accurately described the Catholic years; few Catholic writers have correctly described the Protestant or Anglican years.

The conviction is further expressed:

...In this connection I might state that for many years of my own life (before I became a Catholic) I was a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church and spent lengthhy periods in each of its important divisions, High, Low, and Broad. This should help me to write with some understanding of Newman as a Protestant and as an Anglo-Catholic — as well as of the Anglican Broad Church School. And being a Catholic for the past fifteen years, perhaps I now have some modest qualifications for writing of his Catholic career.

These qualifications, modestly stated by Mr. Moody, are substantiated by a keen appreciation of Newman — both as a man and a writer. At times one feels that this study of Newman is didactic in tone. The fault does not lie in the author's lack of interest and effort for the lengthy bibliographies indicate a thorough study of Newman and almost infinite pains in research. It seems at times that Mr. Moody almost catches and passes on to his readers the glowing fire in Newman's heart — his intense and personal love of Christ and of his fellow-man.

It is indeed a "popular" account. Its aim is praiseworthy — to draw a very human portrait of Newman; to convey an understanding of his conversion, ideas, sermons and literary efforts, to readers who might be frightened by a more philosophical work. An alive, clear exposition, enhanced by some fine passages, it should easily hold the attention of readers who know little about Newman and his times. It portrays Newman's conversion against the tapestry of the religious controversies and movements of his era — but fails to bring out that, in all probability, Newman, in any era since Luther, would, if born outside the Church, have become a convert.

Mr. Moody's book is a bold line drawing with little shading. It leaves no doubt as to Newman's greatness and uniqueness. But in contrast to Dr. Harrold's book, both viewed in retrospect, it seems to provide only

rarely any memorable insight into Newman's spirit.

Dr. Harrold possesses much of the deep spiritual insight he constantly attributes to Newman. He has written a book which whets one's interest in Newman and which is characterized by a spiritual quality as well as understanding, appreciation, sympathetic interpretation and delicacy. As Plutarch says of the young student, "The young mind is not a vessel to be filled but a torch to be enkindled."

Harrold is eloquent, convincing and at all times reverent when paraphrasing Newman and clarifying passages which, if quoted out of text, might not be clear. In the latter part of Harrold's book, covering Newman as a historian, biographer, writer and poet, he assumes the rôle of a critic. And his criticism is always constructive, his manner never condescending. Reading Harrold is an enlightening experience, giving pause for thought and stimulating reflection. It is keyed to Catholicism and Newman. Catholicism came first. No one realized that better than Newman himself.

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Consular Relations between the United States and the Papal States. Edited with an Introduction by Leo Francis Stock, Ph.D., LL.D. (Washington: American Catholic Historical Association, MCMXLV. Pp. xxxiv+467.)

In 1933 Dr. Stock published the instructions and despatches to and from the American ministers residing at Rome from 1848 to 1868. In the present volume are published the instructions and despatches sent out from the United States. Some documents could not be found but this loss does

not greatly impair the value of the complete publication.

In 1797 the United States government commissioned Giovanni Sartori, an enterprising Italian, the first of eleven American consuls serving American interest in Rome. No less than 433 instructions and despatches sent out by the government are for the first time printed here beginning with March 28, 1799 and ending September 26, 1870. Besides the Roman consulate the United States government had established consulates in Ancona from 1840 to 1860 and Ravenna in 1844, 1850 and 1852. In Ancona which belonged to the Papal States till 1870 two American consuls and one vice-consul had been appointed to whom thirty-four despatches were sent beginning April 28, 1840 and ending February 25, 1860. At Ravenna which likewise belonged to the Papal States from 1815 till 1860 three consuls were functioning each receiving one unimportant despatch.

The United States government appointed also vice consuls and consular agents for varying periods in six cities belonging to the Papal States, viz. Cività Vecchia, Ceprano, Comacchio, Fiumaccio, Ostia, and Anzio. No

documents issued to these minor officers are printed in the work.

The Popes appointed also consuls who resided in the United States. The first consul general of the Papal States residing in the United States was commissioned in 1826 with residence in Washington, D.C. Three others succeeded to the post from 1829 till 1850 residing respectively in Trenton, Philadelphia and New York. These consuls general appointed, in all, twenty-one vice-consuls for Philadelphia, New York, New Orleans, Baltimore, Charleston, Norfolk, Savannah, Boston and Cincinnati.

The papal consuls general corresponded directly with the vice-consuls and sent their official despatches to the papal authorities at Rome. These reports and papers which are to be looked for in European archives are not included. However, the matter brought to the attention of the American Secretaries of State and preserved in the National Archives in Washington was included, in all 101 documents dating from June 1, 1826

to April 3, 1877.

With the exception of Nicholas Brown, the non-Catholic American consuls in Rome were fair-minded men and the relations between the United States and the Papal States were cordial. Brown's disparaging utterances were ignored by Washington and his indiscreet actions were disowned.

The reports printed in this volume throw many a side-light on the affairs of the church and for this reason they fill a gap. Dr. Stock edited this correspondence in a masterly way. Lack of space prevented the editor from illustrating certain points with proper documentation. Owing to lack of proper financial support the publication of this work was delayed for a number of years.

The Consular Relations owing to their miscellaneous character will appeal to the general public. A copious Index renders the work more useful. All in all we can recommend the edition of Dr. Stock's Consular

Relations unreservedly.

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Franciscan Education and the Social Order in Spanish North America (1502-1821). By Pius Joseph Barth. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. Pp. xi+431.)

The author believes that the "hypothesis that Franciscan education can play a dynamic role in social planning and societal change" is "substantiated by factual evidence in the case of Spanish North America where Franciscan leaders seem to have planned institutionalized education precisely as a dynamic factor in reforming the social order" (p. iv). To prove his point he first sketches the development of studies in the Franciscan Order, and then describes the heroic work of the Franciscans in Chris-

tianizing the Indians of Spanish North America.

The most remarkable achievements of the Franciscans in grafting a Christian world view upon an ancient pagan civilization and culture, and in producing the corresponding social changes "are largely traceable to their enthusiasm for mass education as an instrument of social change" (p. 34). The Spanish Franciscans entered the educational field of the New World clothed with full authority from the Holy Father, the Minister General of their Order, and the Spanish Crown. "The Friars Minor were the first commissioned European religious and educational officers in America" (p. 36). The primary purpose of the Franciscans was the conversion of the natives to the Christian religion, the building of Spanish Christian life, the promotion of social mobility among the natives, and the provision for more abundant individual and social living (p. 43).

The two outstanding Franciscan pioneer educators in Mexico were Brother Peter of Ghent and the first bishop of Mexico, Juan de Zumárraga.

The education of girls was not neglected. This work was carried on by pious women from Spain and especially by religious, particularly the Conceptionists.

Although the formal education of the common people was the chief aim of the Franciscans, they made some attempts at advanced education also and thus enabled many natives to rise to positions of leadership

among their own.

The friars were practical in the adaptation of their curriculum in their various types of schools to the needs and capacities of their pupils, and they were most ingenious in the selection of their instructional methods. They were not only apostles and teachers, but also wrote and published

many books in Spanish and in the language of the natives.

The growth of the educational and social apostolate of the Spanish Franciscans in America during the first century and a half of its existence can be visualized from the statistics of Ozaña for Peru and New Spain as of the year 1635. At that time there were in these regions more than three million Catholic Indians and many Spaniards under the care of five thousand Franciscans working out of six hundred friaries. There were forty convents of the Poor Clares and numerous Indian and Spanish Tertiaries of St. Francis. A map facing page 294 shows the sixteen Franciscan Provinces and Custodies of Spanish North America from 1502 to 1821. Various causes are given for the several Indian revolts against the Spanish regime and the consequent destruction of the good work of the friars.

The author concludes his excellent work with these words:

Franciscan conscious planning and strategic adaptation of personnel, resources, and dynamics to the specific needs of the modern Christian social order have their inspiration in the Order's accomplishments in Spanish North America. One of its primary and traditional instruments for improving the quality of individual and social living was formal institutionalized planned education (p. 377).

This work is the fruit of much painstaking labor and patient research in the archives and libraries of the United States and Mexico. It abounds in illustrations, contains a good Bibliography, and is well indexed. While the lithoprinting is clear, such a work deserves a superior setting and binding. The modern educational and sociological technological phraseology often seems rather strained, applied as it is to facts and ideas so far removed from us in time and viewpoint.

SEBASTIAN ERBACHER, O.F.M.

St. George Monastery, Cincinnati, Obio.

Québec et l'Eglise aux Etats-Unis sous Mgr Briand et Mgr Plessis. By Laval Laurent, O.F.M. (Montreal: Librairie St. François, 1945. Pp. xxviii+258.)

This dissertation was prepared for the doctorate at the Catholic University of America and is based on documents found in the archiepiscopal archives of Quebec concerning the relations of Bishop Briand and Bishop Plessis with the Church in the United States. Although these matters have been treated, as can be seen from the references in the bibliography of the author, the dissertation presents them from the angle of the Canadian archival sources compared with many other sources, both archival and printed.

In the first part, after an explanation of Msgr. Briand's jurisdiction, his stand regarding the American Revolution is evaluated. His severity towards the Canadians espousing the cause of the American colonies is explained by his conviction that they were sinning against the oath of allegiance they owed to the British Government. To him this was a sacred matter, made all the more binding because religious liberty had been granted in Canada. Although he was strenuously opposed to Father Carroll's mission, he did not personally forbid the sacerdotal delegate to offer the Holy Sacrifice while in Canada. Next the author notes Bishop Briand's interest in the missions east of the Mississippi, particularly in the work of Fathers Meurin and Gibault in the Illinois country, of Fathers Bocquet and Potier in and around Detroit, and of others in the Michillimakinac region. Concerning Gibault, the author tries to steer a middle course between the extreme views of United States and Canadian writers.

The second part, on Bishop Plessis, opens with this ordinary's vehement opposition to the American invasion of Canada in the War of 1812, which opposition was shared by many Americans. The author then depicts the interest of the bishop in the lands bordering on his vast diocese by visits to the territory in American dioceses that could not easily be reached by the United States prelates. For this reason they exchanged the powers of vicar general with him in their dioceses. This friendly relationship becomes quite pronounced in the last chapter on the inter-episcopal correspondence. Although Bishop Plessis was careful not to interfere in the diocesan affairs of the neighboring bishops, he showed particular interest in the Kentucky Trappist affair and in the trustee struggles, and tried to be of help to the United States bishops. In the appointment of American bishops, the author claims that Bishop Plessis upheld the viewpoint that the new appointees should not be Europeans but Americans, i.e. such as had labored in the American missions, whether they were of Irish or French ancestry.

The bibliography of this book shows the pains taken by the author to explore the available sources in all American archives, besides the Canadian, in printed material and other pertinent matter. We miss the reference to Grace Lee Nute's Documents Relating to Northwest Missions, 1815-1827. An appendix cites six important documents. There is an index of proper names, and another of places. Two original maps, one for Bishop Briand and the other for Bishop Plessis, enhance the value of the work. The footnotes indicate several slight corrections that will have to be noted

by the respective writers.

It is most unfortunate that the promising young historian, Father Laval Laurent, found an untimely death by drowning on June 29, 1944, before he could completely arrange his manuscript for the printer. It was done as a labor of love by Father Leander Poirier, O.F.M. Historians will agree with the statement of J. M. Rodrigue Cardinal Villeneuve in the preface regarding the author:

Son talent m'avait frappé par l'esprit de recherche, d'analyse, d'exactitude élaborée... Le Chapitre le plus difficile à écrire,... c'est sans doute celui qui traite de la Révolution américaine... Sous la plume du jeune docteur, la théologie s'ajoute à l'histoire pour nuancer les jugements

sans torturer les faits. Le livre révèle un travailleur. Que son exemple en entraîne d'autres à sa suite.

THEODORE ROEMER, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Lawrence College, Mount Calvary, Wis.

The Social Thought of American Catholics, 1634-1829. By C. J. Nuesse. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1945. Pp. x+315. Cloth ed., Newman Bookshop, Westminster, Md, 1945. \$3.00.)

The dissertation of Dr. Nuesse aims at setting forth the ideas of Catholics in regard to their social bearing. The author admits that the Catholics of colonial times and after did not express any social thought in theory. He takes the term to denote in writing this dissertation ideas ranging over the fields of economics, politics, sociology proper, religion, education, philosophy, even the more avowedly literary and artistic disciplines (p. 2). This is indeed a very ambitious program which the author was unable to carry out within the compass of a dissertation. Of social thought expressed by art we find practically nothing in the book. Of literary trends we find very little. Of economics, philosophy and sociology we come across next to nothing. In regard to the social thought of other fields the author states that he does not aim at completeness.

The term American Catholic is taken in the narrow sense of English speaking Catholics; the French speaking people of Louisiana are completely ignored and the German speaking people in the eastern colonies are mentioned only cursorily.

Taken into account these limitations the author has worked up a large literature, all printed books (list given pp. 287-304). Numerous quotations of source-material in the text and references to other sources enable the student to check certain statements adduced in the text.

The European background of the colonists is to the author identical with the English one. An Irish, German or French background does not exist for the author or is only imperfectly known to him. Thus the trusteeism of the German Catholics of Philadelphia is traced to a wrong source. Those Germans attempted to introduce into their church a system which had been practised in their Westphalian native land for centuries and having found the approval of the Church authorities in the fatherland was considered good also in their country of adoption. As a matter of fact the new Code recognizes that system as legitimate under the title of a centenary custom.

Yet within its restricted field the work of Dr. Nuesse has great merits through its viewpoint events and movements of American Church History in the light of social thought. It is a valuable contribution to the eventual history of the social thought of American Catholics and as such it can be heartily recommended despite limitations in outline and misconceptions in the text.

JOHN M. LENHART, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Augustine's Monastery, Pittsburgh, Pa. Spiritual Doctrine of Father Lallemant, S.J. Edited by Alan McDougall. (Westminster, Md.: The Newman Book Shop, 1946. Pp. xvi+304.)

This present volume serves to perpetuate the memory of the great master of the spiritual life Father Louis Lallemant, S.J., often called the Balthazar Alvarez of France. It is a collection of maxims and instructions compiled by Pierre Champion, S.J., from manuscript notes made by Fathers Rigoleuc and Surin, the two chief disciples of Father Lallemant.

The book opens with a short, but edifying, biography of Louis Lallemant (1587-1635), who passed "for one of the most perfect Jesuits of his time" (p. 24). As a spiritual director he set the highest ideals before his disciples, and required them to rise to such ideals. To his spiritual legacy may be traced in no mean measure the specific spirituality of the French Jesuits, which the disciples who came under his teaching and formation diffused throughout the French provinces.

The spiritual doctrine of Father Louis Lallemant is reduced to seven principles: viz., the consideration of the end of man, the idea of perfection, purity of heart, docility in following the leadings of the Holy Spirit, recollection and interior life, union with God, and the order and steps of spiritual life. Of all the instructions that Father Lallemant gave on the order and degrees of spiritual life, there remain only notes on mental prayer. They treat of prayer in general, and of the three sorts of prayer in particular, namely, meditation, affective prayer, and contemplation. Two kinds of contemplation are distinguished, the ordinary and the extraordinary, both of which are infused. The ordinary contemplation "is a supernatural habit, by which God raises the powers of the soul to sublime knowledge and illuminations, lofty sentiments, and spiritual tastes" (p. 258). Extraordinary contemplation consists in raptures, ecstasies, visions, and other extraordinary phenomena. They who possess this gift commonly pray without knowing they are praying, or being aware of it (p. 258).

Father Lallemant's spiritual doctrine enuntiated in the seven principles does follow the threefold classification of the way of perfection into the purgative, illuminative, and unitive way, corresponding respectively to the degrees of incipient, proficient, and perfect. Likewise it does not constitute a systematic body of principles and doctrines dealing with Christian asceticism and mysticism. It consists chiefly in reflections, meditations, and instructions on the idea of perfection peculiar to the Society of Jesus. The spirit of holy indifference and the necessity of purity of heart as the essential requirements for perfection are stressed throughout the book.

The article dealing with the passions of man (p. 86 ff.) contains some exaggerations, for it attributes too much power to the devil over our bodies. It is stated that, so long as we are in subjection to passions, Satan "makes them act at will, much as the performer does the notes of the organ on which he plays. To this end he excites the humours of the body and the phantoms of imagination" (p. 87).

Likewise Fr. Lallemant's view of the nature of St. Paul's "sting of the flesh" (2 Cor. xii, 7) is at variance with modern exegetes; he interprets it as the "importunate temptation of impurity" (p. 91).

On the whole, however, the book offers many serious and profound reflections on the interior life which testify to the keen insight of Father Lallemant into the spiritual and moral formation of a perfect religious.

GREGORY GRABKA, O.F.M. Conv.

St. Hyacinth Seminary, Granby, Mass.

BOOKS RECEIVED

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME, NOTRE DAME, INDIANA:
"Publications in Mediaeval Studies, VIII" The Summulae Logicales of Peter of Spain, by Joseph P. Mullally, Ph.D. (civ+172pp.); II Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in Epistolas Pauli e Schola Petri Abaelardi in Epistolam ad Hebraeos,

by Artur Landgraf (653-864pp.).

THE NEWMAN BOOKSHOP, WESTMINSTER, MD.:

Life of St. Stephen Illurding Abbot of Citeaux and Founder of the Cistercian Order, by J. B. Dalgairns (x+208pp.; \$2.50); A Mystic Under Arms, by Ft. M. Eugene Boylan, O. Cist. R. (59pp.); More About Fatima and the Immaculate Heart of Mary, by Rev. V. Montes De Oca, C.S.Sp. (125pp.).

- THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA PRESS, WASHINGTON, D.C.:

 A Philosophy of Poetry, by Rev. John Duffy, C.SS.R. (xi+258pp.; \$2.75).
- Morehouse-Gorham Co., New-York:

 Mother of Carmel, A Portrait of St. Teresa of Jesus, by E. Allison Peers (xi+220pp.; \$2.50).
- King's Crown Press, Morningside Heights, New York:

 On the Nature of Value, The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander, by Milton R.

 Konvitz (viii+117pp.).
- Franciscan Herald Press, 1434 West Fifty-First St., Chicago, Ill.:

 A Primer of Perfection for Everybody, by James Meyer, O.F.M. (viii+184pp.;
 Paper \$1.00; Cloth \$1.50).
- COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK:

 Bibliography of English Translations from Medieval Sources, by Clarissa P.
 Farrar and Austin P. Evans (xiii+534pp.; \$7.50).
- PEUSER, ARGENTINE: San Francisco de Asis, Patrón Universal de la Acción Católica, by Prof. Augustin Baez, O.F.M. & Dr. J. M. Núñez Ponte (304pp.; \$3.00).
- F. A. DAVIS CO., PHILADELPHIA, PA.: Medical Ethics for Nurses, by Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A. Ph.D. (xv+356pp.; \$3.00).
- REV. MICHAEL A. MATHIS, C.S.C., P.O. BOX 1197, SOUTH BEND, INDIANA:

 A brief Commentary on The Text of Matins and Lauds of the Roman Breviary for The Two Sundays of Passiontide, and Mass of Easter Sunday, by Michael A. Mathis, C.S.C. (139pp.; 50c).
- Paul Anderson Company, San Antonio, Texas:

 China A Model for Europe, by Lewis A. Maverick (xii+334pp.).
- ATLANTA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, ATLANTA, GA.:
 "The Atlanta Historical Bulletin," In Memoriam Father Thomas O'Reilly (58pp.).
- THE JOHN D. LUCAS PRINTING COMPANY, BALTIMORE, MD.:

 History of Holy Trinity Parish, Washington, D.C. 1795-1945, by Rev. Laurence
 J. Kelly, S.J. on the occasion of the Sesquicentennial Celebration, November 4
 to 11, 1945 (137pp.).

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Cum permissu superiorum.

A NEW SOURCE OF THE "SUMMA FRATRIS ALEXANDRI"

The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales

IF literary criticism is today almost in accord with Roger Bacon in that it removes from Alexander of Hales the theological Summa which made his secular glory and transmitted to posterity his name and his thought, it gives back to him on the contrary and by a just compensation his own proper writings and reveals to us little by little an Alexander unknown, greater perhaps than that one of tradition; in any case the original, the true, the one who during twenty years at the University of Paris was listened to and admired, first of all in his secular chair and later in that of the Friars Minor.

Having come as a young man to Paris he remained there, studying and teaching successively the Arts and Theology.1 At the time of the crisis in the University (from 1229 to 1231) he was already in the first ranks among the Masters of the University. For the Alexander who was sent to the Roman Court with the representative of the Faculty of Arts, John Pagus, to defend the rights of the University is certainly he. Two other delegates were there already. They were William of Auxerre and Godfrey of Poitiers.2 He is again delegated on the 25th of August 1235, this time by the King of England, and in the capacity of Archdeacon of Coventry, in order to conclude or renew a truce with St. Louis, King of France;3 and we find him here again in the company of

^{1.} About the main dates of Alexander's curriculum vitae, see V. Doucet, Alessandro di Hales, in Enciclopedia Catt. Italiana, I, Roma 1946, and mostly Summa Halesiana, ed. Quaracchi, To. IV, p. CLIsq.

2. Cf. H. Denisle, Chartularium Univ. Paris., I, Paris 1889, 140sqq.; M. M. Gorce, La Somme théologique d'Alex. de Hales est-elle authentique? in The New Scholasticism, 5 (1931) 7sqq.; P. Mandonnet, La date de la mort de Guillaume d'Auxerre, in Arch. d'Hist. litt. et doct. du Moyen Age, 7 (1933) 41sq.

3. See Th. Rymer, Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae inter reges Angliae et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontisces, etc., I. London 1821, 341. Cf. Calendar of the Patent Rolls P.R.O. 1232-1247, London 1906, 116. On the Truce itself: Le Nain de Tillemont, Vie de Saint Louis (Soc. Hist. de France), II, Paris 1847; 210sqq.

such illustrious personages as Simon Langton (the brother of Stephen) and the future Archbishop of London, Foulques Basset.5 This Alexander of Hales was therefore no mean personality when towards 1236 he renounced his numerous prebends and the Archdeaconate of Coventry⁶ to become a Friar Minor, Friar Alexander, to the very great joy, which goes without saying, of the poor Franciscans of Paris. Roger Bacon relates in his Opus Minus:

"Ex suo ingressu fratres et alii exultaverunt in celum et ei dederunt auctoritatem totius studii et adscripserunt ei illam magnam Summam, quæ est plus quam pondus unius equi, quam ipse non fecit sed alii. Et tamen propter reverentiam fuit adscripta et vocatur Summa Fr. Alexandri." 7

It is easy to understand the exultation of the friars and the authority given to the new recruit. Not so easy is it to understand that a famous Master like Alexander of Hales accepted in his own lifetime the attribution of a Summa to which he did not contribute, and it is permitted to ask if the "propter reverentiam" of Roger Bacon really says the whole truth. That Alexander of Hales, already an old man, did not alone undertake to compose this colossal Summa, goes without saying. But did he not direct it? And above all, has he not handed over his own writings (to others), and in such measure is not the Summa basically his own work, or principally his?

It is precisely this which the writings of Alexander, which are being recovered little by little, will teach us. More than two hundred Ouestions and Ouodlibita disputed before and after his entrance to the Order are already critically assured to him.8 The reader will find the list of these writings and the proofs of their

^{4.} Cf. K. Norgate, Langton Simon, in Dict. of Nat. Biography, XI, London 1909, 562sq.; F. M. Powike, Stephen Langton, Oxford 1928.
5. Cf. T. A. Archer, Basset Fulk, in Dict. of Nat. Biography, I, London 1908, 1298sqq.: R. Graham, Bassett Foulques, in Dict. d'Hist. et de Géogr. eccl., VI, Paris 1932, 1269.
6. About the prebends and dignities held by Alexander in the English Church, see Adamson, Alexander of Hales, in Dict. of Nat. Biography, I, 271, but mostly Josiah Cox Russel, Dictionary of Writers of 13th Century England (Bulletin of the Institute of Hist. Research, Suppl. 3), London, New York, Toronto, 1936, 13sq.
7. Ed. J. S. Brewer, Fr. Rogeri Bacon Opera hactenus inedita, I, London 1859, 326.

<sup>1859, 326.

8.</sup> Cf. F. Pelster, Die Quaestionen des Alexander v. Hales, in Gregorianum, 14 (1933) 401-422, 501-520; F. Henquinet, De centum et septem quaestionibus balesianis cod. Tudert. 121, in Antonianum, 13 (1938) 335-366, 489-514; Les Questions inédites d'Alex. de Hales sur les fins dernières, in Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 10 (1938) 56-78, 153-172, 268-278.

authenticity in the prolegomena to Tom. IV of the Summa (p. CLIII sqq.) which will appear soon at Quaracchi. Moreover, research conducted simultaneously with Father Francis Henquinet on the sources of the Summa led us to the most happy of discoveries, that of the Commentary of Alexander on the Four Books of the Sentences and it is this work, or rather its discovery, which I undertake to make known here.

In spite of certain misinformed authors⁹ it was a known fact that Alexander of Hales had commented on the Sentences and that this Commentary was not the Summa. Roger Bacon deplores in his *Opus Minus* ¹⁰ as one of the principal vices of the study of theology the abandonment of the Book of the Bible in favor of the Sentences of Peter Lombard, and he attributes responsibility for this sin to Alexander, the first he says to introduce this usage to Paris: "Alexander fuit primus qui legit"; that is to say, the first to supplant the Bible by the Sentences in teaching. The *Chronicle of Lanercost* is still more explicit when it relates in the year 1245:

"Obiit Parisius nobilis clericus, magister Alexander de Hales, sacre pagine lector, qui primus de Minoribus maximo cum honore cathedram theologie rexit ac lecturam artificialem per se adinventam in divisionibus et sententiis littere scholasticis per (read: post) eum reliquit. Nam ante eum nec erat littera trita nec sententia littere elicita. Composuit etiam Questionum theologie permagnos codices, ita ut mira sunt videre." 11

These last words clearly denote the Summa. But what must one understand by "lecturam artificialem in divisionibus et sententiis" if not a literal commentary on the Sentences? The same, no doubt, as one of which Bacon speaks and of which Alexander is considered the initiator.

Has this commentary been preserved? Yes, for it is cited in a marginal note of the MS Vat. Ottob. lat. 852 (Duns Scoti IV Oxon.), in these terms: "Alex de halis in *expositione literali* presentis distinctionis, et idem, 2a, 2e, in tractatu de peccato veniali" (f. 126b). It was necessary at any cost to find this writing which must, as were the Quaestiones, have been one of the prin-

^{9.} Quétif-Echard, Scriptores Ord. Praed., I, 497; F. Ehrle, Historia Bibl. Rom. Pontificum, I, Romae 1890, 495: "Commentationes Sententiarum non reliquit"; ed. Summae halesianae, I, Quaracchi 1924, XXV.

^{10.} Ed. cit., 328sq.
11. Ed. J. Stevenson, Chronicon de Lanercost, Edinburg, 1839, 53.

cipal sources of the Summa. None of the commentaries found in the manuscripts under the name of Alexander of Hales were established as authentic. The Liber Primus Alexandri de Ales super Sententiarum lib. I, of the MSS of Padua 183 (f. la - 123c) and Naples Nat. VII, c. 3 (f. 3a - 108a) is only a compilation (otherwise excellent and very old) from the First Book of the Summa.¹² The Lectura doctoris eximii Fr. Alexandri de Hales super I Sententiarum of the MSS Uppsala C. 167 (f. 3a-128b) and Amiens 234 is only one of the numerous abbreviations of St. Bonaventure. 13 Likewise, neither are the Quaestiones magistri Alexandri super IV m Sententiarum of the British Museum Add. 22041 (F. 54v-99v)14 and the Quartus Alexandri de Ales of Vat. lat. 9333 (F. 22r-113v)15 to be regarded as authentic. Finally, the IV us Sententiarum Alexandri de Halis of Leipzig University 451 (f. 1a-168d) is not of Alexander but of John of Erfurt, O.F.M.

The Commentary of Alexander was in fact lying elsewhere, anonymous and quite forgotten; it was the manuscripts of his Quaestiones Disputatae which led us to find it again. Several of these manuscripts contained in fact, either at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the questions, commentaries on one or other book of the Sentences. If the Questions belonged to Alexander, was it not likely that the Commentary was equally his? Our researches centered first around the MS Todi 121 where Father Henquinet had just identified with rare fortune numerous questions of Alexander "antequam esset frater"; 16 but all our investigations on the commentaries included there gave rather negative results. Book I (f. 67a-130a) relates and rejects the well-known opinion of Alexander on the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the Greeks and the Latins (f. 115a): it could not therefore be his. Book II has every chance in the world of being John of Rupella's,

^{12.} Cf. F. Pelster, Zum Problem der Summa des Alex. v. Hales, in Gregorianum, 12 (1931) 439sqq.
13. Cf. Isak Collijn, Franciscanernas Bibliotek på Cràmunkeholmen i Stockholm, Uppsala 1917, 133sq.; V. Doucet, Maîtres franciscains de Paris, in Arch. Fr. Hist., 27 (1934) 538, note 1.
14. Cf. F. Pelster, Die Quaestionen des Alex. v. Hales, in Gregorianum, 14 (1933) 413, note 23; F. Henquinet, Autour des écrits d'Alex. de Halès et de Richard Rufus, in Antonianum, 11 (1936) 190, note 2.
15. Cf. F. Henquinet, loc. cit.; Les questions inédites, 65, note 44.
16. De centum et septem questionibus halesianis cod. Tudert. 121, in Antonianum, 13 (1938) 335-366. 489-514

nianum, 13 (1938) 335-366, 489-514.

judging it at least by its literary forms. Book IV (f. 145a-182b) reveals itself as identical with that of Paris 16406 (f. 153r-217v) of which Msgr. Arthur Landgraf had just shown the dependence on Odo Rigaldi.¹⁷ I soon discovered however, thanks to a detailed description of the MS of Assisi 189 taken in 1932 that this same Book IV could be read there also and was preceded by Books I, II, and III, and that it was indeed (at least the first three Books) a commentary much earlier than Odon Rigaud. I had the manuscript photographed and found myself confronted with an important source of the Summa of Alexander. Several chapters of the Summa which up to then seemed to me borrowed from the compilation on the Sentences attributed to Guerric de Saint-Quentin, O.P. (Vat. lat. 691)18 in fact came from the Commentary of Assisi. It was already a good omen and the expected discovery was close. I therefore entrusted the MS to Father Henquinet for a systematic collation with the Summa, and he was not slow to discover that several texts cited under the name of Alexander by Richard Rufus, O.F.M. in his Commentary on the Sentences¹⁹ and by the anonymous treatise De Fide secundum diversos Magistros of Münster 257,20 could be read literally in our Assisi 189. The Commentary on the Sentences of Alexander of Hales was finally discovered.

All these texts and others besides will be presented in extenso in the Prolegomena to Tom. IV of the Summa; but it is well to present some of them even here. Richard Rufus I Sent. d. 32:

Alicui videtur quod Spiritus Sanctus est amor quo Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem, nec tamen sequitur quod diligunt se Spiritu Sancto, quia Spiritus S. est nomen proprium persone, amor autem est nomen appropriabile. Et sunt quasi unius condescensionis diligere et amor: si enim dicatur diligere

^{17.} Ein anonymes Werk aus dem Bereich des Odo Rigaud O.F.M., in Collectanea Franciscana, 13 (1943) 5-12.

18. Cf. A. Fries, De Commentario Guerrici de S. Quintino in libros Sententiarum, in Arch. Fr. Praed. 5 (1935) 326-340. A. Landgraf, Bemerkungen zum Sentenzenkommentar des Cod. Vat. lat. 691, in Franzisk. Studien, 26 (1939) 183-190.

19. Richard's Commentary on Lib. I, II, III is preserved in the only Ms. Balliol 62. See F. Pelster, Der älteste Sentenzenkommentar aus der Oxforder Franziskanerschule, in Scholastik, 1 (1926) 50-80. A fragment of the second Book (dist. 1-8) has been further discovered by the same Scholar in the British Museum Ms. Royal 8. C.4 (f. 77r-96v). Cf. Neue Schriften des Richardus Rufus, in Scholastik, 9 (1934) 256. The fourth Book is still missing. On Richard's realtion with the Summa halesiana, see F. Henquinet, Autour des éerits, 196sqq. It may be added that another very interesting Work of Richardus Rufus, his Scriptum super Metaphysicam, has been recently discovered by Mgr. Aug. Pelzer in the Vatican Library.

20. Cf. F. Pelster, Literargeschichsliches zur Pariserschule, in Scholastik, 5 (1930) 50sqq., 68sqq; G. Englhardt, Die Entwicklung der dogmatischen Glaubenspsychologie (Beiträge z. Gesch. der Phil. des M.A., XXX, 4-6); Münster 1933, 444-458.

notionaliter, et amor notionaliter dicetur; et si essentialiter, et amor essentialiter. Isti dicunt quod non sequitur: diligunt se amore, ergo diligunt se per amorem, quia hec prepositio 'per' semper notat rationem principii in suo casuali respectu alicuius positi in sermone, ut Pater operatur per Filium: li 'per' notat rationem principii respectu operati. Hec regula falsa est, ut videtur, nam... Isti etiam dicunt quod habitudo notata in ablativo non est habitudo cause formalis, sed quasi forme existentis ab hiis quorum est quasi forma. Vinculum enim vel nexus cedit in rationem forme corum quorum est vinculum vel nexus. Ergo, sicut dictum est, isti plane negant hanc: Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem Spiritu Sancto (cod. Balliol 62, f. 74a).

On the margin is noted 8a [opinio] Alexandri. Now we read in Assisi 189:

Et ita videtur quod sit dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus sit amor quo Pater et Filius diligunt se invicem, non tamen sequitur quod diligunt se Spiritu Sancto. Hoc enim ponit Augustinus . . . Spiritus enim Sanctus est proprium nomen persone, amor autem est nomen appropriabile. Bene enim dicitur: diligunt se amore: diligere enim et amor sininga sunt, id est sub eodem iugo. Si enim dicatur diligere notionaliter, amor etiam notionaliter dicetur; et si essentialiter, amor similiter essentialiter tenetur. Nec convertitur: diligunt se amore, ergo diligunt se per amorem, quoniam hec propositio 'per' semper videtur sonare in rationem principii respectu alicuius positi în sermone, ut Pater operatur per Filium: 'per' enim notat rationem principii respectu operati. Et Filius operatur per Patrem: 'per' notat rationem principii respectu operantis et operati: est Pater principium Filii et creature. Hic autem neutro modo est sumere rationem principii. Non enim Spiritus Sanctus est principium Patris aut Filii. Si vero queratur cuiusmodi habitudo notata sit in ablativo, dicendum quod non habitudo cause formalis, sed quasi forme existentis ab hiis quorum est quasi forma. Vinculum enim vel nexus cedit in rationem forme eorum quorum est vinculum vel nexus (Assisi 189, f. 35 a-b).

The same text in the Summa I, no. 469 (p. 657a), includes there the passages omitted by Richard. The Summa therefore does not depend on Rufus but on Alexander. Richard on the contrary had before him the Commentary and the Summa; he borrowed from the latter the expression "quasi unius condescensionis" for "siniuga id est sub eodem jugo"; but for the rest it is the Commentary, not the Summa, that he is describing. It is therefore the Commentary of Assisi 189 and not the Summa which is given as Alexander's by the above-mentioned marginal note or, if you like, both.

This same commentary is very often cited and criticized by Rufus. Thus in Book III, d. 25, in the question *Utrum fidei subsit falsum*:

De fide Abrahe dicitur quod illa triplicem habuit respectum: unum ad Deum infundentem gratiam, alium ad cognoscentem per fidem, tertium ad ipsum cognitum. Respectu infundentis fidem, semper est fides veri; respectu ipsius cogniti mutabilis dicitur. Talis responsio nihil est . . . (Balliol 62, f. 231d).

The author of this opinion is not named; but we read in the De Fide of Münster 257:

Vel aliter secundum Alexandrum: Fides Abrahe triplicem habet respectum: ad infundentem et ad eum cui infunditur et ad illud respectu cuius infunditur, id est respectu eius quod creditur. Quantum ad duo prima sequitur: si Abraham credidit Filium Dei incarnandum, quod necesse est eum credidisse; et quantum ad illa duo fides Abrahe non dependet a futuro. Quantum ad tertium autem dependet a futuro, hec scilicet: Abraham credidisse Filium Dei incarnandum, quia respicit contingens et mutabile. Est ergo ibi ex parte infundentis necessitas, liceat sic loqui, et ex parte subiecti est necessaria preteritio; sed ex parte tertii, id est crediti, est contingentia, quia illud mutabile erat (Münster 257, f. 64a).

It is indeed the same opinion that Richard and the anonymous author of Münster cite; the first without naming the author, and the other as Alexander's. Now this opinion is exactly that of the Commentary of Assisi 189 in Book III, d. 25:

Ad aliud dicendum quod fides Abrahe triplicem habuit respectum: unum scilicet ad infundentem gratiam et alium ad cognoscentem fidem et tertium ad ipsum cognitum. Secundum autem (respectum) ad Abraham, bene sequitur: fides semel fuit in Abraham, ergo necessarium est fuisse in eo. Secundum autem respectum ad ipsum infundentem, semper est fides respectu veri. Secundum autem respectum ad ipsum cognitum, mutabilis est secundum quod futurum mutabile est. Et sic patet quid est ibi de necessitate et quid de contingentia (Assisi 189, f. 101c).

This opinion is not found in the Summa III, n. 685, which abandons Alexander in order to follow Philip the Chancellor.

We find a little farther on in the same treatise of Münster in the question: Si aliqua sciuntur quae creduntur:

Ad evidentiam precedentium, nota secundum Alexandrum, quod quedam est cognitio sive acceptio in termino et quedam ad terminum, quedam neque in termino neque ad terminum. Nota ergo quod visio in patria cognitio est in termino; visio in via est cognitio ad terminum. Similiter scientia in termino cognitio (!), opinio est ad terminum; sed scientia que est experientia, sicut fuit in B. Virgine, neque est in termino neque ad terminum (Münster 257, f. 64c).

This opinion is read again literally in Assisi 189, Book III, d. 24:

Dico quod quedam est cognitio in termino et quedam ad terminum; quedam neque in termino neque ad terminum. Visio enim in patria est in termino; credere autem in via est ad terminum. Similiter scientia in via est in termino et opinio ad terminum; cognitio autem que est experientie, neque est in termino neque ad terminum, et sic scivit B. Virgo (Assisi 189, f. 101a).

Do not these texts establish with certainty that at least the Books I and III of the Commentary of Assisi are the work of Alexander of Hales? There are still other citations of the 13th century where Alexander is equally given as the author of Books II and IV.

The MS G.V. 347 of the National Library of Florence contains (between the De Sacramentis (f. 1a-35c) and the De Incarnatione (f. 42a-67c) of Albert the Great)²¹ some anonymous questions and extracts. Two of these latter bear the name of Guerric, another that of Hugh of S. Cher, and another that of Alexander.

Alex(ander). Nota: peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum est oppositum gratie Spiritus Sancti a qua est unitas ecclesie et in qua fit remissio peccatorum. Duo ponuntur in hac definitione: unitas et remissio. Sumuntur ergo sex species peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, secundum opposita unitatis et remissionis. În remissione tria exiguntur, et secundum hoc triplex est defectus, scil. ex parte remittentis, ex parte eius cui remittitur et ex parte excitativi ad remissionem. Ex parte remittentis est misericordia quoad culpe remissionem et iustitia quoad penam. Ex parte eius cui remittitur est penitentia, ad quam pertinet commissa flere et flenda iterum non committere et propositum non committendi. Ex parte excitativi duo: dilectio gratie in proximo quoad veritatem agnitam et dilectio in proximo quoad bonitatem. Contra ea que sunt ex parte remittentis est presumptio contra iustitiam et desperatio contra misericordiam. Ex parte eius cui remittitur, contra dolorem penitentie est impenitentia et dilectio commissi; contra propositum non committendi, obstinatio. Contra duo que sunt excitativa est impugnatio veritatis agnite, que est contra verum, et invidia fraterne caritatis, que est contra bonum... (Florence Nat. G.V. 347, f. 41a).

Alexander has one question on this subject among his Questiones antequam esset frater.22 Is it not this which is cited here? The opinion in fact is found here, but only as regards the sense.

^{21.} Cf. Dom A. Ohlmeyer, Zwei neue Teile der Summa de creaturis Alberts des Grossen, in Rech. de théol. anc. et méd., 4 (1932) 392-400. 22. Cf. F. Henquinet, De Centum et septem quaestionibus, 353.

Respondeo: habent plures species materiales, non formales. Dicit enim Augustinus (quod peccatum in Sp. S.) est directe contra gratiam Spiritus Sancti et unitatem ecclesie, in qua fit remissio peccatorum. Sed ex parte gratie duo sunt, scil. misericordia et iustitia. Misericordia quoad dimissionem culpe, iustitia quoad dimissionem pene per satisfactionem. Medium in dimissionem pene ex parte unitatis ecclesie, est amor fraternitatis et fraterne gratie, in quo est remissio peccatorum. Adhuc requiritur quod habeat cognitionem mali inclinantem eum ad detestationem mali et propositum non peccandi ... Misericordie opponitur desperatio, iustitie vero presumptio, quando scil. presumit remissionem peccati sine eius pena. Ad hoc quod obicitur, quod due debent esse differentie peccati huius, quia directe est contra remissionem que est per penitentiam, in qua sunt tantum duo: commissa flere et propositum non committere, et ita duo erunt peccata, obstinatio et impenitentia, respondeo: duo sunt in penitentia et alia sunt adminiculantia. Peccatum autem in Spiritum Sanctum est contra remissionem, ita quod non tantum contra penitentiam, sed contra adminiculantia ad penitentiam, sicut invidentia fraterne gratie est contra amorem superne gratie, que est adiutorium penitentie (Todi 121, f. 33d).

Let us open now the Commentary of Assisi 189 at Book II, d. 43:

Ad manifestationem specierum peccati in Spiritum Sanctum, sciendum quod sex sunt species, scil. presumptio, desperatio, impenitentia, obstinatio, invidentia gratie, impugnatio veritatis agnite. Ponatur ergo definitio peccati in Spiritum Sanctum dicens quid est, que talis est: Peccatum in Sp. S. est oppositum per se gratie Spiritus Sancti, a qua est unitas corporis ecclesie, in qua fit peccatorum remissio. Si quis ergo inspiciat causas unitatis ecclesie et causas remissionis peccatorum, habebit sufficienter quare tot sunt species. Sciendum itaque quod ad remissionem peccatorum exiguntur tria: unum scil. ex parte remittentis et aliud ex parte (eius) cui remittitur et tertium est excitativum ad hoc ut fiat remissio. Ex parte autem remittentis est misericordia cum iustitia, quoniam misericordia quoad remissionem culpe et iustitia quoad satisfactionem pene. Ex parte autem eius cui remittitur (sunt duo), scilicet commissa flere et propositum non committendi illa. Ex parte autem excitantis sunt duo, scil. dilectio gratie quoad veritatem agnitam et dilectio gratie quoad bonitatem agnitam. Sed istis sex enumeratis respondent alia sex per oppositum, ut desperatio contra misericordiam, et presumptio contra iustitiam, et gaudium de commisso quod est in obstinatione contra dolorem de commisso, et impenitentia contra propositum non committendi, et impugnatio veritatis agnite contra dilectionem veritatis agnite, invidia fraterne gratie contra dilectionem quoad bonitatem agnitam. Et sic patet numerus specierum (Assisi 189, f. 87b-c).

There is no doubt that it is the Commentary of Assisi, and not the quaestio disputata, which is cited as Alexander's by the anonymous compiler of the MS of Florence. And even the relationship of this text with that of the quaestio of Alexander only corroborates the justice of this attribution. Book II is, therefore, also Alexander's. Book IV itself, where Msgr. Landgraf thought he saw a work dependant on Odon Rigaud, is expressly cited as the work of Alexander and therefore the source of Rigaldus by the *Summa juris* of Henry of Merseburg, O.F.M.,²³ and another anonymous writing of the 13th cent. called *Speculum juniorum*.²⁴ We have not been able to discover the authorship of this interesting little Summa of morals, the knowledge of which we owe to P. Ephrem Longpré.

Henry of Merseburg:

Respondeo cum magistro Alexandro, omnibus opinionibus omissis, quod papa in omnibus dispensare potest de plenitudine potestatis sue, preterquam in articulis fidei... Dicendum ergo quod, quando dicitur: votum continentie non recipit dispensationem, intelligitur quo.ul genus rei, quia nihil potest continentie equiparari. Ex causa tamen ardua et valde necessaria bene recipit dispensationem, scil. propter necessitatem multiplicationis fidelium in aliquo tempore aut etiam (pro) vitanda magna strage animarum (Munich, Staatsbibl. Clm. 22278, f. 91r).

Assisi 189 Book IV, d. 38:

Si vero queratur de voto continentie, utrum recipiat commutationem, dicendum quod non, secundum genus rei, et sic intelligitur cum communiter dicitur. Secundum necessitatem tamen multiplicationis sidelium in aliquo tempore posset fieri dispensatio (f. 173 b).

Speculum juniorum:

Esto quod aliquis multa peccata fecerit et penitentiam de omnibus illis sufficienter fecerit... Postea patitur recidivum per unum simplex mortale peccatum. Numquid etiam pro eis iterum iniungenda est penitentia?... Dicunt quidam quod non... Sed dicit Magister in Sent., d. 22, quod non satisfecit digne et sufficienter, quia non perseveravit. Debuit enim habere iugem peccati memoriam... Debuit etiam non oblivisci omnes miserationes Dei, que tot sunt quot sunt remissiones peccatorum. Et ita tenebatur ad duplex vinculum, scil., ad vinculum detestationis peccati et ad vinculum iugis memorie beneficiorum Dei, ut dicit Alexander de Hales (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 52, f. 28d).

Quarto modo dicitur ingratitudo, secundum Alexandrum, oblivio sive

23. Cf. B. Kurtscheid, Heinrich v. Merseburg, ein Kanonist des XIII. Jahrhunderts, in Franzisk. Studien, 4 (1917) 239-253.

24. Inc.: Rationalem creaturam a Deo factam esse ut Deo fruendo beata esset,

^{24.} Inc.: Rationalem creaturam a Deo factam esse ut Deo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet. Ideo namque rationalis est... Expl.: nec vesci a parentibus debent. — Mss.: Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College 52, f. 1a-43a; London, Lambeth 485, f. 121r-226r; Oxford, Bodleian 767, Laud, Miscel. 166 and Rawlison A. 367. Many 13th Century Authors are quoted, besides Alexander, such as Fishacre, Cancellerius, Raymundus de Pennafort, Lincoln., Poenitentiale magistri Roberti de flaverna, fr. R. Bacun, Willelmus Altissiodorensis, fr. S. de Hempton.

immemoria habitualis beneficiorum prius acceptorum (cod. cit., f. 29a).

Hales (in marg.). Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis potestatis ad aliquod officium in ecclesia ordinatum ad sacramentum communionis. Per hanc particulam 'ad sacramentum communionis', nota quod sacramentum communionis est finis omnis spiritualis potestatis, et merito, quia ibi est Christus totus, verus Deus-homo, ex quo est omne sacramentum. Unde, cum ad sacramentum communionis sit ordinata omnis potestas ordinis spiritualis, patet quod in eo debet stare omnis ordo. Dignitas vero episcopalis, que superadditur, est ratione earum, scil. potestatum spiritualium, et suppletur ibi potestas Domini in conferendo sacerdotalem ordinem, sicut Moyses, licet non esset simpliciter summus, tamen erat summus sacerdos, quoad hoc quod consecravit Aaron (cod. cit., f. 30c).

All these texts are read in Assisi 189, Book IV, d. 22 and 24:

Ad intelligentiam qualiter peccata redeant et qualiter non, nota quod multiplex est vinculum, ut supra habitum est, quorum unum est vinculum detestationis; alterum vinculum est ad memoriam beneficiorum Dei. Licet ergo... non tamen est dimissio quoad vinculum detestationis perpetue et quoad vinculum memorie beneficii Dei in dimissis (f. 153a).

Ad illud quod obicitur, utrum ingratitudo sit actuale peccatum vel circumstantia, dicimus quod accipitur ingratitudo multis modis: uno enim modo... Tertio modo dicitur immemoria habitualis beneficiorum prius

acceptorum (f. 153b).

Potest autem assignari altera definitio ordinis, ex qua magis potest perpendi quia sit ordo et quis non, et est talis: Ordo est sacramentum spiritualis potestatis ad aliud (!) officium ordinatum in ecclesia ad sacramentum communionis. Constat enim quod sacramentum communionis est dignissimum inter sacramenta, quia in eo continetur ille ex quo omne sacramentum, scil. totus Christus, non dico secundum divinitatem que a nullo continetur. Ad hoc ergo sacramentum communionis ordinari convenit omnem potestatem spiritualem... Ex quo perpenditur (quod), cum potestas ordinis sacramentalis (ordinetur) ad sacramentum communionis et hoc pertineat ad ordinem sacerdotalem in eo debet stare omnis ordo. Dignitas vero episcopalis, que superadditur, est ratione causarum (!) et quia ibi suppletur potestas Domini in conferendo ordinem sacerdotalem, sicut Moyses, licet non esset summus simpliciter, tamen erat summus sacerdos, quoad hoc quod consecravit Aaron (f. 155b-c).

All these testimonies are so explicit in agreement that they dispense with commentary. It is therefore a secured fact: the four books on the Sentences preserved in Assisi 189 are indeed the authentic works of Alexander of Hales. The literary and doctrinal relationships noted above between Book II and the Halesian Question on the sin against the Holy Spirit would again confirm this conclusion, if it were necessary; and it would be easy to give other examples. The manuscript tradition itself goes in the same

direction: the Commentary and the Halesian Questions are generally found together in the same manuscripts.

Even the nature of the Commentary and its antiquity are a sure guarantee of its authenticity. The work in Assisi 189 bears the title of the *Glossa super Sententias* and actually follows the letter of Lombard. The questions themselves, habitually very short, are closely bound with the text, as in the Commentary on the Sentences of Hugues of S. Cher, and we are still a long way from the Commentary of Rigaud. It is precisely the *literal Commentary* that the chronicler of Lanercost had described to us.

Book IV alone is further evolved toward the "question" type, and consequently seems to have been written at a date later than the others. The antiquity of the Commentary of Assisi is equally seen from the citations reported above. Moreover, Odon Rigaud has it constantly before his eyes no less than the author or the authors of the Halesian Summa. The author of the *Divisio Textus I Sent.* of Todi 121²⁵ likewise knows it:

Dividitur autem aliter secundum alios. Dicitur enim quod totale opus continet ea que inducunt in beatitudinem. Unde primus de beatitudines; secundus de beatificabili et suo oppositio; tertius de dispositionibus remotis...; quartus de dispositionibus propinquis, scil. de sacramentis (f. 62a).

It is the division of Assisi 189:

Dividitur hoc totale opus completum secundum ea que faciunt ad beatitudinem. Primus liber agit de beatificante; secundus de beatificabili et suo opposito; tertius de dispositionibus remotis..., quartus de dispositionibus propinquis, scil. de sacramentis (f. 1c).

Again we read in I Sent. of Todi 121:

Aliqui volunt concordare (Graecos et Latinos) sic, ut sit verus intellectus apud utrosque, quia diversis viis procedunt, sicut dicunt, et volunt ita exponere: Est verbum interius et est verbum exterius, et est spiritus interior et exterior. Potest ergo in mente nostra fieri comparatio ex parte verbi interioris ad spiritum interiorem... Primo est mens, deinde cogitatio sive verbum, quia cogitatio in mente concepta verbum dicitur, consequitur autem ut spiretur affectus. Et sic procedit Augustinus... Exterius sic se habet: primo est intellectus qui vocem format, postea spiritus, deinceps verbum. Intellectus qui vocem format, postea spiritus, deinceps verbum. Intellectus

^{25.} Cf. Henquinet, De centum et septem quaestionibus, 337sq.

enim format vocem spirando et in ipsa voce spirata ostendit suum intellectum. Unde dicit Ioan. Damascenus... (f. 115a).

These "aliqui qui volunt concordare" are again the author of the Commentary 189:

Ad determinationem autem contradictionis que videtur esse inter Latinos et Gracos, nota quod est verbum exterius et est verbum interius, et est spiritus interior et est spiritus exterior. Potest ergo comparatio fieri verbi interioris ad spiritum creatum interiorem . . . vel exterioris verbi ad spiritum exteriorem. Augustinus autem facit comparationem priori modo, Ioan. Damascenus secundo modo. Ut enim dicit Augustinus, primo est mens, deinde verbum sive cogitatio, quia cogitatio in mente concepta verbum dicitur; consequitur autem ut spiretur affectus. Damascenus autem facit comparationem aliter, secundum verbum exterius: primo est intellectus, deinde verbum, vox autem vehiculum verbi; intellectus format vocem et spirando in ipsa voce spirata ostendit suum intellectum. Unde Damascenus... (f. 16c).

Numerous extracts from this same Commentary are read in the compilation on the Sentences falsely attributed to Guerric of S. Quentin.²⁶ One example taken from the Prologue will suffice.

Vat. lat. 691:

Materia huius libri potest sumi ab eo quod dicit Dominus Moysi, Exod, 3: Ego sum qui sum. Ego sum Deus Abraham etc. Cum enim dicitur: Ego sum qui sum, per hoc pronomen 'ego', quod est prime persone, potest notari in Trinitate persona Patris. Per hoc nomen 'qui', quod est articulare, notatur identitas substantie cum prima persona sub modo alterius persone, et sic notatur persona Filii. Per hoc verbum 'sum' notatur Spiritus Sanctus, qui ab utroque procedit... Sequitur distinctio aliorum librorum per precedentem partem auctoritatis (f. 1b).

Assisi 189:

Materia huius primi libri potest trahi ab eo quod dicit Dominus in 3 Exodi: Ego sum qui sum. Ego sum Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac (20 lines omitted by 691)... Ego quidem est prime persone et sine qualitate indicium est prime persone in Trinitate. 'Qui', quod est nomen articulare, notat identitatem substantie cum prima persona sub modo alterius persone, et sic notatur Filius. Per 'sum' Spiritus Sanctus, qui ab utroque procedit... Sequitur distinctio aliorum librorum per precedentem partem auctoritatis (f. 1a).

John of Rupella likewise drew his inspiration from it and bor-

^{26.} See above, note 18.

rowed from it entire pages of his Summa de Anima. All converges, one sees, toward Alexander and there is no possible doubt: the Commentary of Assisi 189 is really his. The attribution of this work to Nicholas Trivet, O.P., author of the 14th Cent., by the MS Lambeth 347 (or at least by the catalogue of this library)²⁷ is a manifest error.

To conclude: here is the Incipit and Explicit of each of the Books with a summary indication of the known manuscripts.

Book I:

Inc.: Materia huius primi libri potest trahi ab eo quod dicit Dominus in 3° Exodi: Ego sum qui sum. Ego sum Deus Abraham, Deus Isaac, Deus Iacob et hoc nomen mihi in eternum. Materia sequentium librorum sumitur ab eo quod antecedit immediate in eodem cap.: Dicit Dominus: Vidi afflictionem populi mei . . . Ut dictum est, e contrario. Cupientes etc. Gazophilacium dicitur a filaxe, quod est servare, et gaza, quod est divitie . . . Veteris ac N. Legis. Cum summa perfectio hominis consistat in beatitudine, dividitur hoc totale opus secundum ea que faciunt ad beatitudinem . . . Expl. (dist. 48): et ita non conformat se. — Assisi 189, f. 1a-56b; London Lambeth 347, f. 155-199.

Book II:

Inc.: Creatio(nem) rerum. In hoc secundo agit de creatione rerum sive de rebus creatis. Procedit ergo in hunc modum: 1° ostendit unum solum esse principium creaturarum; 2° ostendit causam rerum creatarum; 3° innuit divisionem rerum creatarum; 4° agit de angelica natura in utroque statu ipsius, tam ante lapsum quam post; 5° agit de humana natura in utroque eius statu... Expl. (dist. 44): secundum statum primitive ecclesie et alterum secundum statum subsequentem. There follows a question, which as it seems, does not belong to the Commentary. De eis que fiunt in eis que supra tempus et motum irrecessum est dubitatio qualiter diversa opera exerceant et qualiter diversa eis accidant... que sunt vel accidunt eis non simul. Then: Explicit secundus liber. — Assisi 189, f. 57a-88b; London Lambeth 347, f. 199-216.

Book III:

Inc.: In tertio libro agitur de creatore (!) et de donis quibus fit reparatio et de preceptis in quorum adimpletione est mereri... tres continet distinctiones. Cum igitur venit plenitudo temporis. Tempus incarnationis Filii dicitur plenitudo temporis... Filius Dei incarnatus est reparatore sive de reparatione humana; in secunda parte agit de his quibus reparamur, scil. de virtutibus et donis; in tertia parte agit de operibus que sunt in pre-

^{27.} Cf. F. Ehrle, Nikolaus Trivet (Beiträgez. Gesch. der Phil. des M.A., Suppl. Bd. II), Münster 1923, 19; F. Stegmüller, Repertorium initiorum, in Rom. Quartalschrift, 45 (1937) 222.

cepto . . . Expl. (dist. 40): diliges Dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo. Explicit Glosa tertii libri Sententiarum. — Assisi, 189, f. 90a-114c; London Lambeth 347, f. 216-246.

Book IV:

Inc.: Legitur IV Reg. 5: Dixit Heliseus ad Naaman: Vade et lavare septies in Iordane etc. Tangitur hoc in historiis. Legitur autem primo quod venit cum equis et curribus et stetit ad ostium domus Helisei misitque ad eum Heliseus nuntium suum dicens: Vade et lavare... mundaberis. Hic agitur de sacramentis et de gratia suscepta per sacramenta et de beatitudine consequente omnes gratias... in hoc quarto. Samaritanus. Sacramentorum etc. Dicitur sacramentum multipliciter: large, stricte, strictissime, Large: mors Christi... Expl. (dist. 39): licet fides non sit communis. Explicit Glosa quarti libri Sententiarum. — Assisi 189, f. 116a-176c (another hand has added: immo multum deficit); Todi 121, f. 145a-182b (ends at dist. 39: cum post conversionem unius persone sit dispar cultus); Paris 16406, f. 153r=217v (ends at dist. 23: qui usura accepisse convincitur, ut vult se voluisse frequenter); Assisi 103, f. 127r-179v (marginal and incomplete; ends at dist. 33); Padua Univ. 853, f. 132b-d (only the prologue, added by another hand between the books III and IV of Hugh of S. Cher).

The Assisi MS 103 seems likewise to contain extracts from Books I, II, and III. In his *Reportorium initiorum*²⁸ Mr. Friedrich Stegmüller adds the Cambridge MS. Corpus Christi 152; but we find there nothing of our Commentary.

There is no need to insist on the importance of this discovery joined to that of numerous Questions of Alexander before and after his entry to the Order. The doctrinal history of the first part of the 13th cent. will have to be remade in part, and very particularly that part which regards the problem of the Summa. For all these texts in various degrees are used therein. The Commentary and the Questions are already entirely transcribed at Quaracchi and their edition is urgent, even before continuing that of the Summa which is now at Part Four. In fact, it is only in the light of these authoratively up to what point the historians will be able to decide authoratively up to what point the theological Summa represents the thought of Alexander of Hales and up to what point also it merits to be called "Summa Fratris Alexander".

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^{28.} Loc. cit.

VULGATA IN CONCILIO TRIDENTINO*

Concilium Tridentinum, propter definitiones suas dogmaticas praecipue Lutheri erroribus provocatas et propter decreta sua disciplinaria quae status moralis praesertim Cleri exigebat, cetera Concilia oecumenica momento superat. In veritate affirmari potest, nos adhuc hodie, post quattuor saecula, vivere ac frui Concilii Tridentini fructibus: si hodie Ecclesia Catholica Romana refulget, prout forsitan numquam saeculorum decursu, sanctitate et apostolatu cleri tam saecularis quam regularis, hoc debetur reformationi verae — pseudo-reformationi oppositae — verae, inquam, reformationi in unione cum Christi Vicario, reformationi a Capite ad membra, reformationi atque formationi spirituali simul ac doctrinali Cleri diocesani in Seminariis et Cleri regularis in Novitiatibus sapienter sancteque a Concilio Tridentino ordinatis.

Etiam in campo biblico adhuc juxta decreta Concilii Tridentini vivinus. Ibi enim definitus est Canon Librorum Sacrorum, complectens tam deuterocanonicos quam protocanonicos sine distinctione auctoritatis. Ibi decretus est exclusivus usus Vulgatae latinae seu textus authentici in tota vita publica, liturgica et doctrinali, Ecclesiae latinae. Ibi ordinata est interpretatio et impressio seu divulgatio Scripturarum. Ibi demum provisum est editioni et emendationi Vulgatae, cui emendationi debetur Vulgata sixto-clementina adhuc hodie in usu Ecclesiae latinae.

Hic considerabimus tantum decretum de usu et authenticitate Vulgatae. Primo huius momentosi et famosi decreti historiam narrabimus iuxta originalia acta et diaria recenter edita. Deinde videbimus quomodo a multis huius decreti vis seu extensio fuerit exaggerata et qualis sit genuinus eius sensus secundum ipsa Concilii acta, sensus authentice declaratus a Summo Pontifice Pio Papa XII, gloriose regnante, in recenter editis encyclicis litteris, "Divino afflante Spiritu".

^{*} Editor's Note: This paper was read by the distinguished author at the meeting of the Catholic Biblical Association of America, held at St. John's Seminary, Brighton, Mass. (August 27-29). We are deeply grateful to Father Vosté, who is the Secretary of the Biblical Commission, for permitting us to print this scholarly and illuminating paper on these pages. It is the first of a series of articles which will treat of the history and content of the Council of Trent on the occasion of the four-hundreth anniversary of this outstanding event in the History of the Church.

I. HISTORIA DECRETI. 1

Declarata aperta prima sessione Concilii dominica die 13 Decembris 1545, Patres conciliares prae omnibus fidem christianam eiusque revelatos fontes definierunt, scilicet symbolum nicaenoconstantinopolitanum in sessione tertia, et in quarto Libros Sacros una cum traditionibus apostolicis: "Omnes itaque intelligant",—haec est conclusio decreti "de receptione librorum sacrorum et traditionum apostolicarum" (22 Martii 1546); — omnes itaque intelligant, quo ordine et via ipsa Synodus, post iactum fidei confessionis fundamentum, sit progressura, et quibus potissimum testimoniis ac praesidiis in confirmandis dogmatibus et instaurandis Ecclesiae moribus sit usura." ²

Methodus sequenda. Summo Pontifice Paulo Papa III accedente, semper primo tractandum erat de dogmate, deinde de reformatione abusuum circa definitum dogma. Itaque postquam in tertia sessione, die 4 Febr. 1546 habita, symbolus fidei erat confirmatus, Cardinales Legati³ ad Cardinalem Farnesium, Pontificis nepotem eiusque consiliorum socium, scripserunt, die 8 Februarii: "Cum fuerit ab omnibus approbata propositio nostra ita ordinate procedendi, ut post symbolum fidei declarentur Sacrae Scripturae, hoc incipiet fieri inde a die Jovis 11 (Febr. 1546) in congregationibus particularibus. Omnibus itidem multum placuit denuo a nobis audire, quomodo finito boc dogmate, transeundum sit ad abusus (come, finito questo dogma, si verrà poi agli abusi)".4 Cardinalis de Monte, primus legatus et praeses, inchoavit cum eadem programmatica declaratione generalem congregationem d. 12 Februarii 1546: "Ut itaque omnia a nobis ordinate proficiscantur, post professionem fidei a nobis factam consequens est, ut Scripturas Sacras probemus, deinde de traditionibus ecclesiasticis etiam disserendum. Et successive si qui sunt abusus tum in vertendo dictam scripturam, tum etiam si videbitur in docendo et praedicando." 5 Textus momentosi valde — illos

^{1.} Omnes citationes Concilii Tridentini fient secundum editionem Societatis Goerresianae: Concilium Tridentinum. Diariorum, Actorum, Epistularum, Tractatuum nova collectio, indicata sola nota CT cum citato volumine.

^{2.} CT. V, p. 32, l. 1-4.

^{3.} Cardinalis de Monte praeses (futurus Papa Iulius III); Cardinalis S. Crucis, Marcellus Cervinus (futurus Papa Marcellus II); et Cardinalis Polus, dictus Anglicus.

^{4.} CT. X, p. 374, l. 6-10; cf. etiam p. 378, l. 3 et p. 379, l. 4 sq.

^{5.} CT. V, p. 7-8.

iam accurate notandos indico — ; textus momentosi, inquam, ad iudicandum de sensu decretorum sequentium de usu et authenticitate Vulgatae, — de quibus loquemur postea.

Commissio praeparatoria. Definito igitur canone Librorum Sacrorum, cui apostolicae traditiones adiunctae sunt, quippe quae ab eodem Spiritu Sancto procedant, die Lunae 1 Martii 1546 inceperunt tractare de abusibus circa Sacram Scripturam.⁶

Cardinalis Sanctae Crucis, Marcellus Cervinus, praeses congregationis praeparatoriae (quae dicitur classis), cum eadem declaratione inchoavit: "Cum iam absolverimus partem dogmatis, de receptone videlicet librorum sacrorum et traditionum, debemus et illam, quae reformationem tangit, perficere, nempe abusus, qui ab ipsis scripturis irrepserunt." ⁷ Iterum igitur atque iterum, canon quidem declaratur dogma; sequentes vero abusus reformatione indigent: haec ex materia disciplinae.

Archiepiscopus Aquensis (Aix) exposuit abusus respicientes statum textus biblici, eius interpretationem, eius impressionem in variis linguis et praedicationem. Ceteri Patres conciliares similiter mentem suam declararunt. Momentosum est sic dictum "secundum votum" episcopi Britonoriensis (Bertinoro), Thomae Caselli O. P.8 Ut remedium afferretur varietati textuum biblicorum ille proposuit: "Ut una in ecclesia designetur translatio, quae tam ad dogmata conficienda, quam ad contraria extirpanda dogmata vim habet, eaque in omnibus gerendis in medium allata nemini liceat subterfugere, et licet ea, quam prae manibus habemus, non ea frasi et filo sit composita, ut multi desiderarent et fieri posset, tamen propter ecclesiae longam consuetudinem et quia maiores nostri, vita et doctrina longe nobis praestantiores, sic nobis eam suis sententiis interpretatam tradiderunt, arbitror eam non esse omnino mutandam . . . " 9 Iamvero "vis ad dogmata conficienda et contraria extirpanda" est ipsa authenticitas, quae dicitur "iuridica".

In congregatione generali diei Veneris, 5 Martii 1546 designati sunt Patres conciliares, quibus incumberet munus examinandi colle-

^{6.} CT. V, p. 21.

^{7.} CT. V, p. 22, l. 3-5. Cf. litteras Cardinalium Legatorum X, p. 403, l. 8 sq.; p. 404, l. 24-26; p. 406, l. 23-28.

^{8.} Cf. Van Gulik-Eubel, Hierarchia catholica medii et recentioris aevi III, ed. 2 cura L. Schmitz-Kallenberg, p. 139.

^{9.} CT. V, p. 27 n. 2.

gendique abusus circa Scripturas, propositis etiam opportunis remediis. Die 8 et sequenti sic dicti Theologi minores (seu Consultores) convenerunt ad eamdem materiam discutiendam. "Omnes fere idem dixerunt, legitur in Actis, videlicet esse abusus, quod Sacram Scripturam interpretentur passim indocti et qui ad id nullam auctoritatem habent. Item quod ab eisdem doceatur. Quod imprimatur a quocumque sine licentia superiorum. Quod usurpetur ad profana et ad superstitiones. Quod circumferantur plures et diversae editiones, ignoreturque quaenam pro authentica recipienda sit..." 11

Propositiones et discussio. Die Mercurii 17 Martii Archiepiscopus Aquensis, Antonius Filiolus (le Filleul), 12 praeses commissionis deputatae pro examine abusuum, in congregatione generali legit quattuor sequentes abusus cum relativis remediis. 13

"Primus abusus est habere varias editiones sacrae scripturae et illis velle uti pro authenticis in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, expositionibus et praedicationibus.

"Remedium est, habere unicam tantum editionem, veterem scilicet et vulgatam, qua omnes utantur pro authentica in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, expositionibus et praedicationibus, et quod nemo illam reicere audeat aut illi contradicere: non detrahendo tamen auctoritati purae et verae interpretationis septuaginta interpretum, qua nonnumquam usi sunt apostoli, neque reiciendo alias editiones, quatenus authenticae illius intelligentiam iuvant.

"Secundus abusus est nonnulla incorrectio codicum qui circumferuntur vulgatae huius editionis.

"Remedium est, ut expurgatis et emendatis codicibus restituatur Christiano orbi pura et sincera vulgata editio a mendis librorum qui circumferuntur. Id autem munus erit Sanctissimi D. N. Papae, quem sacrosancta synodus humiliter exorabit, ut pro ovibus Christi Suae Beatitudini creditis hoc onus ingentis fructus et gloriae, sui-ipsius animi magnitudine dignum suscipiat, curando etiam, ut unum codicem graecum, unum item hebraeum quoad fieri potest correctum sua ipsius opera habeat ecclesia sancta Dei."

^{10.} CT. V, p. 27.

^{11.} CT. V, p. 28 nota d. — Hic prima vice apparet vox "authentica" in sensu editionis "auctoritatem habentis". Cf. A. Allgerer, Authentisch auf dem Konzil von Trient, in Historisches Jahrbuch LX, 1940, p. 147.

^{12.} Cf. Van Gulik-Eubel, op. et l. cit. p. 112.

^{13.} CT. V, p. 29.

Reliqui duo abusus, respicientes interpretationem privatam Sacrae Scripturae eiusque impressionem seu divulgationem, heic nostra non intersunt.¹⁴

Istis propositionibus praelectis, Cardinalis Petrus Pacheccus Giennensis (Jaën in Hispania) movit quaestionem versionum in lingua vernacula, quae in Hispania sub severissimis poenis prohibitae erant.¹⁵

Respondit Cardinalis Christophorus Madrutius Tridentinus, instantissime rogans Patres Conciliares ne umquam omnino tamquam abusum considerarent versionem Bibliorum in lingua vulgari. Audiamus nobilissima et libera verba Cardinalis Tridentini, — tam vera sunt quam utilia et semper actualia remanent: "Nollem equidem adversa i sententiae Rmi D. mei card. Giennensis; sed pro ea quae data est nobis libertate loquendi in hoc loco, summa cum synceritate dicere cogor ea, quae mihi adeo vera videntur, ut tergiversari non possint. Illud autem est, ne umquam patiamur, versionem bibliorum in maternam linguam numerari inter abusus. Quid enim (ait) dicent adversarii nostri iis, quibus quotidie vana praedicant, si sciverint velle nos e manibus hominum evellere sacram scripturam, quam saepius Paulus apostolus numquam ab ore nostro separandam praecepit?16 Scio ego, germana nostra lingua per matrem traditam esse orationem Dominicam, symbolum fidei et pleraque alia, quae omnes patresfamilias in tota Germania filiis infantibus docere solent, ex qua institutione nullum unquam scandalum hominum memoria advenit . . . Quamobrem oro, Patres, ne vobis in mentem aliquando veniat, ne dicam, ut hanc rem inter abusus numeremus, sed ne etiam controvertamus, posse abusum nuncupari".17

Ad tam clara et urgentia verba Cardinalis Hispanus respondit se non affirmasse illum esse abusum, sed petiisse ut consideraretur casus, quia, adiunxit, "sciebam in Hispania hac in re aliquando latas

^{14.} Circa hanc historicam Congregationem Generalem diei 17 Martii 1546 videri etiam possunt diaria Severoli CT. I, p. 36 sq., et Massarelli *ibid.* p. 436 et 514 sq.

^{15.} CT. V, p. 31, nota 1.

^{16. &}quot;Haec in genere de s. Paulo dicta sunt. Cf. Rom. 10, 8; I Cor. 15, 1 sq.; Philipp. 1, 27 sq.; 2 Tim. 3, 14 sq. et alia." Ita in nota l. cit.

^{17.} CT. V, p. 30-31; comp. I, p. 37.

et observatas esse leges, quas Paulus II 18 confirmasset".

Responsum Cardinalis Tridentini est categoricum et forsitan aliquantum ironicum: "Paulus ille pontifex et omnes alii pontifices quandoque possunt et potuerunt errare, licet non dicam eos errasse (curiae diplomatia non est nata heri!...); Pauli autem praeceptum errare non potuit, qui voluit evangelium Christi numquam ab ore nostro amoveri. Quare mihi videtur, de hac re non esse controvertendum". 19

Hoc non obstante, Cardinalis Hispanus non deposuit arma, sed iterum iterumque institit,²⁰ at nihil est adeptus, teste Severolo scribente: "Adhuc haud parva controversia fuit circa bibliorum versionem in linguam vernaculam, quam hispani per fas et nefas volebant proliihere atque haud semel institerunt; ita quidem egerunt, quia hoc in Hispania iam prohibitum est sub severissimis poenis, ne quis scil. legat aut vertat Biblia in lingua materna. Sed Itali atque Galli omnes illis resistunt (ma li Italiani, ancho i Francesi tutti li resistono), ita ut, mea opinione, controversia non ventura sit in congregationem generalem".²¹ Re quidem vera, numquam pervenit in congregationem generalem; atque versio Bibliorum in linguam vulgarem numquam a Concilio tamquam abusus considerata est.

Ad varias observationes circa proposita remedia Episcopus Fanenis, Petrus Bertanus O. P., 22 planissime et optime respondit: "Recepimus vulgatam, quia a Hieronymo et ab ecclesia semper recepta est et antiqua... Recepta est vulgata tamquam authentica; alias non reiciunt, quia illae etiam bonae, sed ista melior. Quod autem habeant haeresim aliquae, quia ab haereticis sunt editae: aliquae bonae editae sunt licet ab haereticis; propterea addiderunt: quatenus invant... Una est recepta, ut una tantum ecclesia pro authentica utatur et non confuse pluribus." 23

^{18. &}quot;In Paulo II Papa Pacheccum errasse putaverim, cum nec tempus concordet nec quicquam huiusmodi de hoc Pontifice sciatur," (CT. V. p. 37 n. 1).

^{19.} Ibid. p. 31.

^{20.} Cf. Massarelli Diarium III, CT. I, p. 518-580.

^{21.} Hercules Severolus, Bernardino Maffeo, 24 Martii 1546; CT. X, p. 429, l. 32-37. Cf. ibidem epistula Card. Cervini, A. Cardinali Farnesio, 17 Martii; p. 421. — Videsis recens editum studium F. Cavallera, La Bible en langue vulgaire au Concile de Trente (IVe Session), Mélanges E. Podechard (Lyon 1945) p. 37-56.

^{22.} Van Gulik-Eubel, op. cit. III, p. 194.

^{23.} CT. V, p. 37, p. 24-32.

Die 1 Aprilis, quaestione canonis absoluta, in congregatione generali transierunt ad abusus considerandos. Cardinales Tridentinus et Giennensis volebant ut sola Vulgata versio admitteretur, ceteris reiectis. De mandato Cardinalis de Monte, idem Episcopus Fanensis respondit: "Si placet, inquit, ego facile has dubitationes resolvam. Nam advertendum est, quod nos non ducimus pro abusu diversas et varias esse bibliorum translationes, quoniam et hoc antiquis semper temporibus toleratum fuit et hodie tolerari debet; sed dicimus abusum esse plures haberi translationes ut authenticas... Propterea hanc unam solam authenticam esse voluimus vulgatam editionem, tum quia antiqua est et semper in manibus Christianorum habita, tum etiam, ne adversariis ipsis detur ansa dicendi, nos hactenus libros non probos habuisse . . . Alias autem non reiecimus, quoniam noluimus christianam libertatem restringere; immo ne hereticorum quidem translationes reicere voluimus, idque exemplo veterum. Nam constat Aquilam, Symmachum et Theodotionem hereticos quidem fuisse, et nihilominus ab illa antiqua ecclesia non fuere rejecta illorum translationes." 24

Sabbato, die 3 Aprilis adhuc in congregatione generali deliberarunt circa abusus.²⁵ Ex actis apparet, omnes Patres concordes solam Vulgatam in usum Ecclesiae admisisse; favebant itidem versioni graecae Septuaginta; nonnulli vero, Cardinalis Pachecci Giennensis opiniones secuti, volebant ut ceterae versiones respuerentur.

Cardinalis praeses controversiam breviter contraxit dicens quoad Vulgatam: "Bene discussa; propterea ad aedificium procedatur. Pars maior inclinat, quod illa suscipiatur vulgata; tamen videtur contradicere, ut dixit Giennesis", 26 scilicet ut aliae versiones declararentur non reiectae (non reiciendo alias...)

Votum igitur Patrum exquisitum est per partes:

"Utrum placeat declarari, habendam esse unam tantum editionem vulgatam; etiam de aliis non fiat mentio in decreto?

"Placuit omnibus, vulgatam recipi et de aliis non fieri mentionem." ²⁷

Deinde decisum est de versionibus haereticis mentionem non

^{24.} CT. I, p. 42, l. 3-15. Hic citavi diarium Severoli, quia explicitius loquitur. Cf. V, p. 50, l. 31-35.

^{25.} CT. V, p. 58 sq.

^{26.} Ibid. p. 65, l. 1-3.

^{27.} Ibid. p. 65, 1. 35-37.

esse faciendam. Quantum vero ad graecam versionem Septuaginta, haec in sequenti quaestione continetur: "Utrum placeat, habere unam editionem veterem et vulgatam in unoquoque idiomate (scil. graeco, hebraeo et latino), qua omnes utantur pro authentica in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus et praedicationibus, et quod nemo illam reicere audeat aut illi contradicere"? Plerique Patres censuerunt omittenda esse verba "in unoquoque idiomate etc.," ac dicendum tantum "unam vulgatam etc." Responsa ad alios abusus heic nostra non intersunt. Die 7 Aprilis adhuc alia congregatio generalis habita est, in qua plerique censuerunt absque mora promulganda esse decreta circa Libros Sacros et reformandos abusus.

Decretum. Die igitur sequenti 8 Aprilis 1546, in quarta sessione Concilii Tridentini, sub Paulo Papa III, Pontifice Maximo, sollemniter promulgata sunt: 1° decretum quo recipiuntur Libri Sacri et traditiones apostolicae: 2° decretum quo recipitur Vulgata.

Notanda est conclusio *primi* decreti, quod manifeste dogmaticum est: "Si quis autem libros ipsos integros cum omnibus suis partibus,²⁹ prout in ecclesia catholica legi consueverunt et in veteri vulgata latina habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit, et traditiones praedictas (apostolicas) sciens et prudens contempserit: *anathema sit*".³⁰

Sequitur secundum decretum de recipienda Vulgata: "Insuper eadem sacrosancta synodus considerans, non parum utilitatis accedere posse ecclesiae Dei, si ex omnibus latinis editionibus, quae circumferuntur sacrorum librorum, quaenam pro authentica habenda sit, innotescat: statuit et declarat, ut haec ipsa vetus et vulgata editio, quae longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa ecclesia probata est, in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, praedicationibus et expositionibus pro authentica habeatur, et quod nemo illam reicere quovis praetextu audeat vel praesumat".³¹

Collatum propositioni supra citatae Commissionis pro abusibus, hoc secundum decretum in forma sua definitiva sequentes prae se

^{28.} Ibid. p. 66, 1. 2-5.

^{29.} Agitur de partibus dictis "deutero-canonicis" quas reiciebant protestantes, non autem de singulis versibus vel sententiis, quas critici probant esse glossas sive quoad originales textus, sive in codicibus vel variis editionibus ipsius Vulgatae. Cf. G. Bonaccorsi, Questioni Bibliche (1904) I. La Volgata al Concilio di Trento, p. 18-21.

^{30.} CT. V, p. 91, 1. 27-29.

^{31.} Ibid. p. 91, 1. 35 ad p. 92, 1. 3.

fert notandas differentias: 32 1 decretum non considerat nisi latinas editiones: "si ex omnibus latinis versionibus"; directe igitur non respicit nisi latinam Ecclesiam;38 2 decretum non declarat, prout declaravit propositio etsi negative, auctoritatem Septuaginta: "non detrahendo tamen auctoritati purae et verae interpretationis septuaginta interpretum ..."; 3 decretum iam non alludit ad alias versiones, prout Commissio proposuerat: "neque reiciendo alias editiones, quatenus authenticae illius (vulgatae) intelligentiam iuvant"; 1 natura Vulgatae, vel potius ratio eius auctoritatis vel authenticitatis clarius est expressa: "(vetus et vulgata editio) quae longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa ecclesia probata est"; demum non iam fit mentio de incorrectione Vulgatae propter Ecclesiae honorem, neque de praeparanda, cura Summi Pontificis, editione correcta; hoc autem statutum remansii neque tantum pro Vulgata latina, sed et pro textibus graeco et hebraco, prout apparet e litteris quas die 26 Aprilis Cardinales Legati ad Cardinalem Farnesium scripserunt: "Conclusio circa hanc rem accepta haec est: ut nos legati nomine Synodi Sanctitati Suae scribamus, prout praesentibus scribimus (come facemo per la presente), supplices rogantes ut dignetur quantocius ordinare correctionem primo editionis latinae, deinde etiam graecae et hebraeae".34

Vulgata latina emendata et promulgata a Sixto V cum bulla "Aeternus ille" die 1 Martii 1590, novae revisioni subiecta est sub

32. Conferuntur propositio et decretum: *Propositio*

Decretum

Primus abusus est habere varias editiones sacrae scripturae et illis velle uti pro authenticis in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, expositionibus et praedicationibus.

Remedium est, habere unicam tantum editionem, veterem scilicet et vulgatam, qua omnes utantur pro authentica in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, expositionibus et praedicationibus, et quod nemo illam reicere audeat aut illi contradicere: (2) non detrahendo tamen auctoritati purae et verae interpretationis septuaginta interpretum, qua nonnumquam usi sunt apostoli; (3) neque reiciendo alias versiones, quatenus authenticae illius intelligentiam iuvant.

Insuper eadem sacrosancta synodus considerans, non parum utilitatis accedere posse ecclesiae Dei, si ex omnibus (1) latinis editionibus quae circumferuntur sacrorum librorum, quaenam pro authentica habenda sit, innotescat: statuit et declarat, ut haec ipsa vetus et vulgata editio, (4) quae longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa ecclesia probata est, in publicis lect., disp., praed. et expositionibus pro authentica habeatur, et quod nemo illam reicere quovis praetextu audeat vel praesumat.

Secundus abusus est nonnulla incorrectio codicum etc. (5)

^{33.} A. Allgeier eodem sensu scribit, quod in decreto "inhaltlich der Blick auf die lateinische Welt begrenzt wird" (l. cit. p. 151).
34. CT. X, p. 471, l. 10-14.

Clemente VIII: hic nobis dedit Vulgatam actualem, dictam Sixto-Clementinam, quae lucem vidit anno 1596 exeunte: 46 annis post decretum anni 1546.85

Ante textum latinum editus fuerat textus graecus Septuaginta anno 1587, promulgatus a Sixto V.36

Documenta recens inventa et publici iuris facta probarunt, Summos Pontifices eodem illo tempore constituisse specialem commissionem pro edendo textu hebraeo Veteris Testamenti, praeside Cardinali Marco Antonio Columna,37 aliamque pro edendo textu graeco Novi Testamenti praeside S. Roberto Bellarmino." Ob rationes hucusque ignotas, labores illarum commissionum non habuerunt felicem exitum.

Sed revertamur ad Vulgatam latinam, atque videamus quisnam sit sensus qualisque vis declaratae eius authenticitatis.

II. SENSUS ET VIS DECRETI.

Decretum disciplinare. Ex actis Concilii, prout hucusque compendiose relata sunt, sequitur cum evidentia decretum, quo recipiatur et imponatur Vulgata, esse decretum formaliter disciplinare; admirationem vero movet, quod a multis theologis olim, praesertim Hispanis, ceu dogmaticum decretum fuerit consideratum,1 et quod

^{35.} Cf. De latina Bibliorum versione quae dicitur "Vulgata", Angelicum IV, 1927, p. 179-180 (separatum p. 29-30)
36. Cf. E. Mangenot, Septante, Dict. Bible Vig. V, col. 1639-1641, 37. De revisione Bibliae hebraicae iuxta votum Concilii Tridentini, Angelicum

XVIII, 1941, p. 387-394. 38. Cf. S. Tromp, De revisione textus Novi Testamenti facta Romae a Commissione Pontificia circa an. 1617 praeside S. R. Bellarmino, Biblica XXII, 1941, p. 303-306; et XXIV, 1943, p. 304-307.

^{1.} Cf. R. Cornely, Historica et critica introductio in U. T. libros sacros; I. Introductio generalis² (1894) p. 460-487. Pag. 467 legitur: "Mirum est, quantopere prior huius decreti pars ab catholicis vix non omnibus et olim sit impugnata hodieque impugnetur, quantasque controversias inter catholicos excitaverit. Maxime in Hispania de hac quaestione disputatum est," usque adeo, inquit P. Mariana, ut a probris et contumeliis, quibus se mutuo foedabant adversarii, ad tribunalia ventum sit... "Immo gravissimi theologi, qui maxima fama florebant nec aliis in quaestionibus ullo modo timidos sese esse monstrabant, in hac una sententiam suam scripto prodere non sunt ausi." Scio quidem, inquit Dom. Bannez O. Praed., si ab Ecclesia interrogarer, quid viva voce responderem: interim pio iustoque silentio me contineo. "(Bannez in Imp partem, q. I, art 8)". Videsis Bonaccorsi, op. cit. p. 22 sqq.; E. Mangenot in Dict. Bible Vig. V, col. 2486 sqq.; nostrum opusculum De Vulgata (1927) iam citatum, p. 27-28; I. Balestri, Biblicae introductionis generalis elementa (1932) p. 231-237; Höpfl-Gut, Introductio generalis (1940) p. 383-389.

talis adhuc sit opinio nonnullorum, etsi semper fiant rariores.2 Pluries enim Cardinales Legati declararunt se semper tractaturos esse primo de dogmate, deinde de reformandis abusibus dogmati conexis.³ Dogma heic erat canon Librorum Sacrorum; inter abusus primo loco recensita est versionum varietas, cui oppositus est, in remedium, usus exclusivus Vulgatae traditionalis. Abusui igitur opponitur usus... et reformatio.

Idem character disciplinaris collegitur haud minus manifestus e verbis in decretis de Sacra Scriptura adhibitis. Nam dum in decreto de canone, quod certo certius est dogmaticum, adversus negatores profertur "anathema sit"; in decreto contra de usu Vulgatae consideratur Ecclesiae utilitas: "considerans non parum utilitatis accedere posse Ecclesiae Dei," propterea Concilium "statuit et declarat (non docet, nec definit, sed praecipit), ut Vulgata exclusive adhibeatur "in publicis lectionibus etc." (nota bene "in publicis"; si ageretur de fide, obligaret non minus in privato quam in publico); et demum concluditur decretum cum praecepto: "quod nemo illam (Vulgatam) reicere quovis praetextu audeat vel praesumat."

Authenticitas Vulgatae. Concilium statuit et declarat, ut Vulgata in Ecclesiae vita publica "pro authentica habeatur." Quo sensu sumenda est hic vox "authentica"?

Secundum iurisconsultum Iulianum: "Authenticum est scriptum aliquod quod ex se fidem facit in iudicio et supremae est auctoritatis, ut a nullo reici vel in quaestionem vocari debeat", 4 — haec sunt fere verba a Concilio adhibita, paulo antea citata, de Vulgata: "ut... pro authentica habeatur, et ut nemo illam reicere quovis praetextu audeat vel praesumat." Aliis verbis, declarat Concilium Vulgatam habere auctoritatem quae "a nullo reici vel in quaestionem vocari" possit "in confirmandis dogmatibus et instaurandis in Ecclesia moribus."

Haec doctrinalis vel iuridica auctoritas Vulgatae posset a priori fluere aut ex perfecta eius conformitate cum primigenio textu autographo, qui sua divina origine talem auctoritatem possidet, aut ex declaratione competentis auctoritatis quae heic est Ecclesia. Iamvero oecumenicum Concilium non invocavit talem cum textu originali

^{2.} Recenti tempore strenue propugnata a Card. I. B. Franzelin (Tractatus de div. trad. et scriptura. 1896. p. 473 sqq.) contra C. Vercellone, (Sulla autenticità delle singole parti della Bibbia Volgata secondo il decreto tridentino, 1866); sed Franzelin ipse refutatus est a G. Banaccorsi, op. cit. p. 22 sqq.
3. Cf. supra nota 4-7.
4. Citatur a Bonaccorsi, op. cit. p. 31.

conformitatem, quin contra imperfectiones agnovit non tantum codicum Vulgatae, sed ipsius versionis, prout collegitur ex actis.⁵ Ad declarandam Vulgatam authenticam seu auctoritate praeditam, Concilium invocavit explicite saecularem eius usum in Ecclesia, infallibili in rebus fidei et morum Spiritus Sancti assistentia: "(vetus et vulgata editio) quae longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata est." Rite observat P. Lagrange: "Une édition reçue dans l'Église ne pouvait être contraire à la vérité dogmatique", (i.e. Bibliorum editio in Ecclesia recepta, non poterat esse veritati dogmaticae contraria).

Formaliter ergo disciplinare, decretum de usu exclusivo publico Vulgatae supponit dogmaticum factum, scilicet Spiritus Sancti assistentiam Ecclesiae promissam in rebus fidei et morum, inter quas indubie est traditionalis usus versionis Vulgatae latinae Sacrarum Scripturarum; idemque decretum habet dogmaticas sequelas, scilicet inerrantiam doctrinalem Vulgatae et substantialem eius conformitatem cum textibus a Deo inspiratis. Vulgata est genuina Biblia, verbum Dei affirmatum ab Ecclesia: est praecipuus fons fidei nostrae, indeque haurire possumus argumenta, quin unquam eius doctrinalem valorem in dubium vocare possimus. Qui hanc Vulgatae auctoritatem negaret, ipso facto negaret Ecclesiae infallibilitatem, atque eius doctrinali magisterio subtraheret Spiritus Sancti assistentiam.

Sed de conformitate perfecta et adhuc minus de primatu huius latinae versionis quoad originales textus aut quoad alias antiquas versiones, graecam vel orientales, numquam in Concilio actum est.

Tamquam versio — seu formaliter ut versio — Vulgata est opus humanum, quamvis sit confecta a sancto Doctore specialiter a Deo excitato et conducto; et tamquam humanum opus continet traduc-

^{5.} Cardinalis A. Farnesius die 29 Maii 1546 ad Cardinales Legatos scripsit decretum de Vulgata Romae haud levem causare turbationem, "parendo... strano non poter rifiutare la detta editione in quelli luoghi, dove il senso del testo comune Hebreo et Greco non concorda o non è ben espresso nel Latino, alla quale difficoltà non vedono come si rimedi con la correttione che si designa di fare, perchè se si correggeranno solamente li errori venuti dal tempo et dalla negligentia delli scrittori e delle stampe, ne rimarranno molti, che male si possono imputare a questa cagione" (CT. X, p. 507, l. 23-28). Responderunt legati die 8/9 Iunii sequentis: "circa alli lochi, che in essa (Volgata) fossero oscuri, inetti, barbari, mal intelligibili, non e tolto nè prohibito ad alcuno di potere o con interpretatione o con annotatione o con nuova traduttione dichiararli et illustrarli". (Ibid. p. 519, l. 24-27). Cf. Bonaccorsi, op. cit. p. 43-52.

^{6.} R B. 1908, p. 104.

tiones perfectibiles et perficiendas, plus minusve mendosas, errores nominum et numerorum. Insuper est versio christiana seu interpretatio christiana; exprimit igitur quandoque textum in sensu messianico magis explicito; v. gr. Is. XLV, 8: "Rorate, caeli, desuper, et nubes pluant Justum; aperiatur terra, et germinet Salvatorem," id est Messiam; dum hebraice legitur abstractum "iustitiam" et "salutem" loco concreti "Justum" et "Salvatorem". Quandoque sic dictas versiones introducit, quae revera sunt omnino novae creationes, v. gr. Is. XI, to: "Et erit sepulcrum eius gloriosum," magnifica prophetia futurae resurrectionis Messiae, — si foret tamen genuinus sensus prophetae, qui contra dicit: "Et erit habitatio (quieta) eius gloriosa," scilicet Terra Sancta; item Aggaeus II, 8: "Et veniet Desideratus (Messias) omnibus gentibus," dum contra hebraicus textus dicit: "Et venient pretiosa (i.e. thesauri) omnium gentium"; atque talia exempla facile multiplicari possent.7 Nunc vero quaeretis forsitan: "Quomodo Vulgata dici potest authentica, si continet tam evidentes versiones liberas et mendosas, etiam in materia doctrinali?" Respondeo: quia Vulgata duo elementa aeque infallibilia continet, quae theologus eamdem citans deberet semper caute distinguere: scilicet genuinum verbum Dei inspiratum, ubi cum originali concordat (qui casus est ordinarius); et solum testimonium ecclesiasticum, ubi ab originali recedit; in priore casu theologus poterit citare textum Vulgatae tamquam argumentum Sacrae Scripturae; at in altero, de traditionis argumento debet loqui.

Textus originales et versiones antiquae. Auctoritas vel valor peculiaris textuum primigeniorum et versionum antiquarum, Septuaginta v. gr. et Pesitta, nullo modo minuitur declarata authenticitate Vulgatae, quasi haec sola libros a Deo inspiratos contineret, aut quasi eos contineret melius quam textus hebraeus, graecus vel syriacus etc. Primigenii textus Veteris Novique Testamenti, sicut et aliae versiones antiquae, totum suum valorem conservant. Immo, primigenii textus a se vel a sua immediata divina origine auctoritatem vel authenticitatem omnino singularem possident, a qua tamquam a fonte promanat auctoritas versionum atque ipsius Vul-

^{7.} Cf. Bonaccorsi, op. cit. p. 60-66.

^{8.} Cardinales Legati diserte scripserunt ad Cardinalem A. Farnesium: "per l'approbatione della quale (Volgata) però non si dannano le altre, che fussero cattoliche et coadjuvassero la intelligentia di questa, che sola deve esser authentica; ma sensa altrimenti nominarle, ciascuna si lascia nella sua prima dispositione" (CT. X, p. 470-471).

gatae. Insuper versiones antiquae sunt authenticae pro sua cuiusque Ecclesia eodem modo ac Vulgata pro Ecclesia latina, et quidem propter eamdem rationem, scilicet propter usum suum saecularem in Ecclesia infallibili in rebus fidei et morum. Quam bene haec omnia, quae nobis est veritas sensus communis, conciliantur cum sapienti praecepto Leonis XIII immortalis memoriae: "Sua habenda erit, inquit, ratio reliquarum versionum, quas laudavit usurpavitque antiquitas, maxime codicum primigeniorum".9

Nullus veritates illas, tam ignoratas et deturpatas, maiore vi et perspicuitate exposuit defenditque quam S. Robertus Bellarminus in aureo suo opusculo cui titulus: De editione Latina Vulgata, quo sensu a Concilio Tridentino definitum sit, ut pro authentica habeatur. 10 Quoad textus originales et eorum auctoritatem scribit: "Editio hebraica et graeca in iis, quae ab ipsis sacris scriptoribus hebraice et graece scripta sunt, non minus sunt authentica quam vulgata latina editio, immo magis, cum illae sint fontes, ista rivus...; neque vulgata anteponitur omnibus editionibus, sed solum aliis latinis.

"At, inquiunt, latina declaratur authentica, hebraea et graeca non declarantur authenticae; igitur illa anteponitur. Respondeo, hebraeam et graecam, cum sint ipsi fontes, per se esse authenticas, neque egere Concilii approbatione; latinam, quia est versio, approbatione indiguisse. Praeterea Vulgatam latinam ideo authenticam fieri debuisse, ut discerneretur ab aliis innumeris versionibus latinis; hebraeam et graecam, quia unicae sunt, non eguisse tali signo discretivo".¹¹

Illis vero qui primigenios textus hebraeum et graecum tamquam corruptos et depravatos contemnunt, respondet S. Bellarminus severe: "Praecipuus thesaurus Ecclesiae est Scriptura divina; at maxima ex parte hic thesaurus perit, si dicamus ipsos fontes divinarum Scripturarum nullam fidem iam mereri, et ut corruptos et depravatos reici posse, nihil autem superesse nisi versionem unam, eamque iam variam ut vix duo codices inveniantur, qui in omnibus conveniant. Profecto valde male merentur de Ecclesia, qui tam insignem thesaurum illi eripiunt, quique de scriptis originalibus Apostolorum

^{9.} Providentissimus; cf. E. B. n. 91.

^{10.} Editum a Patre X.-M. Le Bachelet, Bell.urmin et la Bible Sixto-Clémentine (Etudes de Théologie historique, 3; 1911) p. 107-125.

^{11.} Cf. op. et loc. cit. p. 114-115.

et Prophetarum tam contemptibiliter loquuntur, ut ea authentica esse negare non vereantur". 12

Quod ad versiones orientales antiquas attinet, idem Ecclesiae Doctor scribit sapientissime: "Ecclesia catholica non solum est apud Latinos, sed etiam apud Syros, Armenos, Arabes et Graecos etc. Ergo non debet solum Scriptura authentica esse apud Latinos, sed etiam apud alias nationes, et maxime apud illas quae utuntur fontibus. Quis igitur credat Concilium Tridentinum ita voluisse solam latinam editionem authenticam, ut simul assereret Ecclesiam graecam et syriacam non habere nec habuisse a multis annorum centuriis authenticam Scripturam?" ¹⁸

Declaratio conciliaris de authenticitate Vulgatae, quae nullam eidem confert intrinsecam dotem neque ullam novam auctoritatem quoad se,¹⁴ manifestat quoad nos intrinsecam eius auctoritatem; quam auctoritatem possident etiam originales textus et versiones antiquae, quae tamen numquam talis explicitae declarationis fuerunt obiectum.

Decretum, imponendo publicum usum Vulgatae prae ceteris latinis versionibus tunc lectitatis, has minime condemnat: possunt esse bonae; Vulgata admittitur et imponitur ceu melior pro Ecclesia, haud quidem collatione cum illis instituta, sed quia indubie magis authentica in rebus fidei et morum, cum longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata sit.

Interpretatio decreti Tridentini, olim tam acriter discussa, nunc authentice declarata est a Summo Pontifice Pio XII, gloriose regnante, in recens editis encyclicis litteris Divino afflante Spiritu: "Quod... Vulgatam Tridentina Synodus esse voluit latinam conversionem, qua omnes pro authentica uterentur, observat Summus

^{12.} Ibid. p. 116, 5° — Eodem sensu scripsit Franciscanus fr. Joannes Consilii, theologus Concilii Tridentini: "Cum ergo manifestum sit, multos esse opus nos (in Vulgata) errores, si dicere voluerimus non esse adhibendam fidem fontibus ipsis, hebraeo et graeco, id tantum ageremus, ut fateamur, nusquam nos habere scripturae veritatem" (CT. XII, p. 538, l. 27-29). Cf. etiam R. Cornely, Introductio generalis² (1894) p. 283-293: De textus massorethici auctoritate dogmatica et critica.

^{13.} Loc. cit. p. 116, 3°.

^{14.} Sirletus idem observavit die 17 Aprilis 1546 ad Cardinalem Cervinum scribens: "...alcuni m' han detto, quantunque homini di poco momento, che quella parola, che si dice essere stata determinata in la ultima sessione, ut editio vetus et vulgata pro authentica habeatur, non par che satisfacci. Io l'ho risposto... massime dicendo, che sia autentica quella traduttione che la S. madre Chiesa ha sempre autenticata e tenuta, e quella parola que legi consueverunt me par che risolvi tucto. Intendendose da qui, che niuna cosa di novo s' è determinato" (CT. X, p. 939, l. 16-23)

Pontifex, id quidem, ut omnes norunt, latinam solummodo respicit Ecclesiam, eiusdemque publicum Scripturae usum, ac nequaquam, procul dubio, primigeniorum textuum auctoritatem et vim minuit. Neque enim de primigeniis textibus tunc agebatur, sed de latinis, quae illa aetate circumferebantur conversionibus, inter quas idem Concilium illam iure praeferendam edixit, quae longo tot saeculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata est. Haec igitur praecellens Vulgatae auctoritas seu, ut aiunt, authentica non ob criticas praesertim rationes a Concilio statuta est, sed ob illius legitimum in Ecclesiis usum, per tot saeculorum decursum habitum; quo quidem usu demonstratur eamdem, prout intellexit et intellegit Ecclesia, in rebus fidei ac morum ab omni prorsus esse errore immunem; ita ut, ipsa Ecclesia testante et confirmante, in disputationibus, lectionibus, concionibusque tuto ac sine errandi periculo, proferri possit; atque adeo eiusmodi authentia non primario nomine critica, sed iuridica potius vocatur". 18

Versiones novae. Vulgatae declarata authenticitas nihil omnino praeiudicat vel imponit quoad versiones novas. Textus originales cum sint et qui authentici atque a priori magis genuinum verbum inspiratum quam textus latinus quae est versio humana, consequitur cum evidentia versiones factas e textibus originalibus praeferendas esse — ceteris paribus — versionibus factis secundum Vulgatam. Erronea igitur est et multum turbare potest Episcopos et Censores sequens sententia, quae legitur in noto manuali iuris canonici conscripto a P. Matthaeo Conte a Coronata (edito an. 1931): "Vigilantia Episcoporum (in edendas versiones biblicas) id importat ut Episcopi testentur versionem esse fidelem et cum originali concordare; quia tamen nullus Sacrae Scripturae textus originalis declaratus est authenticus, pro originali accipitur textus latinus Vulgatae." 16 Simili modo docet Ius canonicum Wernz-Vidal (editio anni 1935; haec sententia tamen est solius Patris Vidal, minime clarmi. canonistae P. Wernz): "Vigilantia Episcoporum eo spectat, ut non publicentur lingua vulgari versiones de quarum fidelitate et concordantia cum originali (i.e. cum Vulgata latina) non con-

^{15.} Cf. AAS. 1943, p. 309. Videsis ctiam Lettera della Pontificia Commissione per gli Studi Biblici agli Eccmi Arcivescovi e Vescovi d'Italia, diei 20 Aug. 1941; AAS. 1941, p. 468.

^{16.} Institutiones iuris canonici ad usum utriusque Cleri et Scholarum II (1931) p. 326.

stet". 17 Si s. Hieronymous qui, aetate et scientia proficiendo, ter castigavit aut vertit Libros Sacros: primo emendando veterem Vulgatam, deinde sequendo graecum textum hexaplarem, ac demum vertendo "secundum hebraicam veritatem"; si s. Hieronymus rediret hodie post quindecim saecula studiorum biblicorum et orientalium; si rediret hodie ad manus habens grammaticas perfectissimas, optima vocabularia, concordantias et editiones criticas textus sacri in variis linguis, nonne vobis videtur fore, Egregii Domini, ut et ipse posset atque vellet nobis dare versionem latinam Bibliorum fideliorem aptioremque textibus primigeniis, quam illam quam abhinc quindecim saeculis fecit?18

Si decretum Tridentinum nihil omnino praeiudicat quoad auctoritatem versionum orientalium antiquarum, ita neque afficit editiones novas illarum pro Orientalibus carholicis faciendas, neque versiones pro iisdem parandas in ipsorum idiomate hodierno. Editiones catholicae vertionum orientalium antiquarum non tantum possunt, sed debent remanere tales quales, dummodo earum canon sit conformis canoni definito in Concilio Tridentino. Quantum vero ad earum textum, etsi quandoque sit brevior aut fusior Vulgatae, remanere debet qualis semper fuit, perinde ac textus latinus, qui idem prae se fert phaenomenon seu similes exhibet differentias relatus ad textus originales. Quod demum attinet ad versiones novas pro Orientalibas catholicis faciendas, hae nullo modo faciendae sunt secondum Volgatam authenticam declaratam pro Latinis, sed proprias versiones liturgicas sequi possunt, et melius adhuc commendatur - sicut pro Latinis - ut deinceps fiant secundum originales textus. Errarunt igitur Missionarii illi latini, qui contendebant textus syriacum aut aethiopicum imprimendos esse correctos, prout tarı falso quam ingenue dictitabant, secundum latinam Vulgatam, aut qui Orientalibus catholicis iam imposuerunt versiones vernaculas factas secundum eamdem Vulgatam. Atque haud parum iudicii expertem se prodidit Delegatus Apostolicus ille in Orientalibus partibus, qui ceu condicionem sui "Imprimatur" statuit, ut versus suppositi desicientes in Pesitta collata Vulgatae, v. gr. in libro Eccle-

^{17.} Ius canonicum IV, 2 (1935) p. 139. Observandum est tamen nihil simile legi in authentico magno opere clar.mi. P. Fr. X. Wernz, Ius decretalium III, 12 (1908) p. 113 sq.; ideo sententia illa imputanda est soli Patri Vidal.
18. Cf. responsum pont. Commissionis Biblicae De versionibus Sacrae Scripturae in linguas vernaculas; AAS. 1943, p. 270.

siastici, ibidem adderentur saltem inter uncinos. Alibi demonstrabo tales exigentias numquam neque a s. Congregatione de Propaganda pro negotiis orientalibus neque a s. Congregatione pro Ecclesia Orientali fuisse suggestas vel approbatas.

Quod pertinet ad libros spirituales vel liturgicos privatos in lingua vulgari, sicut parva missalia, vesperalia et "parochiales", superfluum videtur repetendum decretum Tridentinum "de usu publico Vulgatae latinae" illos nullo modo respicere, neque ullo modo illos afficere. Libri illi destinantur privatae devotioni fidelium: iamvero patet devotionem tanto efficacius foveri, quanto clarior seu planior est versio pericoparum biblicarum; versio autem facta immediate secundum originales textus, a priori erit clarior ac planior quam versio versionis in multis mendosae. Idem hodie affirmari potest de praedicatione iuxta insigne exemplum Summi Pontificis, qui in augustis orationibus suis numquam textum biblicum citat, quem non probaverit conformem originali textui hebraeo aut graeco.

PROGRESSUS ET VOTUM. — Concludo.

A Concilio Tridentino descendimus ita ad hodiernam praxim; iamvero ab hoc Concilio ad dies nostros, decursu quattuor saeculorum, progressus apparet iam peractus in triplici campo: in praelectionibus, in praedicatione et in oratione liturgica; mutatis enim circumstantiis, decretum "obtinet applicationem mitiorem magisque conformem novis exigentiis seu necessitatibus". 19 — Hodie Sacrae Scripturae professor, digne apteque gravi suo muneri praeparatus, debet explicare Libros Sacros secundum originalem textum: haec est primordialis condicio exegeseos scientificae, quae scrutatur et illustrat litteralem sensum ab hagiographo et Spiritu Sancto intentum, sensum directe expressum in originalibus textibus. — Hic dignus modus verbum Dei tractandi a cathedra professorum transeat oportet ad pulpitum praedicatorum; idem igitur progressus faciendus est in praedicatione, prout diximus paulo supra; atque in verbo "praedicationis" comprehenduntur omnes lectiones et explicationes

^{19.} Ita Bonaccorsi, op. cit. p. 74.

textus sacri, quae in ecclesiis traduntur fidelibus.²⁰ — Demum, idem progressus iam apparet in oratione liturgica, in qua recenter Summus Pontifex Pius Papa XII iis omnibus, qui officio tenentur Horarias Preces cotidie recitare, benigne concessit ut, sive in privata sive in publica recitatione, si libuerit, nova Psalterii versione secundum originalem textum confecta utantur.21

Hinc licet nobis votum proferre, ut aliquando Professoribus Sacrae Scripturae et Theologis versio latina totius Sacrae Scripturae secundum textus criticos originales confecta offeratur. Hoc votum, haud secus ac novum Psalterium unanimi plausu acceptum, Vulgatam tamquam textum authenticum in rebus fidei et morum non supprimet: haec remanebit immutabilis tamquam veritatis arx, cum indelebilem suum titulum nobilitatis habeat, scilicet quindecies saecularem usum, quo in ipsa Ecclesia probata est.

JAC.-M. VOSTÉ, O.P.

^{20.} Hic est genuinus sensus responsi pont. Commissionis Biblicae de versionibus Sacrae Scripturae in linguas vernaculas (d. d. 22 Aug. 1943), cum in ultima paragrapho, ubi agitur de textu biblico a sacerdote celebrante praelegendo, addatur: "integra manente facultate illam ipsam versionem, si expediat, ope textus originalis vel alterius versionis magis perspicuae apte illustrandi". Ita enim versio legetur originalis textus et quidem critice restituti. Ne igitur deinceps nimis urgeatur vis seu obligatio decreti De usu versionum Sacrae Scripturae in ecclesiis (d. d. 30 Aprilis 1934). Meminerint omnes legentes Libros Sacros, se quo fidelius eorum litteralem sensum intellegunt et interprétantur, eo propiores esse menti et cordi inspirantis Dei O. M.

^{21.} Motu proprio: In cotidianis precibus; AAS, 1945, p. 65-67.

ST. BONAVENTURE AND THE POWER OF THE KEYS

PART II

IV. The Sacrament of Penance and the Forgiveness of Sins. A. The causality of the Sacrament of Penance.

AT the time of St. Bonaventure, practically everyone supposed that no instrumental power could directly and immediately cause the infusion of grace.1 Hence, it was denied that the Sacraments were effective of grace, if real causality were implied. Authors conceded, however, that the Sacraments disposed to grace and had a virtue of their own which exercised some kind of influence upon the soul. Concerning the nature of this virtue, two opinions prevailed.2 Some theologians said that the Sacraments possessed a created, spiritual force which produced a certain physical disposition to grace in the soul (causalitas physica dispositiva). Wherefore, they considered the Sacraments to be physical instruments, not of procuring grace itself, but of producing a physical disposition to grace. This was the opinion of Alexander of Hales, who taught that the Sacraments dispose the soul for the reception of grace and make the grace itself efficacious.3

Confessing that he did not quite grasp this opinion, St. Bonaventure, with the greatest caution and consideration, departs from the doctrine of his Master.4 He thereupon leans towards the teaching which attributes a certain moral causality to the Sacraments.5

^{1.} Bon. Op. Om., IV. Sent., Scholion II, p. 18.
2. Bon. Op. Om., IV. Sent., 28 b.
3. Alex. Hales, Summa Theol. p. IV, q. 5, m. 3 ad 5.
4. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent. 24 b — : "Utraque harum positionum satis videtur probabilis, haec tamen mihi videtur ad sustinendum facilior; nescio tamen, quae sit verior, quia cum loquimur de his quae sunt miraculi, non multum adhaerendum est rationi. Concedimus igitur, quod Sacramenta novae legis sunt causa et efficiunt et disponunt, extenso nomine, ut dictum est, et hoc securum est dicere; utrum autem plus habeant, nec volo affirmare nec negare".
5. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 23 a — : "Est etiam aliorum magnorum circa hoc opinio dicentium, quod Sacramentis non sit causalitas neque virtus aliqua, nec effectiva nec dispositiva ad gratiam, quae sit qualitas vel proprietas aliqua absoluta, sed per quandam assistentiam. Sacramento enim dicunt assistere divinam virtutem, quae est causa gratiae, et fidem et devotionem suscipientis, quae disponit ad gratiam".

This moral effectiveness depends upon a value extrinsic to the Sacraments, namely, upon divine assistance or preordination. To illustrate this moral causality the Seraphic Doctor uses the account of the cure of Naaman.6 There was no curative causality either in the words of Eliseus or in the waters of the Jordan, writes St. Bonaventure, but while Naaman was bathing a divine virtue effective of cure was present. Now if, by some preordination, God should have decreed to always assist the waters of the Jordan, these waters could be said to have the power to cure. This very thing obtains in the Sacraments of the New Law. Because of the divine assistance. which perpetually accompanies the administration of the sacraments, they are said to have power and, according to the common manner of speaking, are called causes.7 In this theory, the Sacraments have no intrinsic virtue, or absolute quality, productive of grace; but, in so far as God has promised to give grace to the recipient of the Sacraments, they have a divine preordination to grace and may be said to cause grace. Wherefore, operatively the Sacraments are not causes of grace, but dispositively.8 Hence, the Sacrament of Penance can do nothing directly or effectively towards the removal of sin, since sin is deleted through the infusion of grace. Still, it may be considered the cause of the remission of sin because it produces a disposition which God has promised to reward with grace.

From what has been said, it is obvious that St. Bonaventure attaches to the Sacrament of Penance a causality which is merely dispositive to grace. While he does not claim absolute certainty for his opinion - since God could assign to the Sacraments an efficaciousness far beyond our comprehension 9 — in no wise is he willing to concede the possibility of man cooperating efficiently with God in the production of grace. At most, man can dispose

^{6.} Bon. ihid. 23 b—: "Et adducunt simile: quoniam ad verbum Elisaei, Naaman se lavante, astitit virtus divina effectiva sanitatis et devotio et obedientia Naaman dispositiva; nulla autem causalitas fuit nec in verbo Elisei nec in aqua Jordani. Si ergo Dominus ita instituisset, ut ad verbum Elisaei non solum ipse Naama, sed ceteri accedentes curarentur, et hoc ex quadam pactione, ita quod semper assisteret vis divina; aqua illa diceretur curare et sanare lepram et esse causa curationis et habere virtutem curandi. Sic in Sacramentis."

7. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581, 3.

8. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 474.

9. Bon. Op. Om. III, Sent., 895 a, dub. 3—: "Hoc tamen scio et intelligo, quod plura potest Deus et etiam in ipsis Sacramentis facit, quam nos possumus intelligere."

intelligere.'

himself for grace; only through prayer and impetration can he obtain it for others 10

For those who have sinned after the reception of Baptism, St. Bonaventure designates two means of obtaining pardon, namely, the virtue of penance and the Sacrament of Penance. The former reconciles with God alone: the latter effects reconciliation with both God and the Church.11 To each of them the learned Franciscan applies the name sacrament. The first has remission of sins for the res sacramenti, and extends to guilt and eternal punishment; its signum is the exterior humiliation of the penitent; interior penance constitutes the res et signum.12 Arising from the dictates of the natural law, this "sacrament" has no institution properly so-called, but was insinuated in Paradise when God exclaimed "Where art thou?" This form of penitence was sufficient in the Old Law, and it suffices even in the present economy when facilities for fulfilling the prescriptions of the New Law are wanting. However, it is not a Sacrament of the Church.13

In the real Sacrament of Penance, which reconciles with both God and the Church, we find the traditional parts, to wit, contrition, confession, and satisfaction on the part of the penitent, and absolution on the part of the confessor. This Sacrament is the property of the Church and has been ordained

ad gratiam acquirendam et obtinendam ut baptismo.14

^{10.} Bon. $Op.\ Om.\ IV$, Sent., $128\ b-$: "Cooperari alii est dupliciter: vel per modum vere efficientis, sicut natura cooperatur Deo in productione naturalium, et liberum arbitrium gratiae in faciendo opus meritorium; secundo vero per modum disponentis, sicut cooperatur homo Deo quantum ad gratiam quia se disponit. Primo modo... Deus non dare potuit, quia creatura capax non fuit... dare gratiam est potentiae infinitae... Secundo vero modo dare potuit, ut homo secundum actum interiorem baptizato gratiam obtineret, non gratiam efficiendo, sed ipsam impetrando."

11. Bon. Op. Om., IV, Sent. 579 a; Alexander of Hales makes the same distinction: "Duplex est poenitentiae: quaedam quae solummodo consistit in contritione; quaedam quae consistit in contritione; quaedam quae solummodo consistit in contritione; quaedam quae consistit in contritione; confessione et satisfactione, et utraque

est sacramentum; sed primo sumpta non est sacramentum ecclesiae, sed secundo modo; ut est enim sacramentum ecclesiae excepta contritione requiruntur ex parte suscipientis confessio et subjectio sui arbitrio sacerdotis et satisfactio poenitentiae junctae, ex parte sacerdotis absolutio et injunctio satisfactionis." Summa Theol. IV.

q. 14, m. 1, a. 2, p. 3.

12. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581 a - · : "Secundum namque quod est Sacramentum reconcilians Deo, pro re habet peccati remissionem; pro signo habet exteriorem humiliationem sive in habitu, sive in verbo; pro re et signo interiorem poenitudinem... procedit exterius ab interiori, non exterius facit id quod interius est."

^{13.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 579 a. 14. Bon. Ibid. p. 579.

As to its formal element, the binding and loosing power inherent in the priest, it was instituted by Christ; as to its material element, a complete and candid confession, it was taught by Our Lord and promulgated by the Apostles at His command. Since this Sacrament reconciles with God and the Church, rationem habet causae et signi. The absolution of the priest is the causa; the humility of the penitent, consisting of contrition, confession and satisfaction, makes up the signum; the two combined form the signum sacramenti, and signify interior penitence, which constitutes the res et signum sacramenti. From this interior penitence follows perfect remission of sin, both as to guilt and as to punishment; and this is the res sacramenti. Since the signum sacramenti.

Interior penitence, however, is not the efficient cause of the remission of sin. In so far as the deletion of guilt and eternal punishment is concerned, it has a rationem signi exterius Sacramentum, and only in respect to the removal of temporal punishment does it have a rationem quodammodo causae. ¹⁷ As a signum exterius Sacramentum it points to the internal operation of God infusing grace in the soul, for, as St. Bonaventure remarks elsewhere,

peccata remittuntur in Sacramentis ratione rei interioris, quam Deus solus infundit.18

Since God gives grace only to a person rightly disposed, the Sacrament of Penance, in so far as it produces the required disposition in the penitent, can be looked upon as the cause of grace, and so it can be said that the acts of the penitent together with the absolution of the priest have the nature of causa et signum. But in

^{15.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 579 a.

16. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581 a—: "Sed in quantum est Sacramentum Ecclesiae, institutionem habens, sic habet rationem causae et signi, sicut alia Sacramenta; et ratio causalitatis residet penes id quod formale est, ratio vero signi penes id quod materiale est. Materiale autem in hoc Sacramento est humiliatio poenitentis... formale vero est absolutio sacerdotis. Haec duo simul inuncta significant poenitentiam interiorem, secundum quod per ipsam est remissio culpae perfecta quantum ad poenam habet rationem signi exterius Sacramentum, quantum ad remissionem poenae habet quodam modo rationem causae." Cf. Alex. Hales. Sum. Theol. IV. q. 14, m. 2, a. 2: "Quae igitur fiunt ex parte poenitentis, magis habent rationem signi, quae ex parte sacerdotis magis rationem causae; utrumque tamen utrumque habent, sed absolutio et injunctio causalitatem quodammodo formaliter, confessio cum subjectione arbitrio sacerdotis et satisfactio injuncta quodammodo materialiter."

^{17.} Cf. note 16. 18. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 474, 2.

regard to the remission of sin and punishment, the combined action of penitent and priest has the nature of a cause only in respect to temporal punishment.19 In this St. Bonaventure does not depart from the common opinion which taught that the Sacrament of Penance, taken as a unit, is capable of deleting sin, not, of course, as an efficient cause, but in so far as it is dispositive to the perfect remission of sin.20

It is not permissible to conclude from the words of St. Bonaventure, Et sic patet, quid in hoc Sacramento sit res, scilicet peccati remissio perfecta,21 that the potestas clavium possesses the same effectiveness. The effects of the Sacrament of Penance, taken as a moral unit comprising contrition, confession, satisfaction, and sacerdotal absolution, is one thing; the effects of the power of the keys, considered precisely in itself, is another. It is true that the potestas clavium functions only within the ambits of the Sacrament of Penance, and that the separate parts of the Sacrament are complementary to one another, so that, independently, they can produce no sacramental effect, while conjointly they produce the total effect of the Sacrament; still, it is none the less true that the potestas clavium, not unlike contrition, confession, and satisfaction, has a peculiar operation and effect of its own. The question to be solved, then, is not: are sins remitted in the Sacrament of Penance? The Saint never doubted the efficacy of the Sacrament in the removal of sin. The question must rather be placed in this wise: are sins removed by the power of the keys?

In order to isolate the direct and immediate effects of sacerdotal absolution from the total effect of the Sacrament of Penance. it will be well to resort to a process of elimination. Besides absolution, St. Bonaventure names contrition, confession, and satisfaction as contributing definite operations towards the remission of sin and punishment.²² It will be our task to determine just what effects he attributes to each of these elements, then, by subtracting the results from the total effect of the Sacrament, we should arrive at the peculiar efficacy he assigned to the power of the keys.

^{19.} Bon. Op. Om. VII, 345 (Comm. in Lucam) — : "Unde in hac solutione operatur sacerdos per exteriorem dispensationem Sacramenti, et peccator per interiorem detestationem peccati; et Deus per superiorem infusionem gratiae."

20. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581 a.

21. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581 a.

^{22.} Ibid.

B. THE EFFECTS OF SACRAMENTAL CONTRITION

Sorrow for sin is the first requirement on the part of the penitent for the procurement of pardon in the sacred tribunal. Using efficacy rather than motive as a norm, St. Bonaventure distinguishes two kinds of sorrow. The one, attrition, is a motus doloris ante insusionem gratiae; the other, contrition, is an actus doloris formatus. The latter comprises two elements, namely, detestation of sin and possession of grace.23 Then, taking motive as a basis, the Seraphic Doctor subdistinguishes a twofold form of attrition: the one, arising out of any motive whatsoever, is in no wise connected with the remission of sin; the other, begotten out of a supernatural motive, is preparatory to the reception of sanctifying grace. A person may regret a transgression, says the Saint, "either because it is a violation of nature or because it is an offence of divine justice and majesty".24 The former kind of penitence is found in the wicked and the damned, and since it is tainted with self-love and ill will it is not acceptable to God. In the latter form, however, the sinner hates sin because it is offensive to God, and is prepared to render satisfaction. Such sorrow so disposes to grace, St. Bonaventure asserts, that God grants it only to those whom He has decreed to show mercy.25 Fallen man, by his own free will, could never convert to God unless he were excited by some gift of grace. Therefore, the root of this kind of penitence must be sought in the mercy of God, who gives the actual graces necessary for the formation of this sorrow.26

The true origin of sorrow, then, is God; but its dispositive origin is to be sought in man. Man disposes himself in the following manner: out of the knowledge of the maliciousness of sin and the

^{23.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 447 a.

^{24.} Bon. Op. Om., Sent., IV, 334 b.

^{25.} Bon. Op. Om., Sent., IV, 335 a.—: "Alia est poenitentia, qua quis poenitet propter Dei offensam, paratus ei facere emendam. Et haec non est sine divina gratia gratum faciente, vel gratis data; et haec adeo disponit ad gratiam, quod nullus est sic poenitens, quin inveniat gratiam et veniam; et ideo Deus nulli eam dat, nisi cum quo proponit facere misericordiam."

^{26.} Bon. Op. Om., Sent., II, d. 28, a. 2, q. 1—: "Liberum arbitrium lapsum nunquam ad Deum converteretur, nisi aliquo munere gratiae excitaretur." The same thought is expressed in a sermon—: "Nec solum est hoc a Deo quod peccator convertitur, sed etiam quod homo se ad hoc praeparat et disponit". Serm. de Temp. Circum. Dom. Serm. I. p. 137 col. a.— Cf. Alex. of Hales, Sum. Theol. IV, q. 17, m. 2, ad 1 § 3.

displeasure it gives to God, arises fear; from a knowledge of God's mercy, the hope of pardon is generated; then, from the combined attitude of fear and hope, springs the determination to return to God and make reparation.²⁷ This is attrition. In motive it does not differ from contrition.28 But there is, nevertheless, a great difference between the two: contrition is informed with sanctifying grace; attrition is not. The conversion of attrition to contrition is described by the Seraphic Doctor somewhat in this fashion: By attrition the sinner detests sin from a supernatural motive and, to the best of his ability, disposes himself to grace; God thereupon confers grace which immediately converts attrition into contrition; contrition, in turn, expels sin.29

Primo et per se the deletion of sin must be attributed to grace, and only through the medium of grace to contrition.30 But the sinner must cooperate, for God confers grace only upon the willing. By an act of the free will the penitent offers consent to prevenient, dispositive grace; then, by an act of contrition he offers consent to grace in so far as it is expulsive to sin.31 So far as guilt and eternal punishment is concerned, complete destruction of sin follows in-

^{27.} Bon. Op. Om., Sent., IV, 327 a -: "Dispositio autem hoc ordine procedit. Primo necesse est Dei bonitatem et iustitiam cognoscere — cui displicet omne malum et inordinatio, et ab illa offenditur et nullo modo malum relinquit impunitum — et se et inordinatio, et ab illa offenditur et nullo modo malum relinquit impunitum — et se aliquid fecisse, quod suae displicere debeat bonitati; et haec est cognitio culpae, et ex hoc cognoscit se homo ex divina sententia obligatum ad poenam. — Necesse est etiam secundo cognoscere Dei misericordiam, qua paratus est omni revertenti et dolenti de culpa commissa sibi remittere et indulgere. — Ex prima cognitione generatur timor; ex secunda generatur spes remissionis; et ex his voluntas revertendi et confoederandi Deo et satisfaciendi per genitum et alias poenas; et si incipiat facere quod in se est, dispositus est ad justificationem."

^{28.} Cf. Mitzka: Die Vorbereitung auf die heiligm. Gnade nach Bon. ZfKTh. (1926) p. 250 ff.

^{29.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent. IV, 430, n. 3; Bon. IV. Sent., 422 b — "Sed certe, si ad hoc, quod gratia infundatur, necesse est, quod homo se praeparet consencerte, si ad hoc, quod gratia infundatur, necesse est, quod homo se praeparet consentiendo gratiae et detestando peccatum; necesse est, in ipsa gratiae infusione ista quatuor esse, scilicet gratiae "infusionem et liberi arbitrii motum, et contritionem et peccati expulsionem. Deus enim expellit culpam infundendo gratiam; sed non infundit nisi ei qui concordat, et necesse est concordare gratiae advenienti et peccatum expellenti. Gratiae ut advenienti concordat per motum liberi arbitrii, gratiae ut peccatum expellenti, per motum contritionis . . . Gratia enim adveniens in animam commovet rationem, secundum quod est pars liberi arbitrii, et conturbat voluntatem per contritionem, et postmodum sanat per peccati expulsionem." — N.B. It is difficult to understand how an act can be informed with grace before sin is expelled. Scotus therefore denies that contrition deletes sin; "Ergo non per contritionem deletur culpa, quia non est contritio nisi in tertio signo naturali, et in secundo deletur" Sent. IV. d. 14, q. 2, m. 4.

^{30.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent., 430.

^{31.} Cf. note 29.

stantaneously, but the amount of temporal punishment remitted depends upon the intensity of the act of sorrow.32

C. THE EFFECTS OF SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION

Under the New Dispensation no one disposes himself to the best of his ability unless he proposes to submit his sins to the power of the keys by a complete, candid confession.33 St. Bonaventure says that in order to obtain perfect reconciliation, interior penitence must be accompanied by confession, satisfaction, and the absolution of the priest. These need not be realized at one and the same time, it being sufficient that they be one in intention. For he who is contrite has confession and satisfaction in mind, observes the Saint.34

It was commonly taught in the Schools that contrition with the proposal to confess was sufficient for immediate remission of sin. St. Bonaventure finds substantial support for this doctrine in the words of Psalm 31, vss. 5, 6: "I have acknowledged my sin to thee ... I said I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin". 35 However, he did not see in this text, as did St. Albert, 36 confirmation for a prevenient operation of the potestas clavium in the act of contrition. Remission of sin must be ascribed to God alone, and in corroboration the Seraphic Doctor quotes the interpretation of Cassiodorus on the same psalm:

Magna pietas Dei, quod ad solam promissionem peccatum dimittit. Votum enim pro operatione judicatur.37

^{32.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent., 395, 3—: "Dolor enim non tantum habet oppositionem ad culpam, sed etiam ad sequelas et pronitates peccati, quae quodam modo doloris intensione in nobis remittuntur paulative et expelluntur." Cf. S. Thom. Suppl. q. 5, a. 3— "Quantumcumque parvum sit dolor, dummodo ad contritionis rationem sufficiat, omnem culpam delet."

^{33.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent., 442; 432, 448 d. 2 etc.

^{34.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, 397 dub. 1—: "...contritio et confessio et satisfactio... sunt partes integrales. Et si tu obiicias, quod non habent esse simul; dicendum, quod quamvis non sunt simul actu, sunt tamen simul voto, vel effectu. Unde quando quis conteritur, habet confessionem et satisfactionem in proposito."

35. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 423, fund. I.

^{36.} Alb. Mag. IV. Sent., d. 17, a. 53, t. 29, p. 748, ed. Borgnet.

^{37.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent., 423, fund. I.

But the mere proposal to confess is not altogether equivalent to actual confession, for, in the mind of the learned Franciscan, confession has a virtue of its own. Moreover, if the sinner does not confess when opportunity presents itself, either his original proposal was not sincere, and then he was not contrite, or if it had been sincere, he now falls from justice.³⁸ Furthermore there is the precept of Christ:

Unde quamvis Dominus mundet per interiorem contritionem, nihilominus ad sacerdotale offcium ligat, cum dicit: "Vade, ostende te sacerdoti." 39

Still, if there be no opportunity to confess, the intention suffices for contrition to produce its effects. An even when is opportunity to confess, antequam perveniat ad opus, God reputes the sole intention as sufficient warrant for deleting sin immediately.⁴⁰ It becomes forthwith apparent that the keys can have no direct effect upon the guilt of sin. Guilt and grace being diametrically opposed, once contrition with the proposal to confess is present in the soul, sin automatically ceases to exist. The subsequent application of the potestas clavium can only come too late in point of time to accomplish anything whatsoever towards the remission of guilt and eternal punishment.⁴¹.

Some recent authors have voiced the opinion that St. Bonaventure demands the same conditions for approaching the confessional as for the reception of the Eucharist.⁴² In speaking of the disposition necessary for a valid confession, the saintly doctor says that, just as those Sacraments which have been ordained to increase grace have efficacy only in those who have charity, so those Sacraments which have been ordained for the acquisition of grace have

^{38.} Bon. Op. Om. IX, 425 (Serm. de Temp. 18 post Pent.).

^{39.} Bon. Op. Om. p. 432, dub. 1—: "Concedo ergo bene, quod semper aliquid recipit qui opere accipit Sacramentum et aliquam utilitatem habet; tamen ubi deest facultas, Deus reputat sufficiens ad impetrandum ipsum votum; et ubi adest, antequem perveniat ad opus, reputat conveniens ad obtinendum gratiam."

^{40.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 396 b — : "Prout est deletiva culpae; sic opératur in iustificatione impii in instanti . . . simul et in instanti est contra omne peccatum commissum."

^{41.} Idem, IV. Sent., 432 — "si enim pro loco et tempore non confiteretur, verum votum non esset, aut esse desisteret, si prius esset."

^{42.} Cf. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, III, 147; Pesch, Prael. Dogm. De Sacram. Pars II, p. 88.

efficacy only in those who are rightly disposed.⁴³ Now, just when is the sinner rightly disposed for the reception of the Sacrament of Penance? Did St. Bonaventure demand contrition as a prerequisite for confession, or did he consider any kind of sorrow sufficient, so long as it was derived from a supernatural motive? In the Seventeenth Distinction of the Fourth Book of Sentences, the Seraphic Doctor introduces the question: An quis quoad modum obligetur consiteri ex caritate? In his response the Saint first adduces the reasons postulating sanctifying grace; these he either rejects altogether or explains in such a manner that his leaning towards the opposite opinion becomes strikingly apparent. Then he states the arguments for the contrary thesis, and leaves them intact. Finally, he embraces the negative, which states that it is neither necessary nor obligatory to confess ex caritate. But he immediately qualifies his position by stating that, whereas the penitent need not de facto have charity, still he must have a disposition sufficing for charity tel secundum probabilitatem, tel secundum veritatem.44 Analysis shows that this concession which allows the "attritus" to approach the Sacrament is rather chimeric for he must think himself "contritus". And only the fact that the penitent can never have absolute certainty that his sorrow is elevated by grace forces St. Bonaventure to admit the "attritus" to confession. 45

Bearing in mind the Tridentine doctrine on the sufficiency of a sorrow arising from the consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell for the acquisition of grace in the Sacrament of Penance, it is difficult to understand how anyone having

^{43.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 447 a — : "... quaedam sunt sacramenta ordinata ad gratiam acquirendam et obtinendam, ut baptismus et poenitentia; quaedam ordinata sunt ad gratiam promovendam sive augmentandam, ut confirmatio et eucharistia. Dico ergo quod sicut sacramenta augmentantia gratiam non habent efficaciam nisi in habentibus caritatem; sic sacramenta gratiam impetrantia non habent efficaciam nisi in eis qui se disponunt."

^{44.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 446; ibid. p. 447; "Et sicut dictum est . . . quod non tenemur ad eucharistiam accedere cum caritate secundum veritatem, sed secundum probabilitatem sufficit, sic dico, quod ad Sacramentum poenitentiae non est necesse, quod accedat habens caritatem, vel dispositionem ad caritatem sufficientem secundum veritatem, sed sufficit secundum probabilitatem — Haec autem dispositio est attritio, quae frequenter ob confessionem superadiunctam et absolutionem sacerdotis formatur per gratiam, ut fiat contritio, sive ad ipsam contritio subsequatur."

^{45.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 447 a. — : "Unde dico, quod sufficit, quod probabiliter se disponat ad gratiam per omnium peccatorum detestationem. Quodsi se non disponit... peccat mortaliter."

the Bonaventurean form of attrition (i.e. sorrow motivated by sin considered as offensive to God) could be insufficiently disposed to receive sacramental pardon. Nevertheless, St. Bonaventure, insisting on contrition as an integral part of the Sacrament,⁴⁶ finds sorrow not informed with sanctifying grace inadequate for the valid operation of the keys.⁴⁷ He states his position unequivocally in the text

Sacramentum Poenitentiae, cujus res est interior contritio, sine qua nulla vera est absolutio, et cum qua nulla absolutio est vana vel inutilis. 48

This leads to the difficulty of reconciling sufficiency of attrition in confession with the necessity of contrition for absolution. Whence the celebrated question: how does attrition become contrition in confession?

The Scholiasts say that St. Bonaventure would have this transformation brought about by the *potestas clavium*, thereby attributing causality to the keys in the remission of sins. In support of their contention they advance a formidable array of texts, 49 which shall be examined later. Others, however, say that the Seraphic Doctor attributes the conversion of attrition to contrition in the Sacrament of Penance to oral confession itself, and if anything at all in this regard is effected by the absolution of the priest, it must be assigned to the deprecative part. 50

In the normal procedure, contrition should precede confession tempore et natura, for a truly reconciliating confession can be made only by one who is suscitatus, i.e. elevated by grace.⁵¹ But no one, as we have heard, can have certainty of being in the state of grace, and so it suffices that the penitent dispose himself to the best of his ability. This he does by a candid, integral confession. St. Bonaventure ascribes a psychological value to confession. The humiliation and shame experienced in laying bare the innermost secrets of the soul so effect the disposition of the penitent that God in-

^{46.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 397, dub. 1.

^{47.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 502 b.

^{48.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 645 a.

^{49.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 474 sq. (Scholiun)

^{50.} Cf. Vacandard, D.T.C. Vol. 1, col. 178, "Absolution des Péchés."

^{51.} Cf. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 424; ibid. p. 447 b ad 1. By a "suscitatus" St. Bonaventure means a person who is disposed to charity, "qui jam incipit suscitari, cum atteritur per dolorem et in confessione plerumque recipit vitam."

fuses grace, if it is not already there, and the attrition of the penitent is raised to contrition.⁵²

The Seraphic Doctor admits progressive stages in the confession of sins:

Nemo recipit effectum nisi charitatem habeat saltem in principio confessionis, vel in medio, vel in fine.⁵³

The first step is the approach: here already the penitent should have contrition. Should he, however, have attrition only, he is nevertheless permitted to begin his confession, provided he thinks himself contrite.54 The next step is the open acknowledgment of sin to the priest. Here, shame and humiliation may effect such a change in his disposition that attrition becomes contrition. But there is a possibility that the wrong disposition still persevere in the penitent. And so we arrive at the third step: here the deprecatory absolution of the priest may yet bring about a change in the perverse attitude of the sinner. But, if the penitent be not contrite when the final step is reached, that is, when the indicative absolution is imparted, he derives no benefit from the Sacrament. 55 As the context will show, the phrase in fine refers to the act of confessing and is not to be associated with the final act of the Sacrament of Penance. This follows from the Bonaventurean doctrine that contrition belongs to the materia Sacramenti, which must be determined by the formal element, the indicative absolution of the priest. Unless the materia be complete, it is invalid, and the form cannot be effectively applied. The form does not produce

^{52.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 433, dub 2 — : "Dicendum, quod posse confiteri est dupliciter: aut peccatum detegendo, ut sit confessio manifestata, et sic potest fieri etiam a peccatore; aut ut sit confessio vere reconciliativa, et sic non potest fieri nisi a iusto et suscitato. Si enim alia fiat, absolvitur exterius, sed non interius. Nihil enim ad salutem valet alicui poenam termporalem taxare, quousque Dominus absolvat ab aeterna." Cf. Buchberger, op. cit. p. 53; Schmoll, op. cit. p. 162. The doctrine of St. Bonaventure is the same as that of Hales: "Si autem poenitens praeparatus quantum in se est, accedat ad confessionem, attritus non contritus, dico quod confessio cum subjectione arbitrio sacerdotis et satisfactio poenitentiae a sacerdote injunctae est signum et causa deletionis culpae et poenae, quia sic subjiciendo se et satisfaciendo gratiam acquirit." Sum. Theol. IV. q. 14, m. 2, a. 1, § 2.

^{53.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 447 b, ad 4.

^{54.} Ibid.

^{55.} Ibid.

the materia Sacramenti, but presupposes it; hence, absolution does produce contrition.⁵⁶

"Non habet efficaciam oris confessio, nisi praecedat perfecta cordis contritio," so writes St. Bonaventure. 57 With contrition a desired, if not an absolutely required condition for confession, it is obvious that he does not look upon confession as having been primarily ordained for the introduction of sanctifying grace into the soul. This notwithstanding, he considers confession necessary in the New Testament. For sanctifying grace does not free the penitent from the double precept of confessing, namely, the one from God, who commands the sinner to do penance (Mt. 4, 7), the other from the Church, which commands confession once a year.58 Moreover, contrition does not dispense from making sacramental satisfaction, which is meted out by the confessor. 59 Furthermore, the penitent cannot long remain in the state of grace without confession. 60 Besides contributing to the formation of contrition in the penitent who is not well enough disposed, confession is beneficial in other ways. First of all, it remits part of temporal punishment, 61 then it disposes the soul for the reception of sacramental graces, 62

^{56.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 581 a; p. 441, 1.

^{57.} Bon. Op. Om. IX, Serm. de Temp., 395.

^{58.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 432; 448, dub. 1, p. 431 fund. 1.

Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 432, 2; "Ad illud quod obiicitur: (confessio) aut est necessaria propter deletionem culpae etc. 1 dicendum quod ista non est ratio, sed institutio. Quia enim confessio instituta est sub praecepto, ideo nemo absolvitur, sed quilibet tenetur, quantumcumque poena et culpae deleatur. Valet tamen ad deletionem culpae quantum ad eos qui se non paraverunt sufficienter omnino, et etiam poenae quantum ad alios, et ad multas utilitates."

^{59.} Ibid. p. 431, fund. 3.

^{60.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 432 a — : "Sicut enim nullus potest iustificari, qui Sacramenta contemnat; sic nullus in iustitia perseverat, si post iustificationem ex contemptu negligat confiteri. Et ideo, si potest confiteri et non curat, cadit a justitia, cum cadit a propositio confitendi, sine quo iustificari non poterat."

^{61.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 434 d. 7: "Dicendum, quod in absolutione, quae est in contritione, culpa recipit veniam quantum ad poenam aeternam, in confessione vero partim recipit veniam, partim non, quia ad unam partem poenae ligatur, ab alia absolvitur."

^{62.} Bon. Op. Om. p. 437 b in fine —: "Valet enim (sc. confessio) ad peccati cognitionem propter instructionem sacerdotis . . Ad cogniti deletionem . . . si propositum valet, quanto magis valet opus? — Ad cogniti et deleti satisfactionem, quia erubescentia in confessione est magna pars satisfactionis. — Ad poenae diminutionem vi clavium." — Cf. p. 449 dub. 8 — : ". . . Aliae sunt utilitates annexae (sc. confessioni) et ad illas valet multoties confiteri, scilicet ad erubescentiam et intercessorum multiplicationem et ad humiliationem et gratiae augmentum."

but above all it is ordained for absolution through which the sinner is reconciled with the Church.⁶³

D. SACRAMENTAL SATISFACTION

St. Bonaventure teaches that, when God sanctifies the sinner, He remits guilt and eternal punishment. But God is just and must punish evil. The sinner, therefore, remains liable to temporal punishment. And since injury is also done to the Church by sin, God has placed judicial power in the hands of priests so that through them the sinner might know the will of God, and satisfaction might be made principally to God and subsequently to the Church.⁶⁴ And so, by virtue of the keys the priest has the power to impose penance upon the sinner.

The satisfaction imposed should be in conformity with the enormity of the sins committed and the disposition and ability of the penitent to perform it. Since it is impossible for the priest to estimate accurately the amount of satisfaction demanded by God's justice, he must be guided by conscientious probability in meting out penance, and if the sinner accepts and performs such a penance, he makes full reparation. But if the priest, either out of neglect or because of the frailty of the penitent, does not assign congruous

^{63.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 459 f. 2; "Quaeritur, utrum sit confitenda omnis mortalis differentia: ... Et quod omnem differentiam, videtur ... quia pro quolibet horum efficitur homo inimicus Dei et separatur ab unitate Ecclesiae; sed confessio ad hoc directe instituta est, ut homo reconcilietur Ecclesiae et ostendatur reconciliatus Deo; ergo de omnibus tenetur confiteri." Ibid. p. 451, 3, 4, 5. Here St. Bonaventure argues that confession to a lay person has no sacramental value, "pro eo quod non accipit totam causam, nec etiam principalem causam, quae est reconciliatio facienda Ecclesiae." N.B. The text (IV. Sent. p. 447 b): "Confessio... est opus sacramentale ad justificationem institutum; unde haec confessio ad absolutionem est ordinata," must be understood as referring to complete justification, i.e. including removal of temporal punishment and reconciliation with the Church.

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64. Bon. Op. Om. IV, 364 a — : "Cum autem divina misericordia iustificat, remittit omnem culpam et reatum poenae aeternae... Sed quia misericordia non potest praeiudicare iustititiae, cuius est mala punire; ideo sic solvit a culpa et poena, ut tamen remaneat obligatus ad aliquantulum poenam temporalem. Sed quoniam peccator ipsum offenderat et etiam damnificaverat eius Ecclesiam; commisit Dominus iudiciariam potestatem super peccatores rectoribus Ecclesiae et in eos compromisit tanquam in arbitros, ut sic innotescat voluntas Dei poenitentibus per sacerdotes, et per illos imponatur poena peccatoribus, et Domino satisfiat principaliter et Ecclesiae per consequens. Unde satisfactio proprie de peccato fit ipsi Deo, tamen per Ecclesiam et in Ecclesia." — Ibid. p. 531, 4 — : "... confessio et contritio sunt ordinata, ut ingrediatur unitatem ecclesiasticam; satisfactio vero utramque consequitur; et fundamentum istius communicationis est in caritate."

satisfaction, God will exact what remains due in Purgatory. 65 While it may happen that total remission of punishment follows immediately upon a most perfect act of contrition, the confessor is, nevertheless, bound to impose a penance because of the uncertainty of such an eventuality. 66 The purpose of satisfaction, then, is to remit part of temporal punishment; all, therefore, is not remitted by the keys.

V. THE EFFICACY OF THE KEYS IN THE SACRAMENT

Up till now we have learned that, according to St. Bonaventure, contrition immediately remits guilt and eternal punishment; that confession has an ethical value and also contributes to the lessening of temporal punishment; that the imposition of satisfaction is necessary for the further relaxation of temporal punishment. From this it is obvious that of sin and its sequels only part of temporal punishment remains upon which the potestas clavium can exercise any causality. In order to determine just what is effected by the keys in the Sacrament of Penance, the Seraphic Doctor proposes two questions: First, does the power of the keys extend to the guilt of sin?1 After denying that the keys actively extend to guilt, he proceeds to ask a second question, namely, does the potestas clavium have any effect upon punishment. The answer is yes.2

In deference to the Scholiasts, who claim that St. Bonaventure errs merely in the presentation of his views,3 we quote at length from the 18th Distinction of the Fourth Book of Sentences, where the Seraphic Doctor answers the question: "Utrum potestas clavium habeat posse in culpam?" 4

66. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 364, 3—: "Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod totum remittiur; dicendum quod verum est; sed quia Ecclesiae non constat, ideo debet a sacerdote imponi."

^{65.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 399, dub. 6 — : "Satisfacere Deo dupliciter est; vel secundum forum suum et secundum veritatem . . . si poenitens hic congruam poenam a sacerdote suscipit, plenam poenitentiam facit; si non, propter hoc quod sacerdos non imponit, attendens fragilitatem peccatoris; Dominus expectat, et solvet in purgatorio."

Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 472.
 Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 476.
 Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 474.
 Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 473 b.

Et ideo est alius modus dicendi, quod habens clavem per potestatem clavis mediator est Dei ad hominem et hominis ad Deum. Unde per ipsum peccator ascendit ad Deum, et sic est sacerdos os peccatoris sive loquens pro peccatore; per ipsum descendit Deus ad hominem, et sic est sacerdos angelus Dei, immo os, eo quod ipse separat pretiosum a vili. — Secundum quod ascendit, habet se per modum inferioris et supplicantis; secundum quod descendit, per modum superioris et judicantis. Secundum primum modum potest gratiam impetrare, et ad hoc est idoneus; secundum secundum modum potest Ecclesiae reconciliare. Et ideo in hujus significationem in forma absolutionis praemittitur deprecatio per modum deprecativum, et subjungitur absolutio per modum indicativum; et deprecatio gratiam impetrat, sed absolutio praesupponit. Nunquam enim sacerdos absolveret, quemquam, de quo non praesumeret, quod esset absolutus a Deo.

Si ergo quaeratur, utrum potestas clavium se extendat ad delendam culpam; dicendum, quod bene potest se extendere per modum deprecantis et impetrantis...; sed per modum impertientis non. Quoniam ergo potestas clavium proprie loquendo, non se extendit supra culpam.

From the above citation we gather that the priest, by virtue of the keys, is a mediator between God and man. This office comprises two distinct functions, viz., that of advocate and that of judge. As advocate the priest is inferior, and enjoys no real authority, for he must ascend to God, the true Judge, and there plead the cause of his client. This he does by applying the deprecative form of absolution. And so, per modum deprecantis et impetrantis the keys may be said to extend to guilt.

The case is quite different when the priest acts as superior, i.e., as the "os Dei." Now he assumes the office of judge, he uses the power conferred in Orders and pronounces sentence authoritatively. But to what purpose? Before the keys can operate as a power the priest must be reasonably certain that the penitent is contrite. Therefore, he first appraises the sorrow and other attendant circumstances in order to decide whether or not the sinner has found forgiveness with God — here the key of knowledge comes into play; next, because he cannot have absolute certainty that contrition is present, he uses the deprecative form of absolution and implores God to grant pardon; finally, but only after presuming that God has already justified the penitent, does he pronounce absolution per modum impertientis. Constrained to follow his contritionism to its logical conclusion, St. Bonaventure is forced to avow that the potestas clavium "per modum impertientis" can reconcile only with the Church.

According to St. Bonaventure, the sinner not only forfeits friendship with God, but also severs himself from the bond of charity by which the true members of the Church are united with Christ, the head of the Mystical Body. This alienation, though it excludes from the Church non numero sed merito tantum, he considered as something positive, demanding a separate reconciliation.⁵ This idea is not original with our Saint. It is found in the doctrine of Alexander of Hales, and seems to have furnished the basis for the "ostensive" theory of Peter Lombard.6

Under the Old Law the sinner was restored to favor with God by virtue of penance alone. But even then certain legal prescriptions had to be fulfilled before he was permitted to partake in the religious activities of the community. In the New Law, where the union between the Mystical Body and its members should be perfect, reconciliation must be perfect. Supernatural contrition, while it remits guilt and eternal punishment, leaves the sinner still at variance with the Church. Wherefore Christ, observes St. Bonaventure, instituted the Sacrament of Penance secundum statum perfectionis, i.e., to effect reconciliation with the Church.7

It would appear that, even in the internal forum, the potestas clavium is conceived by St. Bonaventure as a function pertaining primarily to the regimen of the Church. When Christ conferred the primacy upon St. Peter, He placed the salvation of all mankind in the hands of the Church, and by the collation of the keys He bestowed upon the Church a power through which its unity, both external and internal, should be preserved. The ancient Church manifested a vivid consciousness of this tremendous responsibility

^{5.} Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 364 a — : "Sed quoniam peccator ipsum offenderat et etiam damnificaverit eius Ecclesiam; commisit Dominus iudiciariam potestatem super peccatores rectoribus Ecclesiae... ut per illos imponatur poena peccatoribus, et Domino satisfiat principaliter et Ecclesiae per consequens. Unde satisfactio proprie de peccato fit ipsi Deo, tamen per Ecclesiam et in Ecclesia." — Ibid. p. 401, dub. 12 — : "qui fuit per mortale excommunicatus ad Sacramentum unitatis Ecclesiae non debet accedere nisi prius reconciliatus Ecclesiae." — St. Bonaventure (ibid. p. 196) offers the following description of the Mystical Body — : "Quod constat ex fidelibus puris, fide et caritate copulatis."

6. Cf. Landgraf: Grundlagen fuer ein Verstaendnis der Busslehre der Scholastik ZfkTh (1927) p. 191 (Innsbruck). The remote basis for the idea of a separate reconciliation with the Church seems to lie in the ancient penitential discipline which associated excommunication with every mortal sin. Cf. Jungmann, J., S.J., "Die Lateinischen Bussriten in ihrer geschichilichen Entwicklung, Innsbruck (1932) p. 241.

7. Bon. Op. Om. IV, 579 a — : (Sacramentum Poenitentiae) "In lege autem nova, ubi unitas ecclesiastica est perfecta et reconciliatio plena, institua fuit secundum statum perfectionis, et quantum ad formale... et quantum ad materiale."

with its corresponding tremendous power by the severity with which it treated sinners. Dreadful excommunications, drastic public penances, witholding of absolution, reservation of sins, all found sufficient sanction in the deeply inculcated principle Extra Ecclesia nulla salus. Time and again the Seraphic Doctor re-echoes his sentiments regarding the vital rôle the Church plays in the salvation of men:

Nullus potest ingredi regnum caelorum nisi per Ecclesiam.8-Nulli dimittuntur (peccata) nisi eis qui recipiuntur intra ecclesiasticam unitatem.9-Nemo enim ad forum purgatorii admittitur, qui forum Ecclesiae contempsit.10-Potestas clavium est potestas respectu ingredientium Ecclesiam et deinde caelum.11

These and sundry other texts give evidence that the learned Franciscan does not estimate the operation of the keys, whereby the sinner is placed anew on the road to salvation, as a matter of little moment. After all, eternal life depends upon being in good standing with the Church. It is because of this that the Seraphic Doctor finds confession made to God alone, or to a layman, of little benefit to the penitent, for such a confession does not lead to reconciliation with the Church.12

Having denied that the potestas clavium removes the guilt of sin, and at the same time not quite satisfied with reconciliation with the Church as the sole benefit of the keys, St. Bonaventure asks: "Does the power of the keys have any effect upon punishment?" 13 The opinion stating that absolution merely frees the penitent from the obligation to confess is rejected as attributing too little to the words Absolvo te a peccatis. For the same reason he puts aside the theory that the priest merely commutes punishment by the imposition of sacramental satisfaction.¹⁴ And so he comes to the conclusion that some punishment is removed by virtue of the keys. This cannot be eternal punishment, from which the priest nullo modo solvit, since liability to damnation automatically

^{8.} Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 469, f. 3. 9. Bon. ibid. p. 483 d; Sent. II 992 b. 10. Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 432 ad 3. 11. Ibid. p. 504. 12. Bon. ibid. p. 451, 3, 4, 5. ibid. 451 a. 13. Bon. ibid. p. 476. 14. Ibid. p. 477 a.

ceases when God condones the guilt of sin. 15 Nor can it be the pains of Purgatory per se. 16 The only punishment remaining is that to which God obliges the sinner after absolving him from guilt.17 The priest, therefore, actively and directly remits some punishment due to sin by virtue of the potestas clavium. This he does by the application of the merits of the Passion of Christ, which he, as a divinely appointed minister, has the right to dispense.18 It is impossible to estimate just how much punishment is remitted by the keys, but it can be reasonably assumed that so much is remitted as divine justice will allow.19 This amount should not be made light of, for, owing to the rigor of divine justice the original liability to temporal punishment is improportionate to human strength.20

As a final act, the priest, through the operation of the keys, declares the penitent cleansed. This declaration, says St. Bonaventure, is not to be understood in the sense of a mere external manifestation, but in the sense of perficiendi et exhibendi.21 By removing part of temporal punishment the priest completes the cleansing of the sinner and so verifies the words of Sacred Scripture, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them."

The Seraphic Doctor was aware that his theory on the necessity of contrition in the Sacrament of Penance was prejudicial to the words of Christ: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." He tried to circumvent this difficulty by viewing sin from

^{15.} Ibid. p. 477 a. 16. Ibid.

^{16.} *Ibid.*17. *Ibid.* p. 477 b — : "Et ideo est tertius modus dicendi magis consonus rationi et fidei pietati, quod sacerdos aliquam partem poenae absolvendo dimititi ex vi clavium. — Et hoc possumus intelligere sic: quia universae viae Domini misericordia et veritas, (Ps. 24, 10), ideo in iustificatione, quae est opus misericordiae, misericordia sic remittit culpam, ut iustitiae regulam non praetereat; propterea adhuc detinet obligatum ad poenam. Illa autem poena ob rigorem divinae iustitiae est viribus nostris improportionalis et nostrae cognitioni ignota; et pro illa oportet quod satisfaciat Deo. Providit adhuc igitur nobis viam misericordia divina et constituit arbitrum sacerdotem, cui dedit potestatem arbitrandi et taxandi poenam et manifestandi nobis, et partem poenae remittere ex virtute passionis Christi, ut divina iustitia pro illa parte solutionem ab isto non exigat, sed ex passionis Christi poena sit contenta. Quanta sit illa pars, nostrum non est determinare, sed Dei. Et tunc Sacramentum poenitentiae non tantum erit onerosum, sed etiam fructuosum."

18. *Ibid.*20. *Ibid.*21. Bon. *Op. Om.* IV, *Sent.*, 477 ad. 1 — "Dico ergo... quod sacerdos evangelicus quantum ad absolutionem a culpa absolvit solum ostendendo, scilicet demonstrando absolutum, absolvit autem a poena; et hoc verum est, ut intelligatur ostendere non solum sensui manifestando, sed etiam perficiendo et exhibendo."

the distinct standpoints of guilt and punishment. Pioneers in this respect had been Hugh and Richard of St. Victor. They visualized a double bond arising from sin, the vinculum culpae, and the vinculum poenae. Only God can remit the former; the priest, however, can loose from the latter, and this, in their minds, was equivalent to the peccata remittere expressed in Sacred Scripture.²² Evidence of this persuasion is borne out by the fact that Richard, who conceded to the keys power over punishment alone, condemned the "ostensive" theory of Peter Lombard precisely because it was not in conformity with the words of Christ: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." ²⁸

According to St. Bonaventure, three distinct impediments arise out of sin, and bar entrance to heaven. The first of these is the debitum peccati. It derives from sin, in so far as sin is an offense against God, the Supreme Good, and is generally designated by the term culpa. The second obstruction is poena aeterna to which all guilty of mortal sin are liable. The third impediment is temporal punishment, by which the scales of God's justice are balanced. Corresponding to these obstacles are three keys, to wit, the clavis auctoritatis, the clavis excellentiae and the clavis ministerialis.²⁴

God alone possesses the *clavis auctoritatis*, for He alone has the authority to remit the guilt of sin, which is a personal affront against the Divine Majesty.²⁵ Furthermore, observes St. Bonaventure, by sin the soul is reduced to nothingness and therefore a new

^{22.} Cf. Paulus, Nik, op. cit. I, 256.

^{23.} Richard of St. Victor, De Potestate Ligandi et Solvendi, P.L. 196, col. 1159 etc. Cf. Schmoll, op. cit. p. 47 ff; p. 57 ff. 24. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 470 —: "Obstaculum autem ingrediendi in caelum

^{24.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 470 — : "Obstaculum autem ingrediendi in caelum est debitum alicuius peccati; hoc autem est triplex: primum peccati mortalis commissi, et hoc est debitum aeterni supplicii. Hoc autem obstaculum solus Deus amovet, quia hoc removetur per culpae deletionem; et ideo potestas hoc removens est potestas divina, quae ab aliquibus dicitur clavis auctoritatis. — Secundum obstaculum est debitum peccati contracti, et illud est debitum solutionis pretii, et hoc solvi potuit per eum qui potuit satisfacere; talis autem fuit solus Christus; et ideo haec potestas removens illud obstaculum est solius Christi, et vocant eam aliqui clavem excellentiae. — Tertium obstaculum est debitum peccati dimissi, quia postquam homini dimissa est culpa, adhuc obligatus ad temporalem poenam, et hoc removeri potest per illum qui potest peccati poenam taxare, et talis est minister Christi, non tantum Christus, et ista potestas est hominibus communicata, et vocatur ista potestas clavis ministerii."

^{25.} Bon. Op. Om. II Sent., dist. 28, a. 1, q. 1: "tanta est offensa, quantus est ille qui offenditur: cum igitur ipse sit infinitus, offensa habet aliquomodo rationem infiniti."

creation is required to restore it to its pristine state.²⁶ Since only a creative power can revivify such a soul, it follows that God alone can remit sin effectively. God formally deletes sin through grace, sicut sol per radios.²⁷ He could, indeed, destroy sin without any medium whatsoever, but His Divine Beneficence so decreed that evil should be deleted by grace, ut simul daretur bonum per quod homo Deo placeret.²⁸ Although the infusion of grace is prior by nature to the expulsion of sin, in reality they take place simultaneously, and so there is no middle state between justice and impiety: either a man has grace, and is pleasing to God, or he has not, and is hateful to God.²⁹

Eternal punishment is the second obstacle originating from sin. This impediment could only have been removed by one able to make complete satisfaction to God. Christ accomplished this through His Passion and Death, and the power He thereby merited over eternal punishment is called the *clavis excellentiae*.³⁰ Because of the satisfaction rendered by Christ's atoning sacrifice, God grants penitential grace to man; man, in turn, uses this grace in substitution for the reparation demanded for his personal offenses. *Per se* the power of Christ as man does not extend to the guilt of sin, for an infinite power is postulated to effect a new creation.³¹ Still, He is the meriting and stimulating factor in the process of deleting sin, and therefore remits guilt dispositively.

St. Bonaventure maintains that it would be contrary to divine

^{26.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, 130, f. 2.

^{27.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 426 a.

^{28.} Bon. Op. Om. IX, Serm. de Temp., 73 — : "Sicut autem illud quod vivificat, intrat formaliter corpus et essentialiter in qualibet parte vivificat; sic quod vivificat animam effective sive causaliter est essentialiter in anima et in qualibet potentia animae. Hic autem est solus Deus, qui solus illuminat eam." Cf. Op. Om. II Sent. d. 28, a. 1, q. 1.

^{29.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 419; "Prius autem est gratiam creari per creaturam, quam subiectum esse gratiam informatum." — Cf. Sent. II, d. 28, a. 1, q. 1: "Ex quo enim homo nascitur, necesse est animam ejus vel esse perversam per culpam vel erectam per gratiam."

^{30.} The Seraphic Doctor offers the following explanation for the name "clavis excellentiae": "In hoc habet Christus excellere in quantum homo, in potestate dimittendi poenam, quia per se potest totum condonare." IV. Sent., 130, b.

^{31.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 130, b—: "Quaeritur, utrum Christo data sit potestas dimittendi peccata... Respondeo: Dicendum, quod, si hoc intelligatur de potestate effectiva dimitendi peccata, sic solius Dei est, non hominis... Si autem de potestate dispositiva, utpote per modum meriti; sic Christus meruit nobis dimittere peccata et quantum ad poenam et quantum ad culpam."

justice were God to condone sin entirely.32 Wherefore, after remitting guilt and eternal punishment, God still holds the penitent liable to temporal punishment. It remains true that the Atonement of Christ was sufficient to merit complete removal of the total debt incurred by the accumulated sins of all mankind, but anyone who sins after receiving Baptism does not deserve to go unpunished.33 It is in the power of the priest to remove this third obstacle.34 The key to which this power is attached is called the clavis ministerialis and is derived from the clavis auctoritatis through the clavis excellentiae. Subordination, then, is to be noted among the keys: the priest can effect nothing towards the remission of sin except through the Passion of Christ, and the Merits of Christ can be applied only to those whose guilt has been removed by God.35

Since temporal punishment is a consequence of sin, it may be called sin. So thought St. Bonaventure. The priest, therefore, by remitting temporal punishment, remits sin, and so fulfills the commission of Christ to forgive sin.36 A resume of the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on this point is to be found in his Commentary on the Gospel according to St. John. There he states that two things are to be taken into consideration in respect to sin, viz., guilt and punishment. God alone remits guilt effectively. Christ as man does so meritoriously, and the priest may be said to remit it dispositively. Both Christ and the priest, however, have direct power in the remission of punishment. But, whereas the power of Christ

^{32.} Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 363 b-: "Cum autem divina misericordia iustificat, remittit omnem culpam et reatum poenae aeternae, qui inseparabiliter adhaeret culpae. Sed quia misericordia non potest praeiudicare iustitiae, cuius est mala punire; ideo sic solvit a culpa et poena, ut tamen remaneat obligatus ad aliquantulam poenam aeternam." Cf. ibid. p. 965 b.

^{33.} To the objection that other media are superfluous if sins are deleted through the Passion of Christ, St. Bonaventure answers that the other media receive their efficaciousness from the Passion; moreover the Passion does not efficiently delete sin "nisi interveniant illa remedia," Bon. Op. Om. III, d. 20, q. 4. and III. d. 19,

al, q. 2. ad. 2.

34. Cf. note 24.

35. "Dicendum quod peccato duo considerantur, scilicet culpa et reatum poenae; culpam remittere solius Dei est effective, quia solius est dare gratiam, quae delet culpam; meritorie est Christi hominis; dispositive vero sacerdotis est, quia facit, quo facto, Deus remittit, conferendo scilicet Sacramenta. — Est autem alia remissione culpae. quantum ad poenam, et super hanc habet potestatem sacerdos, facta remissione culpae, et Christus-homo; sed potestas Christi-hominis est excellentiae et universalis, potestas vero sacerdotis est ministerialis et particularis. Et sunt hae potestatis ordinatae, quia sacerdos non habet effectum in remittendo poenam nisi per passionem Christi, nec rursus passio Christi alicui confertur, nisi cui Deus remittit culpam." Bon. Op. Om. VI, Commentarium in Joannem, 514. 36. Mt. 16, 19.

is excellent and universal, that of the priest is ministerial and particular.³⁷

VI. THE DOCTRINE OF ST. BONAVENTURE AND THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

If we consider the *potestas clavium* as an integral part of the Sacrament of Penance, which embraces contrition, confession, and satisfaction as the material element, and the sacerdotal absolution as the formal element, then it can be said that St. Bonaventure extended the power of the keys to guilt and eternal punishment, for he teaches that the total effect of the Sacrament is remission of sin both as to guilt and as to punishment. But, if we isolate the particular contribution effected *ex opere operato* by the *potestas clavium* towards this total remission, we are forced to admit that the keys remit only temporal punishment. Hence, there are not wanting authors who think that the Seraphic Doctor's teaching on the extent of the power of the keys falls under the condemnation of Trent. According to the Fourteenth Session of the Tridentine Council the following must be held:

Quamvis autem absolutio sacerdotis alieni beneficii sit dispensatio, tamen non est nudum ministerium vel annuntiandi evangelium vel declarandi remissas esse peccata: sed ad instar actus judicialis, quo ab ipso velut a judice sententia pronuntiatur.²

Canon 9, drawn up from the proceedings of the same Session reads:

Si quis dixerit, absolutionem sacramentalem sacerdotis non esse actum judicialem, sed nudum ministerium pronuntiandi et declarandi, remissa esse peccata confitendi, modo tantum credat se esse absolutum . . . A.S.³

^{37.} For a brief resumé of the doctrine of St. Bonaventure on the process of the remission of sin we quote from one of his sermons: "Primo propitiatur Deus et dimittit debitum propter vehementem dolorosae contritionis in affectu... Secundo propitiatur Deus et dimittit delicta propter diligentiam purae confessionis in effectu... Et quia, licet mediante ministerio sacerdotis peccata remittantur, et quia solus Deus est, qui effective potest dimittere peccata; ideo sequitur: 'Dixi Confitebor', id est, statim, ut proposui confiteri, etiamsi desit tempus et locus, ut homo non possit recurrere ad confessionem, eo quod in sola contritione remittuntur peccata... in tali casu tu, Deus, et non alius, remisisti impietatem peccati mei. Unde statim cum homo proponit confiteri, antequam confiteatur, Deus dimittit peccata. Unde ad confessionem contritus non tenetur propter deletionem peccati, sed tantum propter obligationem praecepti." Bon. Op. Om., Serm. de Temp. serm. 1, IX, 437.

^{1.} Cf. note 21, § 4.

DB 902.
 DB 919.

Pallavacino, the historian of the Council of Trent, says that the definition of the Council was not directed against St. Bonaventure, for his doctrine had already been condemned by the Council of Florence, where it is said that the effect of the Sacrament of Penance is the absolution from sins. Moreover, he states that the Council could not have used words less compromising to the doctrine of the Saint, because its purpose was to condemn those heretics who had distorted to a metaphorical sense the meaning of the evangelical words pertaining to the forgiveness of sin, and had thereby reduced the power of the keys to a perfunctory declaration of the remission of sins.⁴

The defenders of St. Bonaventure would have him escape all condemnation by the Council of Trent. To corroborate their contention they point to the fact that he teaches that remission of sin is not a consequent of contrition alone, but is dependent also upon the intention to confess; furthermore, that he permits the attrite to confess; lastly, that he holds sin to be forgiven in the Sacrament of Penance. Two texts are advanced to show that the opinion of the Seraphic Doctor does not differ from the doctrine of Trent. The first:

Haec dispositio (i.e. attritio) frequenter ob confessionem adjunctam et absolutionem sacerdotis formatur per gratiam, sive ad ipsam contritio subsequatur;8

the second:

Remissio peccati utroque modo (scil. quoad culpam et poenam) est res ipsius poenitentiae sacramenti. Quae aliquando tempore praecedit sacramentum exterius, aliquando autem in ipso sacramento efficitur. Quia quando aliquis accedit ad confessionem attritus, non plene contritus, si obicem non ponat in ipsa confessione et absolutione sibi gratia et remissio datur.⁹

^{4.} Pallavicino, Sforza: Istoria del Concilio di Trento, Faenza 1793, vol. III, l. XII, cap. XII, § 3. N.B. It is difficult to understand how St. Bonaventure falls under the condemnation of the Council of Florence for in his 22nd Distinction of the Fourth Book of Sentences he explicitly teaches that sin is remitted by the Sacrament of Penance both as to culpability and punishment. The Council simply says: "Effectus huius sacramenti est absolutio a peccatis." DB 699.

^{5.} Cf. note 34 § 4.

^{6.} Cf. note 44 § 4.

^{7.} Cf. note 21 § 4.

^{8.} Bon. Op. Om. IV. Sent. o. 446 a.

^{9.}

A glance at the contexts, however, reveals that St. Bonaventure is here contesting the theory which held that remission of sins always takes place outside the Sacrament of Penance, i.e., through supernatural contrition together with the proposal to confess. Hence, he contends that at times something towards the remission of sins can be effected within the Sacrament itself, and, indeed, by virtue of confession and absolution.

The word absolution in the theology of St. Bonaventure is not always to be construed as synonymous with the operation of the potestas clavium. The Saint speaks of a deprecative and of an indicative form of absolution; the keys, being an active power, are concerned only with the latter. Since the Seraphic Doctor teaches that in the remission of sin the priest conducts himself solely per modum deprecantis, it is obvious that he is not referring to the potestas clavium, when he writes that grace and remission is given in ipsa confessione et absolutione.10

The Quaracchi Scholiasts set much store on the fact that St. Bonaventure permits the attrite to approach the confessional. But they overlook the fact that he distinguishes definite states in the process of confessing,11 and that the penitent must be contrite when the potestas clavium goes into action, if he is to receive benefit from the absolution.12 In other words, the keys cannot operate effectively unless charity be present. If, then, the efficacy of absolution depends upon the presence of charity, it follows that charity cannot be the effect of absolution. On this point St. Bonaventure is very clear. He emphatically forbids anyone to confess unless he feels morally certain that he is contrite. Those who dare enter the confessional knowing that they are not in the state of grace incur the wrath of God. Those, however, who think they are contrite, whereas, in reality, they are only attrite, do not offend God by going to confession, but they do not acquire grace unless their attrition becomes contrition.13 This change is often brought about, as has already been explained, through confession and the deprecative absolution of the priest.14

^{10.} Ibid.

^{10. 101}a. 11. Op. Om. p. 447 ad 4. 12. 1bid. 13. Cf. supra p. 33. 14. Cf. supra p. 33.

But let us examine more closely the arguments which the Scholiasts present in IV, 473 of the Opera Omnia. First of all, they assert that Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure reject the opinion of those who say that the priest, since he only declares sins forgiven, has no power to bind or loose. This is to be conceded. Still, it is to be denied that these authors grant sufficient binding and loosing power to the priest to meet with the specifications of the Council of Trent. Nor does it avail to cite the words of Hales.

Solus Deus peccata dimittit, tunc quoque, quando sacerdos ab eo et per eum dimittit; ipse enim in homine fecit, quod per eum homo fecit.¹⁵

The phrase peccata dimittere, as used by Alexander, refers to punishment, a sequel of sin,16 and that is all that the priest remits ab eo et per eum. All that Hales wishes to convey is the idea that the remission of temporal punishment is also a dispensatio alieni beneficii.

The Scholiasts write:

Confessio et absolutio "valet ad deletionem culpae quantum ad eos qui se non praeparaverunt sufficienter omnino, et etiam poena quantum ad alios et ad multas utilitates,"

and are quoting St. Bonaventure IV. d. 17, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, 2. But here the Saint is speaking solely of confession, and the word absolutio does not occur. In the continuation of the text the Seraphic Doctor refers to IV, d. 17, p. 2, a. 1, q. 1, where among the benefits ascribed to confession we find listed: ad poenae diminutionem vi clavium.17 Effects which St. Bonaventure assigns to confession are wrongly construed as applying to the potestas clavium.

The Scholiasts insist that in order to ascertain what is effected precisely by the keys in the Sacrament of Penance the Bonaventurean principle of the causal influence of the matter and form of the Sacraments must be applied.¹⁸ According to the Seraphic Doctor the Sacraments, by divine ordinance, produce a moral disposition to grace, whereupon grace is created and infused by God

Cf. Bon. Op. Om. Sent. IV, 474 Scholion.
 Cf. Paulus, Nik., op. cit., I, 256.
 Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent. p. 437 b.
 Ibid. Scholion p. 475.

Himself. But this principle cannot be applied to the power of the keys, for, in the light of St. Bonaventure's contritionism, both the disposition to grace and grace itself must be present before the keys can operate.¹⁰

Under the heading "III" the Scholiasts try to explain away the words absolutio praesupponit gratiam, which St. Bonaventure uses in fixing the moment of operation for the keys. They write that the phrase expresses the facts correctly, for the priest, as the spokesman and herald of God, promulgates by the words of absolution the sentence of Him who is operating effectively; absolutio praesupponit gratiam is to be understood, either in the order of time, if absolution confers only gratia secunda to one who is already contrite; or in the order of nature, if it confers grace to one who is attrite.20 In other words, when the priest imparts absolution he is morally certain that God has either already given grace, or that He will now give grace because of His promise to confer it whenever the sacramental sign is placed. In the latter supposition, the interpretation of absolutio praesupponit gratiam is too forced and too subtle. And in either case the priest remains the vicarious promulgator of the sentence of another. Christ did not say: whatever thou shalt judge to be bound in heaven, thou shalt bind on earth, and whatever thou shalt judge to be loosed in heaven, thou shalt loose on earth." But that is the only legitimate interpretation of absolutio praesupponit gratiam.

The position of St. Bonaventure is not bettered by recurring to the text:

Plus potest unumquodque in re quam in solo proposito; si ergo in proposito potestas clavium delet culpam, quanto magis dum exhibetur in re ipso.²¹

In this place the Seraphic Doctor is arguing against the theory of St. Albert, who taught that the keys, by an anticipatory virtue, contribute to the deletion of sin in the very proposal to confess.²²

^{19.} Cf. p. 41 supra.
20. Bon. Op. Om. IV, 475 Scholion III: "Verba autem' absolutio praesupponit' recte dicuntur, quatenus sacerdos ut os et praeco Dei sententiam ipsius effective operantis promulgat verbis absolutionis; intelliguntur autem vel secundum ordinem temporis, si absolutio dat tantum gratiam secundam jam ante contrito; vel secundum ordinem naturae, si attrito confert gratiam."

ordinem naturae, si attrito confert gratiam."

21. Bon. Op. Om. IV, Sent., 473 b.

22. Ibid. For further refutation of the arguments of the Scholiasts confer Ruetten, op. cit. p. 78, n. 1.

It is an argument *ab absurdum*, and, transcribed, reads as follows: When sins are actually confessed, the power of the keys does not extend to the guilt of sin; *a fortiori*, it does not extend to guilt in the mere proposal to confess.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion it must be admitted that, according to St. Bonaventure, the power of the keys, considered precisely in itself, does not attain the notion of causality postulated by the Council of Trent. For it produces neither a right nor a disposition demanding that God infuse grace and remit sin. To the contrary, sin must have already been removed, and grace must be present before the potestas clavium can operate. It follows, then, that the priest can only declare sins to be forgiven, if by peccata the Tridentine Council means guilt before God. Only in the supposition that the removal of temporal punishment is equivalent to peccata dimittere does the Seraphic Doctor attribute remission of sins to the potestas clavium.

In defense of St. Bonaventure, it must be said that, even though he repeatedly avows that God Himself judges each penitent, and that the judgment of the priest is void nisi praecedat auctoritas Dei absolventis, still he holds the office of the confessor to be something more than a "bare ministry".23 Whereas the judgment of the priest may be merely declarative in so far as culpability is concerned — for he does not make a just man out of an unjust man — still, if condemnatory, the decision is binding, or, if absolvatory, it frees the penitent from liability to part of temporal punishment, and thereby confers a jus which did not exist before judgment was pronounced. Furthermore the learned Franciscan teaches: (1) that Penance is a true Sacrament; (2) that the effect of Penance is remission of sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment; (3) that confession is of divine origin and is necessary sub praecepto for the remission of sins and for reconciliation with the Church; (4) that contrition remits sins only when there is the intention to submit them to the power of the keys; (5) that the potestas clavium is a practical power, for it remits temporal punishment,

^{23.} D.B. 919.

effects reconciliation with the Church, and imposes sacramental satisfaction.

All things considered, it is well to agree with Pallavicino that, even though the doctrine of St. Bonaventure on the potestas clavium falls under the condemnation of the Council of Trent, his reputation is not dimmed in the eyes of the wise.²⁴ For there are other doctors of the Church whose writings on specific theological questions have been found at variance with subsequent ecclesiastical definitions. After all, the Saint who wrote: "fateor quod sum pauper et tenuis compilator," would be the last to claim for himself infallibility.²⁵

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^{24.} Pallavicino, loc. cit.

^{25.} Bon. Op. Om. Sent. I, 11, praeloc., n. 2.

MISCELLANEA

Franciscana Notes

GUTENBERG, THE INVENTOR OF PRINTING, SEEMINGLY A FRANCISCAN TERTIARY.

John Gutenberg, the inventor of printing, died a month or two before February 26, 1468, and was buried in the Franciscan church in Mayence, Germany. We have an unimpeachable document stating this fact in a book printed in 1499 at Mayence. James Merstetter, pastor of St. Emmeram's in Mayence since 1497, published in 1499 a kind of FESTSCHRIFT in honor of his former professor of philosophy at the university of Heidelberg, Marsilius ab Inghen. It is a slender pamphlet of forty-four pages, printed at Mayence by Peter Friedberg under the title: Oratio complectens elegantias oratorias. The text ends on page 42. To fill up the blank space left, short literary pieces were printed on page 43 which have no connection with the book as such. Thus James Wimpfeling's famous epigram on Gutenberg was printed on that empty space of page 43 beginning: Foelix auspicare and comprising six lines. Wimpfeling calls Gutenberg an immortal man who made Germany immortal, for in Mayence he has begun, illuminated by the Holy Ghost, to print books as first printer. Religion, Greek and Latin literature are heavily indebted to him. This epigram is preceded by the so-called epitaph on Gutenberg: D(eo) O(ptimo) M(aximo) S(acrum). Joanni Genczfleisch (Gutenberg) artis impressorie repertori de omni natione et lingua optime merito in nominis sui memoriam immortalem Adam Gelthus posuit ossa eius in ecclesia divi Francisci Moguntina foeliciter cubant. The words preceding ossa formed the real epitaph set up by Adam Gelthus in the Franciscan church in Mayence over the grave of Gutenberg. According to the custom of those days the epitaph was written on parchment or paper and pasted on a board; nothing elaborated was tolerated in the Franciscan church. To the epitaph Gelthus added the passage about the grave of Gutenberg in the Franciscan church in Mayence. Adam Gelthus was a relative of Gutenberg. Born in Eltville about the time of the death of Gutenberg, he was ordained priest and attached to the Chapel of St. Nicolaus in Eltville, dying about the year 1520. The booklet of Merstetter was published with recommendation of John Faust, priest, dean of the chapter of St. Victor and vicar general of the archbishop of Mayence, who contributed also some epigrams on the last page. With the positive approval of these three priests the so-called epitaph printed on the last page states that Gutenberg was the inventor of printing and that his body was enterred in the Franciscan church of Mayence and everybody could read this epitaph over the grave of Gutenberg in said church for centuries after. Probably Adam Gelthus had just then set up

the epitaph and the thing was a sort of novelty yet in 1499, so that he

thought to have the inscription printed as a sort of curiosity.

The burial of Gutenberg in the Franciscan church presupposes close connections between the inventor and the Sons of St. Francis. There was first of all a local connection. The Franciscan church was located just opposite the house, in which Gutenberg had printed his first books. There were also personal connections between Gutenberg and the Franciscans. The grandmother of Gutenberg was buried in the Franciscan church and since the year 1402 the Franciscans celebrated every year a Requiem Mass for the repose of the soul of Gutenberg's grandmother and her second husband (not Gutenberg's grandfather). So we can picture Gutenberg interrupting the printing of the Latin Bible in 1451 and 1452 on the day, when the anniversary Mass for his grandmother was celebrated; for Gutenberg was a pious man all his lifetime.

There were other connections with the Franciscans across the street. Before Gutenberg could bind the first copy of his Latin Bible he had to store up his printed sheets which formed a pile five hundred feet long, two feet deep and one hundred sheets high. In the walled-in city of Mayence storage room was a precious article. Therefore George Parker Winship (Printing in the Fifteenth century. Philadelphia, 1940, p. 19) thought Gutenberg may have stored up his printed sheets "in the basement chapel of a church, possibly one in the part of the city from which the worshippers had removed to a more favored development." The medieval churches did not need to be vacated to serve as a storage-room. The basement and the garret of churches were favorite hiding-places in times of war and served also the same purpose in peace time. So we may picture the sight how parts of the printed sheets of the Gutenberg Bible were carried over to the Franciscan church and monastery to be stored up for some time there. Neighboring other churches may have served also as storage rooms.

On November the 6th, 1455, court proceedings were brought by Fust against Gutenberg in the refectory of the Franciscan monastery, when Fust put his signature to the paper which made Gutenberg a beggar. The official document states that the Franciscan Friars were spectators of this

scene Gutenberg not having appeared in person.

The fact that Gutenberg was buried in the Franciscan church presupposes that he must have chosen this church as his burial place. Only such who expressed their wish to that effect could be buried in that church. Since the times of St. Bonaventure the Franciscans were counseled again and again to grant burial in their churches only sparingly. So only great benefactors were given the distinction of burial in Franciscan churches. Gutenberg who was always heavily in debts could not have been a great benefactor of the Friars. We can best explain the fact that Gutenberg was granted burial in the Franciscan church on the assumption that he was a member of the Third Order of St. Francis. Persons who had become Tertiaries were regarded in those days as RELIGIOUS and as such were exempted from the jurisdiction of their pastors, so that the Franciscans acquired a right to bury them and the secular clergy could not object (see Bull Sixtus IV of 1473, where he says that this opinion had been current and that he legalizes it). Accordingly the supposition voiced by Rev. Francis Falk in 1899 (Zur alten Topographie von Mainz, p. 14) that Gutenberg had been a Tertiary has much in its favor. The Franciscan church in Mayence was placed in 1577 in charge of the Jesuits and was torn down in 1742 and thus Gutenberg's grave has disappeared ever since. (Karl Schorbach in: Festschrift zum fuenfhundertjaehrigen Geburtstage von Johann Gutenberg. Leipzig 1900, pp. 127, 300-302, Franz Falk in Zentralblatt fuer Bibliothekswesen, vol. XVIII, 1901, pp. 209-214).

J. M. LENHART, O. Cap.

QUINONES BREVIARY A BEST SELLER.

Cardinal Francis Quinones, O.F.M. (died in 1540) is best known for his reform of the Roman Breviary. Entrusted by Clement VII with the task of revising the Roman breviary, he shortened it considerably by eliminating antiphons, versicles, little chapters, hymns and changing of lessons. Paul III approved the radical revision for private recitation of the secular clergy and in 1535 the first edition of Quinones breviary was printed in Rome and issued on March the first. According to the approval of Paul III. only secular priests who were very busy could use the new breviary after receiving a special papal dispensation. Soon, however, some theologians declared that a special papal dispensation was not necessary and many priests followed this opinion. The Jesuits received a special papal privilege to use this breviary on June 1545. In 1558 Pope Paul IV. stopped granting any new papal indults for the use of the Quinones breviary. The grantees of older privileges continued to use the breviary which was finally set aside by the bull Quod a nobis of Pius V. on July 9, 1568. Shortly before that date the last edition of the breviary of Cardinal Quinones appeared in print at Antwerp at the beginning of 1568. The printer of this last edition, the celebrated Christopher Plantin, issued in the latter half of 1568 three editions of the new breviary of Pius V. Opposition to Cardinal Quinones breviary was particularly strong in Spain. Yet despite all opposition the breviary of Quinones appeared in print at Salamanca in 1564. The greater number of editions of Quinones breviary were printed in Paris and Lyons in France. Other editions appeared in Venice and Rome in Italy, at Antwerp in Belgium, Cologne in Germany and Salamanca in Spain. In the course of forty-three years more than one hundred editions were printed with a total of 100,000 copies. Even in a number of collegiate churches the breviary was used in the public recitation in the choir. Although Cardinal Quinones breviary was superseded by the breviary of Pius V., his arrangement of the distribution of the whole psalter over a week was adopted in principle by Pius X. in 1911. In England Cardinal Quinones breviary has exerted an influence to this day having been used in compiling the Book of Common Prayer. A reprint of the Quinones breviary of the Antwerp 1537 edition was issued in London in 1908. It is noteworthy that the Antwerp edition of 1537 was printed by Michael Hillen van Hoochstraten who in 1526 had issued anonymously the first edition of the Protestant New Testament in English translated by Tyndale.

J. M. LENHART, O. Cap.

FRIAR JOHN SINTRAM OF WUERZBURG, O.F.M. (d. 1450)

Friar John Sintram of Wuerzburg is one of the many outstanding medieval Franciscan Friars who have been recovered from oblivion by modern scholars. Wadding does not mention this Friar at all. Parthenius Minges O.F.M. tells in four lines all he knows about him (Geschichte der Franziskaner in Bayern, Muenchen, 1896, p. 20), "Friar Sintram," he writes, "was famous for his learning, died in the odor of sanctity, was lector in various monasteries of Germany, France, and England, and left numerous monuments of his indefatigable zeal of copying books on vellum and paper." The extant manuscripts which he bequeathed to posterity furnish the proof that Friar Sintram was not only a great copyist but also a collector of books, writer of sermon-books, translator of Latin into German and of German into Latin, and composer of hymns. In 1405 Friar Sintram studied philosophy in Ulm, from 1406 to 1410 he studied theology at Strassburg and other places, in 1412 he lived in England where he copied two manuscripts at Oxford, then he resided for some time at Cologne, he spent from ten to fifteen years living successively at Reutlingen, Hall, Colmar and Esslingen, residing besides at Strassburg and Augsburg. About his residence in Paris no particulars are known. Friar Sintram was a speedy copyist crowding his text as much as he could using extremes of abbreviations, was an eager glossator and methodical collector of texts. In copying the "Fasciculus Morum," a treatise on the seven vices and virtues he omitted the English rhymes of the original and added German ones. He added two pages of drawings serving as a pictorial index showing 56 fruits on the trees of virtues and vices. The Latin hymn Septem gaudia Mariae he translated into German in 1415 from a manuscript which he had obtained in Cologne. He possessed also a manuscript of English rhymes. Some of the manuscripts were purposely kept unbound, so that any part of them might be taken out and used in the classroom and pulpit. Sintram had a predilection to intersperse his manuscripts with German verses, mostly translation of the Latin poems occuring in the transcribed texts and occasionally free compositions which have no connection with his texts. The references in which he quotes the literary sources used, run sometimes up into the hundreds in one work. Nearly all the sermons of the Princeton manuscript, whether composed by Sintram himself or borrowed from others, were copied as outlines rather than as finished sermons, and ample directions are given how additional material can be found elsewhere. Friar Sintram was fond of quoting the legal texts from canon law, the penitentials and the glosses; even in his oldest extant manuscripts he uses the systems of abbreviations current in canonistic writings. In 1444, six years before Friar Sintram's death, sixty manuscripts which he had copied or collected were transferred to the library of the Conventual Friars at Wuerzburg, to be installed (and chained) on four desks. Miss Dorothy K. Coveney has traced nine manuscript codices written in the hand of Friar Sintram in the following libraries: 1. Miscellaneous treatises, written at Ulm in 1405, at London (University College, MS. Lat. 4), 2. Theological Treaties, written about 1444, at London (British Museum, MS. Add 30049). 3. Miscellaneous treatises and Exempla, written at Reutlingen in 1415, at London (British Museum, MS. Add. 44055). 4. Hugo de S. Victor, De vanitate

mundi, S. Bonaventure, Itinerarium mentis in Deum et alia, written at Oxford in 1412, at Leeds (Brotherton Library), 5. De Incarnatione filii Dei, written at Strassburg in 1408, at Wuerzburg (Conventual Monastery, MS. I, 86). 6. Vocabularia herbarum, written at Esslingen in 1422, at Wuerzburg (Conventual Monastery, MS. I, 87). 7. Die 24 Alten, written at Schwarzenberg in 1435, at Berlin (Preussische Staatsbibliothek, MS. germ. 4°. 559). 8. Fasciculus Morum et alia, written at Oxford in 1412, at New York (Pierpont Morgan Library MS. 298). 9. Sermones et alia, written at Reutlingen in 1415, at Princeton (University Library MS. Sintram, Garrett gift). The first manuscript is described in detail by Miss Coveney in A descriptive catalogue of MSS. in the Library of University College, London, 1935. The second and third manuscripts are described briefly in: Robert Priebsch. Deutsche Handschriften in England Bd. II: Das Britische Museum. Erlangen 1901. The fourth is described briefly in I. A. Symington, A catalogue of ancient manuscripts and early printed books in the Brotherton Library, Leeds, 1931, pp. 4-5. The 8th and 9th manuscripts are described in detail by Rev. Theodore C. Petersen, C.S.P., of the Catholic University, in Speculum, vol. XX, Cambridge, Mass., 1945, pp. 73-82. (Note. I am indebted to the Rev. Professor Theodore C. Petersen of the Catholic University for a list of the Sintram manuscripts (Letter of August 26, 1945) and for a reprint of his study in the Speculum).

J. M. LENHART, O. Cap.

FRANCISCAN PUBLICATIONS

The following annual Franciscan Bibliography is a departure from the previous quarterly list in several respects. It was hoped to combine the material that appeared during the past year into one annual listing. But due to the fact there was such a wealth of literature of Franciscan interest it was decided to restrict the bibliography to those items which may be of particular help to the scholar and scientist. Hence it was felt reluctantly necessary to omit many of the more popular type of articles. This should not be taken as a reflection on fine work being done by Franciscan Clerics whose ability to write is clearly evident in the various magazines published in the several Clericates. It is hoped, at some future time it may become possible to publish an all-inclusive bibliography of articles by and about Franciscans or of Franciscan interest, to be published as a Supplement to Franciscan Studies.

Included in this Bibliography the reader will find a number of items that were published previously to 1946, some of them going back to the early war-years. Due to the world-conflict many of the foreign publications and periodicals did not come to the attention of the compiler until more recently. It is hoped to eliminate such older items in future listings, restricting them to the ones that appeared the previous year.

The entire Bibliography includes Books and Periodicals in the fields of Theology, Philosophy, History and Others of Franciscan interest. Dissertations and Pamphlets have also been added, followed by Items of interest to Franciscans.

The Editors of FS would appreciate receiving a copy of every publication by Franciscans or on Franciscan subjects which should be listed in the proposed Bibliography.

Suggestions for the improvement and greater usefulness of this section are invited by the compiler,

> Fr. Irenaeus Herscher, O.F.M. Librarian.

St. Bonaventure College, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.

PERIODICAL ABREVIATIONS

- The Americas (Washington, D.C.)
 - American Academy for Jewish Research (Philadelphia)
- AAJR - Art Bulletin (New York City) AB
- AER. — American Ecclesiastical Review (Washington, D.C.)

AF - Archivio di Filosofia (Rome)

- Archivo Ibero-Americano (Madrid) AIA

- Anales de la Provincial Franciscana del Santa Evangelio An de Mexico (Covoacan, Mexico)

Ant - Antonianum (Rome)

AOM - Acta Ordinis Minorum (Florence)

B - Brotéria (Lisbon) C — Culture (Québec)

- Catholic Biblical Quarterly (Washington, D.C.) CBQ

CLW Catholic Library World (Scranton)
 China Monthly (New York City) CM CS - Cruzeiro do Sul (Petropolis) CW - Catholic World (New York City)

DR — Dublin Review (Dublin)

DT — Divus Thomas (Piacenza, Italy) E Ensayos (El Paso, Texas)

ECO — Eastern Churches Quarterly (Ramsgate)

ESC - L'Enseignement secondaire au Canada (Montréal)

- Franciscan Herald and Forum (Chicago) FHF FS — Franciscan Studies (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.) FSSC -- Franciscan Social Study Club (Burlington, Wis.)

FvL - Filosofia y Letras (Mexico City)

HPR - Homiletic and Pastoral Review (New York City) - Harvard Theological Review (Cambridge, Mass.) HTR

- Italica (Menasca, Wis.)

- Illinois Catholic Librarian (River Forest, Ill.) ICL

IER - Irish Ecclesiastical Record (Dublin)

IF — Ideales Franciscanos (Guadalajara, Mexico) IR - Interracial Review (New York City)

— Itinerarium (Buenos Aires) IT

JRI - Journal of Religious Instruction (Chicago)

L — Lumen (Lisbon)

LTP - Laval théologique et philosophique (Québec)

Lu — La Lucerna (New York City)

- The Missionary Academia (New York City) MA

MQ — Musical Quarterly (New York City) - The Modern Schoolman (St. Louis) MS

- Missionary Union of the Clergy Bulletin (New York City) MUCB

P

The Priest (Huntington, Ind.)
Provincial Annals (Holy Name) (New York City) PAHN - Polish American Studies (Orchard Lake, Mich.) PAS

PASB — Provincial Annals (Santa Barbara) (Santa Barbara, Cal.) - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (Buffalo) (* PPR RACH - Records of the American Catholic Historical Society (Philadelphia)

- Reader's Digest (Pleasantville, N.Y.) RD REB — Revista Eclesiastica Brasileira (Petropolis) RFN — Rivista di filosofia Neo-scolastica (Milan) - Review for Religious (Topeka, Kan.) RR

- Rivista Rosminiana (Pallanza, Italy) RRo

RTFR - Round Table of Franciscan Research (Marathon, Wis.)

S - Speculum (Cambridge, Mass.) SF - Studi Francescani (Firenze, Italy) SJR - Social Justice Review (St. Louis)

SMHE - St. Meinrad Historical Essays (St. Meinrad, Ind.)

T Traditio (New York City)Thought (New York City) Th To - The Tower (Columbus, O.)

V - Verbum

VP - Vozes de Petropolis (Petropolis)

- Verdad v Vida (Madrid) V v V

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COMMENTARY

UNIVERSITY RECORDS AND LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

When studying the Masters of the Middle Ages seldom do we get a glimpse at their personal life and their environs. Yet such knowledge, especially as to the conditions of their academic career, the institutions in which they worked and the regulations to which they are submitted is not only highly desirable, but also at times absolutely necessary for a correct understanding of their writings, the development of their ideas, and oftentimes for the understanding of the technicalities of the very language used by them. We can hardly expect information from the Scholastics about all these things which were to them common knowledge. We, however, who have lost contact with the civilization of the Middle Ages, and are always tempted to project our way of life and thinking back upon the organizations of the Middle Ages, have to turn to chronicles, letters, official documents and art that we may learn to see the medieval man in his environment. For this reason Lynn Thorndike, the well-known Professor of History at Columbia University, in the present volume has collected many records appertaining to medieval scholastic life. Though the items come mostly from official documents, several are from letters and personal accounts.

In spite of its dry content — as most official documents always will be dry — a discerning reader will easily detect behind the many regulations, condemnations of errors, exhortations and warnings, the real life of Medieval learning, and he cannot but admire its highly developed organization. He will discover the true internationalism of medieval intellectual culture, freed from the interference of ministers of education and sheltered by the very catholicity of the Christian Church. He will notice that education in the Middle Ages had at least a plan, and that it had definite standards which were not according to the vacillating opinions of men, but according to the Truth which is God. One thing he certainly cannot deny: that intellectual culture was highly valued and for that reason safely privileged by the Church. Yet, too, many a modern reader of these documents will find new evidences of the "slavery" to which the Church has held the human mind, but we cannot omit reminding him that even our own liberalistic era seems now no longer a thing of the present. The humiliations visited upon it in Europe have been its undoing. Furthermore, while the Church of the Middle Ages and of always knows a freedom from error, liberalism knows mainly a freedom for error.

Such reflections will come to the mind of the reader as he makes even a casual persusal of the many records collected from the *Chartularium Parisiense* which constitute the bulk of the selections. Other Universities, however, are not neglected. Some personal accounts, mainly of Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury, add liveliness to the picture. The translator has also chosen some documents (five) which were not yet edited; one of them, a very lengthy one, is presented also in its Latin text.

University Records and Life in the Middle Ages. By Lynn Thorndike. Number XXXVIII of the "Records of Civilization — Sources and Studies," Austin P. Evans, Editor. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. Pp. xviii+476. \$5.50.) The presentation follows the chronological order, starting with Abelard and ending with the middle of the seventeenth centruy. All educational fields are covered by texts, and likewise all phases of the academic life. Even the manufacture and sale of manuscripts is represented. For the benefit of the reader an appropriate arrangement of survey has been made by the author on pp. xiv. An additional Index of names and matters helps to locate items in which the reader is especially interested. Explanations and bibliographical data precede the individual documents and a few footnotes of further explanation are added. At the end we find two appendices, one is the edition of the *De commendatione cleri*, which is the longest single item in the whole work; the other is an essay on the colleges of Paris, accompanied by a plan of the Medieval Paris south of the Seine. We consider especially the last one a very useful addition.

There are of course more records available and other selections possible. But Thorndike's choice seems to be quite appropriate. It gives us at least an idea of that Medieval University-life which was considered officially standard in the Middle Ages, and occasionally it gives us a glimpse of the men who lived this life. The picture is neither brightened nor darkened. Though the choice, arrangement, and translation deserve praise, nevertheless, the translator and editor have not always shown a sufficient acquaintance with the philosophical and theological thought and language of the Middle Ages. A few times this has lead him, astray. As we are most interested in documents which have some bearing on Franciscan scholasticism we have studied those more carefully and were occasionally rather disappointed. We would like, therefore, to submit a few suggestions or even corrections, not for the sake of criticism, but with the hope that they will merit the consideration of those using this very illuminative work, and possibly be of value in the editing of a new edition.

Record No. 78, p. 195 f. has the title: "Occamist Errors Reproved." This important document has been discussed in a recent article by the present reviewer. (Franciscan Studies, pp. 275ss.) We are glad to discover that the translation in the book under review is more in accordance with our own interpretation than that advanced by other scholars. However, there is one mistake in the translation and at least one inadequate rendering. The expression found in the original document falsa secundum suppositionem personalem terminorum does not mean, as the translator renders it "false according to one's own personal interpretation of its terms." Supposition in this connection has nothing to do with interpretation and "personal" has nothing to do with a human personality; it is a technical term that must be understood in distinction to simple and material supposition as regards the logical function of signification Personal supposition simply means that a term in a proposition stands for and signifies the thing that it signifies.

A little further on we read in the document:

Item, quod nullus dicat scientiam nullam esse de rebus quae non sunt signa, id est, que non sunt termini vel orationes, quoniam in scientiis utimur terminis pro rebus, quas portare non possumus ad disputationes. Ideo scientiam habemus de rebus, licet mediantibus terminis vel orationibus. (Chartularium Univ. Par. p. 506).

This is translated as follows:

Also, that no one should say that there is no knowledge of things which are not signs, that is, which are not terms or expressions, since in the sciences we use terms for things, albeit by means of terms or expressions. (p. 196).

It seems that the translator has taken the term scientia in too loose a manner or sense, viz., "knowledge" and "science" as synonymous. However, the terms notitia (knowledge) and scientia (science in the medieval sense) should be distinguished. We must not forget that this document is directed against Occamists, and they certainly took scientia in the sense of a true proposition, as, by the way, the whole tenor of the document likewise presupposes. I do not know any scholastic who has denied that we have knowledge of things without having knowledge of terms, or who has maintained that all our knowledge is of terms only. The issue concerns only propositions which, or the collection of which, is a science. Strictly speaking only the conclusion of a demonstration is a science. As regards such a science the problem as to whether we have science of things or of terms arose. Certain Ockhamists apparently maintained that "science" is of terms alone, and refused to make a distinction. The masters of the Faculty of Arts implicitely at least demand such a distinction, viz. the distinction between mediately and immediately, since they state: "Therefore we have science of things, albeit by means of terms or expressions," It so happens that this is in accordance with the teachings of Ockham himself:

Scientiam esse de aliquibus est dupliciter: vel quia sunt partes propositionis scitae, vel quia sunt illa pro quibus partes conclusionis supponunt. Primo modo scientia non est de rebus extra sed de aliis rebus... Sed secundo modo scientia est de rebus extra, quia subiectum et praedicatum propositionis, quamvis non sint una res, tamen supponunt pro eadem re; et iste modo est de rebus extra, hoc est termini propositionis scitae supponunt pro re extra. Ordinatio d. 27, q. 3. AA. Cf. also: "The prologue to Ockham's Exposition of the Physics of Aristotle," edited by Gaudens Mohan, O.F.M., in Franciscan Studies 5 (1945), 243 ff.

The most important document, by Thorndike, published for the first time, seems to be No. 81 (translation) and Appendix I (text-edition). The title of the original is misleading in so far as it does not show that this interesting tract really contains a medieval discourse on education, dealing even with such modern topics as the location of schoolrooms, the physical and psychological condition of the pupils and even sport (ludi). It was composed before 1365 and subsequent to Ockham, since he is mentioned by name. The manuscript, the only one available, is of the fifteenth century. Through the courtesy of Columbia University we were able to use a photographic copy of this Vatican manuscript. We had asked for a copy since we hoped that certain defective parts in the edition could be remedied by the use of the manuscript. Unfortunately the manuscript itself appears to be defective and hence an edition based on such a manuscript has its peculiar difficulties. We could convince ourselves that the editor has often used prudent judgment and frequently shown his skill in deciphering the not always easy writing. Nevertheless, we have also convinced ourselves that the edition and the translation are not always as careful as could be desired in the case of so important and unique a document. Furthermore, the punctuation adopted in the edition is rather arbitrary, frequently confusing, and certainly not consistent. The same is to be said about the spelling. Neither the punctuation nor the spelling of the manuscript itself is consistently kept, as the editor intended, even in cases where it would have been preferable to that adopted by him.

The following corrections are suggested (either as misreadings or printing errors) in the text itself without regard to the punctuation and

spelling:

p. 409, l. 12, clerus for clericus; p. 409, l. 15, nonnulli for nonnulle; p. 409, l. 25, asserunt for asseruntur; p. 410, l. 20, dii for dei; p. 410, l. 25, dicuntur for dicultur; p. 410, l. 26, proprie for quippe; p. 410, l. 28, clericus spiritum dei vivi for clerus spiritus dei vim; p. 411, l. 7, mons for mens; p. 411, l. 9, felicium for felicum; p. 411, l. 17, quid for quidem; p. 411, l. 28, argento for argumento; p. 412, l. 39, commederunt for commedunt; p. 413, l. 12, Sicut for Sunt; p. 413, l. 37, quod for quid; p. 414, l. 16, prospiciat for perspiciat; p. 414, l. 18, quoniam for quantum; p. 415, l. 34, hee for hec; p. 415, l. 35, econverso for econtrario; p. 416, l. 18, hominis domus (thus corrected by "a" and "b") for domus hominis (which gives a different sense!); p. 417, l. 7, atque for et; p. 417, l. 19, fluvium for flumen; p. 419, l. 8, tamen for cum; p. 419, l. 23, symoniaco for symoniace; p. 420, l. 19, enumeratorum for enunciatorum; p. 422, l. 3, suxit for suit; p. 422, l. 12, eas for causas; p. 422, l. 21, commetitur (which makes good sense!) for come(n)titur; p. 423, l. 28, hoc for hunc; p. 423, l. 34, exaravit for exoravit; p. 425, l. 21, veluti for velut; p. 425, l. 40, permollitur for permovitur; p. 426, l. 2, repetitoribus for repetitionibus; p. 426, l. 25/26, congregare for congregari; p. 426, l. 37, pulchritudinis for pulchritudinum; p. 427, l. 19, luculentius for lutulentius; p. 427, l. 28/29, connititur or convicitur for cognititur; p. 428, l. 7, buculicorum for buculitorum; p. 428, l. 32, Supple (which makes sense) for supple(visset); p. 429, line 6, recte for recta; p. 429, l. 11, Supple for Suple(e); p. 429, l. 27, Supple for Suple (?); p. 429, l. 37, et for ac; p. 430, l. 22, adversus (thus corrected by the scribe) for adversum; p. 431, l. 3, (immorari) for minorari; p. 431, l. 18, soloetizant (or: soloetizant) for soloetizant; p. 431, l. 25, etiam for etenim; p. 433, l. 25, sanctam for sanctem.

It seems that the world supple which is freely used by scholastics, especially when explaining texts, was not understood. It usually means to

add something for the understanding.

The translation of this text does not always show the errors mentioned above, partly because it does not render the text too literally into English. In general it gives a fair idea of the content but cannot be used safely without a prudent and critical use of the Latin text. A few examples,

one of which concern Franciscans, may illustrate our warning.

On page 203 we read: "For what is sleeping amid the clergy except their resting in the midst of all the extremes of human activity? For all human virtue consists in observing the mean between two evils, as I have elucidated when monastic life allowed." The two underlined expressions seem to be incorrect. The first should read: "of the extremes of all human activity (agibilium)." The second, we have to admit, is difficult; yet we do not believe that the author intended to speak of free moments in his monastic life, but rather of a work on Ethica monastica, that is on Ethics in the modern sense which deals with the Ethics of the Individual (monasticus) and not of the house or family (Ethica oeconomica) or of the city or state (Ethica politica); these are the divisions of the Aristotelean and scholastic Ethics. There is no evidence, as far as we could see, that the author was a monk.

On the same page we encounter a criticism of Scotus: "Those moreover in scholastic life exceed the mean who invent certain conceptibles outside the soul which they themselves deny to be things but represent as intrinsic modes of things or surely formalities of things. And these men place a plurality of such formalities in God contrary to the fact that the supreme absolute is found in Him." The Latin text of the last sentence reads: "et in deo hii talium formalitatum ponunt pluralitatem praeter hoc quod summa simplicitas collatur in eo." In the manuscript we have clearly collatur that follows a tollatur which was canceled by dots. I am convinced that the original tollatur should be retained; since the scribe evidently experienced difficulties in distinguishing the "t" from the "c", he finally decided in favor of the latter. Then the meaning would be: "And these men place a plurality of formalities in God, but not so (preater-except) that the highest degree of simplicity is taken away." What collatur means is not clear to us. The translator apparently took it for collocatur. At any rate, the problem is the reconciliation of a formal distinction in God with the highest simplicity of God. Unfortunately the word "simplicity" is translated with 'absolute."

On page 204, first paragraph, the translation does not show clearly that the author is using metaphors taken from medieval Astronomy (for instance: non exorbitant nec a centro veritatis ad circumferentias inanes declinant). Hence we suggest for the translation of the following phrase, Hii sunt felicissimi virorum quibus hoc solis proprium est ut hominum regant universum — "These are the happiest of men, who possess this property of the sun to rule the universe of men" instead of "to whom alone it is appropriate to rule the world of men."

At the end, on page 235, the translator overlooked the fact that a famous quotation occurs in the text: "It is the error which the abbot Joachim incurred and it is condemned as to the supreme Trinity and catholic faith in the first of the decretals." The Latin text reads (p. 433): "Error est (in should be added as sound conjecture) quem incidit abbas Ioachim et reprobatus de summa trinitate et fide catholica primo decretalium." The part italicized by us is merely a quotation of Canon Law which occurs quite

frequently in scholastic texts.

The quotations of the author are verified in the footnotes of the translation. They are in general very useful. Footnote 25 (p. 212) is not correct. Grosseteste's commentary does exist in a printed edition; Ueberweg-Geyer, Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie, 11th edition, (Berlin, 1928), on page 359, enumerates eight printed editions (from 494-1552). It is interesting to note that on page 422, lines 36-37, Siger of Brabant is quoted: Dices forsitan mihi quod nil tibi de miraculis dei cum de naturis rerum disseras. The whole chapter XI (p. 429) is a paraphrase of St. Bernard's discussion of the various aims of scientific work.

In conclusion let us hope that our critical comment will benefit a future edition of this extremely valuable work.

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FRANCISCANA NOTES

The Benjamin Franklin Library, Mexico City has outlined its "work in prospect" in the May, 1946 number of HAHR (page 281-2). Included is a project of particular interest to Franciscan Scholars. Termed "Series D" in the outline is a project devoted to Franciscan Papers in the National Library, and in the National Museum of Mexico. Plans are under way for the microfilming of this rich source of Franciscan history.

According to an official report made in August, 1945, the Franciscan archives of Manila and vicinity were destroyed during the conflict just

ended.

A reply to Father Francis Borgia Steck's volume *The Jolliet-Marquette Expedition* appeared in *Mid America*, XXVIII (July, 1946), 173-194, and is to be continued.

A special number of the periodical Cruzeiro do Sul is devoted and dedicated to Alexander of Hales. It is the May, 1946 issue.

According to the Acta Ordinis Minorum, LXV (Maii-Junii, 1946),

110, "Jubileum Martis Alexandri Halensis Parisiis celebratum."

Millions call him Father is the title of a new film on Brother Peter of Ghent, O.F.M., founder of Mexican schools. It is available on rental basis from Mrs. Fanchon Royer Gallagher, 1558 Vine Street, Los Angeles, California; according to an announcement in FHF (July, 1946), 224.

The Academy of American Franciscan History has opened its new

quarters at Bethesda, Maryland, on Thursday, October 10, 1946.

Among the articles of Franciscan interest to be found in the recently published cumulative index to *Thought*, XXI (June, 1946) are: Saint Francis and Freud; St. Francis in Literature; and St. Francis of Assisi, His Literary Significance.

According to the March, 1945 issue of Scott's Monthly Journal one of the Ten Best Designs of stamps for 1944 was the one printed in Commemoration of Brother Michael O'Clery, O.F.M., one of the Four Masters.

According to a scholarly 48-page article in the April, 1945 issue of Catholic Historical Review, by Rev. Charles H. Metzger, S.J. the fact that the first officially appointed chaplain of the U.S. Army was a Franciscan is confirmed. The author mentions that Father Louis E. Lotbiniere (but fails to mention that he is of the O.F.M.) is also the only Catholic Chaplain of the Revolutionary War.

A new Franciscan Seraphic College has been dedicated and inaugurated at Lima, Peru. It is attached to the age-old monastery of San Francisco Solano, where the Apostle of South America lived and died, and which may rightly be called the "Cradle of Missionary Activity in South America." The new building was dedicated by His Excellency the Most Rev. Fer-

nando Cento, Papal Nuncio to Peru.

The first publication of a new Bibliographical series to be published under the auspices of the Academy of American Franciscan History will be entitled Calendar of documents in the Santa Barbara Mission Archives, and is scheduled to appear shortly. Rev. Maynard Geiger, O.F.M. is the editor of this volume.

The February, 1946 issue of *Ideales Franciscanos* carried the Obituary of R. P. Pascual Ruiz, O.F.M., noted Franciscan author and historian, who died at Aguascalientes on January 1, 1946 after a short illness.

The Conventual Friars in Rome have started publishing a Piccolo Biblioteca Francescana (A Little Franciscan Library). Two numbers have already appeared: La Via Crucis della vita interiore, by Fr. Leo Veuthey, O.F.M., who also wrote: L'Unione a Christo nell' ascetica francescana.

The Rev. Roderick A. Molina, O.F.M., of the Academy of American Franciscan History delivered a lecture before the Institute of Ibero-American Studies at Catholic University. His subject was: "Spain: a survey of Four Years." The Rev. Francis Borgia Steck, O.F.M. is Vice-Director of the Institute.

In September, 1945 there was opened at the University of Montreal an Institute of Family Studies sponsored by the Department of Philosophy. The direction of the Institute has been entrusted to the Franciscan Fathers, with Rev. Dr. Hervé Blais, O.F.M. director.

A Special Number of the scholarly Studi Francescani was dedicated to St. Bernardine of Siena, the centenary of whose death was commemorated throughout the Franciscan world. Almost 400 pages are thus devoted to the subject in SF XVII (Gennaio-Decembre, 1945), and Vita e Pensiero, 1945.

ITEMS OF INTEREST

Back numbers of *Sanct Fidelis*, provincial publication of the Swiss Capuchin Province, have recently come to this country. They show that literary activity was by no means stifled during the war years among the Swiss friars.

Outstanding among new publications by them are two important works by the Most Rev. Bishop Hilarin Felder, O.F.M. Cap.: General und Erzbishof P. Bernhard Christen von Andermatt (1837-1909) und die Erneuerung des Kapuzinerordens, and Der Christusritter aus Assisi. The latter is a supplement to his Die Ideale des hl. Franziskus, which recently appeared in its fifth German edition. A French translation of Der Christusritter was immediately made by R. P. Paul-Marie, under the title Chevalier du Christ au Pays d'Assisie.

Of special importance is the three-volume work Compendium Introductionis in S. Scripturam by two Fathers of the Province. Father Idlefonsus Ayer wrote the two volumes Introductio generalis in universam Scripturam and Introductio specialis in libros Veteris Testamenti; Father Peter Morant completed the work with his Introductio specialis in libros Novi Testamenti. As volume VI of Biblische Beiträge, the latter also wrote Die Zukunftserwartungen des Neuen Bundes. Father Heribert Jone completed his threevolume work on Canon Law with his Gesetzbuch des Kanonischen Rechtes: III. Prozess und Strafrecht. Rather thorough studies are Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung. Ihr Recht und Unrecht im Lichte der Scholastik by Father Clodoald Hubatka, Das Absolute in Hegels Dialektik. Sein Wesen und seine Aufgabe by Father Calixt Hoetschl, and Theophrastus Paracelsus by Father Idlefons Betschart. Father Candide Clerc's Le bienheureux Apollinaire Morel, Capuchin Martyr is a new study of 1945. Another very thorough study is Die Dienerin Gottes, Mutter M. Theresia Scherer by Father Veit Gadient. It was also published in French by Father Paul-Marie d'Albeuve. Die socialen Ideale des hl. Franziskus von Assisi was translated by Father Burkhard Mathis from the book of Father James Meyer, O.F.M.

Some of the following booklets on sociological, ascetical and devotional subjects are also important: Father Armand Salamin, Les empêchements au mariage en droit canonique et en droit suisse; Father Benoît-Joseph Bickel, Religion et Sport; Father Faustin Pittet, Die Stellung der Kirche zur Eugenik und Rassenbygiene; Father Konstantin Roesch, Die Offenbarung

des bl. Johannes.

Sanct Fidelis, XXXI (1944), pp. 131-132, reports that on May 2, 1944, Father Gaudentius Koch, member of the Tyrolese Capuchin Province, died in the Swiss friary of Naefels. He had reached the age of seventy-seven, and had been a priest for fifty-three years. Father Gaudentius was known throughout the German-speaking countries for his many hymns to our blessed Lady, which were arranged for music by some of the best-known composers. He was the author of many popular works on religious subjects and contributed articles to various periodicals. One of his books, a life of Mary in verse, saw eight editions. In 1939 he came to Switzerland for his health, which did not permit him to return to his province. He will be remembered as the poet of Our Lady.

BOOK REVIEWS

(All books received will be listed in Franciscan Studies under the title of Books Received; books to be reviewed shall be left to the judgment of the editors.)

Sanctity in America. By the Most Rev. Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate to the United States. Third Revised Edition. (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1945. Pp. xxvi+244. \$2.00.)

Those who welcomed the first edition of Sanctity in America will be even more pleased with this third, revised and enlarged, edition. The Preface brings the data on the processes of beatification and canonization up to June 29, 1945. Throughout the book the bibliographies have been revised and augmented. New names have been added to the martyrology, in conformity with the list sent to the Holy See by the committee designated by the archbishops and bishops at their meeting in 1939. The biographies of Archbishop Charles John Seghers and Sister Miriam Teresa Demjanovich have been written for this edition.

It is not necessary to add to the encomiums bestowed upon the author by the reviewers of the first and second editions. The Most Reverend Apostolic Delegate has immortalized his name in American Church history through his interest in the holy persons of our country. He has demonstrated that the United States and the neighboring countries are really a "land of opportunity" for those who are interested in striving after sanctity, and need not be a sterile plot of materialism. We are most grateful to His Excellency.

THEODORE ROEMER, O.F.M. Cap.

St. Lawrence College, Mount Calvary, Wis.

Light from the Ancient Past. By Jack Finegan. (Princeton University Press, 1946. Pp. xxxiii+500. \$5.00.)

There are hundreds of books and reports on archeology treating on different projects or groups of objects, but none of them written in English came to the notice of this reviewer, that was as extensive and comprehensive as this archeological backgroung of the Hebrew-Christian religion. The American author received his theological degree at the University of Berlin. He became a minister of the Disciples of Christ and is at present the director of religious activities at Iowa State College in Ames. The book covers archeological discoveries relating to the period between 5000 B. C. and 600 A. D.

The volume may be divided into two parts: before and after Christ of about equal length. The pre-Christian period in four chapters treats of the following material. Ch. I. Mesopotamian Beginnings: treats under 7 subtitles among other things on the early and pre-dynastic period, early villages, the Flood (5000-2800). The early Dynastic Period, the first Dynasty of Ur, the old Akadian and Gutian periods (2800-2070 B.C.). The Neo-Sumerian period, Gudea, and third Dynasty of Ur, and the

Elamite and Amorite invasions (2070-1830 B.C.). The first Dynasty of Babilon, Code of Hamurabi, Epic of Creation and Abraham (1830-1550 B.C.). It is truly marvelous how much these recent discoveries contribute to the understanding of the historical parts of the Old Testament and confirm it in almost every instance.

Ch. II brings a panorama of Egypt in 8 sub-divisions. Among other things, we are told about the pre-dynastic periods (000-2900 B.C.), the 30 following dynasties, Moses and the Children of Israel (2900-332 B.C.). During these periods, the reconciliation between the popular and scriptural

names was difficult.

Ch. III. Penetrating the Past in Palestine, brings in two subdivisions the findings from Stone Age up to the late Iron age (5000-300 B. C.) and the excavations and discoveries relating to Hebrew times. The coming of the Israelites, Jericho, Jerusalem, Samaria, etc. hold predominant places. Ch. IV has ten subdivisions concerns itself with the empires of Western Asia, in particular with Assyria, Chaldea and Persia. It begins with the Kassites and ends with the successors of Alexander the Great (1650-330 B. C.). This chapter with its wars, destruction of cities, Transplanting of nations, captivity, slave labor, wholesale executions, destruction of civilization and uprooting of commerce, industries and governments, reminds the reader of some of the present post-war conditions. The ancient Oriental mind, although well knowing the difference between good and evil seems to have turned again to practices the flourished four or five milleniums ago as if Christianity had brought no change at all. Some centuries hence, archeologists may add chapters on the decline of Western civilization. In this first part of the book the present reviewer found nothing to criticise from a religious or historical viewpoint. There are some problems not fully cleared up by archeological finds but this lies in the nature of the subject and cast no reflection whatever on the author.

According to our logical division, the second part begins with the time shortly before and during the time of Christ. In five subdivisions, Chapter V deals with the Rise of Rome (735 B. C. - 478 A. D.), the Maccabees (168-63 B. C.), Herodians (63 B. C. - A. D. 70), Highpriests, Pretorians. Sacred ways and sites, especially those closely connected with Christ, and the later days of Jerusalem. This chapter throws light on

Hebrew conditions at the birth and death of the Redeemer.

Chapter VII depicts the decline of Jewish Christianity and follows St. Paul on his travels and reords the archeological findings in the cities along the routes. It ends with the martyrdom of Sts. Peter and Paul in Rome. Here it is surprising to see the author reverse the names of the Apostles to Paul and Peter, which notwithstanding some similar grafiti discovered is against all traditions. This blunder, however, seems to prepare for statements found in the following Chapter VII dealing with a large number of biblical papyri found in the sands of Egypt. In the introduction to this chapter the author writes about the world-wide transformation which certain passages of Paul's letters brought about. He cites as examples St. Augustine, Luther and Wesley (p. 305). The world-transforming effects were indeed great, but not such as maintained by the author. St. Augustine read the Scriptures as explained by the infallible magisterium of St. Peter, his successors, the visible vicars of Christ in the visible Church,

the only One founded by Him. St. Augustine became a Saint. Luther (and all the great apostates and Schismatics) rejected this magisterium, employed their own interpretation and caused the religious disorders of to-day. Luther did not become a saint but a thoroughly bad man, as his Tischreden published during his life-time fully substantiate. These deplorable consequences are perfectly natural. The Holy Spirit was given in His fulness to the Apostles and Christ's Church exclusively and lastingly. Hence, all those who have separated from the unity of the Church, have separated from Christianity and are no longer guarded and guided by the Holy Ghost. This fact also delays conversion. Two forces are working at present. One preserves the tranquility of order in the faith, the other one tries to multiply and perpetuate the existing disorders outside the Church of Christ, but

is now rapidly disintegrating and reverting to paganism.

Why the author purposely introduces poison into his otherwise splendid book, baffles the reviewer since archeological finds give no basis for controversy. He moreover, takes up the same point in following chapters. In Chapter VIII on the Catacombs, he draws the conclusion from a few inscriptions reading "Paul and Peter" that the early Christians made no distinction between the standing of the two Apostles, but he does not refer to the majority of inscriptions giving the precedence to Peter as liturgical tradition did from the very beginning. In the concluding Chapter VIII dealing with ancient churches in all Christian regions, the author expresses his astonishment that the original Church of St. Peter far outdistanced that of St. Paul outside the walls. As an excuse he gives that there was no room, although they made room some years later. It is certain that both Apostles were always highly venerated by both Hebrew and Gentile Christians, but these Christians knew that although Paul worked most extensively, Peter was the rock upon which Christ built His Church and was the official bearer of the infallible magisterium which was to last until the end of time. The author quotes throughout the book from Godspeed's American Version of the Bible. Works of Catholic Archeologists are but rarely quoted.

In addition to the material outlined above the finely printed and well-made book contains 204 apt and clear illustrations (unpaged), 6 maps and 4 ground plans, a list of Scripture texts quoted and a good general

index.

KILIAN J. HENNRICH, O.F.M. Cap.

Our Lady of Sorrows Friary, New York 2, N.Y.

Mariology. By M. J. Scheeben. Translated by T. L. M. J. Geukers. Vol. I (St. Louis: Herder Book Co., 1946. Pp. XXXIV+252. \$2.50.)

Today we must reckon Scheeben among the classic theologians. His three major contributions to theology — The Glories of Divine Grace, Mysteries of Christianity, and Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik — are outstanding for their orthodoxy as well as originality, for their depth of thought and exactness of expression. Among all the treatises of Scheeben, his treatise on the Blessed Mother is said to hold first place. A scholar of Scheeben has styled it "ein Herzstueck Scheebenschen Denkens."

His Mariology is distinguished by the four charasteristics found in all his works. 1. He grounds it on the solid rock of Sacred Scripture and of Tradition. He specialized in getting back to the thoughtfull doctrines of the Fathers - and he was well-versed in them. 2. He sought to put coherence into the truths of Christianity, as is clearly evident and profoundly exemplified in his Mysteries of Christianity. So, too, his Mariology is not a conglomeration of disparate truths, but an architectonic temple with a sure foundation and a central theme. 3. He is a master of speculative theology. In Mariology, as elsewhere, he displays his genius at original thinking about the ancient truths. And perhaps nowhere does he surpass the originality of his Mariology. 4. His writings all breathe a spirit of piety and even mysticism. He always stands in reverent admiration before the works of God. Rightly, then, the Mother of God calls forth his greatest admiration, piety and love. It is the heart of a child pushing the pen of a master theologian to tell of the glories of Mary all that the human mind can grasp and fathom.

Scheeben treated of the Blessed Virgin at length only in his ponderous volumes on dogmatic theology. That makes his Mariology inaccessible to many. Moreover, Scheeben was not always so happy in putting his thought into clear, readable language. Since the centenary of his birth in 1935, scholars are publishing some of his treatises separately and in more readable language. Such is, for example, Fechte's Die Braeutliche Gottes-Mutter,

of 1936.

The volume under review is the first of an English translation of the Mariological theses of Scheeben. It will make it possible for many more of the clergy, and perhaps even educated laymen, to become acquainted with and appreciate Scheeben's richness of thought in regard to the Mother of our Redeemer.

The Reverend Translator introduces us into the Mariology of Scheeben with an interesting thirty-four page preface, in which he speaks of Scheeben as a student and theologian, and especially on his central and basic truth of Mariology. The body of the work is divided into three parts, treating in order the concept and sources of Mariology, the Christological foundations of Mariology, and the basic principle of Mariology. The second section is inserted here from the treatise on the Sonship of Christ. It includes a discussion of the virginal conception and motherhood, on perpetual virginity, on the divine motherhood and on the bridal motherhood. This last point, to which the other points tend, is developed as the basic principle of Mariology. By the motherhood of Mary Scheeben understands not merely that Mary was the mother of Jesus in a material way, but that she was so also in a spiritual sense in that she consented to the conception of Jesus, the God-man, who gave Himself to her. This exalted doctrine might well be pondered by those who are attempting to prove that Mary was ignorant of Jesus' divinity until later in life. By bridal motherhood Scheeben means that the Blessed Mother was the bride of the Eternal Word, who gave Himself to her prior to her maternal action of begetting Jesus by divine power. In fact, Scheeben maintains that there is no solid reason why she was not actually this Bride of the Eternal Word from the first moment of her immaculate existence. Mother she became at the Annunciation. Through this grace of bridal motherhood Mary was really made holy

to God and pleasing above all other pure creatures. This bridal motherhood is the basic idea from which all other truths about Mary can be deduced. It is the basis of all of Mary's other dignities. In this it is parallel to the hypostatic union in Christ. To appreciate this important element in the

Mariology of Scheeben, one must read Scheeben.

Steeped as he was in the thought of the Fathers, Scheeben had not difficulty with the great Mariological texts of Scripture. For him Gen. 3, 15 speaks of Jesus and Mary. In the Apocalypse (12, 1) St. John draws from Mary the features for his vision of the Church. In these few words Scheeben gives the correct interpretation of that passage, unlike the rationized exegesis of some Scripture scholars who refuse to see Mary in that picture. Again, the angelic greeting "Full-of-grace" he rightly claims, expresses Mary's fullness of sanctifying grace as well as that unique and basic grace of bridal motherhood; just as Christ's fullness of grace includes His grace of union and sanctifying grace. Lastly, his exposition of Wisdom as including Incarnate Wisdom and also Mary who is inseparably united with Incarnate Wisdom in the decree of God and actually, is thoroughly patristic.

On page 127 a foot-note should have been added stating that Scripture scholars hold that Mary and Joseph were merely espoused, not married, when Christ was conceived at the Annunciation. The marriage was solemnized only after Joseph was introduced by the Angel about Mary's

virginal conception.

We who are interested in seeing Scotistic thought get a fair hearing, regret that Scheeben was not better acquainted with the writings of Blessed Scotus, who holds his own among Mariologists of all times. He could then have quoted him sometimes for other purposes than just to refute him; at least he could have referred to him when giving the bibliography of

Marian writers in the beginning.

Mariology was translated from the Flemish translation of Scheeben's Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik. Considering Scheeben's oftentimes cumbersome language, it is a difficult task to translate him. There are places where the translator might have departed still more from the German combination of phrases. The bottom paragraph on page 152 is a poor rendition of the original. And there are a good many such passages where the translation is not precise enough. Compare, for instance, the translation of chapter 8 with the German.

The technical English word for "merere" in the theological sense is "merit" not "gained". We say "consubstantial" not "co-substantial". In at least one place only the Greek words are given; the average priest would appreciate the English equivalents at least in parentheses. There are some

printing mistakes in Greek and English words.

We hope this translation will win for the great Scheeben still more admirers, and followers. We anxiously await the second volume. But could we hope that the *Mariology* of Scheeben be put into one volume. From the reader's and scholar's viewpoint two volumes are useless and inconvenient.

DOMINIC UNGER, O.F.M. Cap.

Capuchin College, Washington, D.C. Ozdoba Padwy czyli Ascetyczno-Biograficzne Rozprawy o Swietym Antonim z Padwy. Napisal Przew. O. Norbert Zonca, S.T.D., S.T.M., D.P., Franciszkanin Zakonu Braci Mniejszych Konwentualnych. (Buffalo, N.Y., Franciscan Fathers, OFM Conv., St. Anthony of Padua Province, 1945, Pp. XV+270.)

A discussion of Saint Anthony, the Wonderworker of Padua, will always prove to be a source of interest, particularly in these days in which the Holy Father has conferred upon him the Doctorate of the Church. The graces gained and the wonders wrought through his intercession to this very day are as varied as they are numberless. The texture of Father Zonca's book is woven of ascetical reflections to which a strong mixture of biographical data has been skillfully added. The author, rather than follow a chronological sequence has grouped his matter into four lengthy chapters consisting of fifty-two topics and writes in what may be termed a "point and counterpoint" style, in which the Saint is, of course, the dominant note contrasted against or blended with a variety of pious reflections. The style of the book though concise on the whole, does now and then, glitter with bits of flowery language, due no doubt to the author's enthusiasm for his subject. It is this lively spirit that carries him on and often away. However, who is there that can seriously write of St. Anthony in a minor key?

The amount of material is vast and can be easily whipped into short "fervorinos" of the type that are usually preached during Tuesday devotions in his honor. The book is written in the Polish language and consequently will be a welcomed addition to Polish Hagiology, which has suffered so very severely during the recent war. Another interesting feature of this work is its large number of fine half-tone illustrations. There is also a short, though select bibliography and a topic index. The author has also added a supplement in the nature of a Perpetual Novena to the Saint. The general make-up of the book is excellent and far superior to that

generally found in books of this type.

As among other nationalities so also among the Poles the devotion to Saint Anthony is deeply rooted and since the subject has never been overwritten Father Zonca's book should find a welcomed place in every Polish library.

MATTHEW JOSEPH BARAN, O.F.M. Conv.

St. Bonaventure's Novitiate Lake Forest, Ill.

Medical Ethics For Nurses. By Charles J. McFadden, O.S.A., Ph.D., (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., 1946. Pp. XIII+356.)

The title of this very worth-while book is more restricted than its contents, for besides the principles of ethics for nurses, it properly contains the moral teaching of the universal Church. The author rightly has no intention to restrict the various topics discussed to the purely ethical and natural level. He explains the nature of Ethics in detail because his approach is primarily, but by no means exclusively, a rational one. The moral ideals of the Christian nurse should certainly be molded on the Revealed Word of God and the teaching of Christ's Church, as well as on the dictates of

reason. Therefore the author utilizes thruout both reason and Revelation. There is another restriction in being addressed to nurses, for it is a good book to place in the hands of upright conscientious doctors, chaplains, and hospital officials (even though these have peculiar problems of their own). The book is intended to help produce the truly Catholic nurse. A Catholic Training School which would confine itself to the purely secular aspects of nursing would be quite forgetful of the very reason of its existence. Such a training could be had in any community hospital.

The nursing profession is so full of complex moral problems, that the catholic girl should be trained in a Catholic hospital where besides a course in religion, which would not supply the moral education required by the nurse, there should be specific medical ethics, and I doubt if there is a better text than this. Its contents should be the right and possession

of every Catholic nurse.

A nurse should be reliable, diligent, and conscientious in the care of bodily ills, but her duty does not stop with the care of the body, for since the soul is more important than the body — the eternal salvation of a man depends on the state of his soul at death — the nurse has a duty in this respect. If she builds her character on the teachings in this book and lives up to them she will make the most of her opportunities, and become Christlike and worthy of her high dignity and exalted profession. The first five chapters present a very satisfying presentation of such topics as: the nature of Ethics, and its value for the nurse, the patient, and the profession itself; the foundation of morality (natural law, conscience, the moral act, its types, the two-fold effect principle); the nature of Christian marriage; contraception; and the safe period.

The sixth section, together with the foreword written by Fulton Sheen, make an excellent treatise on the Catholic philosophy of suffering. The next four chapters treat of direct abortion, therapeutic abortion, indirect abortion, and ectopic gestation. These chapters are truly masterful, and evidence sound doctrine, skilful application of principles, and much experience. There is clarity of concept, presentation, and application. A further chapter on "Assistance at Immoral Operations" is likewise a masterpiece of elucidation, and precise use of the twofold effect principle in evaluating the material cooperation of nurses in various procedures and operations

which are immoral.

There are also adequate chapters on the sacrament of Baptism; sterilization; truthfulness and professional secrecy; and the Last Sacraments. The author implements his book with an appendix and an index. The former includes among other items, a treatise on the non-Catholic patient; the Moral Code of Catholic Hospitals; and the Ten Commandments. This grand work is much enriched by the addition to each chapter of a bibliography indicating chapter and pages relevant to the topic treated; and furthermore there are interesting practical problems for discussion.

Dr. McFadden is to be complimented for championing the newer and better opinion that the tube in ectopic gestation is in a pathological condition long before rupture, and that therefore it is allowed under certain conditions to excise it before waiting for the rupture or the danger of a fatal hemmorhage. The author mentions that some reputable moral theologians permit for a grave cause the extraction of seed, by needle and without

any sexual pleasure, from the testicles of a husband for implantation into the cervical canal of his wife. But the intrinsic reasons of these few authors seem to lack any intrinsic probability. The proponents of this procedure cannot satisfactorily answer the objections of the many theologians who maintain that this method is sinful. The marriage would not be consummated for this requires carnal sexual intercourse as canon 1015 teaches. Were these proponents correct, then our accepted notion of invalidating impotency and its relation to sterility would be overthrown. The right given in marriage is to intercourse — the object of the consent — and married people have no more right to use this method than single people. There are other major obstacles to this method, and Noldin has these strong words to say of it: "I maintain against a few who think otherwise, that this method is sinful and illicit. I hold this without any hesitation or doubt." (De Matr. n. 382.) This kind of artificial insemination is being done too much and it is a pity for Catholics to resort to it for it is a much disordered and unnatural procedure.

Suggestions for a future edition. Emphasize more the relations of supervisors of operating rooms to the superiors of hospitals regarding sinful operations; the strict duty of religious superiors and chiefs of staff in this regard; the cardinal importance of having chief doctors who are not only upright and sincere, but who possess the knowledge of our moral teaching; something about habitual states of mind and mental nervous diseases as hindrances to accountability for conduct; something about the use of sacramentals and indulgences in nursing; the care of the dead body, and the disposal of a dead foetus and amputated members of the body; and autopsies; and the contractual relationship and its effects between

nurse and patient.

This book is a bright beacon and guide in our day when immoral operations are on the increase, and the teaching in medical school and universities are more and more at variance with the law of God as known by the authoritative moral teaching of the Catholic Church, and as a result many conscientious doctors are not correctly informed and think this or that operation is permissible. Hence the necessity of Moral Codes implemented by the teaching of Reason and Revelation.

BARTHOLOMEW TIMLIN, O.F.M., J.C.D.

Washington, D.C.

Discovering Plato. By Alexandre Koyré. Translated by Leonora Cohen Rosenfield. Foreword by Irwin Edman. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945. Pp. ix+119. Index.)

This little volume by the French philosopher Alexandre Koyré does not attempt a full exposition and criticism of Plato's philosophy. It has been written primarily to help modern readers and students of philosophy to use Plato's own writings, since the author is convinced that "In the midst of the crisis that shakes our world to its very foundations, Plato's message is laden with teachings that deserve reflection." (page 111). The merit of the book lies principally in the author's approach to Plato. Convinced that Plato is not studied more widely because modern readers do not appreciate the philosophic dialogue which is his characteristic vehicle, M. Koyré devotes the first part of the book to an analysis of the dialogue

as Plato uses it especially in the so-called "Socratic" works. The author admits that the dialogues are a valuable lesson in method, but he maintains that each one has a definite doctrinal content. In spite of the apparent inconclusiveness of the discussions carried on by Socrates and his interlocutors, there is a definite conclusion in each case. It is "not a conclusion formulated by Socrates, but one which the reader-auditor is in duty bound and is in a position to formulate." (page 6). This follows from the dramatic nature of the dialogue. The drama demands the active cooperation of the spectator who must draw the correct conclusions from the action that unfolds before him. So also the Socratic dialogue demands the active cooperation of the "reader-auditor" who must draw the correct conclusion from the discussion at which he is present. This emphasis on personal effort in the "reader-auditor" is, according to M. Koyré, closely bound up with Plato's teaching on the nature of philosophical knowledge. Since Plato holds that truth is discovered in the soul by personal effort, "the difficulty inherent in the dialogue, incompleteness, the need for personal effort, is not a defect in Plato's eyes, but an advantage." (page 7). Further, since Plato held that philosophy is accessible only to the few, the difficulty in the dialogue "constitutes a test, and allows for differentiation between those who understand, and those, doubtless the majority, who do not." (ibid).

To illustrate these principles regarding the dialogue, M. Koyré devotes an essay to each of the three most dramatic Socratic dialogues, the Meno, the Protagoras and the Theatetus. Limiting his study to the problem of the relationship between knowledge and virtue, the author very skilfully places the reader in the position of an actual witness to the dialogue and helps him to follow its development step by step, until a definite conclusion is reached. Much in the treatment of these dialogues deserves commendation. M. Koyré gives evidence of a clear grasp of Platonic thought, and his insight into the mentality of Socrates' interlocutors and their modern counterparts adds greatly to the reader's understanding of the dialogue. It is refreshing, too, in these days of subjectivism, to read his able exposition of Plato's defense of objectivity in thought and morals. Several points are, however, open to criticism, principally the fact that the author is too inclined to accept Plato's solution without any qualifications. He holds with Plato that philosophical science and reason is "the apprehension of being in its essence, structure and relations," but he is inaccurate in making the general statement that "science is intuitive knowledge that nobody can instill in us." (p. 31, note 14). In his discussion of the nature of virtue, the author does not distinguish between intellectual and moral virtues, whereas this distinction would help to clarify the problem of "teaching" virtue. He also overemphasizes the intellectual content of moral virtues. Knowledge and moral virtue are by no means identical, as M. Koyré seems to hold when he writes: "In modern terms, virtue implies a scale of values and is naught but the knowledge of this scale; virtuous conduct necessarily results from knowledge of the good, since for Socrates, as for Spinoza, to know, to judge and to act are all one." (page 24).

The second part of the book, "Politics," is devoted to the problem of the relation between politics and philosophy as found principally in the Republic. M. Koyré defends the position that for Plato the philosophical and political problems are one and the same, since good government can

come only through statesmen who are truly philosophers, and the true philosopher alone is fit to rule. The author vindicates Plato of the charge of state worship and points out that in the "just city" of the Republic, it is not the state, but the man that matters. In the just city, a just man like Socrates can live without fear of being condemned to banishment or death, while in the imperfect (and therefore unjust) cities, human liberty is restricted or even completely denied. Plato's philosophy of education is presented at some length, with emphasis upon the thesis that "knowledge alone justifies the exercise of power, justifies it and at the same time carries with it the moral obligation to exercise it" (page 84). The author's comparison of the tyrant state of Plato with the modern dictatorship is very well done. He does not hesitate to point out that the causes of decay described by Plato are at work in our own political life. The author's treatment throughout this section is on the whole better than his treatment of the problem of knowledge and virtue. The strength and weaknesses of the treatise are those of Plato himself. Plato indeed recognized the defects in the educational and political systems of his time, and analyzed the basic defects with a considerable degree of exactness. His faulty teaching on human nature, however, makes his educational and political philosophy fundamentally untenable. Again, we can agree with Plato and M. Koyré when they warn us, "Do not restrict yourself to training them [future citizens] for a specific job, trade or function; moral education, respect for truth, devotion to the city is what makes good citizens." (p. 111), but we cannot agree that philosophy is the sole source of such benefits. It is regrettable that M. Koyré makes Plato's own mistake of placing the supreme value in philosophy: "It is from and through philosophy alone that salvation can come." (p. 69). Not philosophy, but the religious reform which Plato himself advocated as the first basis of sound education, will be able to bring about some measure of justice in the state. Apart from the fact that philosophy knows nothing of the supernatural dignity and destiny of man and cannot provide any effective remedy for concupiscence, it fails on another score, namely, it is limited to the few. This is especially true of the Platonic concept of philosophy. The reform of society can be accomplished only by a reform of morals through a return to the principles of Christian living. Social reform must be based upon the principles of Christ, which are accessible to all and alone can effectively change man's way of living.

The author's style is vigorous and lively, reminiscent of Plato's own. The translation from the original French by Leonora Cohen Rosenfield is very well done. A detailed index is appended to the text. While the author purposely avoided burdening the book with formidable footnotes, it would have been very helpful had he indicated the exact passages from Plato which are discussed. This would make it easier to read Plato himself in conjunction with M. Koyré's commentary.

Teachers and students who already have a foundation in Scholastic philosophy, will find in this book a very searching study of the method of Plato, and a stimulating discussion of his educational and political philoso-

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
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
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